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Förord 
År 2006 deltog jag som andraårsstuderande på ett seminarium vid Tammerfors 
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riksdagsval. Som tur var, drog kursens hållare Sami Borg mitt namn ur hatten. 
Kursens andra hållare, Heikki Paloheimo, introducerade senare skiljelinjernas 
fascinerande värld för mig i egenskap av handledare för min avhandling pro 
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Jag vill tacka min handledare, professor Kimmo Grönlund, för att du gjorde så 
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gästforska i Göteborg och Uppsala. Både språkmässigt och vetenskapligt var 
dessa vistelser viktiga och gav mig dessutom många fina minnen.  
Jag vill tacka universitetslektor, docent Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen för hennes 
enorma hjälp, kommentarer, villkorslösa engagemang, sporrande och stöd under 
avhandlingsprocessen. Idéer har utvecklats ännu bättre med mysiga 
kanelbullepauser emellanåt! Tack för att du alltid har haft tid för mig.  Du är en 
viktig mentor och god vän, Elina! 
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Jutta uppmuntrade mig att bara prata modigt, och hon tyckte att det var roligt att 
få en kollega med rötter i (och kanske också karaktär från) Östra Finland. Dessa 
fyra år har inte enbart handlat om att utveckla mig som forskare, utan det har 
också gällt att bli en modigare människa. 
Jag har njutit av tiden vid akademin eftersom jag har upplevt så mycket och 
fått många fina nya vänner. Jag vill speciellt tacka Inga, Maria och Sarah för alla 
roliga och uppiggande stunder! Jag har också haft möjligheten att träffa trevliga 
kolleger i Vasa. Särskilt givande har det varit med seminarier där jag träffat andra 
doktorander som arbetar på sina egna avhandlingar: hälsningar speciellt till Janne 
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Många kolleger har bidragit till att jag har kunnat utveckla avhandlingen vidare. 
Härmed vill jag tacka dem som gett mig sina synpunkter inom Finlandssvenska 
forskarskolan och det allmänna forskarseminariet, samt på seminarier i Göteborg 
och Uppsala. Alla dessa har hjälpt mig att förtydliga logiken med skiljelinjer. Jag 
vill tacka mina förgranskare, direktör och docent Sami Borg och 
universitetslektor, docent Maria Oskarson för värdefulla synpunkter som gjort 
manuset bättre. Dessutom tackar jag Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland och 
Rektor vid Åbo Akademi för stipendier under åren 2014 och 2015.  
Omistan ison kiitoksen äidille ja isälle kannustuksesta. Into opiskelua 
kohtaan, usko omiin voimavaroihin ja itsensä kehittäminen monipuolisesti 
kumpuavat kotoa. Rehulasta ja Saimaan aalloilta on voinut ammentaa vankan 
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min far (Tuure Westinen 2003): 
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                    Hengähdät hetken 
Katsot taakse 
     Ja katsot eteen 
Vuosien läpi 
näet elämän saaren 
Tajuat heti 
    vaistoat heti 
Kantaa ystävyys               
pitkän kaaren                
Tammerfors, den 3 september 2015 
          Jussi Westinen 
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Abstract 
 
Cleavages have been central in understanding the relationship between political parties and voters 
but the credibility of cleavage approach has been increasingly debated. This is because of decreasing 
party loyalty, fewer ideological differences between the parties and general social structural change 
amongst other factors. By definition, cleavages arise when social structural groups recognize their 
clashing interests, which are reflected in common values and attitudes, and vote for parties that are 
dedicated to defend the interests of the groups concerned. This study assesses relevance of cleavage 
approach in the Finnish context. The research problem in this study is “what kind of a cleavage 
structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century? Finland represents a case that has 
traditionally been characterized by a strong and diverse cleavage structure, notable ideological 
fragmentation in the electorate and an ideologically diverse party system. Nevertheless, the picture 
of the party-voter ties in Finland still remains incomplete with regard to a thorough analysis of 
cleavages. In addition, despite the vast amount of literature on cleavages in political science, studies 
that thoroughly analyze national cleavage structures by assessing the relationship between social 
structural position, values and attitudes and party choice have been rare.  
The research questions are approached by deploying statistical analyses, and using Finnish 
National Election Studies from 2003, 2007 and 2011as data. In this study, seven different social 
structural cleavage bases are analyzed: native language, type of residential area, occupational class, 
education, denomination, gender and age cohorts. Four different value/attitudinal dimensions were 
identified in this study: economic right and authority, regional and socioeconomic equality, 
sociocultural and European Union dimensions. This study shows that despite the weak overall 
effect of social structural positions on values and attitudes, a few rather strong connections between 
them were identified. The overall impact of social structural position and values and attitudes on 
party choice varies significantly between parties. 
Cleavages still exist in Finland and the cleavage structure partly reflects the old basis in the 
Finnish party system. The cleavage that is based on the type of residential area and reflected in 
regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions concerns primarily the voters of the Centre Party 
and the Coalition Party. The linguistic cleavage concerns mostly the voters of the Swedish People’s 
Party. The classic class cleavage reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 
concerns in turn first and foremost the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance and the Social 
Democratic Party, the agricultural entrepreneur voters of the Centre Party and higher professional 
and manager voters of the Coalition Party. The conflict with the most potential as a cleavage is the 
one based on social status (occupational class and education) and it is reflected in sociocultural and 
EU dimensions. It sets the voters of the True Finns against the voters of the Green League and the 
Coalition Party. The study underlines the challenges the old parties have met after the volatile 
election in 2011, which shook the cleavage structure. It also describes the complexity involved in the 
Finnish conflict structure and the multidimensionality in the electoral competition between the 
parties.  
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Abstrakt 
Skiljelinjer är centrala när det gäller att förstå relationer mellan politiska partier och väljare, men 
man har debatterat om huruvida de fortfarande kan bidra till förståelsen om vad val handlar om 
idag. Skiljelinjer uppstår när socialstrukturella grupper identifierar gemensamma intressen. Dessa 
återspeglas i värderingar och attityder, och leder till att man röstar på ett parti som representerar de 
gemensamma intressena. På grund av sjunkande partilojalitet, minskande ideologiska skillnader 
mellan partier och en generell socialstrukturell förändring, har relevansen av skiljelinjer emellertid 
blivit ifrågasätt. Det centrala forskningsproblemet i denna studie är således: ”hurdan är 
skiljelinjestrukturen i Finland i början av 2000-talet?". Finland representerar ett fall som 
traditionellt har haft en stark skiljelinjestruktur, och vars partisystem uppvisar flera ideologiska 
dimensioner. Trots detta råder det en brist på studier i vilka man systematiskt undersöker 
skiljelinjestrukturen och där man använder en definition av skiljelinjer som består av tre element: 
social struktur, värderingar/attityder och partival.  
Undersökningens data utgörs av nationella valundersökningar från åren 2003 till 2011, och de 
statistiska analyserna består av principalkomponentanalys samt lineär och logistisk regression. I 
studien analyseras sju olika socialstrukturella grunder till skiljelinjer: språk, typ av boningsort, 
samhällsklass, utbildning, religion, kön och generation. Fyra olika värde- och attityddimensioner 
kan identifieras i den finska väljarkåren: ekonomisk höger och respekt för auktoritet, regional och 
socioekonomisk jämlikhet, den sociokulturella dimensionen och EU-dimensionen. Studien visar att 
det finns enskilda starka samband mellan socialstrukturella positioner, värderingar och attityder 
och partival. Trots detta förklarar alla socialstrukturella variabler bara en tiodel av variationen i 
värderingar och attityder. Den sociala strukturens, värderingarnas och attitydernas förklaringskraft 
beträffande partival varierar mycket mellan finländska partier.  
Skiljelinjer existerar fortfarande i Finland. Skiljelinjestrukturen återspeglar den gamla basen i 
det finska partisystemet. Den skiljelinje som grundar sig på typen av boningsort och som reflekteras 
i dimensionen av regional och socioekonomisk jämlikhet, sätter främst Centerpartiets och 
Samlingspartiets väljare mot varandra. Denna skiljelinje är speciellt karakteristisk för Finland i 
jämförelse med andra länder. Språkskiljelinjen berör främst väljarna av Svenska Folkpartiet. Den 
gamla skiljelinjen baserad på samhällsklass uppstår mellan arbetare som röstar på vänsterpartier, 
jordbruksföretagare som röstar på Centerpartiet och högre tjänstemän som röstar på 
Samlingspartiet. Denna skiljelinje återspeglar olika intressen gällande omfördelning och 
decentralisering. Studien identifierar också konflikter som kan ha potential att utvecklas till 
skiljelinjer. Mest förklaringspotential finns det i konflikten som baserar sig på social status, både när 
det gäller samhällsklass och utbildning. Denna konflikt ställer lågutbildade mot högutbildade på 
den sociokulturella dimensionen och EU-dimensionen. Studien lyfter fram de utmaningar som de 
gamla stora partierna har mött efter det volatila valet 2011. Därtill beskriver studien också 
komplexiteten i den finländska konfliktstrukturen och mångdimensionaliteten i tävlingen mellan 
partier.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In political science there is an ongoing discussion on the credibility of cleavage 
approach in grasping what party politics is about and what elections are fought 
over nowadays. Simply put, cleavages arise when social structural groups 
recognize their clashing interests and vote for parties, which are dedicated to 
defend the interests of the groups concerned. It is of little doubt that the classic 
cleavages, based on social class, religion, land-industry-tension and ethnicity, 
played a major role in the establishment and stability of West European party 
systems. The ties between parties and social structural groups were close, which 
was manifested in a high degree of party loyalty.   
In the last few decades, there has been a clear reduction in the significance of 
cleavages, due to a decrease in voter loyalty deriving from a social structural 
position, a decrease in ideological disputes between political parties, and due to 
social structural transformation at large. The credibility of the cleavage approach 
in political science has been further eroded due to the notions of parties 
becoming more similar ideologically and no longer representing the interests of 
certain social structural groups, instead seeking votes wherever they are to be 
found, as well as the notions of voters becoming more individualized in their 
electoral behavior, being less attached to parties and being increasingly affected 
by short-term effects. 
In light of the above, the current state of affairs appears to be ill-fitted for 
analyzing the present party-voter ties in cleavage terms. However, despite the 
individualization of electoral behavior and parties broadening their electoral 
appeal, the idea of parties having the ability to reflect  institutionalized, group-
based conflicts in the electorate still has importance; the question being whether 
cleavages still capture the dynamics in the relationship between parties and 
voters.  
The aim of this study is to evaluate the continued value of the cleavage 
approach when focusing on contemporary Finland. Finland represents a case that 
has traditionally been characterized by having, inter alia, a strong and diverse 
cleavage structure (see Lijphart 1984; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005), reflecting 
 2 
 
several issue dimensions, having notable ideological fragmentation in the 
electorate (Paloheimo 2008) and having an ideologically diverse party system 
(Bengtsson et al. 2013). Finland matches the general West European pattern in 
the sense that its party system was anchored to major cleavages and conventional 
party families by the 1920s. In Finland, however, social structural transformation 
and modernization took place in a later stage, rapidly so in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Karvonen 2000; 2014), which accentuates the peculiarity of Finland in the long 
run.  
The stability of the party system continued with some exceptions until the 
1960s. However, from the 1970s onwards, voters became especially more mobile, 
ideological grievances became less pronounced and new parties emerged to 
challenge the old ones (ibid.). While the old basis of the party system that was 
established already at the beginning of the 20th century still remains at the 
beginning of the 21st century, totally new parties have also emerged, which appear 
to have stabilized their position in the party system. Nevertheless, the picture of 
the party-voter ties still remains incomplete with regard to a thorough analysis of 
cleavages. Hence, this study focuses on answering the following question: What 
kind of a cleavage structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century? 
With the more detailed research questions, this study explores the relationships 
between the three central cleavage elements: social structural position, values and 
attitudes and party choice. Thus, its aim is to enlighten the understanding of the 
Finnish electorate and its political preferences. 
The contribution of the study lies in adding to the present analyses, which 
have a restricted focus on single cleavages, by assessing both old and new social 
structural bases simultaneously and exploring how they are reflected in the values 
and attitudes in the electorate. Furthermore, the study explicates how social 
structural positions and values and attitudes are manifested in party choice. It is 
as well discovered which social structural positions and values/attitudes that are 
linked to each other have both an effect on voting for a particular party.  
Therefore, the analytical approach model applied in this study could also serve in 
detecting the cleavage structure in other political contexts than Finland. 
The study shows, that following the threefold cleavage definition, cleavages 
still exist in contemporary Finland. The results do not, however, indicate for 
particularly strong overall connection between social structural positions, values 
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and attitudes and vote for a party that represents the common interests, which 
indicates that there is also much else intervening between the cleavage elements. 
The cleavage structure partly still reflects the old basis of the Finnish party system 
and the old sources of conflict between parties and voters. More importantly, this 
study identifies a few potentially emerging cleavages that go well along with the 
change in the party system that has taken place in recent decades. Moreover, this 
study challenges the dichotomization of old parties being anchored to social 
structure and of new parties being anchored to values and attitudes.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the research design 
and how it is set within the context of previous studies. Specifically, the chapter 
first discusses the concept of cleavage, i.e. how the term ‘cleavage’ is understood 
in this study. Then, the research problem and research questions are introduced. 
Finally, Finland is placed in a comparative perspective to further motivate the 
chosen case. Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. The first section 
contextualizes the cleavage approach by presenting the different schools in the 
field of electoral research, by exploring the influential Lipset-Rokkan-model 
(1967) in detail and by analyzing the legacy of the model in West European party 
systems. The second section focuses on the development of the cleavage approach 
and discusses the social structural positions behind the traditional cleavage 
approach, party-voter-ties from a social structural perspective, the move towards 
values and attitudes in explaining party choice and finally the suggestions for new 
cleavages. The third section presents an overview of the interpretations of the 
Finnish cleavage structure. 
The empirical analysis begins in Chapter 4. This chapter introduces first the 
data and discusses the limitations of the study. It proceeds by analyzing the social 
structural basis of cleavages and detecting the value/attitudinal dimensions in the 
electorate. Then, the effect of social structural groups on value/attitudinal 
dimensions is analyzed in the last subchapter in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 brings 
party choice along to the analyses. After briefly assessing the political context in 
the 2003–2011 Finnish parliamentary elections, the analysis proceeds by 
analyzing the relationship between social structural positions and party choice 
and the relationship between values and attitudes and party choice. Social 
structural positions and values and attitudes are finally brought together in the 
same statistical model to address cleavage-based voting behavior. Building on the 
 4 
 
previous analyses, the conflicts are finally categorized as established cleavages and 
as conflicts that have potential to emerge as cleavages. The last main chapter 
summarizes the major findings and discusses the implications and the 
contribution of the study.  
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2. Research design 
2.1. The concept of cleavage  
Much of the legacy for cleavage research in political science was set in Party 
systems and voter alignments, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan 
(1967), wherein their article on cleavages, party systems and voter alignments 
became highly influential. This article highlighted the prerequisites of cleavage 
formation in historical contexts; the central thesis of the ‘Lipset-Rokkan-model’ 
was that the basic blocks of party support were formed by social identities. 
Peculiarly enough, Lipset and Rokkan did not provide a precise definition of the 
term ‘cleavage’ in their seminal article. Since then, cleavage has become one of the 
most used and one of the most imprecise concepts in the field of electoral 
research. Many other concepts, such as ‘conflict dimension’ and ‘opposition’, 
have been used alongside the term cleavage without conceptualizing the term 
cleavage properly. Moreover, the concept of cleavage has been accompanied with 
additional terms. The use of terms ‘social cleavage’, ‘political cleavage’, ‘cultural 
cleavage’, ‘ideological cleavage’, ‘segmental cleavage’ and ‘structural cleavage’, to 
name a few, has added to the confusion in the research field. (Aardal 1994, 218.)  
The term cleavage has been deployed to reflect long-standing and broad social 
divisions within society, as is the case also in this study. Moreover, the definition 
of the term cleavage in this study is firmly based on one of the most thorough 
efforts to provide a precise cleavage definition (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 41–46, 
215; Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 494–495). This definition consists of three 
dominant elements; 1. structural/empirical, 2. psychological/normative, and 3. 
organizational. In this study, these are called the structural, value/attitudinal and 
organizational elements of a cleavage. It is important to note that a cleavage 
cannot exist if it does not have all the three elements at the same time. This 
concept of a cleavage is handled in detail in the following section, where it is 
contrasted with other suggestions to aid in grasping the concept of cleavage.  
 First, cleavages are primarily rooted in a relatively permanent social division, 
which gives rise to objectively identifiable groups within society. These groups 
can be identified and distinguished empirically by social structural characteristics 
such as language or religion. The first prerequisite for a cleavage is thus a dividing 
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line between objectively identifiable social structural groups. People are born with 
certain social structural characteristics, like ethnicity, while other characteristics, 
such as occupational class, are partly affected by family background and acquired 
later in life. Moreover, while religion and native language, for example, are not 
extremely likely to change during one’s lifetime, occupational class and type of 
residential area are more prone to change. In any case, there should be a long-
lasting conflict between the social structural groups involved in order to establish 
a stable cleavage base.   
 Second, the group members should have a set of common values and attitudes 
for which they are ready to act and which provides them with a sense of identity. 
This set of common values and attitudes forms an element, which has been called 
psychological as it consists of group identity, group consciousness and common 
values and attitudes. This study focuses on the last-mentioned aspect. Group 
identity refers to a sense of belonging: i.e. whether individuals think of themselves 
as belonging to a certain social structural group. Group consciousness consists of 
the perceptions of group members regarding whether the intergroup relationship 
is characterized by conflict as well as their evaluations concerning their own, and 
the opposing group’s positions, in the conflict (Tajfel 1978, 28; Stubager 2009, 
208).  
 Although group identity and collective group consciousness are vital and 
could serve as such to form the second cleavage element (see Bartolini & Mair 
1990), they tell little about the values and attitudes that the members of a social 
structural group have in common. In addition, elements of cleavage politics less 
often crystallize into self-conscious oppositions nowadays (Enyedi 2008, 300)1. 
As the study at hand focuses on cleavages in the 21st century, it is more 
enlightening to focus on common values and attitudes, which are reflected in 
opinions on political issues. In this respect, group-based values and attitudes are 
the most concrete and accessible way to understand the substance of the common 
interests.  
                                                            
1 When talking about group consciousness, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 202) talk about the external 
closure in social relationships.  This kind of social closure, admittedly, was more likely to be found 
in times when social mobility was not yet on the rise, when educational opportunities were more 
restricted and internal migration was lower etc.      
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As mentioned above, values and attitudes provide the actual political substance to 
the differing group-based interests and can constitute solid dimensions in the 
electorate (see Thomassen 2005a, 17; Enyedi 2008, 288). However, these attitudes 
and values should be fairly stable in order to suffice for cleavage explanations – 
i.e. they should form long-term predispositions (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005). The 
following section will elucidate what is meant by values and attitudes and explain 
why they are used side by side as the second element of cleavages, i.e. the 
value/attitudinal element. 
 The concept of value is used with varying content in the disciplines of social 
sciences. An early and often cited definition was put forward by Kluckhohn 
(1951, 395): “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an 
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable, which influences the 
selection from available modes, means and ends of action”. Rokeach (1969), a 
pioneer in value and survey research, defined values in terms of enduring beliefs 
on preferable modes of conduct. As a supplementary addition to these views, van 
Deth and Scarbrough (1995, 28) have stated that values are not directly 
observable and they engage moral considerations and conceptions of what is 
desirable. Also the inter-subjective, social and contextual nature of values has 
been emphasized (ibid. 33–37), which fits the cleavage approach of social groups 
sharing values.  
 Political values, in turn, can be defined as “prescriptive beliefs, which 
individuals would like to see implemented in the political system” (Knutsen & 
Kumlin 2005, 125). Moreover, political values have been considered to stem 
strongly from pre-adulthood experiences (see e.g. Rose & McAllister 1990) and 
from social positions in society (e.g. van Deth 1995, 6). The latter aspect is 
especially important in this study.  
 Despite the debate on the nature of attitudes, it can be stated that attitudes 
generally involve a predisposition to respond in a specific way, positively or 
negatively, towards some object (Tourangeau & Galesic 2008, 141–142). 
However, it is worth noting that values are traditionally conceived to be more 
ground-breaking, stable and general than attitudes. Values are underlying 
orientations, relevant for the formation of attitudes, which capture the 
relationship towards a specific object, for example a political issue. (van Deth & 
Scarbrough 1995, 31–32.) The idea of values causally preceding attitudes, which 
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are in turn reflected in positions on political issues, is an acknowledged and 
shared view (Aardal and van Wijnen 2005, 195). Nevertheless, it has still been 
pointed out that the causal relationship can be the other way around (van Deth & 
Scarbrough 1995, 33). Individuals also mold their values when they are 
influenced by the attitudes of other people, for example. Miller and Shanks (1996) 
argue that attitudes towards election-specific issues, and subsequent opinions on 
them, can affect or activate latent values.  
 Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991, 269–270) conclude that the relationship 
between values and attitudes should be considered as the most important aspect 
of values because it enables individuals to deal with an infinite number of specific 
policies. Values are shortcuts for a voter who wants to save costs in voting: values 
generate consistency to electoral choices whereas attitudes can fluctuate more. 
According to them: 
 
 “It would be hard to explain how average person keeps a myriad of specific 
opinions about particular policies…given how little attention he or she tends to 
pay attention to political issues; it is considerably easier to give an account of 
how the average person could keep track of a small number of general values, 
which in turn give him direction on how to respond to a large number of specific 
issues.” 
 
  It is still dubious whether opinions on redistribution from the rich to the 
poor, for example, reflect value orientation or whether they tell more about one’s 
attitudes (cf. Knutsen & Kumlin 2005, 132). As such, it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between value orientations and attitudinal orientations, especially 
empirically (see van Deth & Scarbrough 1995, 31-2; cf. Thomassen 2005a).  Both 
values and attitudes are reflected in political issues. Opinions on political issues 
can thus be regarded as more specific manifestations of broader underlying 
attitudes and values (Tourangeau & Galesic 2008, 142).  
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A classic and still very useful definition to political issue was given by Sjöblom 
(1968, 123): 
 
 “Issue…refers to a matter of dispute between the parties in the electoral arena. 
Normally, one also reads into the concept that an “issue” must not be too 
insignificant matter of dispute, which only appears sporadically or incidentally 
in the election debate”.  
 
 Hence a political issue can be defined as follows; 1. a target of conflict 2. a 
politicized topic and 3. essential to the political system (Lane & Ersson 1991, 269; 
cf. Berelson et al. 1954, 182). When opinions on political issues are the political 
reflections of underlying value/attitudinal orientations, the issues at hand are far 
beyond idiosyncratic, singular questions (Aardal & van Wijnen 2005, 195). 
 The discussion shows that as values and attitudes affect one another and are 
closely entangled, it would be too restrictive to speak only about either value 
dimensions or attitudinal dimensions in the scope of cleavages. Many studies, 
especially those focusing on new cleavages, have taken the stance towards value 
orientations (see Inglehart 1984; Flanagan & Lee 1987; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005), 
but by doing so they disregard the potential the constant attitudes have as regards 
to the cleavage approach. When political values and attitudes are coherent, it is 
justified to treat them simultaneously and to speak of values and attitudes of 
constituting dimensions (cf. Enyedi 2008, 288). 
 Third, cleavages must be expressed in organizational terms, such as political 
parties, labor unions or churches. As political parties give institutional expression 
to the political interests of a specific group through elections, they are the most 
important organizations concerned. The role of labor unions should not, 
however, be undermined. They are essential in reinforcing the ties between voters 
and parties. Indeed labor unions were a source of common identity and group 
cohesion among social classes and they paved the way for cleavages before 
political parties were established (see Rokkan 1970, Karvonen 2014).  
 As such, it is however essential for cleavages to be revolved around stable 
party-voter ties in the electoral arena. The members of social structural groups, 
who are opposed to other social structural groups, should vote for the party that 
articulates their common interests in the political arena. As Franklin (2010, 651), 
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puts it, we are talking about cleavages when “social groups recognize their political 
differences and vote for different parties because those parties are dedicated to 
defending the interests of the groups concerned”. It is not enough that a party seeks 
to represent certain group-based interests if the group does not vote for it. The 
members of a social structural group should also trust this party as the 
representative of these interests by voting for it.  Moreover, it is argued in this 
study that in order for a cleavage to be politically relevant, the social structural 
element and value/attitudinal element should jointly contribute towards voting 
for a party that represents the common interests of a social structural group.  If a 
cleavage is not manifested in voting for the party that is dedicated to defending 
the group-based common interests, it should be called a latent cleavage2.  
 Political parties thus transform social divisions into cleavages by giving 
coherent political expression to what would otherwise be inchoate beliefs and 
fragmentary values and attitudes among members of some social group (Knutsen 
& Scarbrough 1995, 494). As Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 26) formulated, “cleavages 
do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course”. As such, 
parties have an active role in pushing certain social divisions and issues forward 
while dampening others. Once cleavages become organizationally 
institutionalized, they develop much of their own autonomous strength. 
(Bartolini & Mair 1990, 202; Enyedi 2005.) This is in line with the interpretation 
of cleavages that puts emphasis on the role of political elites in shaping or 
creating cleavages from above. Political parties do not just wait for group 
identities and common value basis to develop: they can set interests against one 
another in order to mobilize their potential electorate. They try to push certain 
issues forward while putting non-favorable issues to the back and influence the 
opinion formation in the electorate (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Torcal 
and Mainwaring 2003; Enyedi 2005.)  
 On the other hand, the parties aim to reflect the interests of certain voter 
groups as they are well updated by the public opinion and the value and 
attitudinal changes of their potential voters. As a result, the parties can appeal to 
certain social structural groups, conceived as their target electorate, and place 
                                                            
2 Also Lane and Ersson (1987), for instance, use the term latent cleavage when describing a cleavage 
that is not manifested. However, their loose conception of a cleavage differs a lot from the threefold 
cleavage.  
 11 
 
themselves in political issues accordingly. That said, people’s preferences are also 
influenced by how parties act in government and opposition; which policy 
alternatives they present (Karvonen 2014, 2). The task in this thesis is not, 
however, to dig out the extent of proactivity and reactivity of political parties. 
 It can hence be debated whether the relationship between parties and voters is 
more demand-driven (parties adapt to changes in the electorate) or supply-
centered (people’s view of politics is guided by parties). The mechanisms here can 
be diverse. For example Rydgren (2003, 60–61) has noted that the existence of an 
anti-immigrant party (and the politicization of immigration as a political issue) 
might lead to a change in attitudinal atmosphere in the electorate towards 
immigration. This in turn can lead to other parties changing their electoral 
strategies concerning immigration. Furthermore, the mechanisms are country-
bound: in some countries there might be a prominent anti-immigrant party while 
in others there is not, despite similar attitudinal atmosphere (see Kestilä 2007). 
This study is more demand-driven while it pays some attention to the supply side 
by analyzing the political alternatives that the parties represent.  
 The three cleavage attributes help to grasp how certain cleavages persist or 
fade away. The prerequisites for cleavages must be demanding in order to 
distinguish cleavages from divisions in society. The threefold notion of what 
constitutes a cleavage makes the analyses of cleavage structure extremely 
challenging yet analytically powerful. Cleavages are more extensive and exclusive 
than social and political divisions that might have some of the cleavage elements 
but not all three. If the term cleavage would be used to describe any kind of social 
or political division, then the concept would lose its analytical power as a plethora 
of divisions would qualify as cleavages with loose qualifications (Bartolini & Mair 
1990, 216; Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 494).  
 This concept of cleavage stands in contrast to the definitions that have loosely 
defined cleavage. For example Rae and Taylor (1970, 1) defined cleavage as “the 
criteria which divides the members of a community or sub-community into groups 
with important political differences at specific times and places”. Lane and Ersson 
(1987, 39) in turn defined it as “a division on the basis of some criteria of 
individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise”. These 
definitions leave much room for interpretation  and  leave cleavage as a concept 
which is capable of embracing almost every conceivable type of political conflict, 
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as Bartolini and Mair (1990, 200) note. Moreover, they would probably be a 
warning example of what Knutsen & Scarbrough (1995), Gallagher, Laver and 
Mair (2005) and Bartolini (2005) referred to when they discussed a loose 
definition of a cleavage that misses the nature of cleavage politics. In addition, the 
definition misses the prerequisite of longevity as conflicts may come and go 
between different groups.  
 Cleavages should impart the sort of durability that Lipset and Rokkan were 
trying to explain. In this regard, the only such source of durability ever 
demonstrated within this sphere deals with socialization processes. Social 
structural groups develop their persisting group identities largely as a result of the 
socializing mechanisms in their surroundings. In addition to ‘socialization 
agents’, such as family members, friends and co-workers, the role of strong 
institutional/organizational forces such as party associations and trade unions is 
particularly important for forming durability. (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 2009; 
Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999, 32–33; Evans & de Graaf 
2013.)  Later on, Bartolini (2005) suggested different concepts for divisions that 
combine only two of the three cleavage elements. This was in order to maintain 
the high analytical requirements for a cleavage and to depict divides that do not 
fully meet the cleavage criteria. These divides should either be designated as 
‘corporate divides’ (divisions that combine structural and organizational 
elements), ‘political divides’ (value/attitudinal and organizational elements), or 
‘social divides’ (structural and value/attitudinal elements).  
 Although these are examples of what can be 'something less than a full 
cleavage’, Deegan-Krause (2007, 538–541) has noted that major works in the field 
of cleavage research often accept only the strict prerequisite of the three elements. 
He notes that identifying cleavages as (a) self-conscious demographic groups (b) 
a common mind-set for a group of people (c) a distinct political organization and 
stable group-based electoral support for it, do not lead to fruitful results in every 
political context. Figure 2.1 offers a suggestion as to how the interaction between 
the three attributes can lead to cases that are something less than cleavages.  
 The figure has been modified from the study of Deegan-Krause (2007, 540) 
and resembles the classification of Bartolini. However, the given labels for the 
divides better capture the relationships between the three cleavage elements. 
Moreover, Figure 2.1 is useful in the scope of this study as it provides an analytic 
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A cleavage consists of all three elements. When two elements are combined they 
constitute a divide. Three alternatives are possible here: 
 
1. Structure + attitudes = position divide. The alignment of structural and 
attitudinal differences without a political alignment leads to a position 
divide. 
 
 
2. Structure + organizations = structural divide. The concept of structural 
divide leads to what Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) label as purely 
structural voting. Here, attitudes or values do not play a role: the party-
voter ties are close merely on a structural basis, which is why voting is 
mostly habitual. 
 
 
3. Attitudes + organizations = issue divide. This relationship has crossed 
the researchers’ minds the most as studies on new cleavages have built 
heavily on the attitudinal/value dimensions (Deegan-Krause 2007). 
When attitudes contribute to voting for a party that represents this 
attitudinal orientation without an apparent link to social structure, it 
leads to an issue divide. 
 
The importance of issue divides has increased in politics in recent years especially 
at the cost of structure-based politics. As such, there have been a number of 
attempts to provide comprehensive sets of issue divides (Deegan-Krause 2007, 
541), which were aimed towards proving that potential cleavages are no longer 
found from the structural realms. By and large, this tendency describes the shift 
from social structure to values and attitudes. As social location has become less 
important than value orientations in shaping party choice, it has been argued that 
new post-Lipset-Rokkan-cleavages are actually value cleavages (Knutsen & 
Scarbrough 495–496). As these proposed value cleavages are borderline cases 
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between issue divides and cleavages, much debate has focused on whether the 
nature of cleavages is changing (Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006; Enyedi 2008).3   
 According to Enyedi (2008, 288), the applicability of the concept of cleavage 
has narrowed because there has been a lack of acknowledgement concerning 
societal change in Western Europe. He suggests that values, instead of social 
categories, can also dominate the identity of deep-seated, enduring and 
comprehensive political conflicts. Kriesi (2010, 673-674) has even suggested that 
new cleavages are difficult to find because researchers are stuck to the traditional 
conceptions of structural basis.  
 There has also been debate on whether one should use the terms social or 
political (or cultural, structural or ideological) when handling cleavages (see e.g. 
Valen 1981; Kitschelt 2004; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). Bartolini and Mair 
(1990) and Bartolini (2004, 3, 2005) argue that no such attributes are needed. The 
term social cleavage often fails to indicate anything more than traditional 
divisions implied by social stratification (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 198). It has been 
argued that although social cleavages are always there, they may be latent or they 
may be politicized. Politicization of structural conflicts is a key aspect for political 
cleavages. Scholars have, however, struggled to define political cleavages in 
unequivocal and distinctive terms (see e.g. Dahl 1971, Zuckerman 1982). 
Bartolini and Mair argue that in this case cleavages are primarily defined in terms 
of political attitudes in order to free the concept from an emphasis on structural 
variables.  
 It creates thus more confusion than clarity to make a distinction between 
social cleavages and political cleavages as the qualification of the concept still 
lacks a clear-cut definition. The same logic applies, for example, to ideological 
cleavages (see Valen 1981) as it is impossible to determine the extent to which a 
cleavage reflects ideologies (Aardal 1994, 229). Hence, in this study the term 
cleavage is used without qualifications such as ‘social’, ‘political’ or ‘ideological’.  
 To summarize, the analysis of cleavages in this study is based on the threefold 
elements that the cleavages are characterized by: structural element, 
value/attitudinal element and organizational element. By choosing such a frame 
with distinguishable elements, the encompassing nature of cleavages is captured 
                                                            
3 This debate is handled in detail in chapter 3. 2.  
 16 
 
without getting stuck in conceptual complexities. Based on the discussion in the 
chapter, the concept of cleavage is conceived as follows in this study: 
 
 Cleavages are rooted in relatively permanent social divisions, which give rise to 
identifiable social structural groups whose members share common interests, 
reflected in values and attitudes, for which they are willing to stand for. These 
interests are primarily reflected in voting for a political party that represents and 
advocates these interests.   
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2.2. Background, research problem and research questions 
Despite the vast amount of literature on cleavages in political science, studies that 
thoroughly analyze national cleavage structures by deploying the afore-defined 
threefold cleavage are lacking. One field in cleavage research has analyzed the 
existence and strength of (social) cleavages mainly in terms of social structural 
voting, i.e. linkages between ‘old’ social structural positions and party choice, 
while leaving the linkage between social structural groups and values/attitudes 
imprecise (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 20094; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & 
De Graaf 1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Evans & de Graaf 2013). As this field of study 
has measured the impact of social class, religion, place of residence, ethnicity etc. 
on party choice, the studies have built on the assumption that the social structural 
groups do have a sense of collective identity. In the case of social classes and 
denominational groups, this could be confirmed empirically. In the era of strong 
cleavage politics, it could be stated that blue-collar workers voted for the political 
left because they identified themselves with the working class: they had built a 
common identity and group consciousness (see Franklin et al. 1992).  
 What remained unclear in these analyses was how class identity and class 
consciousness were reflected in attitudes and values – the actual political interests 
of social structural groups were, empirically, taken largely for granted. Hence, the 
linkage between social structural groups and attitudes and values has not been 
explored thoroughly. This has of course partly been due to the limited 
possibilities available regarding the data and partly due to the restricted way of 
treating cleavages. The number of studies which primarily investigate the 
structural element of cleavages is vast (see e.g. Rose & Urwin 1970; Franklin et al. 
1992, 2009; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Jansen 2011; Evans 
& de Graaf 2013). In this respect, since the decreasing patterns of class voting and 
religious voting have been so well documented in Europe, there is no longer 
much to explore from this perspective, from a comparative perspective at least. 
 The other field in cleavage research has been keen on finding evidence for the 
emergence of new cleavages beyond the Lipset-Rokkan-model, i.e. beyond 
                                                            
4 The studies of Franklin and his colleagues also included some value and attitudinal elements, such 
as left-right-orientation and religious values, but the focus was on the effect of social structural 
position on party choice.  
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traditional cleavages based on occupational class, religion, urban-rural-division 
and ethnicity (see e.g. Inglehart 1977; Dunleavy 1979; Dalton et al. 1984; Kitschelt 
1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug  & van Spanje 2009 Kriesi 2010; Stubager 
2010). While some of these proposals have focused on finding an alternative 
structural base for cleavages, others have claimed that the new basis of cleavages 
is in values and attitudes. This view propagates the idea of conceiving values and 
attitudes as having an independent role in defining group identities and voting 
behavior: i.e. they have begun to cement partisan loyalties more efficiently than 
social structure (Enyedi 2008, 293).5  
 Thus, it has been challenging to obtain a precise view of the whole cleavage 
structure in West European countries upon which the bulk of (comparative) 
cleavage research has focused. While comparative studies are merited in bringing 
on the differences and similarities in structural voting and party competition (see 
Dalton et al. 1984; Evans 2000; Franklin et al. 1992; Thomassen ed. 2005b; Evans 
& De Graaf 2013) they are still lacking thorough empirical analysis of the 
interaction between all three cleavage elements. Compact case studies suit this 
purpose well, since the political context can be kept constant and the scope of the 
study remains limited. As Kriesi (1998, 131) notes, the core in cleavage research is 
to identify the theoretically and empirically relevant social divisions and explore 
how they are manifested in the value/attitudinal sphere and in party alignments.  
 In light of the above, this study seeks to explore the significance of cleavage 
elements in structuring the relationship between voters and political parties in 
Finland at the beginning of the 21st century. By doing so, the study makes two 
main contributions to research on cleavages. First, it adds to the present analyses, 
which have a restricted focus on single cleavages, by assessing both old and new 
social structural bases simultaneously and exploring how they are reflected in the 
values and attitudes in the electorate. The old structural cleavage bases stem from 
the Lipset-Rokkan model (1967), while the new ones rise from studies that have 
aimed to complete and challenge the model (see e.g. Inglehart 1977; Dalton et al. 
1984; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug  & van Spanje 2009). 
Although certain efforts have previously been made to detect single cleavages 
                                                            
5 A closer assessment of the research tradition and traits in analyzing cleavages is presented in 
Chapter 3. 
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with all three elements in a national context, to the knowledge of the author, such 
studies have been rare (see Stubager 2010).   
 Second, the study makes a contribution in terms of analyzing how social 
structural positions and values and attitudes are manifested in party choice as 
well as in discovering whether the social structural positions and values/attitudes, 
which are linked to each other, both have an effect on voting for a particular 
party. The rationale behind this empirical design is to build linkages between the 
three central cleavage elements: social structure, values/attitudes and party 
choice. As Kriesi (1998, 167) reminds us, if structure, values/attitudes and party 
representation of collective interests jointly determine the existence of cleavages, 
then it will not suffice to look at any one of these aspects independently of the 
other two. Also Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995, 495) have stated that voting a 
party out of group-based interests without sharing common values does not 
constitute cleavage politics; nor does voting for a party out of shared values 
without being a member of the associated social structural group. Structural 
variables or value orientations may yield intelligible accounts of voting, but they 
do not amount to accounts of ‘cleavage politics’. 
 The cleavage structure of Finland has been described and analyzed since the 
1960s. The earlier analyses were based on the development of a party system and 
on the conceived conflicts between social groups (see Allardt 1961; Allardt & 
Pesonen 1967; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979; Pesonen et al. 1993; for political-
historical analysis see also Karvonen 2000, 2014; Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). Later 
accounts have focused more on the value/attitudinal element of cleavages 
(Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). However, there are no 
studies that would empirically scrutinize the whole cleavage structure in Finland 
by building linkages between the three cleavage elements. An indication that the 
conventional cleavage perspective is unsatisfactory in identifying the dynamics in 
the electorate and party sphere, at least in the Finnish case, is if cleavages are not 
detected at the beginning of the 21st century and if social structural positions and 
values/attitudes do not both have a major impact on party choice.  
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Following the previous discussion, the research problem in this doctoral thesis is:  
 
What kind of a cleavage structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st 
century? 
 
 
The specific research questions are derived from the research problem.  
 
1. Which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?  
 
2. Which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate? 
 
3. What is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes 
in the electorate?  
 
 
4. a) What is the effect of social structural position on voters’ party 
choice? 
 
b) Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes that 
are linked to each other, have an effect on voting for a particular 
party? 
 
5.  Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties 
associated with them? 
 
 
The research questions are illustrated in Figure 2.2, which presents the theoretical 
approach model of the study. The first research question (RQ1) focuses on 
exploring the relevant old and new social structural cleavage bases in Finland. As 
such, an analysis is made to discover whether the social structural positions 
function as a source of identity and whether the social structural groups at hand 
are relevant for the Finnish party sphere. Even though the parties are more 
cautious in making restricted appeals to certain social groups and they propagate 
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more for the value/attitudinal basis, the representation of social structural groups 
have not vanished (see Oskarson 2005, 85; Paloheimo 2006; Enyedi 2008). In 
other words, the more distinctively the interests are represented by certain 
parties, the stronger they should also affect party choice. (cf. Franklin & Page 
1984, 527; Belanger & Meguid 2008, 480, 489.)  
 
 
 
    
                                   (     
               (RQ3)                
 
 
                                   (RQ4b) 
    
    
                                                              (RQ4a) 
 
Figure 2.2 The theoretical approach model of the study 
 
 
The second research question (RQ2) focuses on the value/attitudinal element of 
cleavages. The value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate are detected 
by analyzing whether voters’ values and attitudes, manifested in opinions on 
political issues, form clusters that are thematically consistent throughout the 
time-period of the study. These clusters would then be treated as stable and solid 
dimensions (see Thomassen 2005a, 17; Enyedi 2008, 288). The most suited 
method for this is the principal component analysis which sorts the issues 
measuring values/attitudes into principal components that can be interpreted as 
value/attitudinal dimensions. The second research questions concentrates on the 
most relevant political values and attitudes of the Finnish society, which derives 
from the definition of the cleavage in this study. Thus, it does not seek to describe 
exhaustively all possible value/attitudinal differences that may arise in the Finnish 
context (see e.g. Suhonen 1988).     
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The third research question (RQ3) handles the relationship between the 
structural and value/attitudinal elements of cleavages. In order to fulfil the first 
two elements of cleavages, the politically relevant social structural groups have to 
be identified and they should hold differing sets of values and attitudes. In this 
study, the structural element is treated by taking into account classic objective6 
social structural characteristics, native language, type of residential area and 
occupational social class, as well as other social structural characteristics that have 
been suggested to form new bases for emerging cleavages (see e.g. Inglehart 1984; 
Kriesi 1998, Manza & Brooks 1998; Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2009). The latter 
consist of gender, education and age cohorts. Denomination falls between these 
categories as a cleavage base in Finland. The analysis of how social structural 
position affects values and attitudes is done with a linear regression analysis, 
which compares the effects of group membership on the value/attitudinal 
dimensions. 
 The fourth research question finally determines the existence and relevance of 
cleavages: they handle the effect of objective social structural positions and 
values/attitudes on voters’ party choice. In this respect, an analysis is made to 
discover the effect of social structural position on voters’ party choice in the 2003, 
2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (RQ4a) and to discover whether those 
social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other 
have an effect on voting for a particular party (RQ4b). The answer to the latter 
research question obviously builds on the connections found between social 
structural positions and dimensions in RQ3.  
 If the members of a social structural group loyally support a particular party, 
then stability is shown in party-voter ties along social structural lines (RQ4a). If, 
moreover, values and attitudes that are linked to that social structural group, have 
an effect on voting for this particular party (RQ4b), then the values and attitudes 
reinforce the effect of social structural position on party choice. Following 
Franklin (2010), it is not enough to merely show the effect of social structural 
positions and values/attitudes on party choice. The party at hand should also be 
dedicated to advocating these group-based values/attitudes in the long run.  
                                                            
6 This means that social structural position is based on objectively identifiable groups. Class 
identification, for instance, would not be a structural measure. 
 23 
 
Previous research has shown that the overall effect of social structure on party 
choice has weakened; the shift in the electorate from structures to values and 
attitudes has been evident for a long time (e.g. Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995; van 
der Eijk et al. 2009, 412–413.) Nevertheless, the general trend may conceal some 
interesting patterns especially concerning the relative importance of the cleavage 
elements in adding the likelihood of voting for a certain party. By assessing the 
different social structural characteristics and value/attitudinal dimensions, it is 
possible to detect whether some ties between group-based interests and parties 
are so persistent that they do not verify the general pattern of weakened party-
voter-ties, discovered in the literature. The popularity of some parties may be 
strongly anchored to cleavages, while the popularity of other parties may be more 
dependent on other factors.  
 In addition, the overall effect of social structural positions and values and 
attitudes on party choice is analyzed. It has been regarded a theoretically 
important aspect that the cleavage elements should explain a considerable 
amount of party support in order to be regarded as evidence of cleavage-based 
party support (see Franklin 2010). The ability of cleavage elements to explain 
party support has declined over the decades in Western European countries 
(Franklin et al. 2009), which is why it is interesting to see whether Finland fits the 
pattern of party support being based weakly on cleavage elements. 
 The analysis of party choice is conducted by means of binary logistic 
regression to explore the strength of social structural positions and 
value/attitudinal dimensions as determinants of party choice in the 2003–2011 
parliamentary elections. The effects are detected by building first a model, which 
includes only the social structural variables, and then adding each of the 
value/attitudinal dimensions separately in the subsequent models (RQs 4a and 
4b). Moreover, a pseudo R², Nagelkerke’s R², is used to evaluate the goodness-of-
fit of the model that includes only the social structural variables and the model 
that includes the social structural variables and the dimensions. The purpose of 
this is to evaluate the overall impact of the variables in explaining the electoral 
support of parties.  
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To sum up, in the light of Figure 2.2, a cleavage can be regarded to exist  
 
1. If there are objectively identifiable and politically relevant social 
structural groups that share common values/attitudes (RQ’s 1, 2 
and 3) AND  
 
2. If being a member of a particular social structural group leads to 
shared values and attitudes and if these both have an effect on 
voting for a particular party (RQ’s 4a & 4b).  
 
 
The requirements stemming from the threefold cleavage are demanding, as 
discussed earlier. It may be so that although value/attitudinal dimensions affect 
party choice, they do not have strong structural linkages. Vice versa, it may be 
also that social structural group membership affects party choice but is not 
connected to any of the dimensions. These cases would not be regarded as 
cleavages. The last research question focuses on the categorization of the political 
conflicts in contemporary Finland. Based on the analyses that have answered the 
previous research questions, an evaluation is made as to which of the conflicts 
can be categorized as cleavages (RQ5). By answering the last research question, 
this thesis draws a picture of the whole set of conflicts between the voters of 
different parties. Hence, it can be illustrated which parties are set against one 
another on both a structural and dimensional basis. An evaluation is also made 
concerning whether the conflicts that do not fulfil the cleavage requirements have 
the potential of evolving into cleavages.  
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2.3. Placing Finland in a comparative perspective – a brief 
overview 
This study focuses on analyzing contemporary Finland in cleavage terms. Finland 
has traditionally had a strong and diverse cleavage structure (see Lijphart 1984; 
Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005) with complex dimensionality and ideological 
fragmentation in the electorate (Paloheimo 2008) as well as a diverse party system 
(Bengtsson et al. 2013). Traditionally, the parties in Finland have been tightly 
anchored to cleavages (Karvonen 2000) and the country has had one of the 
highest rates in class voting among Western countries (Nieuwbeerta 1995; 
Bengtsson et al. 2013). As such, Finnish politics has been considered as still being 
cleavage-based (Sundberg 1999; Paloheimo 2009; Arter 2012a). 
 Furthermore, the societal development in Finland has affected the strength of 
cleavage politics. In comparison to the neighboring countries, Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark, (social) structural transformation and modernization took place at 
a later stage in Finland and the pace of change was exceptionally rapid. Finland 
remained for a long time a predominantly agrarian society. Still in the 1950s, the 
share of workforce employed in the agricultural sector was as high as 46 per cent. 
The industrial sector never dominated employment in the same way it did in 
other West European countries. With a minor simplification it can be said that 
Finland went from a pre-industrial society directly to a post-industrial economic 
structure with a large service sector and a diminished agricultural sector. 
(Karvonen 2014, 30.) The share of the workforce employed in the agricultural 
sector fell by roughly 64 per cent in Finland between 1920 and 2004. The 
corresponding figure for the other ten West European states was around 27 per 
cent. During the same time-period, employment in the service sector rose by 
more than 51 per cent in Finland while the corresponding share was 38 per cent 
in the other West European states (ibid, 29–30). This development accentuates 
the long history of traditional, sector-based cleavage politics, which came under 
enormous pressure as parties had to react to social structural change, especially 
from the 1960s onwards (Karvonen 2000; 2014).   
 In addition, Finland’s special position in international politics, between Russia 
and the Western World, has affected electoral loyalties and party politics in 
Finland. This special position has explained many anomalies in Finnish party 
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politics (Ware 1996, 213; Karvonen 2000, 133; Pesonen 2001, 122; Karvonen 
2014, 31–37). Despite these intriguing features, Finland represents a case that has 
not been explored thoroughly in cleavage research.  
 In some countries, such as in Sweden and in Norway, national election studies 
have been conducted in a systematic way enabling comparisons over time. Thus, 
it has been possible to build consistent longitudinal analyses on the importance of 
cleavages. In Finland, on the contrary, the tradition for national election studies is 
thin and research on cleavages sporadic. The first large-scale post-election study 
that can be labeled as national election study was performed as late as in 1991, in 
the aftermath of the parliamentary election (see Pesonen, Sänkiaho, Borg 1993; cf. 
Sänkiaho 1983, 1987). Since 2003, national election studies have been conducted 
on a regular basis in Finland (see Paloheimo ed. 2005; Paloheimo & Borg ed. 
2009; Borg ed. 2012a).  
 Cleavages have been analyzed sporadically with limited focus and limited 
methodological elaborations, partly due to data qualities (see Allardt 1961; 
Allardt & Pesonen 1967; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979; Paloheimo 1988; Pesonen et 
al. 1993; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2008). Previous studies have 
not explored the Finnish cleavage structure from a perspective that would look 
for social structural groups sharing political values and attitudes, with those 
interests being reflected in party-voter ties. Rather, the studies have focused either 
on the effect of social structural positions on party choice or on the effect of 
values/attitudes on party choice. Hence, they have not built up the whole picture 
of mechanisms between cleavage elements. 
 To conclude, despite being a favorable case for studying the importance of 
cleavages, Finland represents a case that has not been looked thoroughly into in 
cleavage research. Finland has been considered by experts to have once been the 
epitome of a cleavage-based political system and by many to still be a country in 
which party support can be understood in cleavage terms. Because of Finland's 
archetypical status, the results could be of interest beyond Finland. If cleavages 
are not detected at the beginning of the 21st century in Finland and they have no 
major impact on party choice, then the indication is that the threefold-cleavage 
might be unsatisfactory in identifying the dynamics in the electorate and party 
sphere also in other national political contexts.  
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Analyzing the party-voter ties from a cleavage-point-of-view has nevertheless 
been a major challenge regarding the candidate-orientated electoral system in 
Finland. The Finnish electoral system combines a proportional list system with 
mandatory candidate voting. Voters write the number of the candidate they 
choose on the ballot paper and there is no possibility to cast a mere party vote. 
Thus, voters get to decide the ranking inside of the party, which has contributed 
to intra-party competition among parties and to an equal emphasis on the 
candidate as on the party when voters make their voting decisions (Karvonen 
2012; 2014, 16). However, in the 2011 parliamentary election, only 9 per cent of 
the voters would have voted for their candidate irrespective of political party 
(Borg 2012a). The political parties are strong and stable actors in Finland; they 
have a fairly strong cohesion in parliamentary work and parliamentary life is very 
much party-centered which is why Finland should not be compared with 
countries where both electoral and political systems are highly personalized. As 
such, political parties matter much in Finland (for more, see Ruostetsaari & 
Mattila 2002; Arter 2014.)  
 Even though the time-period for the analysis of the Finnish cleavage structure 
and its effects on voting behavior is 2003–2011, the historical perspective is also 
inherent in the analysis since the cleavages are based on long-lasting 
disagreements in the electorate and party system. The main focus of the thesis 
lies, however, in detecting the previously unexplored, present cleavage structure. 
Cleavages are analyzed in the context of parliamentary elections, as party choice 
in these elections is the most meaningful expression of party-voter alignments. 
The stabilization of the Finnish party system, in the sense of same eight parties 
having candidates elected to parliament in 2003–2011, also motivates the time-
period. In contrast to the 1990s, new parties were not elected to the parliament 
during 2003–2011, which makes the analysis of cleavages in Finland more 
compact. 
 At the beginning of the 21st century the political environment in Finland had 
stabilized after the turbulent 1990s. Finland had become a member of the 
European Union in 1995 and in the European Monetary Union in 1999 and it 
had taken a significant step towards the Western Alliance compared to the times 
of close Ostropolitik with the Soviet Union, the neighboring superpower. The 
gradual collapse of the Soviet Union that began already in the 1980s meant that 
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the ideological struggle between socialists and non-socialists lost ground (see 
Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). In addition, Finland survived a severe economic 
recession in the beginning of the 1990s. The time-period for analyzing 
contemporary cleavage structure does not include such major structural or 
geopolitical shocks, which brings some stability to the analysis. However, even 
though the beginning of the 21st century seemed like a period of stability, the 
worldwide economic crisis and the Euro crisis began to affect Finland at the turn 
of the 2000s and 2010s. The Euro crisis, especially the aid packages to the EMU-
members in crisis, was topical in the 2011 election, where the True Finns7 
(Perussuomalaiset) received the unforeseen landslide victory, by gaining 15.0 
percentage points in comparison to the 2007 election where it got 4.1 percent of 
the popular vote (see Arter 2011). This electoral victory obviously eroded many 
old loyalties in the electorate, which has significance in cleavage terms. The 
success of the True Finns was not ephemeral since it became the second biggest 
party in the 2015 parliamentary election with 17.7 percent of the popular vote.  
 
The Finnish electorate and party system in a West European comparison 
 
In order to gain a more detailed picture of how Finland relates to other West 
European countries, the chapter at hand places Finland in a wider context to 
highlight the nature of competition for votes between the political parties. The 
comparison is restricted to 18 West European countries as these countries have 
gone through much of the same historical phases affecting the formation of party 
systems and cleavages as Finland. The chosen countries are represented in Table 
2.1, which is based on data in the 21st century parliamentary elections. The 
longitudinal comparison is not essential here due to the research task, so the 
figures are averages for 2000–2013, which ensures that the different electoral 
cycles of countries come close to the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2003–
2011. 
 The first column represents aggregate volatility, which indicates the overall 
change in party support from one election to another. It has been hypothesized 
                                                            
7 Throughout this study Perussuomalaiset is referred to as the True Finns. It is a more distinctive, 
clear-cut and internationally known party label than “The Finns”, which the party adopted to 
replace the “True Finns” as the party’s official name in English in 2011.   
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that there is a pervasive linkage between volatility and cleavages. Bartolini and 
Mair (1990, 212) have stated that high or increasing volatility reflects a decrease 
in traditional linkages and close attachments between parties and voters. They 
have listed six factors affecting volatility and one of these is the closure of the 
cleavage system: if the cleavages do not produce a full closure, voters have more 
capacity to become electorally mobile (ibid. 38-41).8 The stronger and more 
persistent the strength of the cleavage system is, the more unlikely switches 
between parties are; hence volatility will be lower.  
 Although the stability of party systems in Western Europe has thus relied on 
the loyalty of certain voter segments to certain parties, loyalties have been 
eroding with growing volatility, taking place especially from the 1990s onwards 
(Mair 2002, 131; Gallagher et al. 2011). In other words, switches between parties 
and fluctuation between voting and non-voting have become more common (for 
country-specific patterns see e.g. Holmberg 2000, 19; Borg 2012b, 131).  
 Table 2.1 shows that Finland belongs to a group of countries with a fairly low 
volatility rate in the parliamentary elections at the beginning of the 21st century. 
Without the landslide victory of the True Finns in the 2011 election (+15.0 
percentage points), the volatility would be as low as in the United Kingdom, 
whose electoral system (indicated in the last column) and party system deviate 
drastically from Finland. A relatively low aggregate volatility does not reveal how 
attached voters are to their own parties as it conceals the mutually excluding 
shifts between parties. However, the low volatility in Finland indicates that 
something has kept the party-voter ties rather stable up until 2011. One 
explanation is the stabilizing effect of cleavages (see Paloheimo & Sundberg 
2005).  
   
  
                                                            
8 The other five are the policy distances of the parties, party-system format, changes in electoral 
institutions, changes in electoral participation and short-term issues such as specific issues, 
candidates and exceptional political events.   
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Table 2.1 The party system and electoral system features in 19 West European 
countries in 2000–20139 (Source: Gallagher et al. 2011, 310; Gallagher 2013; IDEA 
2013; NSD 2013) 
 
Country Aggregate Average Effective  Average number  Blocs in Electoral  
 
electoral turnout (b) number of parties in  government system (f) 
 
volatility (a) 
 
of parties (c) government (d) formation (e) 
 
FINLAND 9,8 69,4 6,0 4,3   PR 
Austria 15,5 81,5 3,8 2,0 
 
PR 
Belgium 14,5 90,6* 9,3 5,0 
 
PR 
Denmark 10,7 86,5 5,4 2,2 x PR 
France 16,0 58,6 4,9 1,8 x MRO 
Germany 10,1 75,9 4,7 2,0 
 
MMPR 
Greece 15,8 70,7* 4,3 1,7 
 
PR 
Iceland 17,1 84,5 4,2 2,0  PR 
Rep. of Ireland 14,4 66,5 4,2 2,3 x PR 
Italy 19,6 80,2 5,3 4,8 
 
MS/MMPL 
Luxemburg 6,8 91,3* 4,4 2,0 
 
PR 
Malta 3,0 94,0* 2,1 1,0 x PR 
the Netherlands 20,9 77,9 5,9 2,5 
 
PR 
Norway 13,7 76,4 5,3 2,3 x PR 
Portugal 10,8 61,2 3,4 1,8 
 
PR 
Spain 10,1 72,3 3,1 1,0 x PR 
Sweden 13,8 82,2 4,7 3,0 x PR 
Switzerland 8,6 47,5 5,8 4,3 
 
PR 
United Kingdom 6,4 62,2 3,5 1,3 x SMP 
All 12,5 75,2 4,8 2,5 
  
 
 
On the other hand, low volatility is accompanied with a relatively low turnout in 
Finland. Hence, Finland represents a rather stable case in terms of party-voter 
ties but also a case where a rather large number of voters abstain from voting.  
For example, in other Nordic countries turnout is higher. Despite having a highly 
educated electorate with considerable political knowledge and growing interest in 
politics, there are many factors that do not encourage voters to use their right to 
                                                            
9 Notes: (a) The average aggregate volatility in the parliamentary elections has been calculated by 
summing all the percentage vote gains of all the winning parties from one election to the next, (b) 
Countries marked with * have mandatory voting that is enforced (c) is calculated with the Laakso & 
Taagepera measure (1979) in Gallagher (2013), (d) takes into account the parties that have had 
ministerial positions in the government i.e. parties giving support to a minority government have 
not been included, (e) takes place in a given country if the same dimension (left vs. right, with the 
exception of the Republic of Ireland) has not been crossed when governments have been formed. (f) 
PR=Proportional representation, MRO=Majority run-off, MMPR=Mixed Member proportional 
system, MS=Mixed system, MMPL=Mixed Member Plurality, SMP=Single Member Plurality. 
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vote. From previous research we know that low turnout is partly entangled with 
the erosion of old loyalties with lowered internal political efficacy: citizens have 
felt that it is too difficult to get a grasp what is going on in politics and what the 
differences between parties are (Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 296–299).  Finnish 
politics is demanding for the voter: the electoral campaigns are often vague and 
there is a lack of concrete and definite policy promises. The political alternatives 
remain to be blurred and the assignment of responsibility is difficult due to the 
reshuffle of heterogeneous multi-party coalitions (Karvonen 2014, 150).  
 The Finnish party system represents many alternatives for the voters. In 
column (c) in Table 2.1, Finland ranks second in the effective number of parties, 
which takes into account both the number of parties and their relative size. 
Actually Finland could be ranked number one, as the rate of Belgium consists of 
two party systems: one in Flanders and the other in Wallonia (see also Dalton et 
al. 2000, 58; Bengtsson et al. 2013, 30). Nevertheless, the high number of parties 
has not been accompanied by competition between two party blocs like in 
Sweden and Denmark, as indicated by the second last column in Table 2.1. These 
party blocs that are based on a left-right-continuum affect government formation 
as the ideological divide between competing blocs cannot be crossed (Oscarsson 
& Holmberg 2013, 261–264). Bloc politics also requires that the coalitions are 
closed in the dominating ideological dimension in the sense that no party that 
belongs in this dimension in-between parties A and B is left is in the opposition 
(cf. Laver & Budge 1992, 3). Many countries with multi-party systems have 
moved towards bipolar competition. However, Finland, along with the Benelux-
countries, is the only West European country which is characterized by 
multiparty contests without a dominant party and with governments being 
formed through a reshuffling of coalitions (Gallagher et al. 2011, 232–233). In 
those countries, where bloc politics dominates the political competition, the 
average number of parties in government (column d in Table 2.1) is not high.  
 Finland ranks third in the number of parties in government. As such, there is 
a long tradition of oversized government coalitions in Finland. In addition to the 
institutional (legislation) reasons, oversized cabinets have been favored because 
of the consensual way of handling politics, i.e. the need to have broad political 
forces behind political decisions has dominated politics in Finland (Karvonen 
2014, 79–81). Furthermore, the government coalitions have not merely been 
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oversized; they have also been ideologically highly unorthodox. Especially during 
the 1990s and the 21st century, there have been few ideological differences that 
would have been too difficult to overcome when forming cabinet coalitions. Most 
importantly, socialism and conservatism are not any longer dictating which 
parties can co-operate and which cannot. Since 1995 there have been three 
government coalitions in Finland that have included the most right-wing party 
and the most left-wing party in socioeconomic terms. Jungar (2002, 78) 
characterizes the general pattern as an expression of political culture in which 
compromise and cooperation are deemed as virtues. Indeed, there has even been 
a will for the inclusion of more extreme or elite-criticizing parties, such as the 
Communists, the populist Finnish Rural Party (see Karvonen 2014, 74–75) and 
most recently, the True Finns.  
 Hence Finland is a reminiscent of what Lijphart (1968) labelled as 
consociational democracies. For these political systems the emphasis has been on 
conflict resolution and on the need to bring the parties together instead of 
increasing the polarization further. This does not mean that cleavages would not 
be strong when parties compete over votes of social structural groups. It indicates 
that the parties have been willing to overcome the ideological lines in 
government. Furthermore, the Finnish parties have represented many different 
party families, which have different ideological features. This aspect is dealt with 
in the next chapter in the context of the Lipset-Rokkan-model.  
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3. Cleavage approach in electoral research 
 
3.1. The contextualization of the cleavage approach  
3.1.1. Models in the field of electoral research 
Three research paths have been dominant in explaining party choice in political 
science. First, in sociological or social structural models the voter is seen 
primarily as a part of the surrounding social environment. In this approach social 
characteristics and belonging to a group explain party choice. Second, socio-
psychological or psychological models derive from the concept of party 
identification. A durable attachment to a particular party is the strongest factor 
that conditions party choice. Third, rational choice models, which originate from 
economic theories and a political-rational approach, emphasize the unique 
individual choices of voters who share the aim of rational behavior. The cleavage 
approach, which is applied in this study, belongs to the first research tradition.  
 
1) Social structural models 
 
The interest in the social structural approach is not in single voters, per se, as it 
emphasizes that people vote according to their social groups. Parties seek to 
represent the interests of their core clienteles that are based, for example, on class, 
religion, ethnicity and region (Dalton 2006, 146.)  The early studies using a social 
structural approach were aggregate-level studies, which set the path for political 
ecology (see Siegfried 1913; Tingsten 1937). Analyses at the micro-level, i.e. 
handling individual voters, were first introduced in Columbia (N.Y.) voting 
studies. They marked an enhancement in the way of analyzing voting behavior as 
it is not possible to draw conclusions at an individual level from aggregate level 
data.10 People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) and Voting (Berelson et al. 1954) 
                                                            
10 The concept “ecological fallacy” means that even though the vote share for a socialist party is high 
in an area where there is a large proportion of working-class voters, we cannot say for sure that the 
working-class is voting for the socialist party (Robinson 1950, 351-357). 
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highlighted that voting preferences remained stable, especially when social 
environment was mutually reinforcing, which was in accordance with Tingsten’s 
findings. The Columbia school presented an approach that Sartori (1997) called 
the sociology of politics. He meant that these analyses overemphasized politics as 
reflections of social structure. Political sociology, on the other hand, shows how 
politics and political systems should be seen as translations of social structure. 
This concern was addressed by subsequent works that analyzed the structure of 
European party systems and party-voter ties (Arzheimer & Evans 2008).  
 The most influential of the political sociology studies was Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments, edited by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which set the basis for the 
formalization and systematization of cleavages in political science and as a way of 
explaining party-voter ties.  It was primarily a theory of how cleavage structures, 
party systems and attachments to parties were developed. Lipset and Rokkan’s 
fundamental thesis was that the stability and patterns in party systems and voting 
behavior could be traced back to historical events, which set different social 
groups in opposition to one another, leading to enduring cleavage systems. The 
legacy of the model is presented in more detail in sub-chapter 3.1.2 as the 
cleavage approach stems largely from the Lipset-Rokkan-model. The study led to 
an ever larger interest in studying voting along social structural lines using 
different class-voting indexes, which initiated a still on-going debate on how 
much class-voting has declined.  
 Social structural contributions have been criticized for not taking the societal 
change enough into account and leaning on group cohesion and consciousness 
that have decreased importance in postmodern societies; a result of that fact that 
social structure has changed dramatically and social mobility and individualism 
has grown (Arzheimer & Evans 2008, xxii). As societal development is paced by 
different modernization processes, many researchers, from time to time, have 
come to the conclusion that voters have become alienated from the traditional 
social divisions and will not realign with new alliances. This means that voters 
will neither choose on the basis of social group cues nor develop long-lasting 
attachments to a particular party (Nie, Verba & Petrocik 1976; Popkin 1991). The 
proponents of social structural models (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Karvonen & 
Kuhnle ed. 2001) have argued that these kinds of judgments may have been 
hastily made. 
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2) Socio-psychological models 
 
Whereas the social structural models became the dominant research tradition in 
Europe, socio-psychological models have been more dominant in the USA (see 
e.g. Cantril & Harding 1943, Belknap & Campbell 1951). The central concept of 
party identification became well-established in the seminal work American Voter 
by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960). This Michigan school 
developed the full model of voting, which was formed around party 
identification. Formally, party identification is defined as a form of psychological 
group membership and was regarded as a truly central and consistent attitude 
that could form a whole system of political beliefs (see Converse 1964). Whereas 
the party loyalties of voters in social structural models stem from a social 
structural position, in socio-psychological models they stem from processes that 
lead to a close and enduring emotional attachment to a party.  
 There has been much debate on the concept itself, especially among European 
researches. Voters tend to change their party identification according to how they 
intend to vote or have voted. Moreover, voters may have several party 
identifications and may vote for the party they identify with, and they identify 
with that party because they have voted for it – leading to a tautology. Hence, the 
applicability of the concept itself decreases. (Budge et al. 1976; Thomassen 1976; 
Schmitt 2009.)  
 
3) Political-rational models 
 
Rational choice theories differ from the aforementioned approaches in 
emphasizing the individual as a conscious and deliberate actor who acts on the 
basis of her own unique preferences by weighing-up the costs and benefits of 
voting. These theories state that besides voters, parties also try to maximize their 
utility, as each potential outcome has its benefits and costs. Rational choice 
models grasp voting as a purely instrumental action.  
 The classic work in the field of rational choice theories in electoral studies is 
An economic theory of democracy (1957) by Downs. Inspiration for the rational 
calculations was derived from economic theories and the burden of the voter is to 
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be able to rank his preferences by evaluating past politics and the policy positions 
of parties and candidates (see Key, 1966). In the Downsian view, group appeals 
are merely a means of gathering support and ideologies are instrumental tools. 
Downs’ idea of spatial voting has given inspiration to proximity and directional 
voting; both of which are interested in the distances between voters and parties in 
various issues (see e.g. Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Listhaug et al. 1994).  
 The rational choice models have had their pitfalls in political reality. A sense 
of duty to vote and willingness or habit to show support for a certain party have 
outweighed the rational calculations that would lead to abstention or a thorough 
comparison of parties and candidates (Riker & Ordershook 1968, 28; Evans 2004, 
97–98).  
 
The funnel of causality and the present study  
  
As it has become evident, the sociological and socio-psychological models 
emphasize the long-term determinants of party choice, whereas rational choice 
models emphasize the more short-term influences of party choice. The funnel of 
causality, presented by the Michigan school, highlights the differences between 
the schools in relation to voting in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The funnel of causality (Campbell et al. 1960, presented in Jakobsen 
2013)  
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The axis of the funnel represents a time aspect; the closer the factors are to the 
final voting decision, the more immediate their effects should be. Social structural 
models represent underlying and fundamental factors behind party choice: social 
divisions, group loyalties and value orientations are located at the left end of the 
funnel.   
 Rational voting models are based on factors that have a more immediate effect 
on party choice at the right end of the funnel. From a funnel perspective, the 
present study analyses the significance of social divisions (labelled as social 
structural positions in this study) and how value orientations (labelled as 
values/attitudes in this study) are attached to them, affecting the vote. Hence, this 
study does not analyze, inter alia, the significance of economic structure, family 
influence, media influence, candidate evaluations, candidate images, 
campaigning strategies and economic conditions. To understand the origins and 
implications of the cleavage approach, a closer review of the Lipset-Rokkan-
model is needed next. 
 
3.1.2. The Lipset-Rokkan-model     
The Lipset-Rokkan-model was built to explain the birth and stability of party 
systems and the loyalties of social structural groups in their voting behavior. It 
showed that once modern party systems were established and parties had formed 
their core voter groups along social structural lines, it was difficult for new parties 
to emerge and it was unlikely for big upheavals to take place in elections, albeit in 
exceptional crisis circumstances. Some divisions in the political sphere became 
politicized and others did not, and parties in Western Europe gathered their 
support from core social groups on the basis of the cleavages. The model also 
explained how voting behavior contributed to the stability of the cleavage 
structures and party systems.   
 According to Lipset and Rokkan, party competition derives from tensions that 
were formed as a result of historical phases. The mechanism of conflict solving 
and its transformation into party systems is of essential importance in Lipset and 
Rokkan’s way of analyzing the cleavage structure. They (1967, 26) famously 
formulated that “cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a 
matter of course” as this requires the active role of the parties to politicize the 
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social divisions. They argued that critical junctures resulted in the formation of 
four pervasive cleavages: 
 
1. Central nation building culture vs. ethnically and linguistically distinct 
populations in the peripheries 
2. Standardizing nation-state vs. historical privileges of the church 
3. Landed interests vs. urban-industrial interests 
4. Owners vs. employees 
 
The first two of the cleavages stem from the critical juncture of National 
Revolution (the process of state building). The two latter are products of the 
Industrial Revolution, although the conflict between owners and employees was 
sharpened further by the Communist revolution. The National Revolution forced 
the population to choose a side in conflicts over values and cultural identities. 
The industrial revolution on the other hand forced citizenry to choose a side in 
terms of their economic interests. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 18–19.) 
 These historical cleavages can be divided into the same categories also in 
another sense. They suggest that horizontal conflicts (3&4), which deal with 
economy reforms, share of income and labor market issues, are easier to solve 
than vertical conflicts (1&2) centered on religion, ethnicity and language.11 The 
vertical conflicts cannot be traced back down to conflicts stemming from 
socioeconomic structure (cf. Zuckermann 1975, 234–235). There is also a varying 
hierarchy in the political weight of cleavages in each political system. 
 The innovative aspect in Lipset and Rokkan’s approach was that it showed the 
similarities and dissimilarities in cleavage structure in Western European 
countries. The first cleavage between dominant national culture and populations 
in the peripheries emerged primarily when those at the country’s socio-political 
‘center’ sought to standardize laws and cultures within the state’s boundaries in 
                                                            
11 Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 6–14) also speak of territorial and functional dimensions in analyzing 
the critical cleavages. The basis for this was the A-G-I-L-scheme, invented by Talcott Parsons 
(1953). Conflicts between the center and periphery and nation-state and church produced 
ideological opposition and handled integration at the i-end of the scheme. Rural vs. urban and 
owner vs. worker -conflicts produced interest-specific oppositions and handled economy (adaptive 
subsystem) at the a-end of the scheme. Still, it can be argued that the latter cleavages also included 
strong ideological oppositions. In the scope of this study, it is not reasonable to go further into this 
highly abstract scheme.   
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the name of state building. Ethno-linguistically distinct populations resisted this 
and tried to retain their autonomy. This cleavage has been present only in a 
handful of European democracies where small and persistent ethnic, linguistic 
and other cultural minorities have established themselves in party systems to 
protect their minority rights. (Gallagher et al. 2005, 265–266.)   
 The process of state-building created also another cleavage – between state-
builders and the church. Both the state and the church fought for the control of 
education, public morality and norms. In Catholic and religiously split countries 
this cleavage proved to be divisive. The Catholic Church tried to avoid the spread 
of secularizing tendencies and ensure the persistence of Catholic values. The 
parties of religious defense established themselves as broad mass movements. In 
Protestant countries, the churches were essentially national churches and they 
became the agents of the state after reformation. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 15, 38; 
Gallagher et al. 2005, 265.)  
 The third cleavage evolved around the conflict between rural/landed interests 
and the urban commercial and industrial interests brought on by the Industrial 
Revolution. The commercial and industrial sectors favoured the free market, 
which was opposed to the protected agricultural sector. In a way, this was a class 
cleavage too, as it was an economic conflict between people employed in different 
sectors (Knutsen 2007, 459). However, when treated as a broader rural-urban-
cleavage, it was also about deeper cultural conflicts between the countryside and 
cities. In most parts of Western Europe this conflict did not develop into a long-
lasting cleavage as mere conflicts in the commodity market could be chanelled, 
for example, through interest organizations. The tension proved to be important 
in the Nordic countries where peasants were opposed to the urban elite in both 
cultural-ideological and economical terms. This led to the formation of Agrarian 
parties, while Conservative and Liberal parties represented the expanding 
bourgeoisie and owners of enterprises. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 19–21; Arter 
2001 162–165.) 
 The most important and universal cleavage to emerge was the one between 
the working class and owners of capital (4). This cleavage between the poor 
workers and rich capitalists was intensified by workers feeling themselves 
economically and culturally alienated from the privileged elite and employers. 
The growing number of unsatisfied wage earners paved the way for trade unions 
 40 
 
and political parties to enhance the workers’ living conditions. The variation in 
the representation of workers’ interests in different countries dates largely back to 
the effects of the Russian revolution. It was then that the Communist parties 
sought a revolt into the whole political systems, while Social Democrats adopted 
pragmatic mechanisms to incorporate the ideals of socialism. Hence, the 
Communist Revolution did not generate new cleavages but accentuated the 
division between the bourgeois elite and the proletariat, which split into two 
camps – a socialist one and a communist one. In Scandinavia and Britain, the 
political elite integrated both workers and communist forces into political 
systems while in Southern European countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, 
the workers adopted a more radical agenda with anti-system segments. (Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967, 21–22, 49; Gallagher et al. 2005, 268–269.)  
 As the clash between the workers and bourgeoisie was a comprehensive and 
universal phenomenon, class cleavage has become the most common and 
standardizing cleavage in Western societies. It has therefore also been the most 
analyzed cleavage in comparative studies (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 42; Evans ed. 
1999). According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the crucial differences among 
party systems ultimately reflect differences in the national histories of conflict 
and compromises across three cleavage lines – center-periphery, state-church and 
land-urban. The cleavages, critical events, conflicts and party families attached to 
the cleavages are presented in Table 3.1. The Finnish parties attached with these 
cleavages are dealt with in detail in Chapter 3.3.   
 Although the conflicts emerged between social structural groups, it is also 
important to point out the often forgotten view that the shaping of party systems 
was influenced by political issues linked to the interests of a certain social 
structural group. Liberal parties wanted to promote individual freedom and 
remove old privileges in societies, while Conservative parties wanted to promote 
the church and the military establishment. The breakthrough of the Socialists was 
based on promising better working and social conditions for the workers. 
Agrarian parties, in turn, prioritized agricultural issues. (Borre 2001, 9–11.) 
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Table 3.1. The background of cleavages and their transformation into party 
families (modified from Klingemann et al. 1994) 
 
Cleavage Critical juncture Conflict Party family Party representative  
        in Finland 
Center -  Reformation - National vs. supra- Ethnically and  The Swedish 
Periphery Counter-Reformation national religion; linguistically  People's Party 
 16
th-17th  centuries linguistic confrontations based parties   
State- National Revolution Secular vs. religious Religious parties 
 
Church 1789 and after control of mass 
  
  
Education 
  
Land - Industrial Revolution Tariff levels for  Agrarian parties;  The Agrarian League 
Industry 19th century agricultural products; Conservative and  The National 
  
control vs. freedom for Liberal parties Coalition Party 
    Enterprise   The Liberals 
Owner- The Russian Revolution Integration into national Socialist and  The Social Democrats 
Worker 1917 polity vs. commitment to Communist  The Communist Party 
  
international revolutionary parties 
 
  
Movement 
  
 
 
The most famous conclusion that Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50) came to, was the 
freezing of the party systems. According to them, ‘the party systems of the 1960s 
reflected, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s’. 
This indicated that both party systems and cleavage structures had stabilized. 
Cleavages persisted because they concerned interests, which remained relevant 
for the groups involved. For example, the cleavage between capitalists and 
workers remains essential as long as the sides felt that they have common 
interests worth fighting for. For example, when the distinctiveness of being a 
worker, a Catholic or a farmer becomes blurred, or when the division to different 
groups is no longer politically relevant, the significance of the cleavage at hand 
should decrease. (Dalton 2002; Gallagher et al. 2005, 273–274) 
 Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized that the parties which were able to 
establish mass organizations and gain power before the final wave of mass voter 
mobilization have been most enduring and successful. Through social groups, 
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political parties were able to institutionalize a firm support base. In each election, 
parties automatically turned on to their own core groups, which voted somewhat 
ritually for the same party, thus narrowing the support potential for newcomers. 
Finally, electoral rules also tended to protect the established interests. 
Proportional representation electoral systems were adopted in certain countries 
to protect the minorities and they encouraged competition to be developed along 
several cleavage lines (Switzerland, Finland), while in other countries majority 
systems often squeezed the competition around one salient cleavage (e.g. Great 
Britain).  
 Party politics and ideological conflicts seemed to have stabilized after the 
Second World War. Lipset and Rokkan indeed had a firm backing from the 1950s 
and 1960s, when changes were modest in elections and party systems, to support 
their analysis of stable party systems and cleavages. Kircheimer (1966) named it 
as the era of waning opposition and Bell (1965) even anticipated an end of 
ideology as he claimed that political ideas had reached a saturation point. This 
political consensus was accompanied by an increase in wealth and prosperity in 
rebuilt Europe. The validity of the straight-forward relationship between social 
structure and party preferences was thoroughly examined by both Rose & Urwin 
(1969) and Rose (1974), who found support for stable voting behavior along 
cleavage lines (for a critique of these early studies, see Knutsen 2004a, 6–9).  But 
the claimed stability soon became challenged.  
 Already at the beginning of 1970s, political scientists started to talk about 
major societal and electoral change in Western Europe (and at large in the 
Western World) that set into question the applicability of the cleavage 
approach.12 The modernization processes, expansion of education, social 
mobility, secularization and urbanization, inter alia, eroded the base for stability. 
The number of mobile voters increased, which led to an increase in electoral 
volatility and a reshuffle in party-voter ties.  
 Next, it is highlighted how the Lipset-Rokkan-model of stable party systems 
with the members of old party families dominating the party scene has prevailed 
in contemporary West European party systems. The point is hence to indicate the 
                                                            
12 In fact Lipset and Rokkan anticipated that change might be just around the corner at the end of 
the 1960s due to growing citizen activism and radicalism.  
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extent to which old, historically class-based parties are supported in relation to 
new ones and compare the Finnish party system to other party systems.  
 
3.1.3 The legacy of the Lipset-Rokkan-model in West European party systems 
Table 3.2 represents the electoral support of parties belonging to the same party 
family, i.e. representing a certain ideological orientation, at the beginning of the 
21st century. The party families to the left of the table, Ethnic-regional, Christian 
Democrat, Centre-Agrarian, Liberal, Conservative and Social Democrat party 
families are old ones, which belong to the Lipset-Rokkan-model. Obviously, there 
is heterogeneity in the historical background of the parties belonging to a certain 
party family. However, the same underlying ideological orientation bundles them 
together. The Christian Democratic party family is a special case in the sense that 
in Catholic and religiously mixed countries it has stemmed from the historical 
church-state cleavage, whereas the Christian parties were established in Nordic 
protestant countries much later as a counter-reaction to the secularization and 
disrespect of traditional moral values (Freston 2004; Hanley 2008: 86). The party 
family located furthest to the left entails both Communist and New Left parties, 
since it was impossible to separate the support for these parties in some countries 
(see Appendix). Two party families are genuinely new, namely the Nationalist-
Populist party family and the Green party family.  
 Ethnic–regionalist parties are represented in the parliament only in Belgium, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy13 and Finland. 
Finland is the sole country, where a representative of this party family, the 
Swedish People’s Party, a historical language party, has constantly received 
governmental power at the national level. Hence, solely in terms of party 
representation, the ethno-linguistic cleavage is of little importance in 
contemporary West European party systems. Instead, ethno-linguistic cleavages 
                                                            
13 The support of the Faroese and Greenlandic parties in Denmark, Ticino League in Switzerland 
and Südtiroler Volkspartei in Italy are not included in Table 3.2 as their support has not exceeded 
an average of 1 per cent of the national vote in parliamentary elections in 2000–2013. Lega Nord is 
not regarded as an ethnic-regionalist but as a nationalist-populist party with the nationalism being 
in this case explicated in the conceived superiority of the Padania region. The ethnic-regionalist 
parties in the French parliament come from overseas departments.  
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have been of increasing scholarly interest in rising democracies outside Europe 
(see e.g. Mozarraf, Scarrit & Calaigh 2003; Raymond 2015).  
  
Table 3.2 The mean electoral support for parties in different party families in 19 
West European countries in 2000-201314 (Source: NSD 2013)  
 
Country Party family               
       
COM/ 
  
 
ETH- 
 
AGR- 
   
NEW  NAT- 
 
 
REG CD CENT LIB CONS SD LEFT POP GRE 
FINLAND 4.5 4.7 21.2 – 20.4 21.7 8.9 8.3 7.9 
Austria – 34.2 – – – 33.7 – 17.8 10.3 
Belgium 9.9 16.8 – 23.0 – 24.0 – 13.9 7.9 
Denmark – 1.4 28.3 9.2 8.7 26.3 12.4 12.9 – 
France – – – 7.4 33.3 26.1 5.3 11.2 4.4 
Germany – 35.8 – 10.6 – 31.9 8.2 – 9.1 
Greece – – – – 35.3 34.0 16.1 5.7 – 
Iceland – – 16.7 6.2 32.0 24.3 14.1 – – 
Ireland – 28.6 – 2.2 33.5 13.5 – – 3.5 
Italy – 4.4 – 5.7 34.6 26.6 5.3 5.1 – 
Luxemburg – 37.1 – 15.5 9.0 22.5 2.6 – 11.7 
Malta – 48.2 – – – 50.4 – – – 
the Netherlands – 24.0 – 24.2 – 21.6 9.7 10.8 5.1 
Norway – 8.2 6.1 4.6 17.5 30.8 9.2 19.9 – 
Portugal – – – – 43.7 36.9 13.6 – – 
Spain 6.5 – – – 41.2 35.2 5.3 – – 
Sweden – 7.1 6.9 9.3 23.9 35.2 6.6 3.4 5.7 
Switzerland – 16.0 – 18.5 1.8 20.5 – 27.4 8.5 
United Kingdom 1.7 – – 21.1 33.4 35.0 – – – 
All 1.1 14.2 4.1 7.9 19.2 29.0 6.2 6.8 3.9 
 
 
                                                            
14ETH-REG=Ethnic-regional, CD=Christian Democratic, AGR-CENT=Centre-Agrarian, 
LIB=Liberal, CONS=Conservative, SD=Social Democratic, COM/NEW LEFT=Communist/New 
Left, NAT-POP=Nationalist-Populist, GRE=Green. Only those parties that can be placed in one of 
the party families and which have been represented in the parliament in the 21st century and whose 
average electoral support in parliamentary elections exceeds 1 % in the time period have been taken 
into account. Thus, the Cinque Stelle Movimento, for example, with 25.6 % of the vote in the Italian 
parliamentary election in 2013 would have been taken into account in terms of electoral success but 
it could not be placed in any of the party families. The categorization of individual parties into the 
party families (see Appendix) has been made on the basis of the historical-ideological basis of the 
parties, current ideological profile and the Euro parliament-group to which they belong to, as the 
Euro-parties are grouped largely in terms of party families (see Hanley 2004; Gallagher et al. 2011).   
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The Christian Democratic party family is the party family that is most attached to 
the old cleavage between church and state. Nowadays, conflicts between the 
church and state are more settled and Christian parties are mainstream parties in 
the centre-right-position of the political spectrum, emphasizing social and moral 
concerns. Religiosity can be seen in reactions to family policies and moral 
questions (Gallagher et al. 2005 241–244; Hanley 2008: 86). Strong and old 
Christian Democrat parties occur only in Catholic or religiously mixed countries 
(such as those in Austria and Germany), whereas the parties that have been 
established later, (such as those in Finland and Sweden) have remained more 
marginal in the parliament.  
 There are only a few parties that have their roots in the land-industry-
cleavage: the parliamentary representation of Centre-Agrarian parties is 
restricted to the Nordic countries in Western Europe. In many other countries, 
tensions between rural and urban interests are no longer present in the party 
system. Comparatively, the strong support of the agrarian-based Centre Party is 
the peculiarity of Finland. The other strong agrarian-based Centre Party is in 
Denmark. However, the Danish Venstre has moved far beyond agricultural and 
rural interests as its emphasis nowadays is on economic liberalism and a free 
market ideology, as it has extended its appeal, to a growing extent, towards urban 
voters (Gallagher et al. 2011, 286; Bengtsson et al. 2013, 163, 206).  
 The Liberal party family is contrary to the Ethnic-Regionalist and Centre-
Agrarian party families represented in the majority of West European party 
systems at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the average electoral 
support of Liberal parties in West European countries is not high (roughly 8 per 
cent). The liberal party family is the only old party family, which is not any longer 
represented in the Finnish parliament, which is one of the biggest changes in the 
Finnish party system in the long run. 
 It is common that there is one strong conservative party in each party system, 
which represents either the Christian Democratic or the Conservative party 
family. From a class cleavage perspective, Conservative parties have been the 
most important counterforce to left-wing parties (Gallagher et al. 2011, 257). The 
electoral support for this party family has been the second highest after the Social 
Democrats. The Social Democratic party family has had by far the highest 
support in Western Europe in 2000–2013. However, the support for Social 
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Democrats has been in a steady and slow decline, with the pattern continuing in 
the elections in the 21st century (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 241).This pattern is also 
matched in Finland, where the Social Democratic Party has lost its once 
dominant position. The Finnish Social Democrats had an average electoral 
support slightly above 20 per cent in 2000–2013, similar to the representatives of 
the Conservative and the Centre-Agrarian party family.  
 The most left-wing party family contains a split to old parties that have been 
traditionally anchored in class cleavage and to new parties representing new 
kinds of political conflicts. In some countries the Communist parties have 
continued to exist while in others, like in Finland, New Left parties have been 
built on the ruins of old Communist parties. In addition, some New Left parties 
have been formed on a new value basis independently from Communist 
tradition. In 2000–2013 the Finnish Left Alliance has had an 8.9 per cent average 
electoral support while the average support for the parties belonging to the party 
families furthest to the left is roughly six per cent.  
 Hence, it can be stated that the old party families continue to thrive in West 
European countries even at the beginning of the 21st century, even though their 
electoral support has been declining. The Green party family, and especially the 
Nationalist-Populist party family, have represented a challenge for the members 
of the old party families. Nationalist-Populist parties have their ideological core 
in the populist way of emphasizing the divide between the elite and people, 
nativism and the homogenous nation-state, and in seeing external influences as a 
threat to the traditional national way of life and to the ordinary, indigenous 
people (see e.g. Taggart 2000; Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007).15  
 The Nationalist-Populist party family has been the dominating party family in 
Switzerland and has fared well also in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and Norway; and recently also in Finland. The success of nationalist-
populist parties has been regarded as a sign of new conflicts taking place in the 
electoral competition (see e.g. Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007). The 
success of the Green parties has been more modest than the one of nationalist-
                                                            
15 Contrary to many other studies, this party family is not labelled Radical Right Populist since there 
are some important centrist populist parties with a nationalist agenda (see for example the 
borderline case of the True Finns in Paloheimo & Raunio 2008, 213 cf. Arter 2010). The label 
Nationalist-Populist party family is more inclusive.  
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populist parties. The origin of the Green party family is in the ecological 
awakening in the 1970s, when ecological concerns challenged material well-being 
and economic growth. There are only a few West European countries where the 
Greens have polled better than in Finland in the 21st century. The Green parties 
have established themselves in the West European party systems by emphasizing 
postmaterialist concerns (Gallagher et al. 2011, 251–252) 
 Table 3.3 concludes the results of Table 3.2 by summing up the number of 
party families represented in each West European party system. The criterion for 
representation is mean electoral support exceeding four percentage points.16 
Whereas the Social Democrats are represented in each party system, the Liberals, 
Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Communist/New Left parties, Nationalist-
Populist parties and Green parties are represented in ten to thirteen countries. 
The Centre-Agrarian parties are represented in five party systems and Ethnic-
Regionalist parties exceed the 4 per cent threshold only in Finland and Spain.  
 Finland is the only West European country where eight out of nine party 
families are represented, with only Sweden coming close to that. The recent 
success of the Nationalist-Populist Swedish Democrats in the 2014 parliamentary 
election also means that Sweden should be considered as a party system where 
eight party families are represented in a stable manner. The eight represented 
party families in Finland include both the old parties, which have their basis in 
historical cleavages and in the Lipset-Rokkan-model, and the members of new 
party families, which have accentuated other kinds of conflicts and challenged the 
old parties. This points to the possibility of a diverse cleavage structure and 
accentuates the need of evaluating the old and new cleavage bases and the 
connections between cleavage elements. In the next chapter, the focus is shifted 
to the interplay between social structural positions, values and attitudes and party 
choice. 
 
 
                                                            
16 As the legal/formal thresholds in parliamentary elections is set at the highest on 4 or 5 percentage 
points in West European countries that have one, the limit here is set on 4 percentage points (see 
Banducci & Karp 2009). It is sufficiently high to exclude the party families that do not have much 
influence on the party system in a given country.  
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Table 3.3 The summary of the existence of party families in 19 West European 
countries in 2000-2013  
 
Country Party family       COM/       
 
ETH- 
 
AGR- 
   
NEW  NAT- 
  
 
REG CD CENT LIB CONS SD LEFT POP GRE Altogether 
FINLAND x x x – x x x x x 8 
Austria – x – – – x – x x 4 
Belgium – x – x – x – x x 5 
Denmark – – x x x x – x – 5 
France – – – x x x x x x 6 
Germany – x – x – x x – x 5 
Greece – – – – x x x x – 4 
Iceland – – x x x x x – – 5 
Ireland – x – – x x – – – 3 
Italy – x – x x x x x – 6 
Luxemburg – x – x x x – – x 5 
Malta – x – – – x – – – 2 
the Netherlands – x – x – x x x x 6 
Norway – x x x x x x x – 7 
Portugal – – – – x x x – – 3 
Spain x – – – x x x – – 4 
Sweden – x x x x x x – x 7 
Switzerland – x – x – x – x x 5 
United Kingdom – – – x x x – – – 3 
All 2 12 5 12 13 19 11 10 10 3.9 
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3.2. Erosion or update of cleavages? 
In the following, an overview of the metamorphosis of the West European 
cleavage structure will be given. Thus, the wider framework of cleavages is 
discussed before analyzing the Finnish case more in detail. In regards to the 
cleavage approach, it can be said that a) social structure and identities/cohesion 
based on social structural position have changed; b) old political parties have 
needed to adapt, update their electoral strategies, while new parties that 
politicized new issues have emerged and taken their place in the party systems; c) 
values and attitudes have started to play a larger role in electoral choices and a 
shift has occurred in people’s value basis; d) the cleavage structure, on the whole, 
has been challenged.   
 All of these aspects, which represent a challenge to the validity of the classic 
cleavage model, are looked into thoroughly in the subsequent chapters. By doing 
so, the need of and voids in cleavage research become more apparent. The critical 
guiding question for the following subchapters is then ‘why should we care about 
cleavages and why is the cleavage approach relevant even at the beginning of the 
21st century? The emphasis here is on analyzing the cleavage approach from four 
perspectives: a) social structural position and group-based identity; b) party-voter 
ties from a social structural perspective; c) the move towards values and attitudes; 
d) the search for new cleavages.  
 
3.2.1. Social structural position and group identity 
The rapid change in social structure, economic structure and surrounding 
societal environment that took place in Western societies, especially during the 
latter half of the 20th century, changed the structural basis of cleavages. First, the 
service sector grew immensely at the cost of agriculture and heavy industry after 
the Second World War in Western Europe, especially from the 1960s onwards 
(see Gallagher et al. 2005, 277). The gradual shift into post-industrialist societies 
meant, first and foremost, that the composition and size of occupational social 
classes changed dramatically. The group stratifications derived from the 
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industrial revolution became evermore outdated (Bell 1973).17 Second, the 
declining agricultural sector and the shrinking number of rural residents were 
due to a changed economic structure and urbanization, leading eventually to the 
weakening of rural interests. Third, secularization processes eroded the base for 
religious cleavages in Western Europe. The ethno-linguistic cleavage has been the 
only one not affected by such turbulence: the share of politically relevant ethno-
linguistic minorities has remained stable. The change in social structural 
positions that are a part of the Lipset-Rokkan-model is handled in more detail in 
the next section.  
 
Social class 
 
As regards to social classes, the change in economic structure decreased the share 
of the working class and a large service sector emerged. As this was in interaction 
with the rise in educational levels, it meant the well-known expansion of a better-
educated middle class at the expense of the working class (see e.g. Dogan 2001; 
Mair et al. 2004; Gallagher et al. 2011). The new middle-class did not become that 
interested in economic conflicts and was so broad that there was no longer any 
firm ground to support any common middle-class interests (Eriksson & 
Goldthorpe 1992; Dalton 2008, 151.). The class consciousness of the working 
class weakened when the need to push class struggle further decreased. When 
many central goals of the working class were achieved, there was less demand for 
class propaganda: the unionized workers in key industries achieved a comfortable 
income level, which was not anymore a direct reflection of one’s class. Hence, 
inequalities in societies became more distantly related to social class than before. 
Furthermore, the decline in labor union strength affected the potentials of the 
working class as a political actor (Dalton et al. 1984, 15–17; Dogan 2001, 109–
111; Trigilia 2011, 271–275).  
 As the coherence of classes weakened, the concept of a social class also needed 
updating. Old class concepts based on the Marxian class struggle were replaced 
by conceiving class as a combination of skills and the degree of autonomy related 
                                                            
17 Furthermore, events such as the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union furthered the decay of solid class images (Dogan 2001, 96).   
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to work (Eriksson & Goldthorpe 1992; cf. Olin Wright 1985).18 Further 
elaborations have aimed to recognize changes associated with post-industrialism 
and differentiate post-industrial categories from the more traditional categories 
(Esping-Andersen 1993).19 In comparison to the heydays of class politics, when 
social class determined political identity and behavior (see Franklin et al. 1992, 
386), it is difficult to redefine social classes in a way that the constituted classes 
would be particularly self-aware of their class positions. People are no longer that 
integrated into class networks and the barriers between social groups have 
lowered significantly (Dalton 2008, 151–152). Hence, the concrete common 
interests of people belonging to different classes are even more crucial to be 
detected in the form of values and attitudes, as group identity and consciousness 
have weakened.  
 
Religion 
 
The structural basis for the religious cleavage has been eroding as both church 
membership and religious identities have lost ground in Western Europe when 
coming into the 21st century. Secularization has meant a decreasing importance 
of authority and religious practices. The historically strong antagonism between 
the church and state has largely vanished and institutions that once had religious 
affiliations are becoming more secular. Moreover, the public sphere and moral 
norms today have a less distinctive religious character and there has been an 
obvious decrease in church-going and in a lifestyle sustaining traditional 
Christianity. (Sommerville 1998, 250–251.) 
 Religion has lost much of its relevance, especially among the youngest 
generations in Western Europe. As such, although people still express a formal 
belief in God, the vitality of religion has eroded steadily (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 
3–4; cf. Kaufmann et al. 2012).20 In Catholic countries, the church-state-cleavage 
                                                            
18 This in fact reminds somewhat of the Weberian view of conceiving social classes (see Trigilia 
2011, 271). 
19 The class categorizations are looked more into detail in Chapter 4.2.1 when occupational class is 
operationalized for the analysis.  
20 Yet, a new uprising of religious confrontations and religious fundamentalism is found in third-
world countries, especially, as well as in the USA. Thus, Norris and Inglehart (2004) remind that it 
is misleading to talk about secularization as an all-encompassing concept. Religion appears to be an 
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has eroded partly because of the weakened role of the Catholic Church and less 
frequent church attendance, even though church membership is still at a high 
level. In Protestant Northern Europe, although the church-state-cleavage was not 
established in the same way, there has been a further decrease in the belief in God 
as well as a decrease in Church membership (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 74, 90). 
Nevertheless, the rise of secularization in the Nordic countries has not been 
without any counter-reactions: revivalist movements have remained strong and 
active church-goers have stood in opposition to the diminishing role of religion 
in society (Freston 2004, 33–34; Nykänen 2012).  
 
Rural-urban/land-industry 
 
The change in economic structure and community structure meant that the basis 
for the cleavage between landed and urban industrial-commercial interests 
became eroded. Urbanization was initially driven by decreasing employment 
opportunities in the agricultural sector, furthered by the increased life 
opportunities that the cities had to offer. Today, tensions revolve less around 
landed and industrial-commercial interests.21 Also the broader tensions between 
rural and urban interests have become less topical, due to internal migration 
from countryside to cities, which has left rural interests increasingly unnoticed. 
Nevertheless, despite being pushed to the margin, rural interests are still 
represented in some party systems, such as in Finland. In these cases, however, 
the differing interests also deal with other issues than landed interests linked to 
agriculture. One such issue deals with an encompassing confrontation that has 
developed between people living in remote areas and cities. This issue, 
concerning the life opportunities in every part of the country, provides the rural 
population, especially, with a sense of identity that is worth fighting for in the 
political arena (see Knutsen 2004a, 132–133; Ruostetsaari 2011). Hence in a 
modern form, a rural-urban-cleavage should be more about the type of 
                                                                                                                                                    
increasingly important component of public culture and there is an ever-extending debate on 
political religions and religious nationalism (Turner 2011). 
21 When these clashing interests are raised in EU-countries nowadays, they mostly deal with clashes 
concerning subsidies for the agricultural sector, albeit without any obvious linkages to the 
representation of farmers’ interests in the party system (Gallagher et al. 2005, 268). 
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residential area, irrespective of sector interests (agriculture vs. commercial-
industrial).  
 
Ethnic background and language 
 
Of the Lipset-Rokkan cleavages, the cleavage between center and ethno-linguistic 
peripheries has had a firm structural basis in members of ethnic and linguistic 
minorities22. The main reason is that ethnic background and native language are 
persistent: they are descended from one generation to another more naturally 
than class, religiosity or residence (Mair 2001, 29–30). Moreover, ethnic 
background and language provide people with a distinctive, self-aware identity. 
Recently, ethnic and linguistic identities have even experienced a reincarnation of 
sorts, as they have been placed more upfront as a result of increasing demands on 
regional autonomy and extended cultural rights (Türsan 1998, 1–4). In other 
words, the revival of ‘new localism’ has meant the resurgence of ethno-regional 
identity (Tossutti 2002, 53).  
 
3.2.2. Party-voter ties from a social structural perspective 
The change in the composition and cohesion of social structural groups resulted 
in changes in party-voter ties, of which two major trends have been documented. 
First, the loyalty of social structural groups to their ‘own’ party has decreased. As 
a result, cleavage lines have become more blurred in voting behavior. Second, the 
parties have realized that they can no longer appeal merely to their core group; 
they have had to broaden their electoral appeal. Thus, tendencies both in the 
electorate and in the party sphere side loosened the ties between voters and 
parties that were found to be strong in the Lipset-Rokkan-model.  
 
  
                                                            
22 Minority Rights Group (1997) has named three main categories of minorities: a. indigenous 
peoples, b. historical minorities and c. new minorities. Three examples of categories are a. Sami 
people in Lapland. b. Swedish-speaking Finns c. Kosovars who have settled in a new country after 
fleeing from their home due to the Yugoslavian war. In this study, the historical minorities (b) are 
of interest from the cleavage perspective.  
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Social class and party choice 
 
The decline in class voting is one of the most documented patterns in cleavage 
studies (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 
1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Evans & De Graaf 2013). Franklin and colleagues (1992; 
2009) found that even though the timing in the decline varied between West 
European countries, it was eventually steep everywhere by the 1990s. Voters had 
released themselves from the ‘straight-jacket of class voting’ (van der Eijk et al. 
1992, 409). Although people did not become unaware of class cues, they became 
more irrelevant to them. In other words, classes no longer voted in such unified 
patterns as before. However, despite, the downward trend in class consciousness 
and class voting, certain parties still have their support basis in the lower classes, 
as do certain parties in the upper classes. 
 The ties between working-class and left-wing parties have eroded the most 
over time. Irrespective of the measure for class voting23, the results have tended to 
point to the same direction: the ability of social class to predict a vote for a left-
wing party has decreased. The electoral ties between other occupational classes 
and parties also loosened, but to a lesser extent (see e.g. Dogan 1995; Nieuwbeerta 
1995; Benoit & Laver 2006; Knutsen 2006; Dalton 2008, 153; Gallagher et al. 
2011). Cross-national studies have showed that although class is still related to 
vote choice in 21st century Western Europe, the relationship is relatively modest 
(e.g. Dalton 2008 153–154; Oskarson 2005, 93–96; Franklin 2009). Knutsen 
(2007, 476) anticipates that class voting is unlikely to experience a new rise in the 
future, unless there emerges a sharper polarization in the political issues that class 
is attached to.  
                                                            
23 The most simplified an common measure has been the Alford-index (Alford 1963), which 
measures the extent to which support for the left is greater among the working class than among 
the middle class. However, this index does not take into account the general shifts in party 
popularity, which can lead to mix correlations between class and vote with changes in party 
popularity (Oskarson 2005, 93). The shifts in electoral support from a party’s ‘own’ group tend to 
overemphasize the decrease in class voting as the size occupational groups have changed 
dramatically (Pesonen et al. 1993, 106). Thomsen-index in turn examines for instance the 
likelihood of a working class voter to vote for a Socialist party. One of the most recent methods in 
research focused on class voting has been to use kappa index with more complex class 
categorizations. (Oskarson 2005, 93.) 
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Religion and party choice 
 
Early studies found that religion, alongside social class, had a major impact on 
party choice.24 However, the explanatory power of denomination on party choice 
has decreased: the fact that many voters habitually belong to the church has no 
political manifestation (Knutsen 2004a, 59, 102). Nevertheless, the decrease in 
denominational voting is more country-specific than the universal decrease in 
class-voting (see Knutsen 1995; Esmer & Pettersson 2007, 499; Dalton 2008, 
156).25 As such, even though there are fewer denominational or religious voters, 
those voters have maintained largely distinct voting patterns, which explains why 
religious voting has proved to be more persistent than class voting (Oskarson 
2005, 94–95). Religious denomination has been an important factor when 
explaining the dichotomous socialist/non-socialist party choice, due to the old 
anti-clerical background of socialist parties and the religious nature of Christian 
Democrat/Conservative parties. Moreover, the growing number of secular voters 
might even have strengthened the need to preserve Christianity in politics. But 
the overall ability of religious characteristics to explain party choice is weakening. 
(Knutsen 2004b.) Thus, although religion constitutes a cleavage base that strongly 
affects niche voters, it is irrelevant to the majority of voters.  
 
Rural-urban-residence and party choice 
 
The connection between rural-urban residence and party choice has not been 
particularly high in many West European countries. Since the 1970s, the 
predictive value of rural-urban residence for party choice has been decreasing 
further, although not in a unified manner (Knutsen 2004a, 133–136). In their 
wide comparison of Western countries from the 1960s to the late 1980s, Franklin 
and colleagues (1992) discovered that rural-urban residence was not a strong 
                                                            
24 Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Rokkan (1960) concluded that class is the most important cleavage 
basis as the electoral support of parties was primarily based on either lower classes or the middle 
and upper classes. Rose and Urwin (1969, 12; see also Rose 1974) argued that religious divisions, 
not class, were the main social basis of parties.   
25 The religious cleavage has also been analyzed in the light of church attendance and party choice. 
Remarkably persistent voting patterns have been found despite secularization, especially in Catholic 
and religiously mixed countries (see e.g. Dalton 2008, Knutsen 2004a). However, as church 
attendance is not a structural quality, but a manifestation of religiosity, it is not analyzed here 
further.  
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predictor of socialist/non-socialist party choice. The exceptions, however, are 
found in the Nordic countries, especially in Finland, where the rural-urban 
cleavage was politicized already at the beginning of the 20th century, with farmers 
finding their political home in a Centre-Agrarian Party. Outside the Nordic 
countries, the rural-urban basis is hence seldom brought up in Western Europe 
as a cleavage basis affecting party choice, whereas in parts of Eastern Europe it is 
more relevant (see Berglund, Ekman & Aarebrot ed. 2004).  
 
Ethnic background and language and party choice 
 
The effect of the ethno-linguistic social structural position on party choice can be 
examined in two different ways. One option is to examine how uniformly people 
living in a particular region tend to vote for a certain party (e.g. Caramani 2004, 
Knutsen 2010a). The other option is to explore the effect of belonging to an 
ethnic/linguistic minority on party choice (e.g. De Winter 1998, Bengtsson 2011). 
The problem with the first approach is that it stems from the idea that the socio-
political center is set against a culturally and ethnically distinct population. 
However, the fact that the support of a party is regionally skewed does not 
necessarily mean that it represents the kind of autonomous interests that are 
attached to the cleavage.26 From a cleavage perspective, only the regions, which 
represent culturally distinct minorities, are relevant. 
 Despite previous research that has showed a general decline in the effect of a 
social structural position on party choice (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta 
1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Knutsen 2006; Evans & De Graaf 2013), 
ethnicity and language have remained robust as dividing lines in voting behavior. 
It has been argued that many ethno-linguistic minorities in Western Europe have 
strong incentives to concentrate their votes to a party that represents minority 
interests (Deegan-Krause 2007, 549; Bengtsson 2011). Moreover, when ethno-
linguistic minorities are geographically concentrated it is easier to maintain a 
common identity and interests. This, in turn, can be reflected in loyalty for a 
                                                            
26 To take an example, the support of Centre-Agrarian parties tends to lean towards regions that are 
geographically peripheral and agrarian. These parties do not represent the autonomous demands of 
regions or the interests of ethnic minorities.  
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certain party, which has been the case in countries, such as Finland and Spain, 
with politically prominent ethno-linguistic minorities (see Caramani 2004, 89).27  
 
The transformation of political parties 
 
As we have witnessed, the previously close ties between social structural groups 
and political parties, that used to stabilize party support, have eroded by a notable 
extent. Partly, this was the result of the weakened incentives for choosing a party 
merely on the grounds of group interests; and partly the result of parties choosing 
to appeal to a larger electorate than their core clientele. As such, parties have been 
forced to rethink their electoral strategies.  
 The Socialist parties have sought to attract votes beyond the working class, the 
Agrarian parties beyond farmers, and the Religious parties beyond strongly 
religious voters. As a result, parties are no longer so uniformly class-based: 
working class voters constitute a smaller share of the electorate of a Socialist party 
than before, for example. Only small parties with a special clientele, such as 
ethno-linguistic and regional parties, could stick to their familiar but restricted 
target groups (Mair 2001, 26). Kircheimer (1966) argued in his article “The 
transformation of the Western European Party Systems” that major parties were 
forced to transform from class-based mass parties to so-called catch-all parties in 
order to succeed, which would eventually lead to a transformation of West 
European party systems. This strategy meant a drastic reduction in ideological 
profile, a strengthening of leadership and a decreasing importance of loyal party 
members (Krouwel 2003, 28). When parties have focused on seeking votes from 
where the majority of the electorate is situated ideologically, they have tended to 
become more moderate, more centrist and more similar to each other – except in 
the countries where there have been deeply rooted controversies between 
different segments in society, such as in Belgium where the party system is 
characterized by a deep linguistic divide (Puhle 2002, 60–69).28 
                                                            
27 Furthermore, in Great Britain and Italy there has been some trend towards reterritorialization of 
voting behavior. In the former, both the Scottish National Party and the Welsh, Plaid Cymru, have 
gathered votes from their own territories, and in the latter, Lega Nord in Northern Italy has 
succeeded by demanding more autonomy to the wealthy Northern regions. 
28 The ideal typologies of Kircheimer have never fully fitted the real-life political parties. The extent 
to which they resembled the catch-all party that Kircheimer described depends on the country and 
party system at hand, historical legacies, salient cleavages, electoral system, etc.   
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A further development in the nature of political parties has taken place from the 
1980s onwards, as the linkages between political parties and their allied 
organizations, such as labor unions, religious groups or agricultural producers’ 
center unions have loosened. Parties have begun to emphasize more short-term 
programmatic and electoral appeals with a reduced capacity for social integration 
and have been labelled as electoral-professional parties. (Panebianco 1988, 263; 
Katz 1990; Puhle 2002, 60–69.)29   
 The characterizations mentioned above do not seem to fit to a cleavage-based 
approach. If the modern parties do not seek to establish stable electoral linkages 
by appealing to specific social structural groups, then traditional cleavage-politics 
is on a weak basis (see Katz & Mair 2002, 132). However, as Gunther and 
Diamond (2003, 191–192) point out, for example, different types of parties have 
different strategies to mobilize voters. Therefore, it is beneficial for the parties to 
have some ideologically distinctive features that appeal to their most loyal 
supporters, even though the parties have begun to shy away from having a too 
restrictive appeal to certain social groups – to a greater extent, they seek to 
politicize value bases by taking positions on political issues (see Enyedi 2008; 
Oskarson 2005, 85).   
 Dealignment and realignment are processes that have indicated the erosion of 
persistent party-voter ties. Put briefly, dealignment occurs when voters no longer 
feel as close to the political parties as they used to and the parties are not able to 
respond to new concerns arising in post-industrialist societies. Recently, voters 
have become increasingly disengaged from conventional party politics, old 
cleavage politics and the interests that the old parties represent. The fact that 
voters no longer feel that parties and elections matter so much can be seen in 
both decrease in party loyalty and turnout (Dalton et al. 1984; Mair 2002, 
133,138; Gallagher et al. 2005). The realignment thesis, however, suggests that 
voters have de-aligned from the structural basis of old cleavage-based politics and 
realigned with new kinds of identities and values instead (handled in more detail 
in the next chapter). Moreover, the realignment thesis neglects the scenario that 
                                                            
29 Also the concept of cartel party has been brought up. Cartel parties have ceased to operate as a 
mediator between civil society and the state and have instead become agents of the state. They are 
orientated towards protecting the acquired benefits and sharing power with other established 
parties since they realize that there are common interests among the “political class” (Katz & Mair 
1995 8–18; Detterbeck 2005, 173–175; cf. Wolinetz 2002, 148–149). 
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dealignment would be a permanent state of affairs. (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 
1984, 455–456; cf. Aardal 1994, 228.)  
 As voters turned their backs on the older parties, new parties such as 
nationalist-populist, New Left and Green parties appear to appeal to a substantial 
part of the electorate in Western Europe. However Mair, Müller and Plasser 
(2004, 4) have argued that the support for new parties has not meant a 
realignment in the sense that there would have been major shifts to new party 
families. Rather, it seems more appropriate to talk about a limited realignment, as 
the basis of the party systems has not been changed in general. Only when new 
patterns of party support become stabilized, can we speak of realignment; if the 
patterns remain fluctuating and unpredictable, it is more suitable to talk about 
dealignment.  
 Evidently, the new parties have challenged the stability of the party systems to 
some extent. As such, the ties between social structural groups and parties have 
been eroding partly because the supply of party alternatives has grown. Party-
voter ties have become much more complicated as a consequence of new parties 
attracting voters from the old parties. Of the biggest new party families, the New 
Left parties, nationalist-populist parties and Green parties have established 
themselves in many West European countries since the 1970s onwards 
(Gallagher et al. 2011).  The number of relevant parties has risen in most West 
European countries since the 1970s (e.g. Dalton et al. 2000, 58); and support for 
new political parties30 has grown rapidly. In the 1980s, new political parties 
gained a mean electoral support of 14.4 % in 16 West European countries. In the 
1990s, the rate was 22.4 % and in the 1st decade of 21st century it was 29.3 % 
(Gallagher et al. 2011, 308). However, these parties have not taken over the 
dominance of party systems, as shown in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.1.3. In this 
respect, the old party families have persisted quite well. One explanation for this 
is that the parties belonging to old party families have accustomed their electoral 
appeal to match the shift from social structure to values and attitudes 
 
                                                            
30 New parties were defined as those that first began to contest elections no earlier than 1960 and 
that have polled at least 1 per cent in a parliamentary election (Gallagher et al. 2011, 308). 
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3.2.3. Moving towards values and attitudes   
When Franklin and colleagues (1992) analyzed the effect of social structural 
cleavage elements and the effect of ideological orientation (left vs. right) on party 
choice in West European countries, they concluded that there is a mismatch in 
timing between changes in social structure and changes in electoral behavior. 
There was something other than structural factors explaining both the 
persistence of old parties and also the upsurge of new parties. Voters were no 
longer voting all that dominantly on the basis of group loyalties – especially from 
the 1980s onwards. Particularly the voting behavior of the post-war generation 
could no longer be explained with social structural factors to any great extent. 
Earlier, when social structure was still a strong determinant of party choice, 
changes in party strength could be largely predicted upon changes in the size of 
social groups. (Franklin 1992; van der Eijk et al. 1992.)   
 Van der Eijk et al. (1992) concluded that if all the issues of importance to 
voters had been measured and given their due weight, the issues would have 
compensated quite accurately for the decline in the explanatory power of social 
structural factors on party choice. Thus they argued for a view that the cleavage 
approach was still valid but that the attention should be shifted from the 
structural element to the value/attitudinal element of cleavages. Knutsen and 
Scarbrough (1995) supplemented this notion by stating that, already between 
1973 and 1990, political values and attitudes explained party choice better than 
social structural positions in West European countries.  
 Although many other studies have also concluded that, since the 1980s and 
1990s, political issues have truly started molding electoral behavior (see e.g. 
Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984, Dalton 2008; von der Brug 2010), it is worth 
noting Borre (2001, 9–11), who has argued that issues have been the catalyst of 
politics ever since elections were arranged in Western Europe. Without survey 
technique it was, however, impossible to evaluate how much the issues shaped 
voting decisions. It is undoubtable, for example, that issues on working 
conditions and welfare were strongly attached to social class, thus reinforcing the 
influence of cleavage politics.  
 In any case, the shift from a social structural position to values/attitudes has 
been quite uncontested and it has certainly been a much discussed topic in 
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literature especially from the 1990s onwards (see e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi 1998; 
Kriesi et al. 2006; Enyedi 2008; Franklin 2010). It is worth noting that since social 
structural cues no longer determine party choice so strongly, there is now a 
certain degree of individualization in terms of voting choice (Dalton 2000, 337). 
Keeping this in mind, it is important to realize that if this individualization takes 
place in such a way that the linkages between social structural positions and 
values and attitudes become almost non-existent, and voters’ opinions on 
political issues have a totally independent effect on party choice, then we are no 
longer talking about cleavage politics in the traditional sense. The threefold 
cleavage definition requires that social structural groups have common values 
and attitudes.  
 
The connection between old social structural bases and values and attitudes  
 
As the importance of value and attitudinal dimensions has increased at the same 
time as the importance of classic social structural characteristics has decreased 
(Franklin 1992; van der Eijk et al. 2005), the following section discusses which 
values and attitudes have united the social structural groups deriving from the 
Lipset-Rokkan-model, and can be hence understood as a dimensional reflection 
of the common group-based interests.  
 First, the left-right dimension31 has a special historical importance in terms of 
social class since left-right values have been conceived as the most important 
value orientation that emerged from the class conflict (Knutsen and Kumlin 
2005, 125). This dimension has continued to be commonly understood as a direct 
political reflection of the social structural conflicts between classes or the 
ideological orientation connected to social class (Thomassen 2005a, 17).  Franklin 
(2009) argued that one of the major reasons for the relative stability in party 
support, despite the turbulence in social structure, has been that the rise of left-
                                                            
31 The dichotomy to left and right was an essential part of democratic parliamentarism as it placed 
the working-class parties on the left side and upper-class parties on the right side of the seating 
order in parliament. The dimension got a new and more distinct political substance when the 
Socialists began to use the left–right metaphor to distinguish the benefits of the working-class from 
the ruling class (Oscarsson 1998, 10). Both left and right have become labels for the major poles of 
political conflict in almost every West European country (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 81). 
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right issues has given new reasons for the same people to continue to support the 
same parties as before (see also van der Eijk et al. 2005).  
 There has been controversy on whether ideological left-right orientation is a 
reflection of people’s social position. For example, van der Eijk & Niemöller 
(1992) already found at the beginning of the 1990s that the correlation between 
them was close to non-existent, while Oscarsson (1998) found that voters’ 
positions in the left–right scale have followed their occupational status and class 
identification quite accurately. Some researchers, for instance Knutsen (1988, 
349) and Holman (2006, 311), have interpreted the left–right dimension as an 
independent ideological cleavage, which has transformed from a purely structural 
class or status cleavage to represent left-wing or right-wing values and opinions 
(cf. Franklin 2009, 435). This conception, lacking any structural linkages, is not in 
line with the threefold cleavage concept, as it frees itself from structural linkages.   
 When interpreted from a socio-economic perspective, the left-right 
dimension has been reflected, for example, in questions over market economy, 
distribution of income, taxation, regulation and control of economy, social 
services, unemployment and entrepreneurship (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 198; 
Dalton 2002, 191). However, some researchers have suggested that the left–right 
dimension actually constitutes a super dimension that absorbs various issues, 
thus replacing the old structure-based cleavages (Knutsen 1999, 1; van der Eijk et 
al. 2005, 167). In addition to the traditional socioeconomic themes, questions 
concerning military policies, law and order, moral issues, and even 
postmaterialist topics have been related to and allegedly absorbed by the left–
right dimension (see e.g. Budge & Farlie 1983, 50; Dalton 2002). 
 The religious cleavage has been primarily reflected in values deriving from the 
role of religion and the church and in views on moral issues (Thomassen 2005a, 
13). As the significance of religion and the church in public life has decreased, 
and as they matter to a smaller number of the electorate than before, the moral 
issues have received an increasing amount of attention. The contemporary issues 
linked to the structural basis have handled social relationships, moral standards 
and authorities (Dalton 2008, 153; Knutsen 2010b). There has also been a shift to 
re-valuing traditional ethics and traditional moral values (Lambert 2004, 42–43). 
The values concerning moral and sexual norms have put the liberal and 
permitting voters against the moral conservatives; this clash has become the most 
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apparent in advanced post-industrial societies (see Inglehart & Welzel 2005). The 
value orientations connected to these views are reflected in the distinction 
between libertarian32 and traditionalist value orientations (Thomassen 2005a, 13).  
 The value/attitudinal element of the rural-urban cleavage has received skewed 
attention in literature. This is because the focus has been on rural values, leaving 
urban values largely ignored. Traditionally, when the Agrarian parties flourished, 
rural political interests concentrated on agricultural issues; the interests of rural 
citizens in contemporary societies go beyond narrow agricultural issues. Today, the 
party interests are more about the decentralization of agencies of the state, 
transferring economic means to smaller and peripheral municipalities and 
concentrating on efforts that make living in the countryside and geographically 
peripheral areas possible (Knutsen 2004a 132–133; Paloheimo 2008 44–45). The 
skewed attention to the rural side of the cleavage may reflect that the rural interests 
have been constantly under threat and ever diminishing. Thus, they have had to be 
actively brought up and guarded. It can be argued that the original urban-
industrial-commercial interests have been replaced by emphasizing the various 
benefits of urbanity: the need of centralization in the search of scale benefits (see 
e.g. Moisio 2012). However, since the social modernization in most West European 
countries has largely reduced the gap between rural and urban political interests 
and values (Dalton 2008, 160) the political significance of the value element has 
been relatively small. Moreover, in many contexts, the rural-urban division is 
superimposed by the religious cleavage, as people living in the countryside tend to 
be more religious than the urban population (see Kriesi 1998, 178; Knutsen 2004a). 
 The dividing lines of the ethno-linguistic cleavage are typically apparent 
already on a structural basis. If one belongs to an ethno-linguistic minority one is 
very likely to develop positive attitudes towards the protection of the minority 
status or value, for example, bilingualism/multilingualism. The opposite pole of 
the value/attitudinal dimension is seeing the rights of a politically prominent 
historical ethno-linguistic minority in a negative light.33 Since there are only a few 
                                                            
32In terms of value orientations, the term ‘libertarian’ is often used to refer individual freedom and 
freedom from authorities. Hence, when discussing libertarian values in this study, economic 
libertarianism is left outside.  
33 This aspect has received much attention in East European countries. Ethno-linguistic cleavages 
have been politicized to be able to present minority groups as a threat to state loyalty and national 
culture. This has occurred, for example, in the Baltic States (Steen 1997, 5).  
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countries where a substantial ethno-linguistic minority is represented in the 
parliament, and since the value-attitudinal element is partly trivial, there is no 
systematic knowledge on the topic. 
 Although the issues attached to the cleavages from the Lipset–Rokkan -model 
have been gaining explanatory power, the most prominent reason for the shift 
towards values and attitudes is found in issues reflecting the value and attitudinal 
dimensions of potential new cleavages, which are handled next. 
 
3.2.4. In search of new cleavages 
Whereas the dynamics of old cleavage politics are rooted in social structural 
positions, it has been suggested that new cleavages should be searched first and 
foremost in enduring value orientations. Although many of these suggestions 
have had a social structural basis, the emphasis has been on the value/attitudinal 
element. (Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 496; Enyedi 2008.)  
 Already at the time of the Lipset-Rokkan scheme, cleavage politics was 
beginning to change and it was anticipated that people would engage into new 
types of policy alternatives and form conflicts around new issues, partly as a 
result of generation change. Most prominently, Inglehart (1971, 992) proposed 
that old cleavages would pave the way for cleavages that would be polarized 
according to differences in new kinds of value priorities, which were not captured 
by the Lipset–Rokkan scheme. Inglehart (1977, 182–183) argued that there were 
two opposite value orientations deriving from the conflict: the materialist 
orientation and the postmaterialist orientation.34 This distinction was based 
directly on age cohorts and indirectly on educational differences between age 
cohorts. There was thus a social structural element, albeit the decisive element 
was the value base. Inglehart argued that values could be deep-rooted and long-
lasting enough to be considered as stable predictors of voting behavior and 
eventually to be comparable to social structural factors. 
 According to Inglehart (1977), the critical juncture for the new cleavage was 
the silent revolution: it acted as a catalyst in the transformation of political 
                                                            
34 In Inglehart’s (1971) original measure, postmaterialism was reflected in the priority of people 
having more say in important political decisions and protection of freedom of speech. Materialism 
was reflected in the priority of fighting against rising prices and maintaining order in the nation. 
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conflicts from class-based conflicts to value conflicts. Unlike national or 
Communist revolutions, it was difficult to capture and less concrete, although 
some events such as large demonstrations and protests towards the politics of the 
old establishment were indicating a new phase more explicitly. Inglehart (ibid, 
see also 2007) stated that after the Second World War, Western societies were 
moving towards a phase where an increasing proportion of people began to value 
other things than safety, economic security and economic growth. Especially the 
higher-educated generation that was born after the war began to foster 
immaterial priorities, such as individual autonomy, self-expression, quality of life 
and environmental protection. These tendencies have a background in the 
scarcity and socialization hypotheses. Under conditions of prosperity, people can 
afford to think in postmaterialist terms and this way of thinking is bound to be 
incorporated, depending on the living conditions of one’s pre-adult years. This 
tendency sets the more postmaterialist young generations, who have lived under 
prosperity, against the older materialist generations who have suffered from 
insecurity. Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1984) found strong evidence for this pattern, 
accentuated by education. The well-educated young people were far more likely 
to prioritize postmaterialist values ahead of the materialist ones than the low-
educated young people.  
 Proponents of the so-called New Politics approach believe that there is a new 
value cleavage rooted in the opposition between materialist and postmaterialist 
orientations, and that it is taking room from the old, traditional cleavages and 
‘Old Politics’, which lays an emphasis on ground-breaking conflicts stemming 
from old social structure. (Kriesi 1998, 166; Inglehart & Baker 2000.) 
 While some scholars have been ready to accept the proposal of a new value 
cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists to contemplate the old, more 
structure-based cleavages (see Klingemann et al. 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006), others 
have questioned the validity of the proposal. For example, Franklin (2010) has 
maintained that the decline in the structuring capacities of traditional cleavages is 
not balanced by an increase in the structuring capacities of new cleavages. Van 
der Eijk and colleagues (2009, 397–411) have stated that postmaterialism cannot 
be reduced to differences in objective social positions and suggested that 
Inglehart (1977) oversimplified the connection between social position and 
values by labelling the pre-war generation as class-based materialists and the 
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post-war generation as postmaterialists (see also Flanagan 1987).35 The 
assumption about younger people acquiring a whole new social identity in the 
form of postmaterialism was said to undermine the multiplicity of political 
identities. In this regard, Aardal (1994, 236) has criticized the inbuilt logic in 
suggestions for a postmaterialist cleavage: i.e. that new conflicts and value 
cleavages are inevitably centered on issues that have no economic linkages.  
 The discussion on the new conflict tended to be centered on the notion of how 
the libertarian-postmaterialist values would replace the authoritarian ones. 
Materialism, tradition and belief in the authorities were conceived as something 
that was withering away. Although Flanagan (1987) and Kitschelt (1988), for 
example, discussed the authoritarian values opposing the post-materialist-
libertarian ideas, Ignazi (1992) pointed out more explicitly that the post-
modernization36 thesis entailed a failed assumption of an ever-growing post-
modernization of societies. Post-modernization awakened a counter-reaction, 
which Ignazi named as the silent counter-revolution. It questioned the priority of 
liberal values, minority protection, environmentalism and internationalism and 
pointed out the need to restore hierarchy, law and order, traditional moral and 
family conceptions, monoculture and a strong state that takes care of citizens and 
economic security. The common denominator for these aspects was thus 
conservatism in its various forms (Mudde 2007). In addition, there was a growing 
pessimism about the fates of ordinary people and a lack of confidence in the party 
system and politicians (Ignazi 1992, 22). While silent revolution built on the ideas 
adopted by the New Left and ecologist movements, the silent counter-revolution 
                                                            
35 Even though Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1984) found a combined effect of young age and high 
education in postmaterialist attitudes, the key structural base was age.  
36 In political science, postmodernization has been understood as a phenomenon that contains at 
least three different perspectives (Inglehart 1997, 23). First, postmodernization can be understood 
as a counterbalance to tradition and as a rise to new lifestyles and values. Especially traditional 
family norms and ethnocentricity have been questioned from the way of greater tolerance towards 
ethnic, cultural and sexual diversity, individualism and gender equality. Secondly, 
postmodernization can be understood as scepticism towards blind faith in the growth of 
production, which had been the corner stone of modernization. Third, the contrasting value 
systems are vivid also in the de-emphasis of authorities: postmodernists are reluctant to hierarchic 
systems and emphasize active engagement in civil society. Furthermore, postmodernists are open-
minded towards new exotic things and accustomed to follow loose rules instead of rigid ethics. 
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focused on the Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties37, which managed to 
politicize the previously latent mixture of attitudes and sentiments that were not 
treated by the established parties. These RRP parties emerged throughout 
Western Europe especially since the 1980s (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 267). 
 There is, however, disagreement on what the new value-based conflict should 
be called and which topics it concerns. The first established label was materialism 
vs. postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977). Postmaterialism can be understood as one 
aspect or part of a broader process of cultural change from modernization to 
postmodernization taking place in Western societies. For example, Gibbins and 
Reimer (1995) have suggested that the materialism-postmaterialism -dimension 
should handle the different grades of postmodernism.38  
 Flanagan (1987; see also Flanagan & Lee 2003; cf. Nas 1995; Palmer 1995; 
Scarbrough 1995; Dalton 2008) suggested that the conflict handles two separate 
dimensions deriving from ‘New Politics’: a materialist–non-materialist 
dimension reflecting economic-industrial and environmental issues and an 
authoritarian–libertarian dimension reflecting issues on moral values and 
minorities (see also Inglehart 1971; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005, 126). Kitschelt 
(1995) and Betz (1994) have combined the poles into libertarian-postmaterialist 
values vs. authoritarian-materialist values. Finally, the nationalist aspect has been 
added to the latter pole. Protecting national sovereignty and rejecting 
multiculturalism has been linked to traditional and authoritarian values. This has 
led to a suggestion of an extended dimension that calls the one end 
green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) and the other traditionalist-authoritarian-
                                                            
37 There is hardly agreement on what the parties stemming from the silent counter-revolution 
should be called, as the parties often state they are neither left-wing nor right-wing. They have also 
varying historical backgrounds and they have been also called radical right, populist right or new 
right parties. The term Radical Right Populist Party captures at least the combination of 
nationalism, anti-immigration, cultural conservatism, exclusionism and populism. (see Eatwell 
2000; Kestilä 2007; Mudde 2007.) 
38 Postmaterialism and postmodernism have often been used as overlapping concepts. From the 
perspective of this study, it is enough to point out that both postmaterialism and postmodernism 
explain shifts in value change, detect emergence of new values and axes of conflict. In brief, 
postmaterialism is an important factor in the postmodernist culture (Inglehart 1989, 251; Gibbins & 
Reimer 1995, 302). There have also been thorough discussions on the specific nuances when the 
terms are perceived as competing approaches. But this approach is not so fertile from a cleavage 
perspective: it would cause more conceptual problems than it would clarify the discussion on 
cleavages. (see ibid. 302–303.) 
 68 
 
nationalist (TAN) (see e.g. Marks et al. 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010, Rovny & 
Edwards 2012). This dimension has also been called the (socio)cultural 
dimension, to differentiate it from the economic left-right-dimension. It has been 
suggested that the electoral competition has mainly revolved around these two 
dimensions in contemporary West European countries. Today, the old 
socioeconomic left-right dimension continues to have importance, but it is 
accompanied by a new (socio)cultural dimension (van der Brug & van Spanje 
2009; Bornschier 2010). 
 
Table 3.4 The elements of the proposals for a new value cleavage  
 
  Postmaterialist- Materialist- 
 
Libertarian- Authoritarian- 
 Cosmopolitan  Nationalist  
Social structural Young Old 
base Women Men 
 
High education Low education 
 
High socio-economic Low socio-economic 
 
position position 
Norms and principles Loose rules,  Strong leaders, 
in society No hierarchies, Law & order, 
 
Citizen activism, Listening to ordinary people, 
 
Equality between people, Traditional gender roles, 
 
Liberal moral values Traditional moral values 
The nation and its Anti-nationalism Nationalism, 
people Pro-multiculturalism Nativism 
  Pro-integration National sovereignty 
Environmental Environmental protection Protecting industrial interests 
concerns and activism Freedom from 
  
environmental norms 
  
 Political parties Green and New Left Radical Right 
representing  parties Populist parties 
interests     
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Table 3.4 presents the different forms in which the new value conflict expresses 
itself. When the different suggestions are summarized, it can be said that the 
conflict handles materialist, authoritarian and nationalist and their opposites – 
postmaterialist, libertarian and cosmopolitan values.   
 As we have seen, the cleavage status of the new value conflict is highly 
debatable. Therefore, the three different cleavage elements, social structural base, 
common values/attitudes and organizational representation, are now analyzed in 
the light of previous studies.  
 
Social structural base 
 
The social structural base of the new value cleavage has been in age cohorts, 
education, gender, occupational status and income level. These social structural 
positions have explained materialist, authoritarian and nationalist attitudes and 
their opposites. In this regard, age cohorts, gender and education have 
constituted suggestions for new structural cleavage elements, while occupational 
status belongs to the world of old cleavage politics. Table 3.4 illustrates that 
postmaterialist, libertarian and cosmopolitan values have been supported 
especially by the young, women, those with a high education and those with a 
high position in the labor market. Materialist, traditionalist and nationalist 
values, on the other hand, are supported especially by the old, men, those with a 
low education and those with unsecure and low positions in the labor market (see 
Inglehart 1997; Knutsen 2004a; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Dalton 2006).  
 Age constitutes a potential cleavage base if horizontal political socialization 
and generational key experiences constitute politically relevant age cohorts. This 
is because key experiences are based on the assumption that people acquire 
certain norms and ways of relating to politics in their early adulthood (see 
Andrews 2002), which in turn cause a long-lasting propensity to prioritize and 
value certain things (Inglehart 1977). However, it has not often been presented 
that age cohorts could solely form the basis of a new cleavage, although there is a 
general generational divide in terms of values and party preferences (Inglehart 
2007; van der Brug 2010). In this regard, Franklin and van der Eijk (2009) argue 
that age cohorts do not fit into cleavage politics of mutually exclusive worlds: they 
suggest that cleavages change because of generational replacement. In any case, 
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those belonging to older generations have developed loyalties to old parties, while 
the younger generations have voted, to a greater extent, for the newer parties – 
whether New Left/Green parties or Radical Right Populist parties, which 
represent the opposites of the new value cleavage.  
 The expansion of education accompanied with generational replacement 
meant that the less educated group diminishes in size and the more highly-
educated group grows, thus contributing to a larger political relevance of the 
highly educated (Stubager 2010). Educational level has now become a potential 
cleavage base. This is because high education has reflected openness for certain 
ideas, values and trends and is attached to different communications networks, 
lifestyles and job environments and grades of status (Inglehart 1977, 72–84; 
Knutsen 2004a, 160–161), which have been reflected in libertarian-
postmaterialist values (Weakliem 2002; van de Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004; 
Brooks 2006; van der Waal et al. 2007). In contrast to educational level/length of 
education, the value clashes deriving from different fields of education have not 
been regarded in cleavage context (see van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 2004). 
 Whereas the coherence among the members of different age cohorts is 
supposed to follow from generational experiences, the coherence among 
members of educational groups is supposed to follow from the educational 
milieus in which the individuals spend their early adulthood. Furthermore, the 
self-aware identity has been evident especially among the highly-educated (see 
Stubager 2009.) Political parties, particularly the bourgeois parties and Green and 
New Left parties, have had growing incentives to represent the interests of the 
highly-educated segment of society (Stubager 2010, 509). As a counter-reaction 
to this, the RRP parties have appealed to the interests of the less-educated 
(Mudde 2007, 111–112).  
 Gender, as a social structural element, gained political prominence when 
gender-related issues were put on the political agenda as a result of the 
emancipation of women. In turn, values associated with feminism become more 
topical due to the increase in women’s education, the transformation of 
traditional gender roles and movements towards equality in the labor market 
(Manza & Brooks 1998, 1239–1243; Inglehart & Norris 2000). It has been 
difficult, however, to present gender as a social structural cleavage basis without 
linking it to other social structural characteristics. According to Turner (2011, 
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294–295), as men become more marginalized within the occupational structure 
and women acquire higher levels of education in advanced Western societies, 
resentment grows especially among the blue-collar male workers who see 
feminism, gay rights, racial equality and the decline of the family as a threat to 
their own social standing and masculinity. This resentment fuels a conservative 
response to cultural liberalism and multiculturalism. As such, the electoral 
gender gap has continued to prevail after women’s emancipation, albeit 
differently. Traditionally women voted more for conservative parties than men, 
since themes such as religion and family were more important for women. 
However, the articulation of feminist values subsequently shifted alignments 
towards the New Left and Green parties. (Dalton 2002, 198; Knutsen 2004b; 
Giger 2009.) Men, accordingly, have begun to vote for the RRP parties, which 
have even been labelled as “Männerparteien” (Men’s parties) (Mudde 2007, 111–
112).39  
 Lastly, the position in the labor market has a connection with the new value 
dimension, mainly due to changes in economic structure. This base can actually 
be seen as the updated conception of how the interests of occupational classes are 
reflected. The position of the traditional working-class occupations in industry 
and construction has been destabilized and the feeling of vulnerability and 
insecurity has become constant (see Harvey 2010, 150; Walter 2010). Companies 
shut down factories and relocate to more advantageous places in a globalizing 
world or recruit a cheaper foreign workforce in certain branches. This has meant 
that the blue-collar workers may feel that the old, ruling parties have betrayed 
them (Gill 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2009). The proletarian protest has 
subsequently become channeled through RRP parties in many West European 
countries (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 
21–25; cf. McGann & Kitschelt 2005). These findings are in contrast with those of 
Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1988, 1995) and Moreno (1999), who have stated that 
libertarian-postmaterialist attitudes go hand in hand with redistributionist 
                                                            
39 Nevertheless, successful parties formed around gender interests have been rare. Feminist parties 
have found it difficult to get into the national parliaments (Dalton 2002, 198; Knutsen 2004a, 198-
201, 222).   
 72 
 
attitudes, and authoritarian-materialist attitudes go hand in hand with pro-
market attitudes.40  
 The proposed cleavage between a postmaterialist–libertarian–cosmopolitan 
orientation and a materialist-traditionalist-nationalist orientation is reflected in 
different attitudes and ways of relating to society. In Table 3.4, I have separated 
these into three categories. The first concerns the conceptions on norms and 
principles in society regarding authorities and differences in moral, family and 
gender norms. The second category deals with nationalism, multiculturalism and 
pro-integration and anti-integration orientations. The third one concerns the 
differences in the relationship between the environment and industrial-economic 
growth.  
 
Norms and principles in society 
 
First, there is profound disagreement between the two orientations on the basic 
ruling principles in society. People with liberal values believe in individual 
autonomy and expressional freedom, freedom from paternalism, equality 
between citizens and active citizen involvement in a control-free society. This 
results in situational ethics, loose hierarchies and a disregard of strong authorities 
(Kitschelt 1988, 195; Inglehart 1997; Kriesi 1998, 169). The libertarian orientation 
also includes an emphasis of tolerance; open-mindedness and individuality (see 
Hanley 2008, 117). Authoritarians on the other hand believe in a strictly ordered 
society, in which law and order and punitive conventional moralism are 
respected and infringements of authority are to be punished severely (Mudde 
2007, 23). However, these represent the architypes of orientations: individual can 
have a combination of liberal and authoritarian values.  
 Furthermore, ideologically conservative and authoritarian forces have 
despised liberal stands towards the family, marriage and sexuality. In these 
questions, it is a matter of tradition and what is the morally right and decent way 
                                                            
40 In the 1980s the latter pattern may have indeed been valid because moral-cultural conservatism 
was linked with economic neo-conservatism, which criticized the overloading burden of the state 
provision and welfare system and favoured the laissez faire principles of the free market and 
privatization (Ignazi 1992, 18–19). But as the economic environment became more challenging in 
the turmoil of the 1990s and onwards, those with insecure manual occupations have had better 
incentives to combine authoritarian-materialist attitudes with left-wing socioeconomic values that 
emphasize state-centred solutions instead of market solutions (Mudde 2007, 119–121).   
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of living (Heywood 2003, 81). The dispute between libertarians and 
authoritarians has then revived the value base of the religious cleavage and 
reinterpreted it in another form (see Kriesi 2010, 682). Individualism and denial 
of traditional authorities are in line with secular or atheist views, while longing 
for traditions and respect of institutions go along well with religious views.  
 Differences are also explicit in terms of conceiving equality between people. 
Libertarians hold the view that men and women are equal and that people should 
be free to express their sexual identity. Those who think in authoritarian terms 
conceive politics concerning women in a patriarchal way and defend natural 
gender differences in opposition to feminists. Furthermore, they conceive more 
permissive (sexual) relations between people as a threat to the natural order 
(Mudde 2007, 92–93; Kofman 1998, 93; Rydgren 2005, 11–13). The paternalist 
and authoritarian features also include a longing for strong leadership, whereas 
libertarians perceive that such leadership weakens citizen participation and 
liberties (Heywood 2003, 87).  
 Self-expression has been present in the libertarian/postmaterialist orientation 
also in the sense that people should be able to influence decision making and that 
their opinions should be better taken into account. Theories on postmaterialism 
have not considered that the demand on ‘people having more say’ (Inglehart 
1971) could also come from those who oppose postmaterialist-libertarian New 
Politics (see Ignazi 1992). Voters drawn towards the themes of the silent counter-
revolution have felt resentment and suspicion towards the political elite in 
general, and politicians and the established parties in particular. Moreover, they 
have felt that their appeals and interests have not been taken into account and 
that they have been pushed aside; i.e. these are voters from the same groups 
which have demanded more authoritarianism and rejected postmaterialist ideas. 
(see e.g. Kestilä 2006, 186; van der Brug & Mughan 2007; Albertazzi 2008, 113–
114; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008, 222.) 
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The nation and its people  
 
One of the cornerstones in the materialist, traditionalist and nationalist side of 
the proposed value cleavage is holding nationalism and nativism as guiding lines. 
The emphasis on nationalism includes two aspects. Ethnic nationalism portrays 
an image of an ideal homogenous society where multiculturalism is not 
welcomed; state nationalism defends independence and the national sovereignty 
of the nation state against external threats and political integration (Greenfield 
2001). Ethnic nationalism is closely related to nativism – an ideology which 
presupposes that nations should be inhabited exclusively by the members of the 
native group: the nonnative elements are seen as fundamentally threatening the 
homogeneity of the people. For ethnic nationalists, the state belongs to one ethnic 
group and other ethnic groups can only live there if they accept this group’s 
dominance. (Michaels 1995, 67; Mudde 2007, 22, 144.) This is in strong contrast 
to views that emphasize the equality between people regardless of their ethnic 
background and who see multiculturalism as an inspiring and exciting ingredient 
in societies. These views have insisted on a future with a global citizenship, where 
the significance of borders and an ethnic background diminishes. (Inglehart 
1997; Mudde 2007; 63, 189; Kymlicka 2011, 129–130.) The multicultural-nativist 
tension has received increasing attention due to growing global immigration. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, nativist ideas re-emerged when RRP parties began to cherish 
ethnic unity within a nation’s borders, while ecological parties and other pro-
minority parties opposed such ideas (ibid.). 
 While immigration has been the major catalyst behind the revival of nativism 
in Europe, further integration inside the European Union has fueled the tensions 
in state nationalism between those who deemphasize national interests and those 
who are worried about national sovereignty. Although European integration was 
close to a nonissue in the electorates for decades, after the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) steps have been taken towards a more integrated Union accompanied with 
federalist features, which has awakened political debate (Raunio 2002). This is 
because political integration has drawn decision-making power away from nation 
states to the EU; economic integration especially inside the European Monetary 
Area (EMU) has led to economic codependence between states, thus 
undermining economic sovereignty. 
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Whereas political and economic integration are important from the perspective 
of state nationalism, cultural integration in the EU has furthered 
multiculturalism-nativism tensions. Common asylum policies and the free 
movement of citizens have been seen as threats to national identity and culture. 
(Oskarson 2010, 84.) Hence, the EU has become an influential vehicle of different 
kinds of integration processes, supranational power and standardization, which 
constitute a potential threat to defending national interests.41  
 It can be argued that the Eurozone Crisis, which has accelerated since 2009, is 
having a major impact on accentuating integration-sovereignty tensions; an issue 
that has already evolved from a sleeping giant to a highly polarizing question (de 
Vries 2007; Verney & Bosco 2013; cf. Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 37–38). 
Although anti-European positions, claiming that integration has gone way too 
far, did not have much of an impact on inter-party competition for a long time, 
they had been apparent at the voter level (see Hix & Høyland 2011, 105–129, 
138–140; Raunio 2008a, 190; 2008b).42 
 Hooghe and Marks (2009) have found that green-alternative-libertarian vs. 
traditionalist-authoritarian-nationalist dimension correlates with issues arising 
from European integration in the West European party space. This relationship is 
not, however, unequivocal. Although authoritarian and nationalist forces tend to 
oppose European integration, the libertarian ones have not supported integration 
strongly. Integration threatens to intensify market-led solutions, weaken 
democracy, and disempower public interest groups, even though it offers vehicles 
for environmental regulation and mobility between countries and cultures. The 
furthering of European integration has been a common project for the big 
parties, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Conservatives (Hanley 
2008). A big question is whether the question over EU-integration and national 
sovereignty divides the electorate along the postmaterialist-materialist- and 
libertarian-authoritarian-lines. For example, Oskarson (2010) has found that 
                                                            
41 Hix (1999, 73) has even argued that the EU-integration question has given rebirth to Lipset and 
Rokkan’s cleavage between standardizing centres and distinct peripheries. Brussels is the new 
centre and the member states are the new peripheries trying to preserve their autonomy. Especially 
the identities and interests of the peripheral countries are more threatened than the ones of 
influential and central member states. 
42 The ruling parties have been willing to downplay the conflict basis of EU-issues, as there has been 
a wide consensus that the ‘integration train’ has to be kept on the right track and moving (de Vries 
2007, 364). 
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negative attitudes towards multiculturalism are intertwined with anti-integration 
attitudes.  
 Hooghe and Marks (2009) and Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) have noticed that the 
European integration–national sovereignty-tension overlaps with a divide 
between de-nationalized and national interests. It pits the winners, who benefit 
from the increasing integration against the losers, who are desperate to keep on 
to the national borders, identities and restrictions in the labor market.43 This is 
related to the human capital hypothesis: the well-educated and those in high 
positions in the labor market are more likely to benefit from integration than 
those with a low education and low/vulnerable professional position (Eichenberg 
& Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998). However, it is not just the social periphery that has 
been against integration, since anti-integration attitudes are usually pursued by 
those who are in disadvantaged positions in society. In this respect, the rural 
population has been afraid that it will be further marginalized and that no one 
will guard their interests in Brussels. Globalization and integration have 
influenced the perspectives of central government in a way that less value is given 
to sparsely-populated areas and small villages. As such, the well-off urban 
population can better enjoy the benefits of integration and mobility. (Bjørklund 
1994; Raunio 2008a, 190; Oskarson 2010.) 
 
Environmental concern 
 
Environmental concern was one of the main sources for the growth of 
postmaterialism from the 1960s and 1970s onwards. From a materialist-
postmaterialist perspective, environmental questions have been crucial as they set 
economic-industrial growth and non-profit views against each other. In times of 
subjective safety and material welfare, people began to think the limits of 
continued growth, since it had been achieved at the cost of the environment. As a 
consequence, environment and nature were lifted to the political agenda 
(Inglehart 1977, 77, 1997, 35).   
 The ecological awakening happened largely outside the party system: 
individual movements, organizations and citizens had an influential role, and the 
                                                            
43 A doubt has nevertheless been laid upon how sharply the distinction between winners and losers 
can remain in altering economic circumstances (Gallagher et al. 2011, 304).   
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action for protecting nature was done in unconventional means. The bulk of the 
old parties, which had a mission to build safety and welfare, could not respond to 
the task as they believed in material growth and unlimited prosperity. (Heywood 
2003, 276.) The growth of environmental awareness and the acuteness of global 
warming and climate change have nevertheless meant that the traditional parties 
have taken environmental protection increasingly seriously (cf. Doyle & 
MacEachern 1998, 34). Although there has been fairly little disagreement on the 
importance of environmental protection in itself (Dobson 2000, 236), there is less 
consensus on how it should be protected. As the opposite pole of environmental 
protection has been economic-industrial interests, it has been debated whether 
environmental protection is actually primarily a part of a socioeconomic or a 
sociocultural question (Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). In 
this respect, the primacy of environmental protection has been closely related to 
libertarian attitudes in some studies (see e.g. Kitschelt & Rehm 2004; Dolezal 
2010), while the combination of authoritarian-nativist attitudes and de-emphasis 
on environmental protection has also received some support (e.g. Kitschelt 1995).  
 Strict environmental norms weaken economic life and competitiveness (Doyle 
& MacEachern 1998, 32–33), which affects traditional industrial branches 
especially. As a consequence, blue-collar workers, who are at risk of becoming the 
losers of the labor market, may develop negative attitudes towards environmental 
protection. Anti-environmentalist issues have not, however, been politicized that 
much in comparison to issues on moral values, immigration and integration – 
the areas which the RRP parties have mostly focused on (see Mudde 2007).  
 To conclude, the conflict between the postmaterialist-libertarian-international 
orientation and the materialist-authoritarian-nationalist orientation has several 
aspects, which have underlined its importance as a source of conflict between 
voter segments and between parties. However, more evidence is needed on 
whether the conflict or some part of the conflict could serve as a cleavage. The 
more recent nature of the bipolarized conflicts and the up-and-down electoral 
fortunes of the RRP parties, especially, underscore the need to assess these 
conflicts in a long perspective. Moreover, the social structural base of the conflict 
is multifaceted, as even some ‘old’ social structural bases such as occupational 
class or place of residence might explain the value/attitudinal orientations at 
hand. Furthermore, there is disagreement as to which issues are actually bundled 
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together, forming a value orientation. However, the organizational element is 
rather clear-cut in the sense that the New Left parties and Green parties, 
especially, have given an organizational form for postmaterialist-libertarian-
cosmopolitan values, and right-wing populist parties have given an 
organizational form for materialist-authoritarian-nationalist values.  
 Suggestions for new cleavages outside the presented frame have not 
established themselves in the same manner. However, the distinction between 
public sector and private sector employment and dependency on public services 
has been brought up from time to time since the 1970s (see Dunleavy 1979). The 
private/public employment aspect acts basically as a supplementary element to 
occupational class, while public service/welfare state dependency reflects the 
position in the labor market and an individual’s income level. It was expected 
that voters would develop different kinds of attitudes towards socioeconomic 
issues according to their working sector and their dependency on the welfare 
state. (Franklin et al. 2009, 60–61.) However, the distinction between the sectors 
has not led to the formation of collective identities: working in a public or private 
sector has not been regarded as a source for group cohesion. The more 
pronounced differences in the party sphere, at least in the Nordic context with an 
extensive welfare state, handle the promotion of private or public services in 
health-care, which has not got so much to do with the working sector (Bengtsson 
et al. 2013). This is why it has been debated whether public-private questions are 
actually a part of socioeconomic left-right logics (Aardal 1994, 235). Moreover, 
the public-private distinction has not been able to replace occupational class as a 
cleavage base (see e.g. Aardal 1994, 234, 2007). In order to keep the number of 
analyzed social status -based social structural positions limited, the focus is 
restricted to occupational class and education.  
 As both the classic cleavages and suggestions for new cleavages have now been 
discussed, the following chapter will focus the cleavage perspective more closely 
on the Finnish case. A historical perspective will serve to highlight the different 
interpretations of cleavage formation and cleavage structure. The subchapter will 
also link the Finnish case more closely to the general discussion on cleavages 
presented in this chapter. 
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3.3. The path to the present – interpretations of cleavages in 
Finland 
The foundations of the cleavage structure and contemporary party system of 
Finland can be traced back to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Of the 
current eight parliamentary parties, four have been formed around central 
cleavages, described by the Lipset-Rokkan-model; one has its roots in the old 
cleavage structure and three have grown from newer tensions in the political 
sphere.  
 The first encompassing political division which grew into a cleavage was the 
one between Finnish-speaking Finns and Swedish-speaking Finns. Finland was 
an integral part of Sweden for six and a half centuries up to 1809 and the 
historical legacy of Sweden accounts for most of the fundamental features of 
Finnish society and culture (Karvonen 2014, 11). Finnish-speaking Finns and 
Swedish-speaking Finns formed their own parties, which controlled the estates of 
the Diet at the end of the 19th century. The Finnish Party aimed to promote the 
status of Finnish in society as Swedish, for a long time, had been the only official 
language in Finland. The Swedish party tried to retain the privileged status of 
Swedish in society. (Saukkonen 2008.) Despite the decreasing proportion of the 
Swedish-speaking Finns, for a long time they remained over-represented among 
the most influential groups in society. Swedish was an elite language, used by the 
higher bourgeoisie and civil servants (Karvonen 2000, 132), which served to pit 
the ordinary Finns against the Swedish-speaking population.  
 Though the antagonisms towards Swedish-speaking Finns have eased since 
the beginning phase of the modern party system, with the last fierce language 
disputes in the 1930s, the Swedish People’s Party (successor to Swedish Party in 
1906) has continued to keep the linguistic lines in voting behavior sharp. The 
geographical concentration of the Swedish-speaking population on the south and 
west coasts has helped to maintain a distinct culture and identity. When this has 
been accompanied by the relentless representation of linguistic interests by the 
Swedish People’s Party, the conflict between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-
speaking voters has been regarded as a stubborn cleavage. (Karvonen 2000, 132.) 
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Social class has been a major source of conflict in the Finnish party system. The 
class cleavage rose in Finland, on the one hand, from the inability of the economy 
and legislature to improve the poor social conditions of ordinary people and, on 
the other hand, from the rapid diffusion of socialist ideology (Pesonen & 
Riihinen 2002, 73). The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed in 1899 to 
enhance the living conditions of the working class and to raise class 
consciousness in order to resist the ruling class and capitalism. The middle class 
and upper classes had their defenders in the conservative Old Finnish Party, 
which was transformed into the National Coalition Party (COA) in 1918 and in 
the liberal Young Finnish Party/National Progressive Party.  
 The clash between the classes culminated in the 1918 Civil War, which set the 
Whites against the Reds. The upper class, entrepreneurs and independent 
farmers constituted the White side while the proletariat constituted the Red side. 
The Civil War and the Russian revolution subsequently led to the formation of 
the Finnish Communist Party, which polarized the class cleavage further. The 
victory of the White side united the center-right parties against Communism and 
the Soviet Union. It is important to note here that the conflicts were not only 
based on the management of the economy; they entailed also setting the whole 
working-class culture against the bourgeois culture. (Karvonen 2000, 133; 
Mickelsson 2007, 61–64, 83.) Although the divide between socialists and non-
socialists was sharp at the beginning phase of the modern party system, it became 
diluted in the 1940s and 1950s, illustrated by governmental co-operation between 
the Agrarian League and the Social Democrats.  
 Finland’s relations to Russia have had an important impact on party 
formation. Finland was an autonomous part of the Russian empire from 1809 
until the declaration of independence in 1917 and the independence was put into 
test in the two wars fought against the Soviet Union in the Second World War. 
The question of Russia was the basis for the early party system before the 
introduction of universal suffrage in 1906 and the arrival of modern parties. 
Allardt and Pesonen (1967) and Karvonen (2000, 133) have hence regarded the 
relationship with Russia as a major cleavage before Finnish independence. 
Furthermore, as noted with regard to class cleavage, eastern relations gave rise of 
a far-left party in the Finnish party system, as the Moscow-bound Communist 
Party was formed in 1918. All other parties adopted anti-Soviet attitudes. 
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(Karvonen 2014, 32.)  Allardt and Pesonen (1967) argued that Soviet-relations 
constituted a non-structural cleavage that built on a stable division in attitudinal 
atmosphere. Although the Communists had loyalties to the Soviet Union, the 
center-right parties, especially, as well as the Social Democrats had a skeptical 
attitude towards the powerful neighbor. Eventually, the majority of the political 
elite supported pragmatic and realistic policies, although suspicion towards the 
Soviet Union dominated the attitudinal atmosphere (for the politics of 
Finlandization see Karvonen 2014, 35–36). From the 1960s to the 1980s, the 
Soviet-relations also affected government formation, as the National Coalition 
Party was excluded from government irrespective of election results (Nousiainen 
1998, 27). The importance of this conflict ceased when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. The relationship to post-Soviet Russia today is still highly relevant in 
Finland’s international relations, although the same kind of party blocs have not 
been built up as before (see Karvonen 2014, 152).  
 As Finland was an overwhelmingly rural society until the 1950s, the cleavage 
between landed interests and urban-industrial interests developed little by little. 
Originally, the clashes evolved between people in different positions in the labor 
market: large landowners, independent small farmers and the landless rural 
proletariat (Karvonen 2014, 25–30). For the evolution of a rural-urban cleavage it 
was crucial that the Agrarian League was formed in 1906 to defend rural interests 
and especially the interests of independent (small and medium-sized) farmers. 
Ideologically, the Agrarian League set the rural way of living against the urban 
way of living (ibid; Arter 2001a, 61–66). The urban city bourgeoisie was defended 
especially by the Liberal and Conservative parties, and proletariat by the left-wing 
parties (Ruostetsaari 2006, 34), although all of the parties had to reach out to the 
rural population in the early decades of Finnish representative democracy 
(Karvonen 2014, 25).  
 The Agrarian League could retain its position as a large party relying 
extensively on farmers’ support until the number of farmers in Finland declined 
sharply along with the change in social structure, especially from the 1950s and 
1960s onwards. Hence, the Agrarian League found it necessary to broaden its 
appeal beyond farmers. This was reflected in the change of the party’s name to 
the Centre Party in 1965 (see Arter 2001a).  
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The triangular model in Figure 3.2 explicates how the class cleavage and the 
cleavage between landed and urban-industrial interests have dominated the 
relations between the electorate, parties and interest organizations. The model 
illustrates first, how the working class is defended by labor unions, Social 
Democrats and Communists (Pole L)44; second, how the upper classes and 
business life are defended by employers' organizations and the National Coalition 
Party (Pole B); and third, how the farmers are defended by the Central Union of 
Agricultural Producers and a Centre-Agrarian party (Pole F).  
 
 
Pole L: Labor concern                                                            Pole B: Business concern 
Organization: Trade Unions                                                       Organization: Trade associations 
Party: Social Democrats,                                                         Party: National Coalition Party 
(Communists) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                      Pole F: Farmer concern 
                           Organization: The Central Unions of agricultural producers 
                                                      Party: Agrarian League/Centre Party 
 
Figure 3.2 The ties between interest groups and political parties in Finland 
(modified from Nousiainen 1970; see also Rokkan 1987, 85). 
 
 
For a long time, conflicts between workers, farmers and business life structured 
voting behavior and party politics. The linkages between social structural groups 
and parties were strengthened by the role of the interest groups. The interest 
groups in Figure 3.2 have influenced decision-making via parties and socialized 
the union members to vote for the party that best represented their interests. 
                                                            
44 Social Democrats and Communists fought fiercely over control of trade unions in Finland, with 
the former, which represented moderate socialism, emerging as the winner of these battles in the 
end (Pesonen & Riihinen 2001, 61).  
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Furthermore, the major political compromises have been found along the lines of 
the triangular model. (Sundberg 2008, 76–77.) 
 The class cleavage mainly set poles L and B against each other, while the 
cleavage between landed and urban-industrial interests revolved around the 
different interests between the poles F and B. Despite having also conflicting 
interests, poles L and F found compromises between labor concern and farmer 
concern, especially after the Second World War, when the welfare state took its 
first steps. Regional equality, important for Agrarians, and social equality, 
important for Social Democrats, were enhanced intensively (Moisio 2012).   
 The historical-political development of Finnish society, the stability of the 
party system, ideological party-voter ties and aggregate level voting behavior left 
little doubt over the existence of a class-conscious electorate and a party system 
based on cleavages in Finland at the time when Lipset and Rokkan formulated 
their thesis. The Finnish party system of the 1960s indeed reflected largely the 
cleavage structure of the 1920s, as Lipset and Rokkan formulated.  
 The stability in party support during that period is remarkable as can be seen 
from Figure 3.3, which shows the average support per decade in parliamentary 
elections for each party since 1907, when the first election was held. Only those 
parties, which have had parliamentary representation on at least four different 
decades, have been taken into account. The party system could be classified until 
the 1970s as a 4+2 model (Arter 1999, 62–65), in which there were four non-
socialist parties – the Agrarian League/Centre Party (AGR/CENT), the Liberals 
(LIB), the Swedish People’s Party (SWE) and the National Coalition Party (COA) 
– and two socialist parties – the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the 
Communist Party (COM). The Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian League, the 
Coalition Party and the Communists were the major parties, while the Swedish 
People’s Party and Liberals were smaller parties. The only upheavals in party 
support between 1920s and 1960s had to do with the ban of the Communists to 
field candidates in elections in the 1930s and the re-legalization of the 
Communist Party in 1944. The Communist tradition (COM) was represented by 
The Finnish Communist Party, which operated behind different front 
organizations in the parliament. Most notably the Finnish People’s Democratic 
League represented the Communist ideology in the parliament from 1945 to 
1990. 
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Until the 1960s, the socialist parties gathered roughly half of the votes and the 
non-socialist parties the other half. The parties that had the strongest mass party 
organizations to mobilize the rural population succeeded the best. This favored 
particularly the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian League/Centre Party. 
 However, the conventional Lipset-Rokkan-paradigm was unable to explain 
the instability in the Western electorates that had begun in the 1970s (Franklin & 
Mackie 2009); the same problem also applied to Finland. First, the support for the 
Communists, which was distinctively high in Finland, comparatively (see 
Gallagher et al. 2011, 245), began to shrink from the 1970s onwards. Also, class 
voting started to decrease at approximately the same time (Pesonen et al. 1993). 
Second, a step towards a more fragmented party system was taken at the turn of 
the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970 election, the Finnish Rural Party (FRP), a 
splinter from the Agrarian League that was formed in 1966, gained 10.4 per cent 
of the popular vote. The FRP45 had been formed as a counter-reaction to the 
rapid change in the economic structure and it had a distinctive populist 
character. The agricultural sector was no longer providing employment the way it 
used to, which meant that people were forced to leave the countryside and search 
for jobs in towns. In this light, the party emerged to defend regional and social 
peripheries; it accentuated the rural-urban divide by splitting the rural camp into 
two. (Nousiainen 2000, 265; Mickelsson 2007, 150.) 
                                                            
45 Originally it was named as the Finnish Peasants’ Party in 1958. However from 1966 onwards 
(when it entered the parliament) it was called the Finnish Rural Party. 
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Paloheimo (1988, 2008) has suggested that the rise of the FRP contributed to a 
birth of a new cleavage between the elite and the people since the party indeed 
leaned on animosity towards the political elite and bureaucrats. The success of 
FRP can be understood well in channeling resentment towards politics and 
politicians. However, this suggestion for a cleavage lacks a social structural base 
as it vaguely places the common people (or forgotten people as the party founder 
Veikko Vennamo formulated it) against corrupted interests and the elite. It also 
lacks evident bipolarity since obviously no party has interests to explicitly defend 
the benefits of the elite against the common people. Nevertheless, this did not 
prevent the FRP from constituting a setting whereby all the old parties were 
equaled in terms of their disregard of the common people (Paloheimo 2008). In 
this vein, rather than representing new kinds of value politics, the rise of the FRP 
can be seen as a protest against the handling of politics.47  
 The electoral support of the FRP weakened the alignments of rural population 
to the Agrarian League. The thrive of the Centre Party to become more of a 
catch-all party for the population outside city-centers instead of being solely the 
vanguard of farmers seemed to backfire in the 1970s as Figure 3.3 shows. 
However, the strategy of the Centre Party to accentuate the tensions between 
densely-populated Finland and sparsely-populated Finland and to promote 
regional politics, paid off in the long run. (Nousiainen 1998, 27–28; Arter 2001a, 
2001b; Paloheimo 2008, 44.) The electoral support of the Centre Party revived in 
the 1990s and 2000s, as Figure 3.3 shows. Paloheimo (2008) regards this as a sign 
of an explicit cleavage between geographical centers and periphery.  
 The second new party, which emerged in the 1960s in the parliament and 
proved to be persistent, was the Christian League48. The party was formed as a 
counter-reaction to the waning of Christian values and to the erosion of 
traditional norms and traditional lifestyle. These changing norms and values had 
to do with cultural and social radicalism, which had been rising in Finland as a 
part of the general ‘revolt of the young’. The new student generation rejected the 
legitimacy of the authorities and engaged in civil activism. (Paloheimo 2008.) 
                                                            
47 Furthermore, as Arter (1999, 151) notes, the rise of the FRP was also influenced by anti-
Kekkonen sentiments, i.e. protest against the incumbent president Urho Kekkonen who had a 
hegemonic power base. 
48 The party was renamed as the Christian Democrats in 2001. 
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Although a minor force, the persistence of a Christian party in the parliament can 
be thus seen as a counterforce to the rise of liberal forces in Finland. Although the 
electoral support of the party has come, to a large extent, from members of 
revivalist groups and other small Christian communities (Freston 2004), it has 
not been suggested that religion would constitute a cleavage in Finland. A Lipset-
Rokkan kind of church-state cleavage could not emerge when the modern party 
system was launched for two reasons. First, there was no major dispute between 
the state and the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Second, Lutheranism had long and 
widespread traditions. (Allardt & Pesonen 1967, 344; Karvonen 2000, 136.) 
 It was not until the 1980s that postmaterialist issues were channeled through a 
new parliamentary party. The environmental movement managed to gain two 
seats in the 1983 parliamentary election. These interests were organized into the 
form of a political party four years later. The Green League (GREENS) has had 
representatives in the parliament ever since 1987: it gained representation by 
criticizing material growth and the exhaustion of natural resources and by 
promoting sustainable development. Further themes have been equality between 
people; liberal orientation in moral issues; multiculturalism and the increase of 
immigration (see Mickelsson 2007, 277). Scholars have interpreted that the value 
change towards postmaterialism and the rise of the Greens has brought about 
new value dimensions into the Finnish electorate and party sphere (Pesonen et al. 
1993; Zilliacus 2001; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2008).  
 The Left Alliance was formed on the ruins of the communist Finnish People’s 
Democratic League in 1990. Although it has continued to thrive and support the 
concerns of the working class, it has endeavored to rid itself from its Communist 
past and has positioned itself as a liberal red-green or New Left party promoting 
postmaterialist concerns. (Zilliacus 1995, 2001, 219–223; Karvonen 2014, 38, 46.)  
Hence, it represents an intriguing case between old and new issues.  
 The True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, TF) has so far been the last major 
inclusion into the Finnish party sphere. It entered the parliamentary scene with 
one MP in 1995 as a successor party for the Finnish Rural Party. Little by little, 
the party had gained increasing support, before making a final breakthrough with 
an unexpected landslide victory in the 2011 parliamentary election (+15.0 
percentage points). This was the biggest upset in Finnish electoral history since 
the return of the Communists to parliament with overwhelming numbers in 
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1945. Even though the True Finns continued with the populist heritage of the 
FRP, the ideological nature of the True Finns is different from its predecessor. To 
some extent the True Finns can be called a Radical Right Populist Party (Arter 
2010), although it has still some features of a center-based populist party 
(Paloheimo 2012). Arter (2012) and Ruostetsaari (2011) argue that the True 
Finns has revived patriotism with an explicitly nativist vision, taken an anti-
integration stance towards the EU, accentuated authoritarian features on moral 
issues and spoken for the common working man and his access to material well-
being. Thus the True Finns has adopted the themes typical for RRP parties, 
namely nationalism, anti-immigration, law and order, welfare chauvinism and 
traditional ethics (see Mudde 2007, 21). In any case, the party has provided an 
alternative through which the materialist-authoritarian nationalist values of the 
electorate can be channeled.  
 Nevertheless, it has not been explored whether cleavages based on age cohorts, 
gender or education and reflected in new kinds of values and attitudes have 
emerged in Finland. In any case, the rise of new kinds of values into the political 
life has brought about a challenge for the old parties. It has not either been 
systematically studied how ‘old’ social structural positions, based on native 
language, occupational class and the type of residential area, are reflected in 
values and attitudes and whether the social structural and value/attitudinal 
elements co-contribute to voting for a certain party.  
 With regard to the analyses of the whole cleavage structure, Allardt and 
Pesonen (1967) (see also Allardt 1961; Pesonen & Sänkiaho 1979) based their 
analysis of the 1960s cleavage structure on the evolution of the party system and 
on the loyalty of certain social structural groups. They argued that class, native 
language and place of residence had been the most enduring social structural 
bases for cleavages in Finland. The Social Democrats and the Communists were 
the parties of the working class, the National Coalition Party and the Liberals of 
the middle class and upper classes and of the urban population. The Agrarian 
League, in turn, was the party of the independent farmers and rural population 
and lastly the Swedish People’s Party was the representative of the Swedish-
speaking minority.  
 
 89 
 
On a structural basis, the old class cleavage and the cleavage between landed and 
urban-industrial interests have lost much of their original resonance. Of the old 
parties, the Social Democratic Party has not been able to rely on blue-collar 
workers and the Centre Party on farmers to the extent that they used to. The 
proportion of the working class vote for the Communists/Left Alliance and for 
the Social Democrats has decreased when coming to the 21st century. Alongside 
with the third old major party, the Coalition Party, they have all made appeals to 
the broad middle class, which has made the triangular model less encompassing 
in party-voter ties (Pesonen et al. 1993, 108; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005, 173– 
175). There has hence occurred a clear decline in the extent to which class 
dictates party choice. 
 It is important to note that both the party membership and the membership in 
trade unions have decreased severely especially from the 1990s onwards. For 
instance, at the end of the 1970s, the Centre Party had 300 000, the SDP 100 000, 
the National Coalition Party 80 000 and the Finnish People’s Democratic League 
55 000 members. In 1995, the respective figures were 260 000, 70 000, 47 000 and 
16 000 (for the successor party Left Alliance). The decline has continued in the 
21st century. In 2011 the Centre Party had 150 000, the SDP 45 000, the National 
Coalition Party 40 000 and the Left Alliance 9 000 members. Hence, the party 
membership in the largest parties has decreased by half in three decades. (see 
Sundberg 1996; 2008; Westinen 2015.)  
 The parties have not thus been able to lean on a broad core electorate and they 
have lost much of their influence at the local level. The trade unions, on the other 
hand, have had less relevance in socializing their members to support a certain 
political party. Even though the ties between interest organizations and parties 
still persist the parties have been less willing to be presented as having close ties to 
labor unions for example, for fear of losing votes. (see Sundberg 2008; Borg & 
Paloheimo 2009, 16.) In this regard, Mickelsson (2007) has discussed the 
breakdown of “political camps” in Finland. The political camps can be 
understood as ideological multi-layer constructions that divide society in 
overlapping ways. In the Finnish context, they divided society in terms of parties, 
labor organizations, economic life (for example bank sector and foundations) and 
in terms of social classes. The socialist camp (especially the communists) suffered 
from internal grievances, the breakdown of “red capital” and the gradual collapse 
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of the Soviet Union. This meant that the ideological struggle between classes lost 
much of its resonance in the party system. The communist Finnish People’s 
Democratic League (SKDL) ran candidates for the last time in parliamentary 
elections in 1987. Its successor, the Left Alliance resigned from communism. The 
agrarian camp obviously had to go through a major transformation due to the 
transformation in Finland from an agricultural society to a more urban post-
industrial society. The bourgeois camp suffered the most from the disappearance 
of the Liberal People’s Party, which had its base in the upper middle-class. This 
accentuated the disappearance of old dividing lines. However, for the National 
Coalition Party the breakdown of political camps was easier than for the socialist 
parties or Agrarian League since the vast middle class was growing and since 
“bourgeois capital” behind the Coalition Party has been rather persistent. 
(Mickelsson 2007; Paloheimo 2007; Karvonen 2014.)  
 Rural-urban and linguistic cleavages have been interpreted to persist on a 
structural basis although the rural-urban cleavage no longer pits farmers against 
commercial-industrial interests; instead it has been interpreted as handling the 
tensions between the rural population and the urban population at large. The 
farmers today have concentrated their votes more strongly on the Centre Party 
and the Swedish-speaking voters have remained loyal to the Swedish People’s 
Party. (Pesonen et al. 1993, 108; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005, 173–175.)   
 Paloheimo (2007) argues that when the significance of social class weakened, 
the socioeconomic left-right-dimension took on a more independent role in 
affecting party choice and conditioning the party sphere in socioeconomic 
questions. The interpretations of the updated cleavage structure have indeed been 
primarily based on analyzing merely the dimensional element of cleavages. 
 Paloheimo (1988) suggested that there were four old cleavages: left–right, 
center–periphery (geographical), linguistic and nationalist–international (Fenno-
Soviet relations). These were accompanied by elite-people, conservative vs. liberal 
moral values and materialism-postmaterialism cleavages.49 These divisions have 
                                                            
49 In addition, Pesonen, Sänkiaho snd Borg (1993) identified a class cleavage, environmental 
cleavage and potential for new cleavages (gender, employment, elite vs. people). Nevertheless, their 
analysis was not based on identifying objective social structural groups and their conflicting values 
bases. Besides, they approached the existence of cleavages in terms of perceived conflicts. For 
example, it was asked whether a person perceives whether there exists a conflict between the rich 
and the poor, employers and employees and politicians and people. 
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continued to be relevant with the exception of Fenno-Soviet relations, which has 
been replaced by an EU-dimension (see Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & 
Westinen 2012). These studies found that left-wing voters have the closest ties to 
the Left Alliance and the Social Democrats, right-wing voters to the National 
Coalition Party, the defenders of peripheries to the Centre Party and the Swedish-
speaking Finns to the Swedish People’s Party. In addition, the EU and elite critics 
have found their home in the True Finns; moral conservatives in the Christian 
Democrats; and postmaterialists in the Green League. 
 To summarize, four of the present Finnish parliamentary parties were formed 
at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries or at the beginning of the 20th century. 
The Social Democratic Party was formed in 1899 to defend the vast and 
underprivileged working class, the Agrarian League (later on Centre Party) was 
formed in 1906 to defend the farmer population in the countryside and the 
Coalition Party was formed in 1918 to defend to the bourgeois, employers and 
owning class in Finland. The Swedish People’s Party was formed in 1906 as a 
continuation for the language disputes in Finland. These parties have continued 
to be influential in the 21st century despite the challenges presented by newer 
parties. The Left Alliance (formed in 1990) has resisted income disparity and 
promoted postmaterialist concerns and the Green League (founded in 1988) has 
accentuated liberal politics and especially environmental concerns. On the 
conservative side, the Christian Democrats was founded in 1958 to defend 
traditional moral values and the Finnish Rural Party in 1959 to defend the cause 
of small peasants. Later on it became a channel of protest against and dissent on 
the old parties. The successor party, True Finns (founded in 1995), has 
accentuated nationalism, conservatism and the needs of common (native) people.  
 Despite the fact that the attention in cleavage research has largely shifted to 
the dimensional element of cleavages, the linkage between social structural 
positions and values and attitudes has been mostly ignored by academics 
analyzing the Finnish parties and their electorates. To summarize, Finnish 
cleavage structure has not been explored from a perspective that would both seek 
out socio-structural groups sharing political values and attitudes and that would 
try to determine how these interests are reflected in the party sphere. However, 
before moving into analyzing the Finnish cleavage structure, the choice of data, 
the methodological approach and the limitations of the study need to be assessed.   
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4. Detecting cleavage elements in Finland in the 21st 
century  
 
4.1. Data and limitations of the study 
The choice of the data in this study is conditioned by the requirement to combine 
individual-level social structural characteristics with a vast array of opinions on 
political issues and party choice in parliamentary elections. The Finnish National 
Election Studies (FNES) 2003, 2007 and 2011 (see Karvonen & Paloheimo 2003; 
Paloheimo 2007; Borg & Grönlund  2011) meet this requirement. They provide a 
systematic set of social structural variables over time and a broad range of 
thematically set questions on political issues, which reflect the value/attitudinal 
element of cleavages. Party choice in the parliamentary elections is best detected 
using National Election Studies in comparison to other domestic or international 
data since the closeness of elections is crucial factor when asking the respondent’s 
choice of a party. The variety of issue questions proposed in the FNES studies is 
better than in European Social Surveys (ESS) and European Value Studies (EVS), 
for example, since the FNES studies better grasp the content of Finnish party 
politics. ESS and EVS, obviously serving the common framework in Europe, do 
not entail for example questions on regional politics or Swedish language. In 
addition, also the sociodemographic variables in the FNES-studies serve the 
research task better than the ones in international surveys.  
 These post-election surveys were conducted after each parliamentary election 
in mainland Finland50 and were two-staged. The first stage was a face-to-face 
interview, which was executed in 2003 with multistage stratified sampling51 and 
in 2007 and 2011 with quota sampling, in which the quotas were based on age, 
                                                            
50 As the sample concerned mainland Finland, the Åland Islands (with roughly 30 000 inhabitants 
and broad autonomy) were excluded. This is a common procedure when conducting surveys in 
Finland.  
51 At the first stage, the primary sampling units were based on type of region, degree of urbanization 
and at later stages on postal codes.  
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gender and province of residence of the respondents.52 The second stage involved 
a self-administered drop-off questionnaire, which the respondents were asked to 
return by mail. The total number of respondents in the 2003 data was 1270, while 
the 2007 data had 1421 respondents and the 2011 data 1297 respondents. The 
structural variables are in the face-to-face interviews while the questions on 
political issues are in the drop-off questionnaire that was filled by 59 per cent of 
the respondents in 2003; 73 per cent of the respondents in 2007; and 61 per cent 
of the respondents in 2011.  
 One obvious downfall of the data in analyzing cleavages is that the same 
respondents are not analyzed in different years. Such panel data would certainly 
have been optimal in comparison to the cross-sectional data at hand since then 
the effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice 
could have been analyzed regarding the same respondents. With panel data from 
a long time-span it would be even possible to detect socialization processes that 
lead to certain values and attitudes, as well as to certain party choice.  As panel 
data is not available for Finnish voters, the cross-sectional FNES-data from 2003, 
2007 and 2011 is the best possible alternative, although it has its limitations. 
   As the analyses combine social structural variables and values and attitudes 
that are measured with issue variables (questions on political issues), the 
respondents who did not answer the drop-off-questionnaire have to be excluded 
from the analyses that contain questions on political issues. This is done in order 
to have the same respondents in each statistical model. However, for descriptive 
analyses (crosstabs) that include only social structural variable(s), the face-to-face 
interview is used. 
 There are two obvious downsides with the analyses that are done with the 
drop-off-questionnaire. First, the number of respondents included in the analyses 
drops considerably. Nevertheless, the N is still high enough to conduct most of 
the analyses reliably. Notwithstanding, caution is required when dealing with 
small group sizes. To address this problem, the final regression analyses are done 
by merging the three separate FNES studies into a single pooled dataset. The 
pooled dataset with a bigger N increases the reliability in the statistical analyses. 
                                                            
52 In the interviews of the Swedish-speaking respondents, the quotas were not based on province; 
instead, they were based on constituency, because the interviews were only conducted in the 
constituencies where the number of Swedish-speaking people entitled to vote was significant 
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Second, the problem of self-selection cannot be totally avoided. Self-selection 
arises when the respondents select themselves into a group that is analyzed and 
when the qualities of the self-selected respondents correlate strongly with the 
object of study. Those who are politically more active and more interested in 
politics are more willing to answer the drop-off questionnaire. As will be clarified 
later on, the sociodemographic features of the respondents who answered the 
drop-off questionnaire in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 studies are slightly skewed in 
terms of age and education. 
 The relevant background variables include each respondent’s native language, 
municipality (coded according to the type of municipality), occupation (recoded 
to constitute occupational classes), denomination, age, gender and education. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the share of different social structural groups in FNES-
studies in 2003–2011 (based on face-to-face interviews)53. Appendix Table 1 
shows the respective shares in the drop-off-questionnaire.54 The motivations for 
these categorizations for social structural groups are discussed in subchapters 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The social structural variables have remained same in the FNES-
studies in 2003–2011, which enables good comparability in the analyses. Table 
4.2, in turn, represents the share of the same social structural groups in the 
Finnish population. The samples in FNES 2003, 2007 and 2011 are well-balanced 
in terms of native language (when the oversample of Swedish-speaking 
respondents is balanced out), gender and church membership in comparison to 
the population. Place of residence has a slight bias as respondents from towns 
outside the Helsinki metropolitan area are underrepresented in the data. There is 
no systematic bias regarding occupational class.    
 However, the data contains a bias in terms of age cohorts and education. The 
oldest age cohort (born before 1945) is overrepresented in the data. Moreover, 
the highly educated (university level education) are overrepresented in the data 
                                                            
53 The following social structural groups were excluded from analyses: respondents with other 
native language than Finnish or Swedish (N=11 in 2003, N=8 in 2007 and N=6 in 2011), 
respondents with some other occupation or with no current occupation, such as unemployed, on 
parent leave etc.( N=177 in 2003, N=138 in 2007 and N=214 in 2011) and also respondents with 
some other denomination than Evangelic-Lutheran (N=73 in 2003, N=69 in 2007 and N=46 in 
2011).     
54 In these descriptive tables a language weight is used in order to balance out the deliberate 
oversample of Swedish-speaking voters in each year. 
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although comparisons to other educational groups are less straight-forward as 
regards to population.  
 
Table 4.1 The social structural characteristics (%) of Finnish voters in the face-to-
face interviews of FNES-studies.  
 
  2003 (N) 2007 (N) 2011 (N) 
Mother language       
Finnish 95 (1196) 95 (1338) 95 (1220) 
Swedish 5 (63) 5 (72) 5 (65) 
Type of residential area 
      Rural municipality 19 (244) 19 (275) 16 (211) 
Small municipality 17 (207) 18 (251) 17 (221) 
Town 42 (524) 43 (606) 48 (619) 
Helsinki metropolitan area 23 (284) 20 (289) 18 (234) 
Occupational class             
Blue-collar workers 31 (335) 30 (388) 27 (277) 
Lower grade white-collar workers 23 (247) 23 (292) 27 (280) 
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural)  12 (132) 10 (123) 6 (59) 
Lower professionals 14 (156) 15 (200) 18 (188) 
Higher professionals and managers 20 (219) 23 (294) 23 (235) 
Denomination             
Evangelic-Lutheran 87 (1034) 82 (1118) 78 (970) 
Does not belong to church 13 (154) 18 (240) 22 (270) 
Gender             
Male 50 (630) 49 (700) 50 (641) 
Female 50 (629) 51 (721) 50 (643) 
Age cohorts 
      -1944 27 (342) 29 (414) 22 (282) 
1945-1959 28 (353) 27 (386) 28 (365) 
1960-1975 26 (328) 23 (320) 24 (308) 
1976- 19 (234) 21 (301) 26 (329) 
Education             
Primary 30 (375) 26 (374) 22 (277) 
Vocational 27 (339) 33 (465) 29 (372) 
Upper Secondary 27 (344) 22 (306) 24 (311) 
Polytechnic 7 (88) 6 (88) 9 (114) 
University 9 (111) 13 (178) 16 (210) 
All 100 (1259) 100 (1421) 100 (1284) 
 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
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Table 4.2 The social structural characteristics (%) in the Finnish population in 
2003, 2007 and 2011.55 
 
  2003 2007 2011 
Native language       
Finnish 95 95 95 
Swedish 5 5 5 
Type of residential area       
Rural municipality 17 16 15 
Small municipality 17 17 16 
Town 47 48 49 
Helsinki metropolitan area 19 19 20 
Occupational class       
Blue-collar workers 29 28 25 
Lower grade white-collar workers 22 22 25 
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural)  12 10 11 
Lower professionals 15 16 17 
Higher professionals and managers 21 25 23 
Denomination       
Evangelic-Lutheran 86 84 79 
Does not belong to church 14 16 21 
Gender       
Male 49 49 49 
Female 51 51 51 
Age cohorts 
   -1944 28 24 19 
1945-1959 29 28 27 
1960-1975 27 26 26 
1976- 16 22 28 
Education       
No degree after 34 31 28 
comprehensive school 
   Graduate, upper secondary 39 41 41 
school, vocational school 
   Vocational examination 13 12 11 
in an institute level 
   Polytechnic degree, studies 6 8 10 
in polytechnic/university 
   University degree 7 8 9 
All 100 100 100 
 
Source: Statistics Finland 2015a 
                                                            
55 Statistics regarding educational level concern those citizens who are 20 years or older due to the 
way educational statistics are conducted in terms of age groups. 
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The drop-off-questionnaire has the same pitfalls as the face-to-face-interview in 
terms of representativeness. The oldest age cohort is even more overrepresented 
in the drop-off-questionnaire in comparison to the population. Moreover, those 
with university-level education are overrepresented also in the drop-off-
questionnaire. These biases are entangled with elderly people and high-educated 
having a higher political interest and being more engaged in politics (see Elo & 
Rapeli 2012) and hence being more interested to answer questions on politics. 
Cautiousness is essential when considering the results of the analyses due to the 
low N of some analyzed voter groups and due to the self-selection problem.  
 The choice of relevant questions on political issues, measuring political values 
and attitudes, is based on the political and theoretical relevance and nature of the 
questions and their applicability. The questions in the election surveys, and in 
other surveys measuring political attitudes and values, tend to change from one 
survey to another. Therefore, as Knutsen and Kumlin (2005, 131) remind us, it is 
rather complicated to find measurements that can be compared over time. The 
FNES-data indeed has such pitfalls: many questions measuring the respondents’ 
values and attitudes have changed over time. In other words, there are only a few 
questions on political issues that have been proposed in exactly the same form in 
each survey in 2003, 2007 and 2011.   
 Hence, the questions that are formulated in a different manner but handle the 
same theme have to be treated as measuring only roughly the same thing. 
However, this is not a major problem because the focus of the study is on 
analyzing which issues covariate and form value/attitudinal dimensions and not 
to compare the development of issue opinions over time. The fluctuation in the 
themes that the questions cover and the low number of issue questions, 
nevertheless, inevitably makes the analyses less robust than would be ideal.  
In order to construct analyses of issues that have been subject to dispute, 
politically charged and relevant from a cleavage perspective, certain issues are 
excluded. As such, the first set of questions included in the analyses handles 
contended issues of importance, while excluding questions that are not subject to 
any major dispute since almost everyone considers them important. Such issues 
excluded, for instance, are the importance of health care, elderly care and crime 
reduction. These issues reminisce thus of valence issues, brought upfront by 
Stokes (1963). In this regard, valence issues refer to policy goals that are shared 
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almost unanimously and are considered commonly important. Moreover, 
valence issues cannot be framed in terms of disagreement over policy choices: 
public controversy handles the priority in solving each acute problem, such as 
reducing crime (van Wijnen 2001).  
The second set of questions used to analyze values and attitudes is derived 
from the statements the respondents agree or disagree with. These questions 
reflect position issues, which measure, as the terms suggest, the different political 
positions the voters take or they measure the policy alternatives they prefer. An 
example of a position issue is whether or not the scope of the welfare state should 
be more limited. Position issues, especially, have been considered to reflect 
underlying political orientations instead of being considered as short-term 
factors, in the sense of issues of the day. (Thomassen 2005a, 17; de Sio 2010.) The 
more detailed presentation of the issue questions used is presented in subchapter 
4.3, where the questions on political issues are analyzed with the means of a 
principal component analysis.  
Party choice was investigated by asking the following question in the FNES-
studies; “The candidate of which party did you vote for in these parliamentary 
elections?”. Since there is obviously always some imbalance in samples in terms of 
party support, an election result weight has to be deployed in the analyses. This is 
important because the voters of the Centre Party and the National Coalition 
Party have been constantly underrepresented and the voters of the Social 
Democratic Party have been constantly overrepresented in the FNES-data in 
2003–2011. As the samples contained also a deliberate oversample of Swedish-
speaking voters, the most suitable option for analyses, in which party choice is 
included, is to deploy a combined weight that allows the share of Swedish-
speaking voters to correspond to the share of the population and which corrects 
party popularity so that it will correspond to the election results in 2003–2011. 
  The research questions in the study are approached using quantitative 
methods, deploying an array of statistical analyses. In this respect, the detailed 
methodological choices are presented in accordance with each statistical analysis 
as this solution enables us to contextualize the methodological choices better. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis proceeds in the following way. First, in 
subchapter 4.2, RQ1 “which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in 
Finland?” is assessed by analyzing the group identity of social structurally defined 
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groups and by assessing the political importance of different social structural 
groups. This is done by comparing both the group identity (measured with 
questions on identity) of the social structural groups involved when they are 
accessible with available data and by analyzing the party profiles: whether the 
social structural groups involved have importance for the political parties or 
whether they have political potential in the party sphere.  
Second, in subchapter 4.3, RQ2 ‘which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in 
the Finnish electorate?” is assessed with the means of principal component 
analysis. It is analyzed which opinions on political issues (measuring either 
salience or agreement) vary in the same manner, load to the same principal 
component and constitute value/attitudinal dimensions. The aim is thus to 
identify latent underlying variables, in this case value/attitudinal dimensions.  
Third, in subchapter 4.4, RQ3 ‘what is the effect of social structural position on 
the values and attitudes in the electorate?’ is assessed by running a linear 
regression analysis (OLS), which compares the effects of social structural 
positions, coded as dummy variables, on the earlier-identified value/attitudinal 
dimensions. The dependent, continuous variables are hence the principal 
component scores based on the principal component analyses.  
Fourth, RQ4a ‘What is the effect of social structural position on voters’ party 
choice?’ and RQ4b “Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes 
that are linked to each other, have an effect on voting for a particular party?” are 
assessed in subchapters 5.2 and 5.3. The effect of social structural positions and 
values and attitudes on party choice is detected by deploying binary logistic 
regression. The dependent variable is dummy-coded: 1 indicates voting for a 
certain party and 0 stands for voting for any other parliamentary party. In this 
respect, six statistical models are built. The first model includes only social 
structural variables, while in the subsequent models each of the value/attitudinal 
dimensions is added separately.  
Subsequently, analyses are made to discover the overall impact of social 
structural positions and values/attitudes in explaining the electoral support of 
parties. In this regard, the idea is to determine the goodness-of-the-fit of the 
model that includes only social structural variables as explanatory variables and 
of the model that includes also all value/attitudinal dimensions as explanatory 
variables of party choice.  
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Finally, the answer to RQ5 “Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and 
which are the parties associated with them? is based on the previous analyses that 
have answered research questions 1–4. The categorization of the conflicts is made 
in subchapter 5.3.3.   
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4.2 Social structural basis of cleavages 
This subchapter deals with the first research question “which are the relevant 
social structural cleavage bases in Finland?” by assessing the group identity of 
social structurally defined groups and by assessing the political importance of 
different social structural locations. The focus is on analyzing whether a social 
structural position functions as a source for a group-based identity and whether 
the social structural groups discussed have special importance for the political 
parties.  
Kriesi (1998, 131) has argued that the crux in cleavage research is to identify 
the theoretically and empirically relevant social divisions and to study their 
political formation. The ‘old’ social structural positions stemming from the 
Lipset-Rokkan-model, which are discussed, are native language, type of 
residential area and occupational class. The new potential cleavage bases 
suggested in the literature, which are discussed, are age, gender and education. In 
addition, denomination is handled as an old structural base that has only recently 
become politicized in Finland.  
The potential for conflicts between social structural groups is assessed, when 
possible, in terms of group identity, using primarily the FNES-face-to-face 
interviews as the data. By group identity it is referred to an individual’s sense of 
belonging to a certain social group, i.e. whether he/she has developed an identity 
that is based on social structural characteristics or whether there exists collective 
consciousness (Bartolini & Mair 1990). Group identity can be empirically 
measured for the ‘old’ social structural characteristics. However, this is not 
possible for the ‘new’ social structural characteristics. Group consciousness – the 
perceptions on whether the intergroup relationship is characterized by conflict 
and evaluations on the socio-political stance of one’s own and the opposing 
group – is disregarded due to the absence of questions measuring these 
phenomena  (see Tajfel 1978; Stubager 2009).   
In addition, how the parliamentary parties have represented the group-based 
interests over the years is analyzed. It has been found that even though explicit 
group-based appeals have decreased and Finnish parties have become less 
selective on their targeted voter groups (Enyedi 2005, Paloheimo 2007), the 
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representation of social structural groups has not vanished (see Paloheimo 2006; 
Mickelsson 2007).  
 
4.2.1. Old cleavage bases in social structure 
Native language 
 
The empirical measurement and treatment of the social structural base as regards 
to the old ethno-linguistic cleavage is a quite straight-forward task. The most 
prominent ethno-linguistic minority are the Swedish-speaking Finns, who 
constitute roughly 5 per cent of the population (291 000 in 2011). The Finnish-
speaking Finns constitute 90 per cent of the population (4 863 000 in 2011). 
There is an obvious ethno-linguistic dichotomy between Finnish-speaking and 
Swedish-speaking people. The other linguistic groups are excluded from the 
analyses since they are small in numbers. In 2011, roughly 5 per cent of the 
Finnish population (245 000 inhabitants) had other native language than Finnish 
or Swedish. The largest of these groups were Russians (58 000), Estonians 
(33 000) and Somalis (14 000). (Statistics Finland 2011a.)56  
Table 4.3 shows that the common identity deriving from native language is 
especially important for the Finnish-Swedes. In the 2003 National Election Study, 
82 per cent of the Swedish-speaking respondents identified themselves primarily 
as Swedish-speaking Finns in contrast to Finns in general. In the 2007 study, the 
proportion decreased to 78 per cent and in the 2011 study, the proportion was 73 
per cent. When these figures are compared to the proportion of Finnish-speaking 
Finns who identify themselves primarily as Finnish-speaking Finns in contrast to 
Finns in general, there is a striking difference. In the 2003 National Election 
Study, 21 per cent of the Finnish-speaking respondents identified themselves 
primarily as Finnish-speaking Finns. In 2007, the respective share was 27 and in 
2011, the proportion was 28 per cent. The results indicate that when compared to 
the Finnish-speaking people, language is a far more important source of 
                                                            
56 Ethnic minorities have been so far rarely represented in Finnish politics. In the 2011 election, 
however, a candidate with a Kenyan background (Green League) was chosen to the parliament. 
After the 2015 election, Finland has one MP with an Afghan background (SDP) and one MP with a 
Turkish background (Green League). 
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identification for the Swedish-speaking people as it is their most distinguishable 
feature.  
 
Table 4.3 Linguistic identity by native language in 2003–201157  
 
  Identity             
Native 
 
Finnish- Finns  Swedish- Other All (N) 
language Year speaking in general speaking 
   
Finnish 2003 21 77 1 1 100 (1073) 
 
2007 27 72 1 1 100 (1101) 
 
2011 28 70 1 1 100 (1178) 
Swedish 2003 1 17 82 0 100 (186) 
 
2007 0 22 78 0 100 (313) 
  2011 3 23 73 2 100 (114) 
All 2003 20 74 5 1 100 (1259) 
 
2007 26 70 4 1 100 (1414) 
 
2011 27 68 4 1 100 (1292) 
 
Note: In this table, in contrast to all other tables, the language weight was not deployed since other 
social structural variables are not assessed simultaneously. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the importance of having a Swedish-speaking identity 
has somewhat decreased from 2003 to 2011, while the importance of having a 
Finnish-speaking identity has somewhat increased. The increased importance of 
a Finnish-speaking identity instead of a Finnish identity may be the result of a 
nativist reaction since the debate on the effects of immigration has intensified in 
recent years (see Borg 2012c). However, it may also reflect the fact that an ever-
growing number of Finnish-speaking people has seen the Swedish-speaking 
population as a privileged group (Grönlund 2011, 7–8). This may accentuate the 
need to emphasize the Finnish-speaking identity. Indeed, because Swedish-
speaking people are portrayed as being fortunate, well-off and socially better 
                                                            
57 The respondents were asked “Which of the following groups would you say you belong to?”. The 
answer alternatives were Finns in general, Finnish-speaking Finns, Swedish-speaking Finns and other 
ethnic or linguistic group.  
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integrated than their Finnish-speaking counterparts, the Finnish-Swedes have 
been called “the better people”. (Tandefelt 2000, 71; Heikkilä 2011, 21.) 
Furthermore, when taking into account the language used at home, the sharp 
dividing lines persist. Very few Finnish-speaking Finns use both Finnish and 
Swedish at home, while less than a third of Swedish-speaking Finns use both 
Finnish and Swedish at home (data from FNES studies in 2003, 2007 and 2011). 
This indicates the social homogeneity of interaction in the Swedish-speaking 
community.  
The core of the politicized tension between the Finnish-Swedes and the 
Finnish-speaking majority has focused on the privileged nature of the Finnish-
Swedes. The position of Swedish is guaranteed as an official language in the 
Constitution and the Language Act assures the right to use Swedish in any state 
authority and in local authority, depending on the linguistic status of the 
municipality. Furthermore, as Bengtsson (2011, 35) notes, the Finnish-Swedes 
have been fostered by their strong position in political, economic and societal 
spheres.  
The position of Finnish-Swedes has been in a striking contrast to the other 
West European minorities, most of which have been more or less peripheral 
either politically, culturally or socioeconomically (see Birnir 2007, 21). In Lipset 
and Rokkan’s classification, ethno-linguistic minorities were indeed equaled with 
periphery. But Finnish-Swedes have been far from peripheral in Finland, as they 
indeed were the ruling class for a long time (see Karvonen 2014).  
Language has been the social structural base for one of the clearest divisions of 
the Finnish party system. The Swedish-speaking people are still explicitly 
represented by the Swedish People’s Party to the extent that Swedish interests are 
the raison d’etre of the party. Disputes over other issues have been overcome in 
order to represent the whole Swedish-speaking population; the Swedish People’s 
Party has always managed to negotiate satisfying arrangements for the party by 
setting language at the top of its agenda. (Bengtsson 2005, 135–137; Sundberg 
2006a, 45; Paloheimo 2008, 48.) In addition, the representation of Swedish-
speaking interests has benefitted from the electoral system since the Swedish-
speaking population is packed to the coastal areas in the electoral districts of 
Helsingfors (Helsinki), Nyland (Uusimaa), Egentliga-Finland (Varsinais-Suomi) 
and Vasa (Vaasa).  
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In addition, the significance of the division to Finnish- and Swedish-speaking 
people has not been solely based on the assembling force of the Swedish People’s 
Party. Although the SFP has been and still is a major force, the societal interests 
of Swedish-speaking population has been furthered especially by the wealthy 
Finnish-Swedish cultural life and foundations, which have also been involved in 
advocating financial support in elections (see Sundberg 1985; Venho 2009).  
While the Swedish People’s Party has a non-negotiable position in 
representing the Swedish-speaking people, the linguistic division has remained 
quite irrelevant for the Finnish-speaking parties. Since Finnish-speaking voters 
constitute over 90 per cent of the electorate, there would be little sense in trying 
to represent the ‘interests of all Finnish-speaking people’. However, the True 
Finns has represented arguments against Swedish language on anti-elitist bases 
and on the grounds that people should not be obliged to study mandatory 
Swedish in school. This has clearly further bipolarized the language-based 
conflicts with the Swedish People’s Party and the True Finns being the opposite 
poles (see Grönlund 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 169).58  
 
Type of residential area 
 
The treatment of the social structural base in the old rural-urban cleavage is 
trickier. The traditional dichotomy of people living in the countryside and in 
urban environments may miss some of the present dynamics. Instead, in this 
study a categorization is proposed that takes into account both the density of the 
population/urbanization degree and the size of the municipality the voters live in. 
This categorization builds on the categorizations of Statistics Finland (2015b). A 
distinction is made between people living in rural municipalities, small 
municipalities, towns and in the metropolitan area of Helsinki. Rural 
municipalities include those municipalities in which less than 60 per cent of the 
population lives in urban settlements (and in which the population of the largest 
urban settlement is less than 15 000). Small municipalities are municipalities in 
which at least 60 per cent, but less than 90 per cent, of the population lives in 
                                                            
58 The grievance of the True Finns towards Finnish-Swedes in fact fulfils the three conditions that 
are likely to make an ethnic (linguistic) minority a target for a populist force (Mudde 2007, 71). (1) 
Finnish-Swedes have extensive minority rights and they are well-organized; (2) they are linked to 
the majority ethnicity of the bordering state; (3) they used to be the dominating group in Finland. 
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urban settlements and in which the population of the largest urban settlement is 
at least 4,000 but less than 15 000.Towns include those municipalities in which at 
least 90 per cent of the population lives in urban settlements, or in which the 
population of the largest urban settlement is at least 15 000. The metropolitan 
area of Helsinki consists of the capital Helsinki and its surrounding cities Espoo, 
Grankulla/Kauniainen and Vantaa.  
One fifth of the respondents live in rural municipalities and one fifth in small 
municipalities, where a larger share of residents live in the center of the 
municipality. About two fifths live in urban environments outside the Helsinki 
metropolitan area and one fifth in the Helsinki metropolitan area.  
 In the 21st century, the interests between people living in the metropolitan 
area and the rest of Finland have become increasingly conflicted. As Moisio 
(2012, 22) argues, the metropolitan area of Helsinki has been seen as a key factor 
in Finland’s global competitiveness when scale benefits and tendency towards 
bigger units have become key aspects in governmental strategies. Moisio calls this 
developmental phase, which has intensified in recent years, the metropolitan state 
phase. Especially in times of a decentralized welfare state, the clash still revolved 
mainly around the classic dichotomy between rural and urban interests.  
 When emphasis on competitiveness and centralization increases, particularly 
those living in rural municipalities and other small municipalities may feel that 
they have been left on their own (see Uusitalo 2003). At the same time, however, 
people living in urban environments, especially in the metropolitan area, may 
argue that the concentration of resources has not gone far enough and that 
peripheral communities are being held up artificially with an ineffective 
allocation of resources (see Moisio 2012). The distinction between rural and 
small municipalities is needed because the rural municipalities can be conceived 
as being in an even more peripheral and vulnerable position: they have lost 
population in the 21st century and the prospects for rural municipalities are not 
especially bright (Uusitalo 2003; Moisio 2006). Moreover, given the long tradition 
and the special vanguard of rural interests in Finnish politics (see Karvonen 
2014), it is important to distinguish between people living in the most rural 
environments and those living in small communities that are not considered as 
being primarily rural.  
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Admittedly, the category of urban residents outside the metropolitan area is large 
and heterogeneous as it includes citizens living in small towns and citizens living 
in towns with 200 000 inhabitants. However, the category of residents living in 
larger towns (for example in towns with over 100 000 inhabitants) would also be 
problematic because there are no clear common interests for people living in a 
northern town like Oulu and a southern town like Tampere, not to speak of a 
common “larger town identity”. Instead, urban interests have persisted in Finnish 
politics (see Paloheimo 2008; Moisio 2012) and urbanity unites people living in 
urban environments despite the differences in the size of the urban community 
(Hellström 2011).    
 How much people identify themselves in rural or urban terms cannot be 
assessed from the FNES data. However, according to a survey conducted in 2011 
by The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, roughly 40 per cent of the Finnish 
population has an urban identity and roughly 20 per cent have a rural identity. 
Slightly below 40 per cent feel that they are both urban and rural (ibid.). Even 
though the mixed identity represents a challenge from a cleavage perspective, it is 
likely that one of the identities is stronger, whereas the other may exist 
simultaneously. As there has been far more migration from the countryside to 
towns than the other way around, many people living in towns have roots in the 
countryside and can pertain towards having a rural identity, at least partly (ibid; 
Statistics Finland 2015b). Moreover, the rural-urban-dichotomy is crude in terms 
of identity and does not leave room for interpretations as to whether the people 
in the metropolitan area have a distinctively different kind of urban identity in 
comparison to people living in other urban environments. In addition, it must be 
highlighted that living environments differ drastically from each other inside the 
Helsinki metropolitan area; from rich neighborhoods to socially peripheral 
suburbs. However, distinction inside towns/municipalities cannot be made with 
available data.  
 Even though the rural-urban divide is closely attached with the antagonisms 
of the past (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 283), the rural-urban identity is still felt 
quite strongly in the Finnish electorate. Only one fourth of the people feel that 
rural-urban identity is not at all important for them. However, those living in 
rural environments consider this identity to be far more important than those 
living in urban environments (Hellström 2011.) Hence, rural identity seems to be 
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stronger embedded than urban identity. Moreover, the continuing deterioration 
of the countryside may have stimulated the importance of defending the 
countryside. All of these aspects explain why the type of residential area where 
people live could have an importance from a cleavage perspective.  
 The interests of rural and urban residents have been represented quite 
explicitly since many of the Finnish parties have had stable support areas in either 
rural or urban environments (see Rantala 1970; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; 
Westinen 2014). The Centre Party has traditionally represented the interests of 
the rural population and sparsely populated areas due to its Agrarian roots, while 
the National Coalition Party and the Green League have been the main 
representatives of the southern population centers, and hence the metropolitan 
area. The Social Democrats and the Left Alliance have been the representatives of 
residents in urban-industrial environments. (Ruostetsaari 2006, Paloheimo 2008; 
Westinen 2011.)59 Moreover, the Left Alliance has attached spatial interests to 
workers’ interests by arguing that market forces should not dictate the living 
conditions of the regions. The Swedish People’s Party has approached the spatial 
representation of interests from a linguistic perspective: it has defended the 
interests of both the rural and urban Swedish-speaking people. The True Finns 
and the Christian Democrats have neither profiled themselves as the 
representatives of groups defined in terms of type of residential area (ibid.). 
Hence, the conflicts have mainly put the Centre Party against the Coalition Party, 
Green League and Social Democrats.  
 
Occupational class 
 
The empirical treatment of occupational class needs a more nuanced approach 
than was given to the other cleavage bases. This is due to the complex nature of 
the concept of class itself. The measurement of class has changed dramatically 
over the years. For Karl Marx, the crucial element in defining classes was the 
control of production. For Max Weber, class relations were the outcome of the 
distribution of property and other resources in capital and labor markets. Class 
divisions arise from the (lack of) possession of property and the nature of 
                                                            
59However, the Left Alliance is still, to some extent, the representative of peripheral areas that stem 
from the Communist Party (so-called backwoods Communism) (see Laulajainen 1979). 
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employment relations. (Scott 2002.) Although modified later on, the most 
prominent class categorizations have followed the Weberian ideas. Erikson, 
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979, see also Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) 
constructed the most widely-used class scheme (EG/EGP-scheme) that divides 
people into several classes according to their skills and the degree of autonomy 
related to their work. Following the footsteps of Lockwood (1958), class situation 
was broken down into market situation and work situation. The market situation 
handles the conditions of employment – income, economic advancement etc. 
The work situation indicates how the work is located in systems of authority and 
control (Goldthorpe 1987, 40). Classes became thus perceived as groups that 1) 
are based on employment relations, which indicate the position within the labor 
market and 2) reflect the degree of autonomy related to the work (Erikson & 
Goldthorpe 1992, 37). The nature of the work has been underlined also in later 
accounts (see e.g. Kitschelt & Rehm 2014).   
 There are several versions of the EG/EGP class-schema which vary as to the 
number of classes. For instance, the most detailed version distinguishes between 
1) Higher-grade professionals, managers etc. 2) Lower-grade professionals, 
administrators etc. 3) Routine non-manual employees (higher grade) 4) Routine 
non-manual employees, (lower grade) 5) Small proprietors with employees 6) 
Small proprietors without employees 7) Farmers and other self-employed 
workers in primary production 8) Lower-grade technicians 9) Skilled manual 
workers 10) Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers and 11) Agricultural and 
other workers in primary production. 
 In modern social science, three further categorizations have been widely used 
and discussed. Olin-Wright’s (1985) schema emphasizes more the ownership 
relations and distinguishes between capitalists, workers and the 'petty 
bourgeoisie'. This was an attempt to retain a Marxist approach in class analyses. 
Esping-Andersen (1993) sought to recognize employment changes associated 
with post-industrialism and differentiate post-industrial categories from the 
more traditional categories. In one of the most recent alternative categorizations 
for the EGP-scheme, Oesch (2006) has suggested a categorization that is based on 
a new “horizontal”, structural conflict in the labor market. He suggests that there 
is a conflict between people whose work follows technical, organizational, 
interpersonal service or independent ‘work logic’. 
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The categorization of occupations in the Finnish National Election studies is 
based on the UN-verified International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-88 from 1988 and ISCO-08 from 2008), where occupations are grouped 
according to the tasks and duties they entail and status in employment. Hence, it 
contains elements from the EG/EGP-scheme but also from the European Socio-
Economic Classification (ESEC) as proposed by Rose and Harrison (2007, see 
also 2010). It is not possible to constitute a class schema with eight or eleven 
categories with the FNES data (cf. Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) since the number 
of respondents belonging to each category would not be large enough. Moreover, 
the occupation categories in the FNES data do not contain as precise details as 
some other surveys on parliamentary elections (cf. Oskarson 2007). The Oesch’s 
(2006) class schema would require that the hierarchical construct of occupations 
would be at least on three different levels inside each class. In the FNES 2007 and 
2011, the occupations are coded only to two different levels, while in the FNES 
2003 they were still on four levels (the most detailed level in ISCO-88 and -08).  
 The categorization of occupation is for the most part correspondent between 
ISCO-88 and ISCO-08. Only minor changes have taken place (see International 
Labour Organization 2013) and they do not affect this study since the 
occupational classes are coded only to two different levels. For example, Oesch’s 
(2006) class of ‘interpersonal service work logic’ would require identifying 
journalists and shop sales assistants but this is not possible with the data available 
from FNES 2007 and 2011. Hence, the classification in this study is theoretically 
anchored to the EG/EGP-scheme and empirically anchored to the European 
Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC) and International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO-88 and ISCO-08). 
 First, the higher professionals and managers constitute the ‘highest’ 
occupational class. Higher professionals and most managers have typically 
acquired the highest education although this is not a definite prerequisite. They 
have a high degree of autonomy and high specificity of skills. Sometimes they are 
referred to with the term ‘higher salariat’. About one fifth of the analyzed 
respondents in the FNES-studies are categorized to this group.  
 The second class consists of associate professionals and technicians, which 
corresponds largely to the label ‘intermediate’ occupations (Rose and Harrison 
2007, 2010). In these occupations, university level education is not required and 
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the work is more monitored than the work of the highest class. Most importantly, 
occupations that belong to this class do not require a high specificity of skills. 
This occupational class is hence called lower professionals. That said, the lower 
professionals, i.e. for example nurses and engineers, nevertheless have a higher 
education, less monitored occupations and a higher specificity of skills than the 
‘lower’ classes. Lower professionals comprise approximately 15 per cent of the 
analyzed respondents in the FNES studies.  
 Self-employed people are difficult to categorize from a class perspective. 
Historically, they have not been involved in class conflicts in the same way as the 
working class or upper classes. Since the self-employed people have a varied 
specificity of competence and a varied level of education, they do not fit into a 
uniform category. The shared attribute of the self-employed is a high degree of 
autonomy. Scholars have divided them to small employers/petty bourgeoisie and 
agricultural entrepreneurs (see e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Agricultural 
entrepreneurs have been distinguished as a separate group than other 
entrepreneurs, as agriculture is a specific branch. Already the Lipset-Rokkan-
model (1967) emphasized the special nature of landed interests.  
 Due to the small N of both agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers60 
in the FNES’s, the analyses would not be reliable if they were treated as their own 
groups in each election. This is unfortunate since farmers have been an important 
group for the Finnish party system with their interests being protected first by the 
Agrarian League and later by the Centre Party. However, pooling of the data of 
2003, 2007 and 2011 increases the N of both agricultural entrepreneurs and small 
employers, and they can be thus treated as their own categories in analyses 
covering all the three elections. When combined, agricultural entrepreneurs and 
small employers, labelled under the category entrepreneurs, form 10 per cent of 
the respondents in the FNES surveys.  
 The fourth group is labelled as routine non-manual employees who are bound 
by labor contracts, whose work is monitored and who do not have a high 
occupational competence. Clerical support workers and service and sales workers 
are examples of this occupational group. The size of this group, which comprises 
                                                            
60 Small employers have been separated from large employers in class categorizations as large 
employers have a higher status and more power than those who have small-scale business.  
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roughly one fourth of the analyzed respondents, owes much to the expansion of 
the service sector. 
 The traditional class schemes differentiate between different kinds of blue-
collar workers. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) distinguished between skilled 
manual workers and semi/non-skilled manual workers. The former often have a 
vocational education, including a formal competence. The occupations of the 
semi/non-skilled manual workers have usually no educational requirements and 
the work requires less specified skills. However, in terms of class interests, this 
categorization can be criticized. As also semi/non-skilled workers have an interest 
in belonging to trade unions that guard the ‘workers’ interests’, it is not all that 
fruitful to differentiate between the different types of blue-collar workers. In 
political life, it is more common to talk about the interests of the ‘working man’ 
or workers than to specify between skilled and less skilled blue-collar workers 
(Mudde 2007; Ruostetsaari 2011). Hence the last category, which comprises 
roughly 30 per cent of the analyzed respondents, is named blue-collar workers.  
 Scholars have found it difficult to place unemployed people in the class 
schemas (Oskarson 2007) since people outside working life and people currently 
without work constitute a diverse group, although for example the ESEC includes 
the unemployed as their own class. In this study the unemployed are not included 
in the class categorization due to the inner heterogeneity. Also students and 
respondents on parental-leave are left outside of the categorization for the same 
reasons. Students’ field of education cannot be differentiated and since different 
studies lead to different occupations, students cannot be treated as an enough 
homogenous group. 
 Subjective class identification is used for evaluating the coherence of class 
identity and class consciousness; whether individuals feel that they are a part of a 
social class. It is important to notice that subjective class identification can stem 
from family background (family’s social status) to a high degree. Hence, it is a 
reflection of a sense of belonging and it might be in conflict with the individual’s 
objective occupational position (Oskarson 1994, 112–113). The (social) class 
identification here is measured with the traditional categories, which differentiate 
between the working class, different grades of middle class and the upper class. 
Table 4.4 shows that class identity still persists within the Finnish electorate, even 
though the strength of the identity may have weakened.  
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Blue-collar workers have the most coherent identity of the occupational classes, 
with approximately 60 per cent identifying with their ‘own’ traditional class, the 
working-class. Blue-collar workers are often organized in and strongly backed by 
trade unions in Finland (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002), thus providing the workers 
with a more unified identity through socialization mechanisms.  
 
Table 4.4 The class identification of objective occupational groups in 2003–2011. 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 61   
 
  Class  Working Lower Middle Upper middle No class All (N) 
Objective identity class middle class class or  identifi- 
  
occupational class Year   class   upper class cation 
 
  
Blue-collar 2003 57 13 23 2 5 100 (338) 
workers 2007 62 10 24 1 3 100 (362) 
 
2011 67 10 17 1 4 100 (274) 
Routine non- 2003 44 13 29 3 11 100 (247) 
manual  2007 31 17 43 3 6 100 (279) 
employees 2011 37 19 34 3 7 100 (282) 
Small employers 2003 12 20 46 4 18 100 (84) 
(including  2007 22 16 46 7 10 100 (122) 
agriculture) 2011 21 15 41 11 12 100 (61) 
Lower  2003 18 15 51 10 5 100 (154) 
professionals 2007 18 15 52 11 4 100 (199) 
  2011 17 12 53 11 7 100 (189) 
Higher professio- 2003 8 13 48 23 8 100 (275) 
nals and  2007 3 7 53 33 4 100 (322) 
managers 2011 6 7 48 33 7 100 (238) 
All 2003 33 14 36 9 8 100 (1088) 
 
2007 32 13 40 10 5 100 (1297) 
 
2011 33 13 37 11 6 100 (1039) 
 
 
More than a third of routine non-manual employees identify with the working 
class, with roughly the same share identifying with the middle class. The non-
manual nature of their jobs is the most likely explanation as to why members of 
this group do not identify with the traditional working class to the extent that the 
blue-collar workers do. The lower middle-class, which would theoretically 
correspond to the routine non-manual employees, is not a strong object of 
                                                            
61 The coding of the objective occupational class was based on the categorization in ISCO-88 and 
ISCO-08 (see International Labour Organization 2013). Class identity was asked with the following 
question: Which social class would you say you belong to? Working class, lower middle class, middle 
class, upper middle class, upper class or not to any class? 
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identification. It should be noted that the term ‘lower’ may also have a 
psychological effect on respondents: since people strive for positive self-esteem in 
the intergroup context, i.e. they want to identify with a ‘better’ alternative. In this 
case, they are either proud to be a part of the working class or willing to be a part 
of the vast middle class. (cf. Stubager 2009, 215.) 
 Roughly half of all the entrepreneurs have identified with the middle class: 
they are far less working class -minded than the routine non-manual employees. 
Agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers are not represented separately in 
the table above due to the small N. However, it can be noted that the agricultural 
entrepreneurs have the most vague class identification and they are the most 
reluctant to identify with any of the classes. In comparison to the agricultural 
entrepreneurs, the small employers more often feel that they are a part of the 
upper class, whereas agricultural entrepreneurs seemingly simply find it difficult 
to identify with any of the classes. This result challenges the widely accepted 
categorization of Goldthorpe and colleagues (1992), which ranks the routine 
non-manual employees/lower white-collar workers ‘higher’ than the small 
employers and agricultural entrepreneurs (see e.g. Oskarson 1994; Nieuwbeerta 
1995; Evans ed. 1999; Evans & de Graaf 2013). The results regarding the 
identification are rather logical, however, since the job of the routine non-manual 
workers is controlled to a great extent. Furthermore, routine non-manual 
employees are in occupations which are more likely to be defended by 
traditionally left-wing trade unions that propagate for the workers’ interests.  
 The class identification of lower professionals does not differ much from the 
entrepreneurs. As such, a third of lower professionals identify either with the 
working class or lower middle class, while half identify with the middle class. The 
major difference is that lower professionals find their class more easily. However, 
in contrast to entrepreneurs having special interests, for example, in keeping 
taxation low (small employers) or subsidies high (agricultural entrepreneurs), it is 
doubtful whether the lower professionals, who identify most with the middle 
class, have special common interests. Lastly, higher professionals and managers 
differ distinctively from the other groups. Approximately one third of this group 
identifies with either the upper middle class or upper class.62 Very few identify 
                                                            
62 As extremely few of all respondents identify with the upper class, it was unified with the category 
upper middle-class in Table 4.3. 
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with the working class or even with the lower middle class. High occupational 
status results in identification with higher classes.  
 On the basis of Table 4.4, the polarization of class identities has been growing 
rather than shrinking, although the time-period (2003–2011) is short. A growing 
number of blue-collar workers identify with the working-class and a growing 
number of higher professionals and managers identify with upper middle class or 
upper class. Hence, it seems that many members of the occupational groups 
recognize that there is something with their occupational status that differentiates 
them from the others. 
 The clashes between occupational classes in contemporary Finland have 
obviously changed their shape. Like elsewhere in Western Europe, class conflicts 
originally arose over ownership of the means of production and the basic rights 
of the underprivileged classes. Nowadays, tensions revolve more around 
economic policies that are considered to treat different occupational groups in 
different ways. Furthermore, clashes arise today over job security, as some 
workers may become the more or less permanent losers of a globalized economy, 
which disfavors the traditional industrial branches. While the workers in these 
branches tend to be blue-collar workers, those in higher professions tend to have 
more resources to find new jobs or alternative careers. Moreover, workers in 
insecure positions tend to see external factors, such as immigration and further 
EU-integration, to blame for their worsening future prospects. (Kriesi et al. 2006; 
2008; Walter 2010; cf. Hooghe & Marks 2009.) In addition, as Finland has been 
characterized as one of the most corporatist societies in Europe with a high 
degree of labor union membership, the labor unions still play a prominent role in 
guarding the occupational interests. However, labor unions in Finland have also 
lost ground due to the weakening sense of collectiveness among young 
employees. They are united more by their insecure position in the job market 
rather than through former communitarian solidarity. (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 
89, 95.) 
 The explicit party representation of occupational groups decreased when the 
social structure and industrial structure changed in Finland. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3.3, the old parties used to have their ‘own’ occupational groups to which 
they turned to and appealed on. This class base still exists to some extent, 
although every party has taken into account the expanding service sector. The 
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Left Alliance (with a Communist heritage) and the Social Democrats have still 
spoken on behalf of blue-collar workers’ interests and the Centre Party has still 
spoken on behalf of farmers’ interests in the 21st century. That being said, their 
appeal to the broad middle class has been even more important. Moreover, the 
composition of the electorates of the left-wing parties and the Centre Party hardly 
resembles those of the 1970s when class voting still flourished (see e.g. Pesonen & 
Sänkiaho 1979). The National Coalition Party in turn has been the most 
prominent representative of entrepreneurs, managers and higher professionals, 
while the Swedish People’s Party has appealed more to the Swedish-speaking 
entrepreneurs and upper classes than to the lower classes (Paloheimo & Sundberg 
2005, 171–174; Westinen 2011, 41.) 
 Of the newer parties, the True Finns has appealed to the lower occupational 
classes, while the Green League and the Christian Democrats have been more 
reluctant to make class-based appeals or commitments (ibid.). Paloheimo (2008, 
36–37) has argued that the formation of these three parties has been based on 
promoting certain issues and values without occupational attachments. However, 
it is at least clear that the party profile of the True Finns is more proletarian than 
the one of its predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party (Ruostetsaari 2011). Indeed, 
the profile of the True Finns electorate resembles that of many West European 
Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties (see Arter 2012b; Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 
422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 21–25), although its profile cannot be 
reduced to that of the ‘party of the working man’ (see Suhonen 2011; Paloheimo 
2012).  
 Workers in traditional working-class occupations feel that their jobs and 
wages are threatened when labor unions and the left-wing parties have had it 
difficult to be able to guard their interests. This picture matches to Finland also. 
Hence, the appeal of a nationalist populist party on workers has grown and 
workers have found a new political channel to express their resentment. (see 
Arter 2010, 495; Harvey 2010, 150; Paloheimo 2012, 327.) While the traditional 
representation of the interests of (agricultural) entrepreneurs and the upper 
classes has not faced a major challenger, the fight over the true representative of 
the lower classes and particularly the blue-collar workers has intensified. 
Moreover, the representation of the interests of lower professionals has not been 
clearly defined in the party sphere. This most likely reflects the fact that all the 
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parties want to appeal to the broad middle class (see Paloheimo 2006), which is 
the primary source of identification for the lower professionals.  
 
Denomination 
 
Religion63 did not constitute a cleavage base in Finland due to the non-existence 
of major disputes between the state and the church, on the one hand, and due to 
the monopoly position of the Evangelic-Lutheran church on the other. 
Nevertheless, the decreasing importance of the church and its principles in 
everyday-life has made the dichotomy over confessional and non-confessional 
voters more interesting from a cleavage perspective. While religion has continued 
to be important for some segments of society, Finns have by and large become 
increasingly secular. However, large-scale resignation from the church occurred 
first in the 2000s and 2010s. This had much to do with the citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with the Evangelic-Lutheran church’s stands on moral and family values. In 
particular, there have been fierce debates on same sex marriages and the right for 
the same sex couples to adopt, as well as the right of women to become priests. 
(Mykkänen 2012, 293; Karvonen 2014, 23.) Hence, in the case of Finland, 
denomination is a borderline case, where old and new social structural bases 
meet.  
 Empirically, the religious cleavage can be detected from two perspectives. On 
the one hand, there is the separation between those who belong to a church and 
those who do not. On the other hand, the members of a church are separated by 
their religious activity (Esmer & Petterson 2007, 496.) The religious activity is 
often measured as church attendance. While church membership reflects the 
structural side of the religious cleavage, church attendance reflects the 
manifestation of the structural base. Some people may belong to a church out of a 
custom while others incorporate religion into everyday life by attending church 
regularly. Since, however, church attendance is not a structural characteristic, 
church membership (i.e. denomination) is the only plausible measure for a social 
                                                            
63 In this chapter, a difference is made between religion and denomination. An example of a religion 
is Christianity, while denomination refers to a recognized autonomous branch of the Christian 
Church, such as the Evangelic-Lutheran Church. In literature on cleavages, the term religion is 
often used. However, in the Finnish context it is a matter of the division between those who belong 
to the Evangelic-Lutheran Church and those who do not belong to any church. 
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structural base. While some studies have used religious attendance as a measure 
of a religious cleavage (see e.g. Franklin et al. 2009), the existence of a 
denominational cleavage between the religiously affiliated voters and the non-
denominational voters has been primarily discussed in countries with a Catholic 
influence, such as in Austria or Belgium (see e.g. Plasser & Ulram 2008; de 
Winter et al. 2006).  
 The dichotomy in this study is made between those who belong to the main 
church, the Evangelic-Lutheran church, and those who do not belong to any 
church. The share of those belonging to the main church has decreased below 80 
per cent in 2003–2011, and the share of people with no religious affiliations has 
risen to roughly 20 per cent. Other respondents are excluded from the analyses: 
they belong either to the Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church or to some 
other Christian or non-Christian church/community. 64 Unfortunately, in the 
FNES data it is not asked whether one belongs to a revivalist movement inside the 
Evangelic-Lutheran church. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that roughly 5 
per cent of Finnish citizens belong to some type of revivalist movement. The 
members of these movements attend church regularly and they form tight 
communities with strict norms. Their moral concepts, concerning sexual life and 
abortion for instance, have deviated drastically from those who belong to the 
mains church out of a custom (Salomäki 2010.)   
 The secularization process has meant that the mainstream church members 
have, by and large, become less religious over the decades. However, Table 4.5 
suggests that about 60 per cent of Evangelic-Lutherans still consider themselves 
to be very religious or somewhat religious; this share has slightly risen in 2003–
2011. At the same time, those not belonging to the church have become less and 
less religious. In 2011, 79 per cent of the respondents with no religious affiliation 
stated that they are not at all or not very religious.65 In 2003, the corresponding 
                                                            
64 The Orthodox Church has an institutionalized status alongside the Evangelic-Lutheran Church in 
Finland due to historical reasons. In 2011, roughly 59 000 people belonged to the Orthodox Church 
in Finland. Other noteworthy groups are those who belong to the Jehova’s witnesses (19 000), the 
Evangelical Free Church of Finland (15 000), the Catholic Church (11 000), Islamic churches 
(10 000) and the Pentecostal Church (7000).  
65 As a substantial share of non-confessional voters still consider themselves to be religious, church 
membership cannot be regarded, therefore, as something needed in order to keep one’s faith. 
Resignation from the church can be a protest to the values the church represents; even though one 
can still have certain religious aspects (see Mykkänen 2012).  
 119 
 
rate was still 59 per cent. This means that polarization has increased in terms of 
religious identity. Much of this tendency has to do with generational 
replacement. The younger voters are more secular than the older ones and they 
constitute a growing share among those who do not belong to any church.  
 It can be asserted that those belonging to the Evangelic-Lutheran church are 
likely to believe that the church represents a respectable institution and that 
membership of this institution reflects certain important values in life. On the 
other hand, those not belonging to the church are likely to have more liberal 
values and are more likely to believe that the church is an institution that should 
neither have any say nor have any control over the moral norms in society. 
(Salomäki 2014; Sorsa 2015; cf. Mykkänen 2012.)   
 
Table 4.5 Religious identity by denomination in 2003–201166 
 
  Religiosity             
  
Not at all Not very  Somewhat Very All (N) 
Denomination Year  religious religious  religious  religious 
 
  
Does not belong  2003 37 22 28 10 100 (154) 
to any church 2007 48 19 28 5 100 (239) 
 
2011 58 21 19 2 100 (270) 
Evangelic- 2003 11 32 45 11 100 (1034) 
Lutheran 2007 9 26 52 13 100 (1118) 
  2011 11 23 52 13 100 (970) 
All 2003 14 31 43 11 100 (1188) 
 
2007 16 25 48 12 100 (1357) 
 
2011 22 23 45 11 100 (1240) 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011                                                          
 
 
Anti-religiousness was kept at the back in party politics after the clerical disputes 
between atheist socialists and the church were solved after the first decades in the 
20th century. However, the interests of denominational (Evangelic-Lutheran) 
voters continued to be kept up front by the center-right parties, the Centre Party 
                                                            
66 Religiosity was approached with the following question in the FNES-studies: Would you describe 
yourself as not all religious, not very religious, somewhat religious or very religious?  
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and the National Coalition Party. The rise of the Christian Democrats in turn was 
a protest against the secularization and decreasing importance of religion. 
However, despite the fact that the Christian Democrats has continued to fight 
against secularization, the other center-right parties no longer represent the 
denominational voters all that explicitly. However, the True Finns has stated that 
its value basis revolves around the doctrines of Christianity (Westinen 2011, 68).  
Non-denominational interests have been best represented by the Green League 
and the Left Alliance. Their recent strategy has been to challenge the 
conventional and close relationship between the church and state and present 
religion as something that should not affect politics. Moreover, they have been 
against the discrimination of those who do not belong to the church (Westinen 
2011). Thus, the interests based on denomination have increasingly divided the 
Finnish party system.  
 To conclude, the group-based identities in the ‘old’ social structure seem to be 
somewhat persistent. The linguistic identity of the Swedish-speaking people is 
still strong, and the Finnish-speaking identity is rising. Class identity has become 
more polarized: blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers stand 
further apart from each other than before. The rural-urban identity is especially 
important for those living in sparsely-populated areas. And finally, anti-
religiousness has increased and polarized the division between those belonging to 
the main church and those not belonging to any church. Still, we do not know 
whether these polarizing patterns are reflected in sharper value differences 
between the groups that are in turn reflected in party-voter alignments. This is 
explored in detail in the next main chapter. Before that, however, an assessment 
needs to be made of the suggested social structural characteristics forming the 
new cleavage bases.    
 
4.2.2. Emerging new cleavage bases in social structure 
Gender 
 
Regarding occupational class, language, place of residence and denomination, the 
members of different groups are willing to identify with a certain group or class. 
However, recently proposed new cleavage bases, such as gender, age and 
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education, have proved to be more problematic. For instance, Franklin (2010, 
651–652) criticizes the fact that scholars do not concretely specify what the 
common interests of the group are, or which parties stand for those interests. The 
crucial question concerns whether the voters on each side of an objective divide 
recognize this divide and their position in it. 
 The first new suggestion for a structural cleavage base that is handled here is 
gender. Obviously, gender is a structural conflict due to societal inequalities 
between men and women. The movements for women's rights have fought 
amongst other things for universal suffrage but gender has rarely been a basis for 
party formation (see Inglehart & Norris 2003). That being said, gender has had 
relevance in the voters’ voting decisions.   
 In a comparative perspective, the position of women in Finnish politics has 
historically been influential since the share of elected female MP’s has been quite 
high (Holli & Wass 2009, 126). Gender-related issues became increasingly 
politicized in the 1960s and 1970s and women stated to make increasingly 
independent voting decisions. Especially women in high social positions began to 
emphasize the feminist perspective when the cultural atmosphere regarding 
gender roles was changing and career prospects for women were on the rise. 
(Haavio-Mannila 1970, 1979.)67  
 The proposed gender-based conflict has concerned more recently even more 
distinctively the status of both women and men in the labor market. 
Traditionally, the position of women in the labor market has been weaker than 
the position of men. However, due to educational emancipation, these differences 
have become more moderate. On the other hand, the conflict has concerned the 
way of grasping gender roles. While feminists have pursued equality in all its 
forms and advocated for women to become emancipated from their traditional 
gender roles, the opposite view has defended the natural differences between the 
sexes and patriarchal family values, and denied positive discrimination. Hence, 
there have been some elements of a ‘class struggle between the sexes’. (Kofman 
1998; Mudde 2007, 92–93.) 
                                                            
67 However, the party preferences of men and women were not identical in Finland in the 1950s 
either. For example working class urban women were more inclined to support bourgeois parties 
and less inclined to support communists than men (Allardt 1961, 7). 
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The extent to which such a phenomenon describes Finland and whether gender 
could function as a new cleavage base, has not been studied thoroughly. Instead, 
it is known that in the 21st century parliamentary elections roughly 70 per cent of 
men have voted for male candidates while roughly 55 per cent of women have 
voted for female candidates. The differences have however levelled partly due to 
parties fielding an increasing number of female candidates. (Holli & Wass 2009.) 
 Of the Finnish parties, Green League has promoted explicitly feminist 
interests and wanted to build a society that is gender neutral – having no 
prejudices on genders and their roles. In addition, women supporting Green 
League have been inclined to choose a female candidate (ibid. 142; Westinen 
2011, 70). The True Finns (2011), by comparison, has had patriarchal and anti-
emancipation features in its ideological profile (see also Ruostetsaari 2011). It has 
also been the only parliamentary party where male dominance has clearly 
prevailed in the party organization (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). These 
have been typical features for the Radical Right Populist parties (Mudde 2007, 
93). The other parties have been more cautious in representing gender-related 
interests as it is beneficial to keep the target electorate as large as possible.  
 
Age cohorts 
 
As regards to age as a potential cleavage base, the assumption of horizontal 
political socialization and generational key experiences constituting politically 
relevant age cohorts is crucial. People are deeply affected by their formative years 
(usually regarded as the age between 17 and 25) and that specific experiences 
during that life period can have a profound effect on the whole cohort depending 
on the socio-historical environment. Horizontal socialization is hence based on 
‘key experiences’ causing a long-lasting propensity to prioritize certain values, 
norms and ways of relating to politics. (Delli Carpini 1986, 8–9; Wass 2008.) Due 
to this common background, the members of a certain generation are expected to 
also develop a generational consciousness which persists in the course of a life-
cycle. Especially Inglehart (1971, 1977) brought the generational explanations to 
contemplate or replace the old class explanations in electoral behavior and in 
debate on values and attitudes. As already mentioned, the younger generations 
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were expected to acquire more postmaterialist values and replace their class 
loyalties with value orientations in electoral behavior.  
In terms of party-voter ties, Butler and Stokes (1974) suggested that the 
differences that were due to differing formative experiences are manifested in 
party choice. Generations become political generations when they become 
socialized to vote for a certain party that they feel close to. The behavior of voters 
is thus supposedly formed by the party landscape and ideological concerns of 
their formative years, especially concerning the older generations who grew up 
when the mass parties were flourishing and when electoral participation and 
party loyalty were on a high level (Tilley & Evans 2011; Wagner & Kritzinger 
2012). In contrast, class structure theories are based on vertical socialization. This 
model argues that lifestyle, values and attitudes are transformed within the same 
family inside each social class. (see e.g. Dudley & Gitelson 2002.)  
 The categorization of different age cohorts in this study contains elements of 
generational key experiences in the Finnish context (see Roos 1987; Purhonen 
2002; Purhonen et al. 2008). The oldest generation consists of those born before 
1945, whose key experience is related to the Second World War (Edmunds & 
Turner 2002 ed.), and in particular to the insecurity, scarcity and hard work 
related to the war and post-war period.68 The second generation entails both 
‘baby boomers’ (born in 1945–1950) and those born later in the 1950s. They are 
unified by major transitions in the surrounding environment. They have been 
able to take advantage of rising living standards, industrialization and the 
expansion of education in their early adolescence. Both age cohorts have played a 
major role in constructing the Finnish welfare state and they have been 
‘obligation-driven’ citizens in terms of work and various life choices, including 
voting. (see Paloheimo 2007; Tuohinen 2010). 
 In Finland, those born in the 1960s have been labeled as the ‘generation of 
suburbs’ due to the increased migration from countryside to towns. They have 
been contrasted to those born in the 1970s (and shortly after it) who have been 
labeled as the ‘generation of individual choice’. (Purhonen 2002; see also 
                                                            
68 Although it would be theoretically sound to distinguish between those who were adolescents 
during the Second World War and to those whose formative years were not during the war, there 
are really few respondents from the oldest categories (born in the 1920s or before) in the FNES 
studies in 2003–2011.   
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Grönlund et al. 2005a; Wass 2008.) Nevertheless, in terms of key experiences, 
both of these cohorts experienced a severe recession at young age in the 
beginning of the 1990s in Finland. Thus, contrary to previous accounts, I argue 
that the key factor in distinguishing between the newest generations should be 
whether an age class was likely to have entered the job market during the 
recession or not, as it deeply affected the prospects in life. The generation that 
was hit hard by recession as young adults consists thus of those who were born in 
between 1960 and 1975. They were forced to deal with more uncertainties in 
working life than the previous generations and the recession should be regarded 
as their most important key experience.  
 Those born after 1975 entered the job market when the Finnish economy was 
recovering. In 1994 the GDP began to rise again and furthermore, Finland made 
a decision to join the EU. Thus this youngest generation did not have to deal with 
such severe economic insecurity and it has grown up in a more international 
environment. Even though this generation has had many opportunities, it has 
also been challenged by increased competition and increasing requirements in 
the labor market. Furthermore, they have been seen to bear more individual-
centered values. (see Purhonen 2002.)  
 Labels, such as ‘portfolio generation’, have been used to depict the generation 
that was born in the mid/late-1980s and later on. The portfolio generation has 
been characterized by an increasing pressure to make the right choices (to gather 
a portfolio) in an increasingly competitive and hectic society and simultaneously 
by a way of relating to life in a more individual-centered way. Traditionally 
respected features such as high societal status and building a stable and 
safeguarded life are less relevant since the young feel that nothing stable can be 
built with increasingly insecure life prospects. Instead, the youngest generation 
orientates in experiencing things and making the most of life as individuals. 
(Hoikkala et al. 2006; Myllyniemi 2008.)  
 However, in a study with eight years’ time-span, starting from 2003, a 
‘portfolio generation’ cannot be separated since many members of this generation 
were not eligible voters in 2003 or even in 2007. The categorization with four age 
cohorts is admittedly problematic, because the youngest cohort includes those 
born in 1976 as well as those born in 1993. Their generational experiences differ 
understandably drastically from one another.  
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In comparison to the other generations, the post 1975-generation has not been 
surrounded by politics in everyday life. In the FNES 2003 data, only every seventh 
respondent from this generation felt that politics played a major role or a quite 
substantial role when they were young adults. In the other generations, roughly 
every fourth respondent felt this way. The same question was not asked in FNES 
2007 or FNES 2011, which could have provided further evidence of the apolitical 
character of youngest voters. 
 Although generational consciousness is difficult to measure, it has been shown 
that certain cohesion exists among the generations in Finland (Purhonen 2002; 
Purhonen et al. 2008). It is, however, difficult to determine which age classes 
should be included in which age cohorts. Nevertheless, group-based interests 
attached to certain age cohorts might be based on quite practical concerns. The 
oldest generations are bound to be most worried about pensions and elderly care, 
while the concerns of the recession generation and generation of individualistic 
choice are bound to be more concerned about their career prospects and how 
much they should contribute toward maintaining the welfare state. It is not 
certain whether there is a generational gap in Finland that would be reflected in 
differentiating value orientations and a vote for a party that represents the 
interests of a generation, thus eventually contributing to cleavage politics. In this 
respect, we must bear in mind the alternative proposition suggesting that age 
cohorts do not serve as cleavage basis; that cleavages rather change because of 
generational replacement (Franklin & van der Eijk 2009). 
 Furthermore, it is difficult to explicate how social structural interests based on 
age cohorts are represented in the party sphere. It can be assumed that the old 
parties have more incentives to represent the interests of the older generations 
while the newer parties, which are entangled in with the ideas of silent revolution 
and silent counter-revolution, have more incentives to represent the interests that 
appeal to the younger generations. The Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party 
and the National Coalition Party belong primarily to the first group, while the 
Green League and the True Finns belong most clearly to the latter group.  
 
  
 126 
 
Education 
 
Education is the last social structural base that is assessed. The interests that the 
different educational groups have in common have been seen to follow from the 
educational milieus where the individuals spend their early adulthood. Education 
offers thus an alternative explanation to class explanations: for example, when an 
individual is in an occupation that does not correspond to his/her education, the 
identity stems from the educational milieus instead of a professional identity. (see 
Weakliem 2002; Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004; Van der Waal et al. 2007.) 
Both occupational class and education can be seen to indicate person’s social 
status. 
 As the fields of education and educational milieus vary much, especially 
among those who acquire a high education, it is debatable as to which are the 
educational groups that should have common interests. Some have argued for a 
more precise division to educational groups. For example, sociocultural 
professionals with an education from human or social sciences have been more 
inclined to have postmaterialist attitudes than managers and engineers who have 
studied hard sciences (Kriesi 1989; 1998). However, this approach runs the risk of 
constituting a mosaic of educational groups, which is not even possible to execute 
with the FNES-data since educational field has not been included in the 
questions. 
   The five educational groups that are analyzed are based on the type and length 
of education (cf. Stubager 2010). These groups are composed of those with 
primary education (elementary school), vocational school, upper secondary 
school, polytechnics-level education and university-level education. Even though 
there are several alternatives for constituting categories, a plain dichotomy to 
low- and highly educated (see Stubager 2009) would not correspond to the 
thought of educational milieus. Instead, primary and vocational schools, upper-
secondary schools, polytechnics and universities act as differentiating educational 
milieus and constitute the potential for specific education-based identities to be 
formed.  
 Although education-based identity cannot be detected from the FNES-data, 
Stubager (2009) has shown that such an identity and also a group consciousness 
exist to some extent in Denmark – especially the lower-educated conceived that 
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there is a conflict between the educational groups. Nevertheless, half of the 
Danish electorate, especially the lower-educated, did not feel attached to 
educational-based groups. Admittedly, universities have been used as the prime 
example of an educational milieu, which can pave the way for an education-based 
identity, whereas upper-secondary school, for example, is less likely to do so (see 
ibid).   
 Educational and occupational groups are admittedly overlapping. For example 
vocational education leads often to a blue-collar job, while university-level 
education leads often to a job of a higher professional. However, manager 
positions do not always require higher education. More importantly, due to the 
vast expansion of education, many highly educated do not find jobs that would 
correspond to their level of education. In such situations, the education-based 
identity may outweigh the occupation-based identity. Hence, also political 
preferences deriving from education may well deviate from political preferences 
deriving from occupational class. 
 The level of education has not been seen as a cleavage in the Finnish context, 
although there has been a clear electoral divide among educational groups (see 
Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). However, the early 
Finnish (electoral) studies explored how the field of education of university 
students affected their political preferences (see e.g. Pesonen 1958, Allardt & 
Tomasson 1967, Lammi & Sänkiaho 1970; Suhonen 1975).  
 Despite the rise in the general level of education, the lifestyles and milieus 
have begun to differentiate more and more among the young according to their 
education. For example, young people with vocational education have 
differentiated from the higher educated young in having more negative attitudes 
towards minorities and immigration. Accordingly, young people in vocational 
schools feel distrust towards politics and are more prone to support the populist 
True Finns Party (Kauppinen 2011). Accordingly, the universities have been a 
milieu for liberal, postmaterialists thoughts to be spread, which most likely 
benefits Green parties (Stubager 2008). Hence, the potential for group-based 
conflicts in terms of the length and type of education may be increasing.  
 The party representation of educational groups, however, has been far less 
explicit than the representation of the occupational classes. The True Finns 
(2011) is an exception in the sense that it has demanded more appreciation for 
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those with a vocational education and stated that higher education should not be 
overvalued. It is more difficult to represent the interests of educational groups 
than the interests of occupational groups, since people are organized into unions 
to a greater extent according to their occupation than according to their 
education, albeit many unions are actually a mix of the two.   
 
Social structural cleavage bases in Finland – a brief summary 
To summarize the answer to RQ1, “which are the relevant social structural 
cleavage bases in Finland?”, it can be concluded that there are several relevant 
social structural cleavage bases. Native language, type of residential area and 
occupational class have formed the most solid cleavage bases. The social 
structural groups involved in these cleavage bases, such as the Swedish-speaking 
population, residents in rural areas and blue-collar workers, were the core groups 
of the Finnish parties when the modern party system was launched at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, parties have still sought to represent 
these group-based interests. For example, the Swedish People’s Party has been 
working explicitly for the Swedish-speaking population, the Centre Party for 
rural residents and agricultural entrepreneurs, the Coalition Party for higher 
professionals and managers and the left-wing parties and the True Finns for blue-
collar workers. Moreover, the linguistic identity, rural/urban-identity and class 
identity are still extractable in the Finnish electorate. Simultaneously, all the 
parties want to reach out to the vast and unspecified middle class.  
 Denomination is a special case as a cleavage base since, despite being an “old” 
social structural cleavage base, it has not yet been fully politicized. A religious 
cleavage has not at least yet emerged in Finland between two religions; rather, a 
denominational cleavage is at the moment being more likely to emerge between 
those belonging to the main church and those not belonging to any church. 
Although Finland has been uniformly Evangelic-Lutheran, during the 21st 
century the number of resignations from the church has accelerated. The 
resignations have been largely based on having differing moral values. Some 
parties, such as the Christian Democrats and the True Finns have advocated 
Christianity as a part of their party identity – Christian values lie of course at the 
heart of the Christian Democrats. However, the representation of those not 
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belonging to the church has been less distinct, even though the Left Alliance and 
the Green League have as parties toned down the importance of religion in 
society. Hence, although denomination is a relevant cleavage base, its potential in 
the Finnish context has not yet been fully explored.  
 Gender, education and age cohorts are social structural bases of a more recent 
nature when talking about cleavages. In contrast to the aforementioned social 
structural bases, the group identity that is attached to these bases cannot be 
detected with existing data. Furthermore, gender, education and age cohorts have 
not been the basis for the birth of any established party in the Finnish party 
system and it has been rare also elsewhere although a feminist party is rising in 
importance for example in Sweden. Due to the emancipation of women, both in 
terms of gender roles and the job market, gender could have more potential as a 
cleavage base also in Finland through already existing parties. The Green League 
has advocated feminist interests (Westinen 2011, 70) while the True Finns (2011) 
has suggested that men have become more marginal and that their interests are in 
need of defense. Hence, gender has been politicized into some extent.  
 The expansion of education and the potential significance of educational 
milieus in forming the identities of educational groups are the primary reasons 
why education may be regarded as challenging occupational class as a status-
based cleavage base. However, the interests of educational groups have not yet 
been incorporated into the logics of political parties to a large extent.  
 The most debatable case is the one of age cohorts. Inglehart (1977) and his 
followers suggest that people belonging to a certain generation acquire certain 
norms, which in turn cause a long-lasting propensity to prioritize and value 
certain things, while Franklin and van der Eijk (2009, 100), for example, suggest 
that generational replacement can merely shift the focus in the issues that are 
politicized: cleavages cannot be built on generations. Generational experiences 
have proved to be important in Finland, which might pave the way for some 
common political interests. Since some of the Finnish parties were formed at the 
beginning of the 20th century and others at the end of the 20th century, in order to 
advocate differing societal concerns, it is possible that they also reflect the 
interests of different generations.  
 Hence, also denomination, gender, education and age cohorts can be regarded 
as relevant cleavage bases, albeit their importance is less established than the 
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importance of native language, type of residential area and occupational class, 
whose relevance as cleavage bases in the Finnish context has hardly been 
questioned. Before it is possible to analyze whether all of the afore-analyzed 
potential cleavage bases are reflected in common values and attitudes, the 
value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate need to be identified first.  
 
4.3. Value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate 
This subchapter deals with the second research question (RQ2) in this thesis – 
‘which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?’. It does this 
by detecting the dimensions by means of principal component analysis, in order 
to explore which opinions on political issues, reflecting the values and attitudes of 
the voters, covary together and form value/attitudinal dimensions.  
 The dimensionality in the electorate is more rarely discussed and explored 
topic than dimensionality in the party system. Analyzing the dimensionality, i.e. 
value/attitudinal dimensions, is not a simple task as an array of interpretations is 
possible. The socioeconomic left-right dimension has gained the position of 
being the most influential and stable attitudinal/value dimension in West 
European electorates. Although there has been a tendency to present the left-
right -dimension as a super dimension that absorbs a variety of values and 
attitudes, many studies, not least the Nordic ones, have shown that there is a 
multiplicity of dimensions in the electorate (see Borre 1995; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson 2004; Aardal 2011; Grönlund and Westinen 2012; Oscarsson and 
Holmberg 2013; Hansen & Goul Andersen 2013). Despite detecting the 
dimensions solely on the basis of values and attitudes in the electorate, it is 
important that the following analyses include also a party perspective: how the 
Finnish parties match to the detected dimensions. Such an aspect helps to 
crystallize how the different ideals attached to the dimensions in the electorate 
have been represented politically.  
 Obviously, by building solely on data in the FNES-studies, the dimensional 
solution is by no means a definite one. The research setting and research 
questions in this study nevertheless force to use same data sources throughout the 
study, which the FNES-data in 2003, 2007 and 2011 provide with. The FNES-
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questionnaires, like many other questionnaires, cover only a limited number of 
politically relevant issues measuring the values and attitudes in the electorate. 
Some critical political issues may be covered only partly.  
 According to Paloheimo (2005, 2008) there are seven dimensions based 
mostly on values and attitudes in the Finnish electorate. These are: 1. 
Socioeconomic left-right-dimension 2. Geographical centers vs. peripheries 3. 
Interests of the Swedish-speaking vs. Finnish-speaking population 4. Elite vs. 
people69 5. EU-integration vs. national sovereignty 6. Conservative vs. liberal 
moral-cultural values 7. Environmental protection vs. industrial-economic 
growth. Although it has been shown that the issues reflecting the dimensions 
correlate with each other inside the dimensions (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012), 
it has not been analyzed whether the dimensions overlap or whether the issues 
could be structured into dimensions in a completely different way.70  
 By means of principal component analysis it is possible to explore which 
opinions on political issues (measuring either salience or agreement) vary in the 
same manner and constitute the value/attitudinal dimensions. The analysis sorts 
the questions into principal components and the aim is thus to identify latent 
underlying variables, in this case the value/attitudinal dimensions. In social 
science research, factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) 
are often confused, as observed by Fabrigar et al. (1999) and Bandalos & Boehm-
Kaufman (2009). Van der Eijk and Rose (2015) remind that FA and PCA are 
different models with different epistemological foundations that lead often to 
different conclusions (cf. Velicer et al. 1990). Factor analysis entails an 
                                                            
69 It can be argued that the dimension between elite and people, which has handled anti-politics and 
anti-politician attitudes, is actually a matter of political (dis)trust. It measures trust in the actors, 
that is politicians, and trust in the institutions, that is political parties and party system – whether 
they act according to the interests of the (common) people. Most importantly, as a certain grade of 
suspicion towards politicians and the elite in itself is a feature for a functioning democracy and as 
the overwhelming majority of the electorate has felt that the reality of politicians, i.e. the political 
elite, is somewhat withered from everyday lives, the elite-people divide is not bound to build bipolar 
tensions. The elite-people tension can be understood as a beneficial factor for the success of 
populist parties in the same way as the charisma of the party leader, but it should not be combined 
with cleavage politics. (cf. Paloheimo 2008.) 
70 In addition, the dimensionality has been also analyzed in terms of candidates’ and MPs’ views on 
political issues by applying voting advice application data. Reunanen and Suhonen (2009) identified 
a left-right dimension and a dimension that sets national interests and decentralization against 
cosmopolitanism and centralization.   
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assumption that an underlying causal model exists and the analysis seeks to verify 
this model whereas PCA aims to reduce the variables into components without a 
causal model although also the analyses with PCA shall of course be theoretically 
motivated.  
 Alternatively, the dimensions could have indeed been identified with a 
confirmatory factor analysis based on the pre-assumptions of the composition 
and the number of factors. However, even though this is a good option as such, it 
would have required a path analysis, where the causal relationships between all 
the variables are explored. This, in turn, would have led to highly complex 
settings due to the broad variety of social structural and dimensional variables. 
Moreover, as party choice is analyzed with eight parties, it cannot be squeezed 
into one dichotomous outcome variable such as non-socialist vs. socialist, which 
would be required in order to keep the analyses interpretable enough (cf. 
Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013). Confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis 
could function better if the scope of the study is narrowed to finding a certain 
cleavage in the electorate. Moreover, detecting the dimensions with confirmatory 
factor analysis using Likert-scale items is not without severe problems, such as 
tendency of overdimensionalization (van der Eijk & Rose 2015).  
 The analysis is based on the covariance between the analyzed items; in this 
case the opinions on political issues. The principal components are based on a 
correlation matrix and the number of principal components can be determined 
by different criteria. As the purpose is not to detect a fixed number of principal 
components, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions, the extraction is based on those 
components that have Eigenvalues over 1.0 (the so called Kaiser’s criterion, see 
Field 2009). The point of inflexion indicated that a larger number of principal 
components would not be informative.  
 The method for calculating the principal component scores is the regression 
method. The component loadings are adjusted to take into account the initial 
correlations between variables. Hence the differences in units of measurement 
and variable variances are stabilized (Field 2009, 634). Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) emphasize that the regression method should be preferred in most 
circumstances since it is the easiest to interpret (in comparison to the Bartlett and 
Anderson-Rubin methods). In order to maximize the dispersion of loadings 
within principal components and to load a smaller number of variables highly 
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onto each principal component, orthogonal rotation (Varimax) is chosen as the 
rotation method. This results in more interpretable clusters of principal 
components.71 The standardized principal component scores, which are 
continuous variables, have a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1 and they do not 
correlate with each other. These qualities enable the use of them as dependent 
variables in further ordinal least squares (OLS) regression analyses in the next 
chapter.  
 The questions that are included in the analyses entail three types of answer 
categories. Most of the questions on political issues have a five-stepped scale from 
1 to 5. They are ordinal variables, as we can put the answer alternatives ‘strongly 
disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘can’t say’, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ into an order.72 The 
same logic applies to questions measuring the importance of issues with answer 
alternatives ‘not at all important’, ‘not very important’, ‘can’t say’, ‘fairly 
important’ and ‘very important’. In addition, the questions in the 2011 FNES-
data on propositions, which handle the direction to which Finland should be 
developed, are dealt with as having an ordinal scale. In these questions, the 
answer alternatives vary from 0=very bad proposition to 10=very good 
proposition.73  
 The variety in the type of questions that were included in the analysis is due to 
the discontinuity in the FNES-data. It is worth noting that the question 
formulations and question types have varied between years and there have not 
unfortunately been so many questions on political issues in the FNES-data in 
comparison to other Nordic countries for instance (see e.g. Aardal 2007b; 
Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013). This explains why the results of the analyses are 
less reliable than they would have been if there had been a large number of 
                                                            
71 There is, however, no theoretical requirement that the dimensions should be orthogonal to one-
another, which is a condition in Varimax rotation.  
72 There are two practices concerning the treatment of ‘can’t say’ answers. The first strategy is to 
ignore them as there is much uncertainty in whether the answer indicates a neutral position or 
ignorance. However, as the respondents are forced to take a stand or have an opinion in one 
direction or another in most of the questions used, an offered ‘can’t say’ answer can, on many 
occasions, indicate a true middle position. Inclusion of this response ensures that the N in the 
analyses is not unnecessarily lowered although it can be debated, whether the ordinal nature of the 
variables suffers. For a broader discussion, see, for example, Gilljam & Granberg (1993).   
73 The answer alternatives are recoded to the scale from 1 to 5 in order to have the same scale for all 
of the questions.  
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questions formulated the same way and with the same answer alternatives each 
year. 
 The number of issue questions included in the analyses is not fixed: it varies 
between years. Through several phases of analyses, which excluded the issues that 
did not eventually fit into any principal component, 14 questions were included 
from the 2003 data. Ten of these questions measure importance and four 
measure agreement. Correspondingly, 15 questions were included from the 2007 
data: eight of which measure issues importance and seven measure agreement. 
Lastly, 14 questions were included from the 2011 data: fourteen of which measure 
agreement (10 questions on how good/bad the political propositions at hand are 
and 4 questions on agreement/disagreement) and one importance. The questions 
which did not load strongly to any of the principal components, or were loaded 
equally strongly to several principal components, were removed and the principal 
component analyses were rerun without these questions.  
 The principal component analysis leads eventually into four principal 
components in each year. This solution enables comparability over time in the 
value/attitudinal dimensions. Table 4.6 shows the empirical support for a 
solution of four principal components.  
 As mentioned, the extraction of principal components was based on those 
components that had Eigenvalues over 1.0. On each year, four components had 
Eigenvalues over 1.0 and explained a satisfying share of variance. Furthermore, 
the table shows that the solution is not dominated by one or two components, 
explaining an overwhelming share of variance. The principal component solution 
remained the same even with alternative rotation methods. When Promax and 
Quartimax were chosen instead of Varimax, the strongest component loadings 
remained essentially the same. These operations served best to test the robustness 
of the principal components/dimensions.74 
  
                                                            
74 If sum variables would have been constructed of the items that loaded the strongest to each 
principal component in each year then Cronbach’s alpha would have been a good measure to test 
the robustness. The analyses in this study are based on principal component scores because they 
can be treated as continuous variables. Sum variables could not have been treated as continuous 
variables due to the low amount of questions per dimension. This would have led to violation of the 
assumptions in regression analyses.   
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Table 4.6 Principal component analysis. Eigenvalues and the total variance 
explained by the principal components 
 
    Initial Eigenvalues 
Year Component Total % of Cumulative Variance  
2003 1 3.45 24.7 
 
2 2.00 39.0 
 
3 1.46 49.4 
 
4 1.15 57.6 
 
5 0.89 64.0 
 
6 0.85 70.1 
2007 1 2.95 19.7 
 
2 2.03 33.2 
 
3 1.72 44.7 
 
4 1.05 51.6 
 
5 0.96 58.0 
 
6 0.87 63.8 
2011 1 2.81 20.1 
 
2 2.24 36.1 
 
3 1.65 47.9 
 
4 1.16 56.2 
 
5 0.88 62.5 
 6 0.81 68.3 
 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
 
 
The factors in the 2003 FNES-data are constituted from three to four issues and 
in the 2007 and 2011 data from two to five issues. Although the questions, which 
formed four factors on each occasion, were formulated in different ways in 
different years, the political themes that the questions covered were fairly similar. 
Thus, although the dimensions over years are not fully comparable but 
representative proxies of the same underlying dimension, the analysis shows that 
certain issues have been bundled together in the Finnish electorate at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Tables 4.7–4.9 show the results from principal 
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component analysis on each data. Component loadings under 0.4 are not shown 
in the tables.   
 In table 4.7, a principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 14 
items with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=0.73. Since the KMO 
measure meets the minimum criteria, there is not a problem that would require 
examining the Anti-Image Correlation Matrix. Bartlett’s test of sphericity tested 
whether the correlations in the data-set were appropriate for principal 
component analysis. Chi-square (df=91)=2421, p<0.000, indicated that 
correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The same procedure 
was applied for the 2007 and 2011 data. The KMO-measures met the criteria and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the correlations were sufficiently large 
for PCA.  
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Table 4.7 Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2003 
Finnish parliamentary election75 
 
Principal component  1 2 3 4 
Increasing law and order in societyᵅ 0.74    
Strengthening traditional values and morals  ᵅ 0.72    
Promoting entrepreneurship ᵅ 0.59    
Lowering taxesᵅ 0.56    
Reducing regional disparityᵅ 
 0.70   
Improving the circumstances of the poor ᵅ 
 0.66   
The whole area of Finland should be kept populated  
 0.63   even if it meant great financial sacrifices to societyᵇ 
Controlling market forcesᵅ 
 0.57   
Not controlling the entry of refugeesᵅ 
  -0.80  
Not controlling the entry of foreign laborᵅ 
  -0.76  
Studying Swedish should be obligatory at all levels  
  -0.66  of the education system ᵇ 
EU membership is a good thing for Finlandᵇ 
   0.85 
Finland should leave the European Unionᵇ 
   -0.78 
Strengthening the integration of the European Unionᵅ    0.63 
 
Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question 
formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. How important 
are the following issues to you? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1=‘not at all important’, 2=‘not very important, 3=‘can’t say’, 
4=‘fairly important’, 5=‘very important’).  b. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1=‘strongly disagree, 
2= ‘disagree’, 3=‘can’t say’, 4=‘agree’ and 5=‘strongly agree’). Source: FNES 2003. The direction of the questions 
concerning the entry of refugees and foreign labor and the Swedish language was reversed from the original.   
 
 
  
                                                            
75 An initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four 
components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 (Kaiser’s criterion) and in combination they explained 58 % 
of the variance. The scree plot showed inflexions that justify retaining the four components. Given 
the N (735) and the convergence of the scree plot as well as Kaiser’s criterion on four components, 
this is the number of components that were retained in the final analysis. There were similar 
grounds for retaining four components also in the principal component analyses with the 2007 and 
2011 data. 
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Table 4.8 Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2007 
Finnish parliamentary election 
 
Principal component    1 2 3 4 
Promoting entrepreneurshipᵅ  0.71    
Lowering income taxes should be put ahead of improving public servicesᵇ 0.64    
Strengthening traditional values and morals ᵅ 0.59 0.40   
What Finland needs are strong leaders who can restore law and orderᵇ 0.59    
Income differences should be reduced because they lead to inequalityᵇ  0.69   
The state should have a much bigger role in directing the economy than it has nowᵇ  0.65   
To reduce internal migration to the metropolitan area we must transfer 
more government jobs to other regions in Finlandᵇ  0.57   
Reducing regional disparityᵅ  0.52   
Improving the circumstances of the poorᵅ  0.50 0.43  
Improving the circumstances of ethnic minoritiesᵅ   0.84  
Improving the circumstances of sexual minoritiesᵅ   0.79  
Refugees and immigrants should be entitled to the same social security 
benefits as the Finns even when they do not have Finnish citizenshipᵇ   0.58  
Protecting the environmentᵅ   0.48  
EU membership is a good thing for Finlandᵇ    0.83 
Promoting European integrationᵅ    0.68 
 
 
Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question 
formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. How important 
are the following issues to you? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1=‘not at all important’, 2=‘not very important, 3=‘can’t say’, 
4=‘fairly important’, 5=‘very important’).  b. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1=‘strongly disagree’, 
2= ‘disagree’, 3=‘can’t say’, 4=‘agree’ and 5=‘strongly agree’). A principal component analysis (PCA) was 
conducted on the 15 items with orthogonal rotation (N=953). KMO=0.73. Chi-square (df=105) =2429, p<0.000. 
Four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 and in combination they explained 52 % of the variance. Source: 
FNES 2007. 
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Table 4.9 Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2011 
Finnish parliamentary election 
 
Principal component  1 2 3 4 
More law and orderᵅ 0.72    
Increasing entrepreneurship and market economy ᵅ 0.66    
Strengthening traditional values and moralsᵅ 0.64    
Lower taxation levelᵅ 0.59    
Smaller differences in regional developmentᵅ  0.73   
Promoting regional policyᵇ  0.71   
Diminishing income disparitiesᵅ  0.59   
The status of sexual minorities should be reinforcedᵅ   0.74  
A more eco-friendly Finland, even if it means low economic growth  
or no growth at allᵅ   0.71  
Increase  immigration to Finlandᵅ   0.69  
Refugees and immigrants should be entitled to the same social security 
benefits as the Finns even when they do not have Finnish citizenshipᶜ   0.63  
Having two strong national languages, Finnish and Swedishᵅ   0.48  
All in all, EU membership has been a good thing for Finlandᶜ    0.86 
Finland should leave the European Unionᶜ    -0.86 
 
Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question 
formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. On a scale of 0 to 
10 (where 0=very bad, 10=very good,, 5=neither good nor bad), how would you rate the following propositions 
about what Finland should focus on. The answer alternatives were recoded to a scale from 1 to 5. b. How 
important are the following issues to you: (Scale from 1 to 5. 1=‘not important at all’, 2=‘somewhat 
unimportant’, 3=‘can’t say’, 4=‘fairly important’, 5=‘very important’).  c. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 
to 5. 1=‘strongly disagree’, 2= ‘disagree’, 3=‘can’t say’, 4=‘agree’ and 5=‘strongly agree’). A principal component 
analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 14 items with orthogonal rotation (N=731). KMO=0.70. Chi-square 
(df=91) = 2100. p<0.000. Four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 and in combination they explained 56 % of 
the variance. Source: FNES 2011.  
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Economic right and authority dimension 
 
The first principal component that can be identified from Tables 4.7–4.9 is a 
combination of right-wing economic issues (pro-enterprise, pro-market and pro- 
tax cuts) and of issues reflecting moral conservatism and belief in authority. In 
the 2003 data, the questions that loaded the strongest on this principal 
component were about strengthening traditional values and moral conceptions, 
increasing law and order in society, promoting enterprise and cutting taxes. In 
the 2007 data, the questions were about promoting enterprise, cutting taxes 
instead of improving public services, strengthening traditional values and moral 
conceptions and restoring law and order in society. Lastly, in the 2011 data, the 
questions that loaded the strongest were about increasing law and order, 
increasing entrepreneurship and market economy, strengthening traditional 
values and moral conceptions and lowering taxation. The questions that load the 
strongest on this principal component are fairly similar between years. In 2003 
and 2011 data, the questions on moral values load slightly stronger to the 
principal component, while in 2007 the principal component emphasizes slightly 
more the economic issues.  
 The principal component’s emphasis on traditional values and authority 
reflects respect for the traditional pillars in society. Indeed, authority, law and 
order and hierarchies have been strongly respected in Finnish society. The 
cultural tradition in Finland has emphasized humble in front of and belief in 
authority (Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 299). Citizens have had a high trust in 
institutions that maintain law and order (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 131; Mattila 
& Sänkiaho 2005 79–80). The entrepreneurial spirit or support for the classic 
economic right issues has, in turn, manifested itself, inter alia, in appreciating 
small-scale entrepreneurship. This has characterized especially the voters and 
parties at the political center and political right. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008). Tax cuts 
and the promotion of the market economy have largely characterized the forces 
on the political right. The right-wing parties have been seen to ‘own’ these themes 
(see Budge & Farlie 1983). Ideologically, the first principal component combines 
the bourgeois stands on economic issues, conservative and traditionalist values 
and respect for authority. Hence, the first identified principal component that 
forms a value/attitudinal dimension can be called the economic right and 
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authority dimension. In the FNES-data, the voters’ left-right-self-placement 
correlates the strongest with the economic right and authority dimension of all 
the dimensions in each year. This dimension clearly captures some of the general 
left-right orientation. Indeed, the general left-right orientation is often 
understood as a combination of socioeconomic issues and moral conservatism vs. 
liberalism issues. 
 Such a dimension has not been identified before in Finland as socioeconomic 
questions have been grouped together and moral-cultural questions have been 
grouped together (Paloheimo 2005; Paloheimo 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 
2012). Nevertheless, these analyses have not shown that there exists great 
consistency in socioeconomic questions, which have been grouped together; that 
they would uniformly measure a single latent dimension.   
 The respect of authority and traditional values and morals (see Karvonen & 
Paloheimo 2005, 299) combined with entrepreneurial spirit and being 
economically on the right side of the spectrum comes close to what Kitschelt 
(1995) called the ‘winning formula’ that the Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties 
could use to appeal to the electorate (see also Moreno 1999). In other words, this 
formula combines right-wing values/attitudes both in the economic and moral 
spheres (cf. Kitschelt 2004). In Finland, right-wing stands on economic and 
moral issues have been combined only to a limited extent. 
 The Christian Democrats and the True Finns have represented conservative 
moral stands. However, they have not been characterized by promoting market 
economy and tax cuts. As a party, the Christian Democrats has identified itself 
with Christian values and conservative moral concepts while also paying 
attention to maintaining a tough attitude regarding law and order themes. The 
same applies to the True Finns, which has feared that too market economy-
driven solutions hamper the ‘common man’. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Ruostetsaari 
2011; Westinen 2011). The True Finns does not thus ideologically match the 
‘winning formula’ of RRP parties, as suggested by Kitschelt (1995). 
 The Coalition Party has traditionally been the primary representative of right-
wing economic stands. However, although the party used to also embrace 
conservative moral stands, it has nowadays partly withered away from its ‘home, 
religion, and fatherland’ -roots. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Westinen 2011.) The 
Swedish People’s Party, on the other hand, has combined a de-emphasis of 
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conservative moral values with a position on the economic right, which reflects 
its liberal-bourgeois ideological tradition (Borg 2006, 27; Paloheimo 2007, 304). 
Lastly, the Centre Party represents the ideals of this dimension quite well. It has 
been characterized by supporting an entrepreneurship spirit and moral 
conservatism (see Jutila 2003, 279–280; Paloheimo 2006).  
 The Left Alliance, the Social Democrats and the Green League have, in turn, 
represented the non-authoritarian, anti-tradition stands while neglecting the 
classic right-wing/bourgeois stands in economic issues. Thus, the other end of the 
dimension is represented more coherently. The Left Alliance rejects traditional 
values, authority and has been explicitly against market-economy driven 
solutions. The SDP and the Green League have also been for market regulation 
and have shown little support for economic-right issues (Paloheimo 2000, 53–54, 
2007, 303–304, 2008; Westinen 2011, 35.) Furthermore, the Green League has 
questioned the authority-driven way of thinking, with its encouragement of civil 
disobedience, for example (Westinen 2011, 68–70).   
 
Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 
 
The second principal component comprises issues promoting both regional and 
socioeconomic equality. In the 2003 data, the questions that loaded the strongest 
to this principal component were about reducing regional disparity, improving 
the circumstances of the poor, keeping the whole area of Finland populated and 
controlling market forces. In 2007, the issues were about reducing income 
differences, having a bigger role for the state in directing the economy, reducing 
internal migration to the metropolitan area by regionalizing governance, 
reducing regional disparity and improving the circumstances of the poor. Lastly, 
in the 2011 data, the questions that loaded the strongest to this principal 
component were about reducing differences in regional development, promoting 
regional politics and diminishing income disparities.   
 Ideologically, the second dimension deals with giving support to such 
socioeconomic issues that have traditionally been considered to be owned by the 
left-wing parties (Budge & Farlie 1983), while the emphasis on regional equality 
issues has been considered as a specific feature of Finnish politics (Paloheimo 
2005; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). All of the issues in the dimension can be 
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characterized by a requirement for a strong and active state that uses its resources 
for decentralizing and redistributing politics. The promotion of such politics 
eventually enhances regional and socioeconomic equality. Hence, this dimension 
can be named the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension.  
 Alongside the economic right and authority dimension, the regional and 
socioeconomic dimension has not either been identified before in Finland. 
Questions on regional politics and (de-)centralization have been previously 
grouped together into their own dimension (Paloheimo 2005; Paloheimo 2008; 
Grönlund & Westinen 2012). The dimensional solution through the principal 
component analysis raises the question as to how it is possible that the classic 
socioeconomic issues did not form a dimension on their own, on a left-right -
continuum. The left-right -dimension has been regarded as the most important 
dimension in practically all West European countries, including Finland 
(Thomassen 2005a; Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005; Franklin et 
al. 2009). However, the (socio)economic questions that loaded strongly on the 
first dimension did not load strongly on the second dimension; and the same 
pattern applies also the other way around. The socioeconomic questions simply 
do not measure the same thing in the light of the FNES-data although for 
example with data from the European Value Survey, a socioeconomic dimension 
has been formed through principal component analysis (see Kestilä 2005, 361–
362).  
 A conventional socioeconomic left-right -dimension, which would entail all of 
the socioeconomic issues, could not be detected since many voters relate 
positively towards equal income distribution, state interventions and improving 
the position of the poor while they do not oppose entrepreneurship friendly 
solutions, tax cuts and market solutions – i.e. going against left-right-logics. This 
may happen partly because of a relatively low left–right polarization in Finland. 
The left- and right-wing voters are not as far apart from each other as they are in 
some other West European countries (see Bengtsson et al. 2013, 30–32). 
 Historically, regional and socioeconomic equality have been promoted hand 
in hand as a result of political compromises in the government. Moreover, 
regional equality has traditionally been important for those living in peripheral 
areas and socioeconomic equality has been important for the working class. The 
Finnish welfare state was built with a regionally decentralized model, with the 
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Centre Party and Social Democrats as its main architects pursuing the active role 
of state and government in social, economic and regional policy (Karvonen 2014, 
19–20). However, the former primarily promoted rural interests and 
decentralization while the latter promoted working class interests and 
redistribution (Moisio 2012). Both regional and socioeconomic equality are 
pursued fairly eagerly in the Finnish electorate, which means that the longing for 
a strong state that takes cares of its citizens through decentralizing and 
redistributing policies remains strong.  
 As such, the issues actually echo the times when Finland’s most powerful 
president of all times, Urho Kekkonen, was in office. Kekkonen advocated 
industrial-regionalist policies benefitting the social and spatial peripheries in 
Finland (see Karvonen 2014, 77, 91). Tervo (2003) and Moisio (2012) have 
maintained that the conflict between centers and peripheries has intensified since 
the beginning of the 21st century. Those who hold a centralized society as the 
ideal argue that regional policy actions collide with macroeconomic effectiveness; 
conversely, those who hold a decentralized society as the ideal argue that keeping 
the peripheries vital is a value in itself and requires an active role from the state. 
Hence, the contemporary tensions have revolved around centralization and 
decentralization (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012).   
 Improving the circumstances of the poor and the reduction of income 
differences can be seen in the context of an encompassing welfare state. However, 
economically challenging times have made it increasingly important to prioritize 
between the means with which the state can help socioeconomically 
disadvantaged citizens, as there have been pressures to limit the scope of the 
welfare state. The view that the welfare state has made citizens passive with 
income transfers and that citizens should take more responsibility themselves has 
appealed especially to those on the political right (see Nygård 2003). The political 
right has thus emphasized the equality of opportunities while the left-wing and 
also centrist parties have called for more solidarity and a more active role for the 
state in reducing income differences and helping the disadvantaged (Paloheimo 
2006, 2007; Westinen 2011). However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that 
the political right, especially the National Coalition Party, would have been 
hostile towards a universal welfare state (Paloheimo 2007; Karvonen 2014, 20). It 
has sought for a centrist party profile in welfare issues and it has talked about 
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responsible market economy that takes also care of the disadvantaged (National 
Coalition Party 2011).  
 Socioeconomic equality has been at the heart of the Left Alliance and the 
Social Democrats. They have advocated it by building an encompassing welfare 
state, which redistributes wealth and makes large scale income transfers. 
However, the Social Democratic Party does not have regional equality or 
decentralization as its main concerns and nor does the Left Alliance, despite its 
historical heritage of ‘backwater communism”. (Paloheimo 2008; Left Alliance 
2010; Social Democratic Party 2011.) The Green League has disregarded 
decentralization, supporting instead a dense community structure while 
promoting socioeconomic equality (Mickelsson 2006, 245, 252; Paloheimo 2008, 
41; Westinen 2011, 36–37, 43). Also the True Finns has been for a strong state 
that actively redistributes wealth, albeit regional equality has not been its major 
concern (ibid; Ruostetsaari 2006, 2011). 
 The Centre Party has promoted both socioeconomic and regional equality. 
The living conditions of the disadvantaged and spreading welfare have been 
important topics as the ‘cause of the poor’ has been a central point in the party’s 
heritage (Ruostetsaari 2006; cf. Bengtsson et al. 2013, 163). But even more 
importantly, keeping the whole country populated and promoting regional and 
local vitality has been the backbone of the Centre Party (see e.g. Centre Party 
2011). The party has contrasted the emptying parts of the country with the parts 
of Finland where investments, services and people are concentrated. Neutral 
positions in the dimension regarding both regional and socioeconomic equality 
have been acquired by the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democrats. 
(Westinen 2011, 42–43.) 
 The Coalition Party is the only party that has been against decentralization 
and the redistribution of wealth to the poor. It has traditionally been less positive 
towards a broad public sector and narrowing income differences than the other 
parties while leaning on a principle that people are masters of their own destinies. 
Moreover, it has had the perspective that the state should not take an active role 
in regional politics or promote decentralized solutions. Hence, the Coalition 
Party is ideologically the opposite of the Centre Party in this dimension. (Nygård 
2003, 284; Paloheimo 2007, 306; Westinen 2011, 36–37.)  
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Sociocultural dimension 
 
The third consistent principal component is formed around tensions between 
those who are in favor and those who are against sexual, ethnic and linguistic 
minorities, immigration and environmental protection. To be more precise, the 
questions that loaded the strongest to this principal component were in the 2003 
data about controlling the entry of refugees and foreign labor to Finland and 
about the position of Swedish language as a school subject. In the 2007 data, the 
main questions concerned improving the circumstances of ethnic minorities and 
sexual minorities, having the same rights for refugees and immigrants as for 
Finnish citizens and protecting the environment. Finally, the questions that 
loaded the strongest to this principal component in the 2011 data were about 
strengthening the status of sexual minorities, promoting environmentalism 
despite low economic growth, having more immigrants, having the same rights 
for refugees and immigrants as for Finnish citizens and promoting bilingualism. 
 The composition of the third dimension varies thematically more than the 
two first dimensions and some imbalance can be observed. In comparison to 
2007 and 2011, the principal component in the 2003 data was more restricted in 
focus: no questions on sexual minorities and environmental protection loaded to 
that component. This imbalance is due to the nature of questions in the 2003 
data. The questions on sexual minorities were extremely specific and did not load 
strongly on any principal component. Also the general question on 
environmental protection had to be removed as it did not fit into the principal 
components. 76  
 Despite the variety of questions loaded into this dimension, the questions 
form a dimension that has been widely recognized in literature on cleavages: 
issues on immigration, ethnic and sexual minorities and environmental 
protection have been seen to form a (socio)cultural dimension, as discussed 
previously in this study. For instance, Kriesi and colleagues  (2006) and van der 
Brug and van Spanje (2009) have suggested that electoral competition revolves 
evermore strongly around two dimensions – a socioeconomic one and a 
                                                            
76 The questions were hence either questions on which practically everybody agreed on and were 
hence excluded or questions that were so specific that they were excluded (questions on artificial 
dissemination regarding sexual minorities).  
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sociocultural one. While in the former the main source of conflict is economic 
resources, the main source of conflict in the latter one is identity. Questions on 
immigration and ethnic minorities are about cultural identity, while questions on 
sexual minorities bring about conflicts regarding social relationships. It has been 
debated whether environmental protection is primarily a part of a socioeconomic 
dimension as it is often set against economic growth, or a part of the cultural 
dimension reflecting the deeper values a person has (Kriesi et al.  2006; van der 
Brug & van Spanje (2009). The results in the principal component analyses 
suggest that environmental protection issue covariates the strongest with 
sociocultural issues. Furthermore, as linguistic issues are at the heart of culture, 
there are good grounds to name the principal component as the sociocultural 
dimension. 
 Curiously, unlike in previous studies, moral values and sexual minority issues 
do not load to the same principal component. Despite the statistically significant 
negative correlation between supporting the rights of sexual minorities and 
emphasizing conservative moral values, they did not fall onto the same principal 
component on any year. Hence, contrary to the expectations, both socioeconomic 
issues and issues concerning ground-breaking values are split into separate 
dimensions. Since the number of questions in the FNES-data is restricted, some 
questions may have a stronger influence on the dimension variable than others 
affecting the dimensional solution.  
 In the light of previous domestic literature on dimensions in the electorate, 
this dimension combines the elements of three previously suggested dimensions: 
monolingualism vs. bilingualism, moral-cultural conservatism vs. liberalism and 
industrial and economic growth vs. environmental protection. The connection 
between issues belonging to these categories has been left unnoticed so far and 
the existence of a gathering sociocultural dimension has not been thoroughly 
discussed. (see Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012.) As a special 
feature of the Finnish case, the results show that attitudes on Swedish language, 
reflecting the attitudes towards bilingualism and the rights of the Swedish-
speaking minority, covary to some extent with issues that handle other 
minorities.77  
                                                            
77 In the 2007 data, there was unfortunately no question on bilingualism/the position of the Swedish 
language. 
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With the exception of the language issue, this dimension depicts the shift in the 
value conflicts in the Finnish electorate. Environmental problems, increasing 
immigration and extensive debate on the rights of ethnic and sexual minorities 
have meant that the sociocultural issues have become increasingly fiercely 
debated in the party sphere. While the newer parties have been willing to keep 
these issues in the political agenda the old parties have been more forced to take a 
stand on the issues. As a result, the sociocultural dimension has structured party 
competition to an increasing amount. (Westinen 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 
2012.)  
 The liberal and permissive ideals of the sociocultural dimension have been 
represented quite coherently, especially by the Green League and also by the 
Swedish People’s Party. The Green League has insisted for a long time on equal 
opportunities, irrespective of sexual identity and its expression. Moreover, it has 
propagated the notion of seeing immigration and multiculturalism as assets 
instead of threats for the Finnish monoculture. Commitment to an ecological 
lifestyle in all forms has separated the Green League most distinctively from other 
parties. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Westinen 2011, 70.) The Swedish People’s Party, 
in turn, has taken steps towards developing a more multicultural image instead of 
a pure bilingual image (Paloheimo 2006, 51). As a language minority party, it has 
also had to be sensitive to other minorities’ needs while accentuating its broad-
minded party image  (Westinen 2011, 69; Törnudd 2006, 222). 
 Also the Left Alliance has had emphasis in sociocultural issues: it has related 
positively to multiculturalism, sexual minorities and environmental protection. 
Thus it has positioned itself as a red-green party, emphasizing postmaterialist 
causes. This is in contrast with the communist heritage of the party (see Zilliacus 
1995, 219–223; Gallagher et al. 2005, 237; Westinen 2011, 75). The Social 
Democratic Party, in turn, has had to balance more between the interests of 
traditional industrial segments and a postmaterialist approach. The SDP as well 
as the other two old major parties, the Coalition Party and the Centre Party, have 
been careful in not taking too explicit stands on different minorities or 
immigration. (Westinen 2011, 75.)  
 The major exception to the bundling of the issues in the dimension is the 
Christian Democrats. It has taken liberal stands on immigration and ethnic 
minorities and promoted environmental protection, but it has taken an 
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unreservedly conservative stand on sexual minorities. (Paloheimo 2006; 
Westinen 2011; Christian Democrats 2011). The True Finns is thus the sole 
representative of the materialist monoculture end of the dimension. It has 
cherished patriotism as one of its main political topics with nativism and 
traditional communality as the ideals. The True Finns has seen accelerated 
individualism, accelerated immigration78 and increasing multiculturalism in 
Western countries (ibid. 68; Harvey 2006, 61; see also Turner 2011, 180–181) as 
threats. The longing for a monoculture has also been accompanied with the 
defense of materialist values: environmental norms hamper industry and the 
everyday life of the common people (Ruostetsaari 2011, 125). Moreover, none of 
the parliamentary parties have treated Swedish in a negative light before the 
arrival of the True Finns, which has been openly against Swedish language due to 
its perceived privileged position in society. This political position can be seen as a 
part of the True Finns’ monotonic idea of national culture. In this sense, the 
linguistic issues also suit well the sociocultural dimension in the party sphere. 
(Grönlund 2011; Westinen 2011, 63.) Hence, the sociocultural dimension 
primarily sets the liberal-postmaterialist Green League and Swedish People’s 
Party against the most nationalist-conservative party, the True Finns and the 
conservative Christian Democrats.  
 
European Union dimension 
 
The last identified principal component handles issues concerning the European 
Union. Both the general approval of EU-membership and specific views on the 
benefits of European integration are entangled with each other. The questions 
loading the strongest into this principal component were formulated the same 
way in different years, albeit not all the EU-questions were proposed each year. In 
the 2003 data, the principal component consisted of questions on whether 
Finland should leave the EU, whether EU-membership is a good thing for 
Finland and whether European integration should be promoted. The principal 
                                                            
78 Although the amount of immigrants in Finland has been exceptionally low in comparison to 
other West European countries (see Arter 2010, 499), Finland has become a part of the all-
European debate on how to relate to immigrants and their habits. Disagreement among political 
parties has concerned the amount of immigrants, the type of preferred immigration and 
conceptions regarding national cultural coherence and unity vs. multiculturalism (Westinen 2011). 
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component in the 2007 data consisted of the two latter questions, while in the 
2011 data, it consisted of the first two questions. Thus, given the limitations of the 
data, the principal component in 2011 measures only general approval of EU-
membership and not attitudes towards European integration.  
 The questions on whether EU-membership is a good thing for Finland and on 
whether Finland should leave the EU are similar and load quite naturally to the 
same principal component. However, one could argue that also the questions 
concerning regional policies are very similar. Nevertheless, the analysis did not 
lead to a separate regional politics principal component. Even when the analyses 
were run with just one EU-issue, it did not covariate strongly with other issues or 
fit neatly into any of the principal components. In some studies, attitudes towards 
immigration have been intertwined with EU-attitudes (see e.g. Oskarson 2010), 
but here they do not fall into the same principal component with EU-issues.  
 The attitudes towards the EU can reflect different kinds of Euroscepticism (see 
Fuchs et. al ed. 2009; Leconte 2010). Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) have made a 
distinction between political Euroscepticism handling the conceptions on the 
level where decisions should be made, and instrumental Euroscepticism that is 
about whether the EU has been a positive and beneficial thing for one’s country. 
Ekman (2010) has presented a corresponding division between general support 
for the EU and specific, performance-based support for the EU. The general 
support for EU-membership is indeed at a higher level in Finland in comparison 
to support for further integration. Despite this, the EU-issues covary to the extent 
that the last principal component can be named the European Union dimension. 
 The European Union dimension is a more recent dimension since Finland 
only joined the EU in 1995. Also the issues in the sociocultural dimension have 
only been quite recently politicized with the exception of the linguistic issue. 
Distinctive anti EU- and pro EU-camps were formed already at the time of the 
EU-referendum in 1994. The anti-EU camp was opposed to the removal of 
decision-making power to Brussels, as well as further political and economic 
integration, while the pro EU-camp saw the EU-membership and further 
integration inside the EU in a positive light. (Paloheimo 2000.) Although there 
are differences in the aspects in which the EU has been conceived as beneficial or 
harmful, the party representation regarding EU-stands has been quite coherent.   
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The True Finns is explicitly a eurosceptic party and has taken advantage of the 
overlapping division between the elite and the people as well as pro-integration 
and anti-integration attitudes. The pragmatic consensus-spirit of Finnish EU-
politics has only accentuated the opportunities of the True Finns to present a 
distinctive anti-EU alternative (Raunio 2011, 197–199, 205: Westinen 2011, 47). 
The True Finns stresses the elitist and bureaucratic nature of the EU, the lack of a 
common identity and the remoteness of the EU since decisions are made far away 
from ordinary people (see Vogt 2007, 100).  
 The Christian Democrats and the Left Alliance have regarded some parts of 
integration as especially negative. The Christian Democrats has been cautious of 
the expansion of the European Union, since its aim is to protect the Christian 
heritage of the EU. The Left Alliance has insisted on that the EU spreads 
unbeneficial neoliberal practices and has a market-orientated tendency that aims 
towards less regulation. (Paloheimo 2000, 57; Westinen 2011, 47.) The Centre 
Party has taken on a more positive attitude toward European integration than it 
had in the 1990s. At the same time, its position is ambivalent as there is still a 
strong anti-EU sentiment inside the party questioning the EU-policy of 
pragmatic adjustment. (see Raunio 2006, 47; Paloheimo 2008, 47; Westinen 2011, 
47–49.) 
 There are four parties that have been largely positive toward EU-membership 
and integration throughout the membership period. The Green League and the 
SDP have been pro-EU but they have voiced occasional skepticism towards 
integration. The Swedish People’s Party and the National Coalition Party have in 
turn been almost unconditionally pro-EU. The SDP has emphasized the benefits 
of integration in the framework of employment and social well-being and also 
promoted the solidary nature of the EU (Raunio 2011, 200). And even though the 
Green League sees the EU as an apparatus that does not strengthen 
environmental and democratic values enough, it has been a supporter of further 
integration (Mickelsson 2006, 248). The Coalition Party has backed the pro-
market spirit of integration and has emphasized especially the significance of the 
Economy and Monetary Union. (Raunio 2006 48; Westinen 2011, 47–48.) The 
Euro Crisis that erupted in 2009 has increased the polarization in and salience of 
EU-issues as there has been room for questioning the benefits of EU (Raunio 
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2011, 216–217). Hence the most distinctive opposite poles in this dimension are 
the Eurosceptic True Finns and the Europhile Coalition Party.  
 
Alternative principal component solutions 
 
With regards to the results of the principal component analysis, the solutions 
with fewer or more dimensions did not lead to more consistent patterns. When 
the number of dimensions was forced to three, the communalities, i.e. the shared 
variance between variables were low and the three components could explain 
only a low share of variance in each year. Moreover, the dimensions became 
more inconsistent thematically and several issues no longer fitted so distinctively 
into one of the principal components. Moreover, the solution became fuzzier 
when the number of principal components was forced to five. Moreover, the 
scree plots, which show how many principal components give the most compact 
solution, reveal that after the fourth principal component, adding principal 
components does not add much to the explained variance. As Table 4.6 showed, 
the Eigenvalues are pretty much the same for the fifth and sixth (and also further) 
components.  
 
Value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate – a brief summary 
 
To summarize the answer to the second research question (RQ2) “which are the 
value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?”, four similar 
value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in each year through principal 
component analysis. They are 1. Economic right and authority dimension 2. 
Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 3. Sociocultural dimension 4. 
European Union dimension. Hence, there seems to be certain stability in the 
identified value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate with the FNES-data, 
although the composition of the dimensions varied between the years: questions 
on some political issues were not proposed in every year.  
 Some uncertainty rises also from the fact that the questions were formulated 
in different ways in different years with different scales. Due to the qualities of the 
FNES-data, however, this problem could not be escaped. Even though the 
respondents answered the questions measuring salience and the questions 
measuring agreement with different logics, previous studies with the FNES-data 
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have shown that they can nevertheless covary to a decent extent (see Bengtsson 
2012). Additionally, there is not great consistency in the questions posed in the 
FNES-studies. For example, there was no question on Swedish language in 2007. 
Although the dimensions over years are not hence fully comparable but 
representative proxies of the same underlying dimension, the analysis shows 
nevertheless that certain issues have seemed to be bundled together in the Finnish 
electorate since the beginning of the 21st century. 
 While the sociocultural and EU-dimensions confirm our knowledge and 
expectations on the dimensionality in the broader West European context (see 
e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2009), the economic right and authority and regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimensions contradict the conventional wisdom. It has 
been typical to point out that the West European democracies have been 
dominated by a (socioeconomic) left-right-dimension that has been accompanied 
by a sociocultural dimension and possibly by an emerging EU-dimension. But 
these analyses have either been based either on assumptions on two-
dimensionality in the electorate or they have been based on the conceived 
dimensionality in the party system (see e.g. van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; 
Hooghe & Marks 2009). The dimensionality in the Finnish electorate proves to be 
more complex. The principal component analysis showed however that the 
dimensions can be reduced to four instead of seven, as has been suggested before 
(see Paloheimo 1988, 2005, 2008).  
 It can be evaluated that economic right and authority and regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimensions reflect rather well the pillars Finnish society 
has been built on (cf. Paloheimo 2008). On the one hand, Finnish politics has had 
a value base in traditional moral values and respect for authority, partly deriving 
from the Lutheran tradition. (see Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). As mentioned, 
regional and socioeconomic equality have also been basic values in Finnish 
politics when building the welfare state. The sociocultural and EU-dimensions, 
on the other hand, represent the newly politicized issues that have become 
increasingly conflictual in the 21st century in Finland (see Grönlund & Westinen 
2012).   
 Finally, as the dimensions in this study are called value/attitudinal 
dimensions, it should be evaluated how this label fits the formed dimensions. It 
can be said that the economic issues in the economic right and authority 
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dimension primarily reflect attitudes (taxation), while the issues that handle 
moral and authority primarily reflect profound values. The regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension could be regarded as more attitudinal as the 
issues in the dimension handle the allocation of resources. However, Ruostetsaari 
(2006) for example, has pointed out that the tensions that have revolved around 
(de)centralization, partly reflect the rural and urban value basis. The sociocultural 
dimension is perhaps the most clear-cut example of a dimension reflecting 
values, although it can be debated whether bilingualism, for example, is a value or 
whether one develops attitudes towards the Swedish language. The EU-
dimension, in turn, can be understood as primarily reflecting attitudes towards 
EU-membership and EU-integration, albeit there can be a strong nationalist 
value base beneath the anti-EU attitudes in the anti-EU camp (see Raunio 2008b).  
Hence, there are not enough good grounds to separate between the value 
dimensions and attitudinal dimensions.  
 So far, the structural element and the value/attitudinal element of cleavages 
have been captured. The next task then is to explore the linkage between these 
two. Cleavages exist only if the different social structural groups have differing 
value/attitudinal orientations, and eventually if these group-based interests are 
manifested in voting for a political party advocating these group-based interests.  
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4.4 The effect of social structural position on values and 
attitudes  
This subchapter focuses on answering the third research question (RQ3) in this 
thesis: ‘What is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in 
the electorate?’ The most suitable way to detect this is to run a linear regression 
analysis (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS), which compares the effects of social 
structural positions, coded as dummy variables, on the earlier-identified principal 
components, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions. The dependent variables are hence 
the principal component scores based on the principal component analyses. The 
mean of the scores is zero and standard deviation one in each dimension. 
Expectations for the analysis 
 
From a cleavage perspective, it is important not only to find out whether social 
structural positions affect values and attitudes but to also explore between which 
social structural groups the value/attitudinal conflict arises. Hence, theoretical 
expectations are needed on which social structural groups are in key positions in 
terms of the conflicts. When the voters can be divided into two groups, as is the 
case in native language, denomination and gender, the reference group in 
statistical analyses is inevitably one of the two categories.  
 The Finnish-speaking-voters and Evangelic-Lutherans are chosen as reference 
groups because of analytical purposes: they constitute a clear majority of the 
respondents and are hence statistically sound as reference groups. In addition, 
men are chosen as the reference group as regards to gender.  
 Traditionally, the Swedish-speaking minority has had a distinctive need to 
protect the status of Swedish in society. With regard to native language, it is 
expected that the Swedish-speaking voters not only regard bilingualism as more 
important, but also have a more liberal orientation in the sociocultural dimension 
than the Finnish-speaking voters. The Swedish-speaking voters have been 
grasped as being more sensitive to minority protection and more permissive at 
large, although this has not been thoroughly explored statistically (see Törnudd 
2006. 222; see also Paloheimo 2006. 51).  
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Following Inglehart & Welzel (2005), the non-confessional voters should 
emphasize more secular-rational values in comparison to those belonging to the 
Evangelic-Lutheran church. Traditional moral norms and respect for authority in 
the economic right and authority dimension are hence expected to be neglected 
by the non-confessional voters. As one can see, the expectations can be derived 
only for some themes regarding the economic right and authority dimension. It is 
not expected that denomination affects the attitudes concerning economic right 
issues. Denomination might also have some effect on the sociocultural dimension 
because of the gay rights issue: church resignations have been deeply affected by 
the fact that the church has had reserved attitudes towards same sex partnerships 
(see Niemelä 2006). However, the other themes covered by the sociocultural 
principal component are not such themes that are bound to be affected by 
denomination.  
 Even though the voting behavior and value basis of women became of 
scholarly interest especially with the rise of New Politics and postmaterialist 
values, the notion of some men developing a counter-reaction to the ideals of 
New Politics and postmaterialist ideas, such as feminism, has balanced the 
research interest on gender as a cleavage base (see Inglehart & Norris 2004; cf. 
Mudde 2007). Gender should affect the value orientations, especially in the 
sociocultural dimension: women have often shown more concern for minority 
questions and environmental protection than men. (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; 
Knutsen 2004b; Inglehart & Welzel 2005. Dalton 2006). Thus women are 
expected to be more libertarian-postmaterialist in the sociocultural dimension.  
 With regards to place of residence, occupational class, education and age 
cohorts, it can be expected that some social structural groups are more likely to 
have distinctive values and attitudes than others. Since there is a lack of cleavage 
research on the rural-urban cleavage in terms of the relationship between the 
type of residential area and value/attitudinal dimensions, the present literature 
does not provide with any clear theoretical expectations. Hence, the assumptions 
are derived from the national context. Historically, the division into rural 
residents and residents in urban/industrial environments has been important (see 
Allardt & Pesonen 1967). However, over the last few decades the interests 
between people living in the metropolitan area and the rest of Finland have 
become increasingly conflicted, as noticed previously. Regional equality and 
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decentralization is often beneficial for people living in rural municipalities and 
other small peripheral municipalities, while people living in the metropolitan 
area of Helsinki benefit the least from regional equality. It is not in their interests 
to support a decentralized model where resources are allocated more evenly. 
These attributes make the residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area the most 
interesting reference group for the analyses. Residents in rural and small 
municipalities are expected to have a more decentralist orientation than 
metropolitans in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension. 
 Place of residence is also expected to affect attitudes in the EU dimension. As 
Batory and Sitter (2004. 529) note, the voice of sparsely-populated areas is even 
more unlikely to be heard in a supranational organ, such as the EU, than in a 
nation-state. In this light, the EU membership means that the rural areas become 
a double-layer periphery: they are a periphery inside the nation’s borders and 
Finland is peripheral from a Brussels perspective. Especially residents in rural 
municipalities thus have a common interest in being against further EU-
integration, as the integration might marginalize them further (see Uusitalo 2003, 
28) whereas residents in urban environments have seen integration in a more 
positive light (Pichler 2009). Hence, residents in rural municipalities are expected 
to have sharper anti-EU-attitudes than residents in the Helsinki metropolitan 
area in the EU-dimension.  
 Pertaining to occupational class, the blue-collar workers and higher 
professionals/managers have been most analyzed classes in previous research.  Of 
these groups, the higher professionals and managers are chosen as the reference 
group. 
 The lower occupational classes, blue-collar workers and routine non-manual 
employees, are bound to support the equal ideals in the regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension due to their interests toward retaining a 
strong state that promotes redistribution and job opportunities. Furthermore, 
blue-collar workers, especially, and routine non-manual employees are expected 
to have less libertarian/postmaterialist values in the sociocultural dimension and 
to have sharper anti-EU-attitudes in the EU-dimension than the other classes. 
They may feel that they are in a position to become the potential victims of 
globalization, integration and free mobility as companies can recruit cheap 
foreign labor force more easily. This, in turn, can result in negative attitudes 
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towards immigration, multiculturalism and international influences at large. In 
this light, blue-collar workers, in particular, can regard the protection of national 
interests, i.e. the national economy and industry, as an area that should be put 
ahead of the primacy of EU-integration, recruitment of a foreign workforce and 
aiding immigrants and refugees. (see Kriesi et al. 2006. 2008; Hooghe & Marks 
2009; Teney et al. 2015.)  
 The resources and abilities of the higher professionals/managers are, in turn, 
expected to have opposite interests, especially to blue-collar workers, but possibly 
also to routine non-manual employees in these three dimensions. They are 
expected to see growing immigration and integration in a positive light as free 
mobility of people, for example, is professionally beneficial for them (ibid.). 
Moreover, due to their high position in the labor market, they are not so 
dependent on a strong welfare state and are more likely to be less supportive of a 
redistributing state.  
  With regard to education, the group with the highest level of education is 
chosen as the reference group. Those with a university-level education are bound 
to spend their time in such environments that socialize into a value base that 
deviates most from those with lower education. Furthermore, the highest 
educated have been the most likely to identify themselves with their educational 
group, which contributes toward differentiating them from other educational 
groups (Stubager 2009, 213–215). In line with authors analyzing the effect of 
education on values and attitudes, the highly educated, in comparison to the least 
educated groups, should hold more tolerant and liberal attitudes towards 
minorities and immigration and address environmental concerns (see e.g. 
Weakliem 2002; Brooks 2006; Stubager 2010).  
 Moreover, highly educated are more likely to take pro-EU positions as they 
have seen further integration as an asset (Pichler 2009). Hence, education is 
expected to have an effect on the value orientations in the sociocultural and EU 
dimensions: those with a university-level education are assumed to be more 
libertarian-postmaterialist and pro-EU than those with primary or vocational 
education. It is worth noting that no previous research has been made on the 
values and attitudes of those with an upper-secondary level of education or 
polytechnic-level education. Hence, it is interesting to see whether they have 
specific group-based interests.  
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The choice of the reference group is far from obvious in the case of age cohorts. 
The members of the youngest generation are, however, interesting in the sense 
that they have not been a part in the building up of a welfare society, contrary to 
the two oldest generations, and they have not experienced the economic 
recession (at the beginning of the 1990s and in mid-1990s) as severely as the 
second youngest generation. Hence, those born after 1975 are chosen as the 
reference group.  In addition, postmaterialist and liberal attitudes and optimism 
towards globalization and integration should increase generation by generation 
(van Deth & Scarborough 1995; Inglehart 1997; Wagner & Kritizinger 2012). 
Hence, the youngest generation is expected to show less support to the ideals the 
welfare society: they are expected to neglect especially the traditional moral 
norms and authority in the economic right and authority dimension and the 
state-led ideals of decentralization and redistribution in the regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension. In addition, the youngest age cohorts should 
hold more postmaterialist-libertarian attitudes in the sociocultural dimension 
and be less Eurosceptic than the older generations in the EU-dimension.  
 
The effect of social structural positions on value/attitudinal dimensions 
 
Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix Tables 2–5 illustrate a multiple linear regression 
analysis79 which compares the effect of social structural positions, coded as 
dummy variables, on the earlier-identified principal components, i.e. 
value/attitudinal dimensions. The dependent variables are hence the principal 
component scores. The method of regression deployed is forced entry in which 
all the predictors are forced to the model simultaneously. This method relies on 
having sound theoretical reasons for including the chosen predictor variables. 
For example, Studenmund and Cassidy (1987) argue that the entry method is the 
only appropriate method for theory testing because stepwise regressions are 
influenced by random variation in the data and thus seldom provide replicable 
results. 
 The reported regression coefficients in Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix Tables 
2–5 indicate how much the social structural location of a voter has affected her 
                                                            
79 All of the linear regression analyses are run with language weight to correct the oversample of 
Swedish-speaking respondents.  
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values and attitudes in 2003–2011.80 Putting the two status variables, i.e. 
occupational class and educational level, simultaneously in the model leads to 
multicollinearity (Variation inflation factor exceeded 3.0 and tolerance is below 
0.35. This is especially evident in the case of those with vocational education). 
Hence, separate regressions were run in order not to violate the models. Tables 
4.10–4.13 include occupational class as the social status variable and Appendix 
Tables 2–5 include education as the social status variable. The regression 
coefficients of other social structural variables are stable irrespective of whether 
education or class is included in the models. The R squared values indicate that 
the extent to which social structural positions explain values and attitudes in 
different dimensions does not depend much on whether one includes 
occupational class or education. As there is a different amount of categories in 
each social structural variable, the coefficients cannot be directly compared with 
each other. Instead, the dimension(s) to which each social structural position is 
connected to the strongest can be detected.81  
 
                                                            
80 The values for the dimensions are principal component scores. Their mean is zero and the 
standard deviation is one in each dimension. The correlation between the dimensions is zero.  
81 A number of assumptions should not be violated in multiple regression analysis in order to be 
able to generalize the findings beyond the used sample: First, the distributions of residuals should 
be normal at every value of the outcome. This was checked with histograms and P-P-plots and with 
outlier detection statistics. Secondly, the variance of the residuals for every set of values for the 
predictors should be equal. The residuals should hence be homoscedastic, not heteroscedastic. The 
scatterplots where studentized (standardized) residuals were plotted with predicted values showed 
homoscedasticty. There was a slight pattern of heterodescasticity when analyzing the effect of social 
structural variables on regional and socioeconomic equality in the 2007 data. The skew was not, 
however, severe. Third, the error term should be additive; effects should not multiply together. 
Multiplying effects were not diagnosed in the analyses, Fourth the independence assumption (lack 
of autocorrelation) is not a big problem as it arises mainly with time-series analyses and in clusters 
of cases. The lack of autocorrelation was tested with a Durbin-Watson test: adjacent residuals were 
not correlated. Fifth, independent variables must not be linear functions of one another, i.e. there 
should not be perfect multicollinearity. As already mentioned, some, although not drastic, 
multicollinearity would occur if occupational class and education were put in the same statistical 
model. However, they are treated in separate models. The sixth assumption that all predictor 
variables are uncorrelated with the error term and the seventh assumption that the expected value 
of the residuals is zero at every value of outcome did not constitute a problem in the following 
analyses.  (see Bowerman & O’Connell 1990; Myers 1990; Menard 1995; Allison 1999).  
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Table 4.10 The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and 
authority dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. 
OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
  Pro economic right and    
  authority        
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant –0.53***   –0.40***   –0.35***   
Native language ᵅ       
Swedish 0.55** .16 0.10 .15 0.29 .16 
Type of residential area ᵇ            
Rural municipality 0.09 .12 0.08 .11 0.21 .13 
Small municipality 0.08 .12 0.09 .11 0.17 .13 
Town 0.06 .09 0.07 .09 0.12 .10 
Occupational class ᶜ              
Blue-collar workers 0.43*** .10 0.15 .09 0.20* .10 
Routine non-manual  0.15 .11 0.10 .10 0.28** .10 
employees       
Entrepreneurs  0.53*** .14 0.57*** .13 0.26 .19 
(incl. agriculture)       
Lower professionals 0.34** .12 –0.01 .10 0.20 .11 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  –0.46*** .11 –0.40*** .09 –0.44*** .09 
any church        
Gender ᵉ            
Female 0.26** .08 0.04 .07 –0.06 .07 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.27** .12 0.53*** .10 0.59*** .11 
1945-1959 0.16 .12 0.27** .10 0.21* .11 
1960-1975 –0.02 .12 0.18 .10 0.06 .10 
R² 0.11   0.10   0.12   
Adjusted R² 0.09   0.09   0.11   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals 
and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975 
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Table 4.11 The impact of social structural groups on the regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension with occupational class included as a social 
status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
  Pro regional and socioeconomic    
  equality   
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant –0.70***   –0.96***   –0.87***   
Native language ᵅ 
      
Swedish 0.00 .16 –0.43** .14 0.13 .17 
Type of residential area ᵇ            
Rural municipality 0.64*** .12 0.63*** .10 0.53*** .13 
Small municipality 0.47*** .12 0.45*** .10 0.54*** .13 
Town 0.25** .09 0.43*** .08 0.32** .10 
Occupational class ᶜ              
Blue-collar workers 0.24* .10 0.61*** .09 0.14 .10 
Routine non-manual  0.16 .11 0.49*** .09 0.16 .10 
employees 
      
Entrepreneurs  0.21 .14 0.14 .12 0.09 .19 
(incl. agriculture) 
      
Lower professionals –0.02 .12 0.36*** .10 0.17 .11 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  0.03 .11 0.01 .08 0.07 .09 
any church            
Gender ᵉ 
 
      
Female 0.05 .08 0.13 .07 0.11 .08 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.51*** .11 0.47*** .09 0.60*** .11 
1945-1959 0.39*** .11 0.32*** .09 0.54*** .10 
1960-1975 0.04 .12 –0.05 .10 0.23* .11 
R² 0.13   0.19   0.11   
Adjusted R² 0.11   0.18   0.09   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals 
and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975 
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Table 4.12 The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural dimension 
with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: 
FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
  Pro cultural diversity and postmaterialism   
  (sociocultural dimension)       
 
2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant 0.31**   –0.12   0.12   
Native language ᵅ 
      
Swedish 0.62*** .16 0.34* .15 0.66*** .17 
Type of residential area ᵇ            
Rural municipality –0.05 .12 –0.08 .11 –0.22 .13 
Small municipality –0.21 .12 –0.25* .11 –0.33** .13 
Town –0.04 .09 –0.10 .09 –0.27** .10 
Occupational class ᶜ              
Blue-collar workers –0.63*** .10 0.01 .09 –0.22* .10 
Routine non-manual  –0.39*** .11 0.03 .10 –0.24* .10 
employees 
      
Entrepreneurs  –0.32* .14 0.01 .13 –0.45* .19 
(incl. agriculture) 
      
Lower professionals –0.10 .12 –0.02 .10 –0.16 .11 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  –0.02 .11 0.13 .09 –0.03 .09 
any church   
 
  
 
  
 
Gender ᵉ 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Female 0.20* .08 0.39*** .07 0.46*** .08 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 –0.21 .11 0.09 .10 0.17 .11 
1945-1959 –0.16 .11 –0.07 .10 –0.07 .10 
1960-1975 –0.09 .12 –0.19 .10 –0.09 .11 
R² 0.12   0.07   0.11   
Adjusted R² 0.10   0.05   0.10   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals 
and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. 
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Table 4.13 The impact of social structural groups on the European Union 
dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS 
regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
  Pro European Union        
          
 
2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant 0.43***   0.23*   0.31*   
Native language ᵅ 
      
Swedish 0.24 .16 0.16 .16 0.35* .16 
Type of residential area ᵇ            
Rural municipality –0.45*** .12 –0.35** .12 –0.23 .13 
Small municipality –0.15 .12 –0.33** .12 0.02 .13 
Town –0.22* .09 –0.23** .09 0.06 .10 
Occupational class ᶜ              
Blue-collar workers –0.20* .10 –0.32*** .10 –0.68*** .10 
Routine non-manual  –0.17 .11 –0.04 .11 –0.41*** .10 
employees 
      
Entrepreneurs  –0.29* .14 –0.16 .14 –0.19 .19 
(incl. agriculture) 
      
Lower professionals –0.28* .12 0.03 .12 –0.13 .11 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  –0.05 .11 –0.17* .11 –0.22* .09 
any church   
 
  
 
  
 
Gender ᵉ 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Female –0.29*** .08 –0.22** .08 –0.15* .08 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.21 .12 0.54*** .12 0.10 .11 
1945-1959 0.01 .12 0.16 .12 0.17 .10 
1960-1975 0.07 .12 0.14 .12 0.01 .11 
R² 0.07   0.09   0.11   
Adjusted R² 0.05   0.08   0.09   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals 
and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. 
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The tables confirm that there is a connection between native language and 
sociocultural dimension, as anticipated. It is the only dimension where the 
Swedish-speaking people have strong group-based interests. However, the effect 
was smaller in 2007 in comparison to 2003 and 2011. The major explanatory 
factor behind the result is that there was not a question on bilingualism in 2007. 
Although the Swedish-speaking population has been more positive toward 
immigration, sexual minorities and environmental protection than the Finnish-
speaking population, the language issue rises above other issues.  
 Unsurprisingly, the place of residence also confirms the assumptions. It has 
the strongest effect on values in the regional and socioeconomic equality 
dimension. In this dimension, the interests of residents both in rural and small 
municipalities are set against the interests of metropolitans. The effect is strong 
and statistically significant in these cases (p <0.001). The strong effect is especially 
due to the conflicting views concerning decentralization and regional politics in 
the dimension, which is why it can be said that the conflict revolves around the 
tension between centralizing and decentralizing interests, as also Tervo (2003) 
and Moisio (2012) have maintained. The residents in rural and small 
municipalities favor regional equality, while metropolitans prefer centralization. 
Interestingly, metropolitan voters differentiate also slightly from voters living in 
towns outside the metropolitan area, but here the effect is far smaller.  
 In correspondence with the expectations, the rural and metropolitan voters 
have differing interests also in the EU-dimension, with the 2011 election being an 
exception. The skepticism toward the benefits that the EU delivers is significantly 
higher among people living in the rural areas. The result confirms that the 
dividing lines that were formed in the EU-referendum in 1994 are still valid: 
people in the countryside opposed the membership strongly, while yes-votes for 
the EU formed an overwhelming majority in the metropolitan area (see 
Paloheimo 2000). The type of residential area does not affect the economic right 
and authority dimension and has just a slight effect on the sociocultural 
dimension, despite some studies suggesting that rural residents respect more 
traditional moral values (Knutsen 2010b) and perceive international influences, 
such as immigration, threatening (Batory & Sitter 2004, 529).  
 The status-based conflicts rise mainly between blue-collar workers and higher 
professionals and between those with a primary/vocational education and 
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university-level education. However, the effect of class and education on the 
dimensions is less consistent than that of native language or type of residential 
area as some of the effects are found in one election while in another they are not. 
First, blue-collar workers and those with primary, vocational or upper-secondary 
level education are both more traditionalist and authoritarian and for economic 
ideals associated with the political right, as indicated in Table 4.10 and Appendix 
Table 2. The same pattern applies to entrepreneurs. The authoritarianism and 
conservatism of those with a lower social status is in accordance with previous 
accounts (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006; Mudde 2007). 
 As regards to the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension, the blue-
collar workers seem to have the most interests in common although the effect 
fluctuates between the years, which is mainly due to regional politics questions 
dominating the dimension in 2011 instead of questions on soccioeconomic 
equality. The blue-collar workers are for a strong state that takes cares of its 
citizens by means of redistribution and decentralization, which is in line with the 
expectations. Moreover, since being an entrepreneur has no effect on this 
dimension, it should be questioned whether this result would change if the 
agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers were treated as separate 
categories. The analysis with merged data clarifies this aspect as the N is then 
large enough to split the entrepreneur category in two. 
 The most pervasive opposite interests between occupational classes and 
educational groups are found in the sociocultural and EU dimensions in Tables 
4.12 and 4.13 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5. However, this tendency was not 
present in 2007 when the question on improving the circumstances of the poor 
loaded quite strongly also to this dimension. Blue-collar workers, routine non-
manual employees and those with a primary or occupational education are anti-
minority and materialist, while the higher professionals or managers and those 
with a university-level education are pro-minority and postmaterialist. In 
addition, the conflict between anti-EU blue-collar voters and pro-EU higher 
professionals and managers is strong. The conflict revolves also around anti-EU 
voters who have a primary, occupational or upper-secondary level education and 
those pro-EU voters who have a university level education. The results confirm 
the previous findings (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje 
2009), which point out that those with lower resources in the job market or those 
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with lower education, perceive growing sociocultural liberalism and EU-
integration as a threat. The conflict in the EU-dimension was especially evident 
in the 2011 election. The EU-issues became extremely politicized in the 2011 
election due to the Euro Crisis (Borg 2012d, 2012e), which may explain the result.  
 A sharp conflict between the voters who belong to the main church and voters 
who are not affiliated to any church arises only in the economic right and 
authority dimension due to the moral and law and order issues. Unsurprisingly, 
the members of the main church show more respect for authority and 
conservative moral values than those who do not belong to the church.  
 Gender has a distinctive and consistent effect only on the sociocultural 
dimension. As expected, women relate more positively towards sexual and ethnic 
minorities, immigration and environmental protection (see e.g. Inglehart & 
Norris 2000). With regards to other gender effects on values and attitudes, 
women are more EU-sceptic than men. This is rather surprising since the Finnish 
women relate more positively to other international influences such as increasing 
immigration and multiculturalism in the sociocultural dimension. There is no 
consistent pattern as to the gender effects on the two other dimensions. 
 Lastly, the differences between age cohorts mainly arise between the two 
oldest and the two youngest generations in the first two dimensions. The pre-war 
generation (born before 1945) and the generation of the great transition (born in 
1945–1959) support more issues associated with the economic right and 
authority as well as regional and socioeconomic equality. These were the 
generations that built up the welfare society. The generation that suffered from 
the 1990s recession as young adults (born in 1960–1975) and especially the 
youngest generation (born after 1975), which entered the job market when 
Finland had joined the EU and when opportunities for individuals were on the 
rise, do not have a first-hand concern for the afore-mentioned dimensions. The 
society where they have been brought up is not filled with such a belief in a 
decentralized welfare state and authority. Curiously enough, there are not any 
generational conflicts in the sociocultural dimension, although Inglehart (1977) 
and his followers would suggest that the oldest generation (born before 1945) 
should be less postmaterialist than the younger ones. Moreover, the youngest 
generation has not been more positive towards the European Union than the 
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oldest one, despite the fact that the members of the youngest generation have 
been EU-citizens for their whole adulthood.  
 As we have witnessed, the effect of social structural positions on the 
value/attitudinal dimensions fluctuates in some cases between elections. As the 
coefficients that were statistically significant did not, however, point to opposite 
directions in analyses in different years, and as the structural variables are the 
same in each year, the data sets can be merged into a single data. This solution 
also evens out the differences in the composition of the value/attitudinal 
dimensions in each year. As the number of cases increases in the analyses, the 
conclusions based on the regression coefficients become more reliable. Hence, it 
can be confirmed as to which of the patterns in Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix 
tables 2–5 are the most stable and strongest. Yet again, it is not possible to 
compare which social structural variable has the strongest effect on certain 
dimensions in absolute terms. This is because some structural variables contain 
only two categories while others contain five.  
 The next section is based on an analysis with merged data and deals with RQ3: 
“what is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the 
electorate?’. Tables 4.14–4.17 indicate the effect with merged data. A language 
weight was deployed in order to guarantee that the share of the Swedish- and 
Finnish-speaking respondents is in accordance with their share in the population 
as the samples contained an oversample of Swedish-speaking voters. The two 
social status variables, occupational class and education, could not either here be 
put in the same model due to multicollienarity. Hence, Tables 4.14 and 4.15 
include occupational class and Tables 4.16 and 4.17 education as a social status 
variable. In addition election year dummy variables were included in re-runs of 
the models to test to robustness of the effects. 82    
 We can confirm that native language has the strongest effect on the 
sociocultural dimension of the four dimensions: the Swedish-speaking voters are 
more liberal than the Finnish-speaking ones. The type of residential area has 
unarguably the strongest effect on the regional and socioeconomic equality 
dimension in comparison to other dimensions. Residents in rural and small 
municipalities are more in favor of a decentralizing and redistributing state than 
                                                            
82 In three dimensions the election year dummies were insignificant and in the economic right and 
authority dimension they changed just slightly some of the regression coefficients. 
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those living in the Helsinki metropolitan area. There is also a striking difference 
between EU-sceptic voters in rural municipalities and pro-EU voters in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area in the EU dimension. 
 Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show that blue-collar voters are more in favor of 
redistribution and decentralization and more EU-sceptic than the higher 
professionals and managers. More limited effects are found in the two other 
dimensions. Nevertheless, blue-collar workers are also both more in favor of 
entrepreneurship, tax cuts, traditional moral values, strong authority, and they 
are less postmaterialist than higher professionals and managers. These patterns 
apply also to the routine non-manual employees although into a lesser extent.  
 As anticipated, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers (other 
entrepreneurs) have deviating interests, which cancelled each other out when 
these groups were treated as one group in the. Table 4.14 shows that agricultural 
entrepreneurs are for a strong decentralizing state in the regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension, while this does not apply to small employers. 
This is obviously due to the fact that decentralization keeps the countryside more 
alive. Moreover, the agricultural entrepreneurs are against the EU, while the 
small employers are not. This has to do with the loss of income that EU-
membership has caused for the farmers, due to the Common Agricultural Policy 
(Laurila 2006 111–115.) Small employers are clearly the most in favor of tax cuts 
and market economy in the economic right and authority dimension. 
 The effect of education on the value/attitudinal dimensions in Tables 4.16 and 
4.17 reveals that those with a primary or vocational education have very similar 
interests, while also those with an upper secondary level education share fairly 
similar values and attitudes. Those with a polytechnic education and those with a 
university education do not differentiate much from each other in terms of values 
and attitudes. The only difference is that those with university education are 
more liberal in the sociocultural dimension.  
 The low-educated and the highly educated differ from each other in the same 
manner as the blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers differ from 
each other. The low-educated are more EU-sceptic and less postmaterialist than 
the highly educated. The low-educated are also more in favor of 
entrepreneurship, tax cuts, traditional moral values, strong authority and slightly 
more in favor of redistribution and decentralization than the highly educated.  
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Table 4.14 The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority and 
regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with 
occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression.83 
 
  Economic right Std. Regional and socio- Std. 
 and authority error economic equality  error 
  dimension  dimension  
Constant –0.43***   –0.86***   
Native language ᵅ   
 
  
 
Swedish 0.28** .09 –0.09 .09 
Type of residential area ᵇ  
  
   
Rural municipality 0.14* .07 0.59*** .07 
Small municipality 0.12 .07 0.49*** .07 
Town 0.09 .05 0.36*** .05 
Occupational class ᶜ          
Blue-collar workers 0.24*** .06 0.36*** .05 
Routine non-manual employees 0.18** .06 0.29*** .06 
Agricultural entrepreneurs 0.36*** .10 0.41*** .10 
Small employers 0.67*** .12 –0.24 .12 
Lower professionals 0.17** .06 0.19** .06 
Denomination ᵈ  
  
  
 
Does not belong to the church –0.44*** .05 0.05 .05 
Gender ᵉ         
Female 0.07 .04 0.09* .04 
Age cohorts ᶠ 
  
  
 
-1944 0.46*** .06 0.52*** .06 
1945-1959 0.22*** .06 0.41*** .06 
1960-1975 0.08 .06 0.07 .06 
R² 0.10   0.14 
 
Adjusted R² 0.09 
 
0.13 
 
F 17.9 
 
26.0 
 
N 2316 
 
2316 
 
                                                            
83 Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The 
reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. 
higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 
2003, 2007, 2011. 
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Table 4.15 The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural and European Union 
dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with occupational class included as a 
social status variable. OLS regression.84   
 
  Sociocultural Std. EU- Std. 
 dimension error dimension error 
         
Constant 0.08   0.33***   
Native language ᵅ       
 
Swedish 0.52*** .09 0.22* .09 
Type of residential area ᵇ  
     
Rural municipality –0.10 .07 –0.31*** .07 
Small municipality –0.26*** .07 –0.16* .07 
Town –0.11* .05 –0.13* .05 
Occupational class ᶜ          
Blue-collar workers –0.26*** .06 –0.41*** .06 
Routine non-manual employees –0.19** .06 –0.22*** .06 
Agricultural entrepreneurs –0.24* .10 –0.42*** .10 
Small employers –0.10 .12 0.02 .12 
Lower professionals –0.11 .06 –0.12 .06 
Denomination ᵈ  
 
  
  
Does not belong to the church 0.03 .05 –0.18** .05 
Gender ᵉ         
Female 0.36*** .04 –0.21*** .04 
Age cohorts ᶠ 
 
  
  
-1944 –0.01 .06 0.32*** .06 
1945-1959 –0.10 .06 0.12 .06 
1960-1975 –0.14* .06 0.07 .06 
R² 0.08   0.07   
Adjusted R² 0.07   0.07 
 
F 15.1   12.6 
 
N 2316   2316 
 
 
                                                            
84 Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The 
reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. 
higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975.  Source: 
FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
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Table 4.16 The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority and 
regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with 
education included as a social status variable. OLS regression.85 
 
  Economic right Std. Regional and socio- Std. 
 and authority error economic equality  error 
  dimension  dimension  
Constant –0.60***   –0.92***   
Native language ᵅ       
Swedish 0.31** .09 –0.14 .09 
Type of residential area ᵇ       
Rural municipality 0.13 .07 0.62*** .07 
Small municipality 0.12 .07 0.52*** .07 
Town 0.06 .05 0.37*** .05 
Education ᶜ          
Primary 0.35*** .07 0.16* .07 
Vocational 0.39*** .07 0.28** .07 
Upper Secondary 0.32*** .07 0.16* .07 
Polytechnic 0.17 .09 0.05 .09 
Denomination ᵈ       
Does not belong to the church –0.43*** .05 0.04 .05 
Gender ᵉ         
Female 0.07 .04 0.12** .04 
Age cohorts ᶠ      
-1944 0.51*** .06 0.54*** .06 
1945-1959 0.26*** .06 0.44*** .06 
1960-1975 0.15* .06 0.10 .06 
R² 0.10   0.12 
 
Adjusted R² 0.09  0.12  
F 18.7  24.2  
N 2316 
 
2316 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The 
reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. 
university, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
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Table 4.17 The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural and European Union 
dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with education included as a social status 
variable. OLS regression.86 
 
  Sociocultural Std. EU- Std. 
 dimension error dimension error 
         
Constant 0.22**   0.49***   
Native language ᵅ        
Swedish 0.52*** .09 0.25** .09 
Type of residential area ᵇ       
Rural municipality –0.07 .07 –0.33*** .07 
Small municipality –0.24*** .07 –0.17* .07 
Town –0.09 .05 –0.12* .05 
Education ᶜ          
Primary –0.37*** .07 –0.49*** .07 
Vocational –0.35*** .07 –0.42*** .07 
Upper Secondary –0.14* .07 –0.30*** .07 
Polytechnic –0.23** .09 –0.01 .09 
Denomination ᵈ       
Does not belong to the church 0.03 .05 –0.18** .05 
Gender ᵉ         
Female 0.35*** .04 –0.20*** .04 
Age cohorts ᶠ      
-1944 –0.03 .06 0.31*** .06 
1945-1959 –0.15* .06 0.09 .06 
1960-1975 –0.22** .06 –0.01 .06 
R² 0.08   0.07   
Adjusted R² 0.07   0.07  
F 15.2   14.2  
N 2316   2316 
 
 
 
                                                            
86 Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The 
reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. 
university, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
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As regards to the effects of denomination, the members of main church members 
hold more  authoritarian and traditionalist values than those who do not belong 
to the church. Gender has a substantial effect only on the values concerning the 
sociocultural dimension: women are more postmaterialist than men. Moreover, 
in the merged data set, the effect of denomination and gender on the EU 
dimension becomes statistically significant, but the coefficient is not particularly 
high. Finally, the results show that the two oldest age cohorts (born before 1945 
or 1945–1959) differ from the two younger age cohorts (born in 1960–1975 or 
after 1975) especially in supporting the ideals of the economic right and authority 
and regional and socioeconomic equality.  
 The goodness-of-the-fit of the linear regression models (adjusted R²) in Tables 
4.14–4.17 indicates that social structural variables explain only around ten per 
cent of the variance in values and attitudes. This is a very modest overall level: 
values and attitudes of a respondent are not determined to a great extent by social 
structural location. Admittedly, several other factors, like family members and 
friends, topical events and media, may affect one’s attitudes and values. They are, 
however, beyond the scope of this study. Despite the weak overall effect, there are 
a few rather strong connections between structural positions and 
value/attitudinal dimensions. Following the idea of a threefold-cleavage, the 
structural and value/attitudinal cleavage elements should be manifested in voting 
behavior. In order to suffice for a cleavage, the group-based values and attitudes 
have to be reflected in voting for a party that advocates the interests at hand.  
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5. Bringing party choice in – detecting the cleavage 
structure in Finland  
 
5.1. The political context in the Finnish parliamentary 
elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 
This chapter briefly assesses the political context of parliamentary elections 
before analyzing the effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes 
on party choice. The political context explicates what the elections have been 
fought over. Some topical issues may be entangled into cleavage explanations of 
party choice while others may not. For example, the Prime Minister question has 
become a topical issue since the 2003 election: the amendment of the 
Constitution in 2000 led to a Prime Minister being chosen solely by the 
parliament. Especially the biggest parties have had elements of more personalized 
Prime Minister campaigns in their electoral campaigns (for more, see Karvonen 
2010).   
 
The 2003 parliamentary election  
 
Prior to the 2003 Finnish parliamentary election, a broad ‘rainbow’ coalition had 
been in power for two terms. Led by the Social Democrats, the government 
included the National Coalition Party, the Swedish People’s Party, the Green 
League87 and the Left Alliance. This coalition included socioeconomically the 
most right-wing party (the Coalition Party) and the most left-wing party in the 
parliament (the Left Alliance). Despite the ideological diversity, the coalition 
managed to find common guidelines in EU-politics and centralizing politics 
(Westinen 2011). The Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the True Finns 
(with only one seat) were in the opposition. The electoral competition in the 2003 
election revolved around the two main competitors – the Social Democrats and 
the leading opposition party, the Centre Party. The topical questions handled 
public services, regional politics and employment. In addition, security politics 
                                                            
87 The Greens left the government in 2002 due to the permit decision of a new nuclear plant.   
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and military alliances rose surprisingly to the agenda, due to the Iraqi War (Borg 
& Moring 2005; Pesonen & Borg 2005.)  
 The electoral support of the parties in the 2003 is shown in Table 5.1. The 
Centre Party became the largest party in the election, leaving the Social 
Democrats second. The National Coalition Party lost the most support of all 
parties (2.5 percentage points). The aggregate volatility was low, 6.4 percentage 
points, which indicates that the power relations did not change dramatically. The 
share of floating voters88 in the electorate was 25 per cent – roughly in the same 
level as in the parliamentary elections in the 1990s (Borg 2012b, 131). 
 
Table 5.1 The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2003. Source: Statistics 
Finland 2011b. 
 
Party 2003 ± change between 1999  
    and 2003 elections 
Centre Party  24.7 +2.3 
Social Democratic Party  24.5 +1.6 
National Coalition Party  18.6 −2.5 
Left Alliance 9.9 −1.0 
Green League 8.0 +0.7 
Christian Democrats 5.3 +1.2 
Swedish People's Party 4.6 −0.5 
True Finns 1.6 +0.6 
Non-parliamentary parties 2.8 −2.4 
All 100   
 
 
The major change was that a government coalition led by the Centre Party and 
backed by the Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party was formed after 
the election. The coalition was formed despite the grievances between the SDP 
and the Centre Party, which emphasizes the pragmatism among the Finnish 
parties. On the other hand, the Centre Party and the SDP have often found 
                                                            
88 The concept ‘floating voter’ refers to voters who switched party, voters who were mobilized or 
who were first-time voters.  
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common ground in strengthening tax-financed social security (Karvonen 2014, 
91).  
 
The 2007 parliamentary election  
 
The 2007 parliamentary election debate largely revolved around the extent of the 
welfare state and around labor market solutions: the socioeconomic left-right-
dichotomy was strongly present. This time, though, the electoral battle was 
centered more on the three main parties: the SDP, the Centre Party and the 
Coalition Party (Borg & Paloheimo 2009). The electoral outcome was even and 
there were no major shifts in party support as Table 5.2 indicates. The Centre 
Party retained the position of the largest party, while the Coalition Party was the 
biggest winner of the election. The Social Democrats lost 3 percentage points of 
its support and was left outside the government coalition. The True Finns gained 
2.5 percentage points. The aggregate volatility was again low (6.7 percentage 
points) and the share of floating voters in the electorate was 25 percent (Borg 
2012b, 131).  
 
Table 5.2 The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2007. Source: Statistics 
Finland 2011b. 
 
Party 2007 ± change between 2003  
    and 2007 elections 
Centre Party  23.1 −1.6 
National Coalition Party  22.3 +3.7 
Social Democratic Party  21.4 −3.1 
Left Alliance 8.8 −1.1 
Green League 8.5 +0.5 
Christian Democrats 4.9 −0.4 
Swedish People's Party 4.6 0.0 
True Finns 4.1 +2.5 
Non-parliamentary parties 2.5 −0.3 
All 100   
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The major change was again the change of the coalition base. The Centre Party 
formed the new coalition with the Coalition Party, the Green League and the 
Swedish People’s Party. Both of the main center-right forces, the Centre Party 
and the Coalition Party, were hence included while no left-wing parties were 
taken to the coalition, which was in accordance with the sharp left-right-
polarization during the campaign.  
 
The 2011 election  
 
The 2011 parliamentary election had a political context that differentiated 
significantly from previous elections. Turbulence has characterized many 
parliamentary elections in Western Europe during the time of the Euro Crisis 
(2009–) and the first election that was distinctively dominated by the Eurozone 
crisis was held in Finland in April 2011. Especially the bailout packages for 
Greece and Portugal that became extremely topical only a couple of weeks before 
the election influenced the voters to great extent. The Euro Crisis became the 
most important political question in the election. (Borg 2012e, 201–202.) 
Moreover, the economic turndown had set the government parties in an 
uncomfortable position as productivity was decreasing and unemployment was 
rising (Pernaa 2012). Furthermore, the election finance scandal had preceded the 
election (2009–2011) and eroded the trust especially to the Prime Minister party 
(the Centre Party) but also to the other major parties, which had received 
financing from business life and/or trade unions (Mattila & Sundberg 2012).  
 All these factors favored the nationalist-populist True Finns Party, which took 
a leap from being the smallest party in the parliament to becoming the third 
largest party. It gained 15 percentage points under the leadership of the 
increasingly popular party leader Timo Soini. Table 5.3 shows that the True Finns 
was the only parliamentary party to gain support and the volatility in the 2011 
election was the highest since 1945 when the Communists were allowed to run 
candidates again in elections. 
 The 2003 and 2007 elections continued largely on the track set in the elections 
in the 1990s with the SDP, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party dominating. 
In contrast, the 2011 election was a ‘big bang election’. The Centre Party lost 
almost a third of its electoral support in 2011 and also other main parties suffered 
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electoral losses. It has been estimated that the share of floating voters rose by 12 
percentage points from the 2007 election (Borg 2012b, 131).  
 
Table 5.3 The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2011. Source Statistics 
Finland 2011b. 
 
Party 2011 
± change between 
2007 and 2011 
    Elections 
National Coalition Party  20.4 −1.9 
Social Democratic Party  19.1 −2.3 
True Finns 19.1 +15.0 
Centre Party 15.8 −7.3 
Left Alliance 8.1 −0.7 
Green League 7.3 −1.2 
Swedish People's Party 4.3 −0.3 
Christian Democrats 4.0 −0.9 
Non-parliamentary parties 2.0 −0.5 
All 100 
  
 
Due to the shocking electoral result, the formation of government was difficult. 
As there did not emerge a solution where the True Finns could have entered the 
government, a compromise was found between six losers of the 2011 election. 
The Coalition Party (as the Prime Minister party), the Social Democratic Party, 
the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian 
Democrats formed a coalition that was unseen in terms of ideological distances 
between the parties (Grönlund & Westinen 2012). Only the Centre Party and the 
True Finns were left in the opposition. Due to the difficulties in governmental co-
operation the Left Alliance and the Greens left the government in 2014. It is 
highly possible that the electoral breakthrough of the True Finns Party has 
changed dynamics in the Finnish cleavage structure since it gathered a substantial 
amount of votes from the Social Democrats, the Centre Party as well as from the 
National Coalition Party (see Suhonen 2011). 
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5.2. Social structural position, values and attitudes and party 
choice  
The following subchapters deal with the fourth research question:  ‘What is the 
effect of social structural position on voters’ party choice?’ (RQ4a) and ‘Do those 
social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other, 
have an effect on voting for a particular party?’ (RQ4b). Subchapters 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2 are more descriptive and focus on the relationship between social structural 
positions, values and attitudes and party choice separately in each election. 
Subchapter 5.3 extracts the party choice effects with merged data by deploying 
logistic regression.  
 
5.2.1 Social structural position and party choice 
The chapter at hand focuses on the relationship between social structural position 
and party choice and assesses the three parliamentary elections in 2003–2011 
separately. The purpose is to find out whether the relationship has been steady or 
whether there have been major fluctuations in the party loyalties of social 
structural groups in 2003–2011. An important requirement of a stable cleavage is 
that the exchange of votes across social structural groups should be low i.e. the 
ties between a social structural group and its party preferences should be solid 
(e.g. Bartolini & Mair 1990; Franklin 2010). Group-party-linkages can be 
extracted when a certain social group concentrates votes for a certain party. 
However, if the loyalty of this social structural group fluctuates between several 
parties in over time it puts into question whether the social structural base can 
serve as a steady cleavage base (ibid. 652; cf. Evans ed. 1999). On the other hand, 
we cannot be sure whether a shift in support to another party in highly volatile 
elections is just a short-term ‘earthquake’ effect or whether it is the starting point 
of a more long-lasting realignment, which builds new party loyalties along social 
structural lines. This is especially relevant in this study since the 2011 election 
was the most volatile in the Finnish electoral history after 1945. The enormous 
electoral win (+15.0 percentage points) of the True Finns in 2011 caused an 
almost unseen shift in votes. 
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Tables 5.4–5.6 illustrate the electoral support of the Finnish parliamentary parties 
among social structural groups in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. Voters who 
voted a non-parliamentary party are excluded from the analyses (N=24 in 2003, 
N=13 in 2007, N=17 in 2011). Pearson’s Chi square test indicates whether the 
observed differences in voting patterns between social structural groups are 
statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6). For the purposes of the analysis, 
the data is weighted with language weight (according to the proportion of 
Finnish- and Swedish-speaking respondents) and with election result weight 
(according to the popularity of the parliamentary parties in each parliamentary 
election).89 These weights were combined into one weight.  
 Table 5.4 shows how the votes have been distributed to different parties 
among social structural groups that form the old cleavage bases. These groups are 
based on native language, the type of residential area and occupational class. 
First, the relationship between native language and party choice is accompanied 
by overwhelmingly the biggest Chi square -value in each year (see Appendix 
Table 6). Few Swedish-speaking voters vote for the Finnish-speaking parties and 
even fewer Finnish-speaking voters vote for the sole Swedish-speaking party, the 
Swedish People’s Party. The party receives roughly 70 per cent of the votes of the 
Swedish-speaking voters, which shows that the tie between the linguistic minority 
and the party that represents first and foremost the interests of the linguistic 
minority is extremely strong. The Social Democratic Party has been the second 
most popular choice among Finnish-Swedes: it has represented a non-bourgeois 
alternative to the Swedish People’s Party. Other than that, the Finnish-speaking 
parties have had a restricted appeal among Swedish-speaking voters although the 
Coalition Party has been a threat for the Swedish People’s Party in the bilingual 
urban areas in Southern Finland and the Christian Democrats has challenged the 
Swedish People’s Party in the conservative and religious Ostrobothnia-region. 
(see Bengtsson et al. 2005, 105; Sundberg 2006b, 83, 92; Westinen 2011, 168.)   
 
                                                            
89 As the samples in 2003 and 2007 contained an oversample of Swedish-speaking people, language 
weight was crucial to be deployed instead of using other weights on sociodemographic variables. 
With multiple (>2) variables in a combined weight, there is a risk of having extremely large case 
weights. 
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Table 5.4.The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups 
based on native language, type of residential area and occupational class in the 
2003–2011 parliamentary elections (1). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
 
Year Social structural position Party choice                 
  Native language  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Finnish 26 27 20 10 2 9 6 1 100 (821) 
2007 
 
23 25 24 10 4 9 5 1 100 (992) 
2011 
 
20 17 22 9 20 8 4 1 100 (954) 
2003 Swedish 11 6 6 4 0 2 4 67 100 (49) 
2007 
 
8 3 5 2 1 5 3 73 100 (60) 
2011   12 0 4 6 4 4 2 68 100 (50) 
  Type of residential area  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Rural municipality 17 47 14 7 1 4 3 7 100 (154) 
2007 
 
16 41 13 9 4 6 6 4 100 (207) 
2011   12 36 12 8 19 1 5 7 100 (154) 
2003 Small municipality 26 35 10 13 1 4 5 5 100 (148) 
2007 
 
24 35 14 8 6 3 4 6 100 (182) 
2011 
 
20 21 16 6 23 4 3 7 100 (181) 
2003 Town 29 19 22 11 1 8 6 4 100 (358) 
2007 
 
25 19 23 11 5 9 5 4 100 (431) 
2011   24 12 24 9 18 7 4 2 100 (472) 
2003 Metropolitan area 24 13 24 9 4 14 6 5 100 (225) 
2007 
 
19 9 37 7 3 16 3 6 100 (234) 
2011   13 6 25 10 18 16 6 6 100 (196) 
  Occupational class SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Blue-collar workers 36 24 12 16 2 4 5 1 100 (211) 
2007 
 
36 24 7 16 6 4 4 3 100 (257) 
2011 
 
32 13 8 12 28 3 2 2 100 (190) 
2003 Routine non-manual 29 20 14 12 3 8 9 4 100 (161) 
2007 Employees 25 21 21 9 5 8 9 4 100 (199) 
2011   24 15 14 10 24 4 7 3 100 (220) 
2003 Entrepreneurs   9 63 14 1 2 1 4 5 100 (97) 
2007 (incl. agricultural)  8 52 22 5 4 4 2 3 100 (99) 
2011 
 
11 50 11 5 9 4 5 5 100 (56) 
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Table 5.4 The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups 
based on native language, type of residential area and occupational class in the 
2003–2011 parliamentary elections (2). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
 
Year Social structural position Party choice                 
  Occupational class SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Lower professionals 31 13 21 10 2 12 5 7 100 (121) 
2007 
 
20 27 27 6 3 7 5 5 100 (155) 
2011   16 21 22 7 16 9 5 5 100 (153) 
2003 Higher professionals  20 18 33 8 0 10 4 7 100 (186) 
2007 and managers 13 15 39 7 3 13 3 7 100 (262) 
2011   11 14 33 9 12 10 5 6 100 (211) 
2003 All 25 26 19 10 2 8 6 5 100 (885) 
2007 All 22 24 23 9 4 9 5 5 100 (1052) 
2011 All 19 16 21 8 19 7 4 4 100 (1002) 
 
 
Appendix Tables 7–9 shows that the electorates of all the Finnish-speaking 
parties are almost entirely Finnish-speaking. In turn, the Swedish-speaking voters 
constitute over 80 per cent of the electorate of the Swedish People’s Party. The 
remaining voters of the Swedish People’s Party have almost always a close linkage 
to Swedish-speaking community, i.e. they have Finnish as native language but 
they are bilingual and/or have a spouse whose native language is Swedish. All 
Finnish-speaking parties, with the exception of True Finns, have a Swedish-
speaking party organization and some attempts have been made to get votes from 
the Finnish-Swedes. Also the Swedish People’s Party has tried to appeal to the 
Finnish-speaking majority by trying to reach all voters who are for bilingual 
Finland (Paloheimo 2008.) Both the attempts have been without significant 
results as the results show in Table 5.4.  
 The party support is unevenly distributed also along the two other old social 
structural cleavage bases, namely the type of residential area and occupational 
class, indicated by the fairly high Chi Square -values in Appendix Table 6. The 
Centre Party has the most skewed support in terms of the type of residential area. 
Following its agrarian roots, the Centre Party has been by far the most popular 
party in rural municipalities. However, the 2011 election marked a decrease 
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especially in the loyalty of residents in small municipalities towards the Centre 
Party. The support of the Centre Party is especially low in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area. 
 The electorates of the Coalition Party and the Green League follow the 
opposite pattern: their electoral support is the higher the more urban/densely 
populated the living environment is. This pattern dates long back in the case of 
the Coalition Party (see e.g. Rantala 1970 on the formation of the Finnish 
electoral geography in 1907–1958). T2he relatively young party Green League 
(formed in 1987) has had an especially urban electorate. Furthermore, it is 
particularly strong in the metropolitan area. In a similar vein, the Social 
Democrats have higher support in urban environments than in rural ones 
whereas the True Finns, the Left Alliance, the Christian Democrats and the 
Swedish People’s Party have an evenly distributed support in different types of 
residential areas. 
 The distinctiveness of the Centre Party’s electorate becomes even more 
apparent in Appendix Table 7–9. Roughly every third voter of the Centre Party 
lives in a rural municipality. Voters in the Helsinki metropolitan area, in turn, 
constitute a large part of the electorates of the Green League and the Coalition 
Party.  
 Occupational class divides the electorates of different parties into four 
categories. First, the two left-wing parties, the Social Democrats and Left Alliance, 
as well as the True Finns, have their highest support among blue-collar workers. 
Notably, the traditional popularity of the SDP among blue-collar workers, which 
constitutes one of the pillars in the triangular model (Nousiainen 1970), has not 
eroded drastically in 2003–2011. Rather, the support of the Social Democrats has 
decreased more among the upper classes: the lower professionals and higher 
professionals and managers. The case of the True Finns, in turn, follows a general 
pattern in Western Europe: workers have become the core clientele of nationalist-
populist parties in many West European countries (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 
422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 21–25). Workers in traditional 
industries have felt that their jobs and wages are threatened and when, for 
instance, the labor unions have not been able to guard the interests of the 
working class, the appeal of nationalist-populist parties has grown (see Harvey 
2010, 150; Paloheimo 2012, 327). 
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However, the True Finns became popular not only among blue-collar workers in 
2011, but also among the routine non-manual employees. Among these voters, 
the SDP is somewhat less popular than it is among blue-collar workers, while the 
right-wing Coalition Party finds higher support than among blue-collar workers. 
The Christian Democrats is the only party that has higher support among routine 
non-manual employees than among any other occupational class. However, the 
N is small in the case of Christian Democrats. At any case, it is not a strongly 
class-based party.  
 The party preferences of blue-collar workers and routine non-manual 
employees are hence somewhat similar but not identical. The results are in line 
with the results found on class identification. As such, blue-collar workers 
identify themselves to a greater extent with the working-class and vote for left-
wing parties to a greater extent than routine non-manual employees. In addition, 
Appendix Tables 7–9 show that the Left Alliance relied heavily on the support of 
blue-collar workers in the 2003 and 2007 elections, while the share of blue collar 
workers in the 2011 election decreased. The party has indeed taken steps toward a 
profile of a red-green party instead of a proletarian working-class party (see 
Westinen 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). 
 Due to small N problems, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers 
had to be merged to a combined group of entrepreneurs in Table 5.4. In the 
upcoming chapter 5.3 where the effect of cleavage elements on party choice is 
analyzed with logistic regression, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small 
employers form their own categories as the merging of 2003, 2007 and 2011 
datasets leads to larger N and larger group sizes allow treating them as separate 
groups. Unsurprisingly, the agricultural entrepreneurs tend to support the Centre 
Party, which is why the Centre Party is by far the most popular party among 
agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers in Table 5.4. The farmer heritage 
of the Centre Party is hence still strongly present, following the logics of the 
triangular model (Nousiainen 1970). Otherwise, the Centre Party is supported 
quite evenly in the occupational classes. The second most popular party among 
entrepreneurs is the National Coalition Party, which has traditionally had 
entrepreneurship as one of its main topics (Westinen 2011, 35).   
 Lower professionals, i.e. for example nurses and technicians, cannot be 
defined as any party’s core electoral group. Moreover, the support of main 
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parties, such as the SDP and the Centre Party, has fluctuated much in this 
particular class, which implies that there is a high number of floating voters 
among lower professionals. The patterns in the party preferences of the lower 
professionals also reflect the fact that the lower professionals have identified 
themselves the most with the vast middle class, which has no clear trustee party 
over other parties. Thus, it seems that there is no particular ‘party of the middle 
class’ in the Finnish party system.  
 In contrast, the voting patterns of higher professionals and managers are more 
stable, predictable and distinctive. They support to a great extent the National 
Coalition Party, which has traditionally been the representative of the upper 
classes and business life, and has advocated the interests of well-off people 
(Paloheimo 2008). These ties represent the third corner of the triangular model. 
Moreover, the Green League also receives higher support among higher 
professionals and managers than among any other occupational class. This 
pattern also applies to the Swedish People’s Party, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Appendix Tables 7–9 indicate that the Coalition Party, especially, leans heavily 
on the support of higher professionals and managers. 
 The electoral ties between occupational classes and parties are in line with the 
theoretical frame. Each corner of the triangular model is still valid in terms of 
party-voter ties, although since the amount of agricultural entrepreneurs and 
blue-collar workers has decreased, so too has their political importance. The 
success of the True Finns has meant that the dominant position of the Social 
Democrats among blue-collar workers and also routine non-manual employees 
has become challenged. The Centre Party has not faced such a challenge over the 
loyalties of agricultural entrepreneurs, nor has the Coalition Party among higher 
professionals and managers. Moreover, especially due to the farmers’ special 
position, the class conflict cannot be simplified into a bipolar setting between 
blue-collar workers and higher professionals. However, due to their share in the 
electorate, the most notable clash evolves between blue-collar workers voting for 
a left-wing party or the True Finns and higher professionals and managers voting 
especially for the major right-wing party, the National Coalition Party.  
 Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show how the votes have been distributed to different 
parties among groups that are based on denomination, gender, age cohorts and 
education and that form potentially new cleavages. Denomination does not cause 
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particularly much variation in party choice. Nevertheless, the differences in party 
choice between Evangelic Lutherans and those who do not belong to church are 
statistically significant, as indicated in Appendix Table 6.  
 The electorates of the parties can be divided into three groups. First, the 
Centre Party, the Coalition Party, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish 
People’s Party have higher support among those who belong to the main church 
than among those who are not church members. These parties have been 
regarded as bourgeois or center-right parties (Paloheimo 2007). However, 
denomination would cause more variation in party choice, if the members of 
revivalist movements could be detected from the data. Despite the diversity of 
revivalist movements, their members generally tend to back either the Centre 
Party or the Christian Democrats. The Centre Party has an especially strong, 
conservatively-orientated Laestadian voter segment. (Jutila 2003.) Christian 
Democrats on the other hand relies relatively speaking more on other Christian 
churches, such as the Evangelical Free Church of Finland and the Pentecostal 
Church (Salomäki 2010). However, the N of these groups, for example, does not 
allow treating them as their own category even though they are a clear target 
group for the Christian Democrats.  
 Second, the Social Democrats and the True Finns (in 2011) have had higher 
support among non-church members than among the members of the main 
church. However, the differences are not striking. Third, the electoral support of 
the Green League and especially the Left Alliance is substantially higher among 
non-denominational voters than among main church members. Both of these 
parties have been openly critical about the status of religion in society (Westinen 
2011, 69–70). Appendix Tables 7–9 show that over 40 percent of the analyzed 
Left Alliance voters do not belong to the church. 
 Thus, the division has not gone that far away from the early days of Finnish 
democracy when clerical disputes revolved between non-socialists, who valued 
religiosity, and atheist socialists. Nevertheless, the importance of religion in 
society has decreased a lot and the nature of clerical disputes has changed. 
Nowadays, the disputes revolve more around the value basis that the church 
represents (Paastela 2006; Mykkänen 2012). However, the case of the True Finns 
does not fit to the traditionalist bourgeois versus secular red-green divide. The 
party has propagated for the traditional pillars in Finnish society with religion 
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being one of them and it has stated that its value basis revolves around the 
doctrines of Christianity (Westinen 2011, 68). Despite this, the vote share of the 
True Finns has been greater among non-confessional voters than among main 
church members, in contrast to the Centre Party, Coalition Party, Swedish 
People’s Party and Christian Democrats, as indicated by Table 5.5. 
   
Table 5.5 The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups 
based on denomination and gender in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections. 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
 
  Denomination  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Evangelic-Lutheran 24 28 21 8 2 8 4 5 100 (738) 
2007 
 
22 27 24 7 4 8 5 5 100 (838) 
2011 
 
19 19 23 6 17 7 4 5 100 (773) 
2003 Does not belong  35 9 11 30 0 13 1 2 100 (101) 
2007 to any church 26 11 19 22 4 12 2 3 100 (175) 
2011   21 7 14 19 25 12 1 1 100 (194) 
  Gender  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Male 26 26 21 11 1 8 4 4 100 (427) 
2007 
 
24 24 24 11 5 6 3 4 100 (522) 
2011 
 
21 17 21 7 23 5 3 4 100 (506) 
2003 Female 25 25 18 10 2 9 7 5 100 (453) 
2007 
 
20 24 22 8 3 12 7 5 100 (532) 
2011   18 16 20 10 16 10 6 5 100 (496) 
2003 All 25 25 19 10 2 8 6 5 100 (880) 
2007 All 22 24 23 9 4 9 5 5 100 (1052) 
2011 All 19 16 21 8 19 7 4 4 100 (1002) 
 
 
The social structural variable causing the smallest differences in party support is 
gender. In the 2003 election the differences in gender-based voting behavior were 
so small that they were statistically insignificant. In the 2007 and 2011 elections, 
however, they are statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6). Table 5.5 shows 
that some parties have constantly had a higher support among men than among 
women or vice versa. The Green League is the most striking case in 2007 and 
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2011. It had twice as much support from women than among men; women 
constitute two thirds of the electorate of the Greens (see Appendix Tables 7–9). 
The same patterns apply to the Christian Democrats, which in terms of feminist 
interests represents the opposite of the Greens. It can be argued that the case of 
the Christian Democrats resembles the gender-based voting behavior that 
dominated the past when women were more likely to vote for the conservative 
forces than men (Knutsen 2004b). The Green League, on the other hand, is an 
example of things turning around: the women’s support for green or red-green 
parties has been seen in the light of emancipation; gaining a more equal status for 
women in society (Giger 2009; Barisione 2014). The Left Alliance has not 
however, despite the exception in the 2011 election, been able to appeal to 
women in any greater extent than to men despite feminist nuances in its party 
platform (see Westinen 2011, 69). 
 The True Finns is the only party that shows signs of being clearly more 
popular among men than among women. This evidence lies of course only to the 
2011 election, where the N of True Finns voters is large enough. More 
importantly, the True Finns has been male-dominated as a party, as regards to 
the party elite (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014) and it has advocated 
patriarchal views of society (Ruostetsaari 2011). Men have also voted for the 
Social Democrats to a slightly greater extent than women, but the difference is 
not dramatic. The Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish 
People’s Party have received almost equal electoral support from men and 
women over time. Hence, the electoral gender gap seems to concern mainly the 
female-dominated electorates of the Greens and the Christian Democrats and the 
male-dominated True Finns (in 2011).  
 Of the other new suggestions for cleavage bases, age cohorts and education are 
related with more unevenly distributed party support in comparison to gender. 
However, there are only two parties whose electoral support either increases or 
decreases systematically when moving from one age cohort to another. Table 5.6 
shows that the Social Democratic Party has been roughly twice as popular among 
the oldest generation (born before 1945) than among the youngest generation 
(born after 1975).  
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Table 5.6 The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups 
based on age cohorts and education in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections.  
  Age cohorts  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 -1944 33 25 20 10 1 2 6 5 100 (241) 
2007 
 
30 23 27 8 1 2 4 5 100 (333) 
2011   25 19 26 5 16 1 3 6 100 (232) 
2003 1945-1959 28 26 17 14 1 5 5 5 100 (261) 
2007 
 
24 24 19 14 2 6 7 4 100 (306) 
2011 
 
20 16 20 11 20 3 6 4 100 (301) 
2003 1960-1975 21 25 19 10 3 13 6 4 100 (232) 
2007 
 
15 27 23 6 8 13 5 4 100 (230) 
2011   19 13 18 8 23 10 5 4 100 (249) 
2003 1976- 12 25 24 6 3 16 7 6 100 (148) 
2007 
 
14 22 22 8 8 19 3 5 100 (186) 
2011   14 17 19 9 19 17 1 4 100 (222) 
 
Education SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All (N) 
2003 Primary 33 30 10 14 3 2 6 3 100 (228) 
2007 
 
28 20 18 10 6 11 3 5 100 (253) 
2011 
 
22 15 17 9 21 7 3 6 100 (198) 
2003 Vocational 30 30 12 11 3 6 5 2 100 (218) 
2007 
 
26 30 14 13 4 5 7 3 100 (325) 
2011   21 18 13 12 25 3 6 3 100 (266) 
2003 Upper Secondary 21 20 25 8 1 13 6 6 100 (264) 
2007 
 
20 24 30 4 6 6 5 5 100 (242) 
2011 
 
24 15 20 7 21 7 3 4 100 (257) 
2003 Polytechnic 14 13 44 7 0 10 4 7 100 (70) 
2007 
 
16 21 33 5 4 13 3 7 100 (77) 
2011   14 23 32 4 12 10 2 4 100 (104) 
2003 University 16 27 26 5 0 12 5 9 100 (98) 
2007 
 
11 18 33 10 1 15 5 8 100 (158) 
2011   12 11 34 8 11 15 6 5 100 (179) 
2003 All 25 25 19 10 2 8 6 5 100 (880) 
2007 All 22 24 23 9 4 9 5 5 100 (1052) 
2011 All 19 16 21 8 19 7 4 4 100 (1002) 
 
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011. 
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The Greens, in contrast to the SDP, has marginal support in the oldest 
generation, whereas it has been among the most popular parties in the youngest 
generation. It can be evaluated that these patterns have partly to do with 
socialization effects. When the members of the oldest generation became eligible 
to vote, the Social Democratic Party was the main driving political force in 
Finland (along with the Agrarian League). Older generations, therefore, have 
found it difficult to identify with the Greens. The Green League (that has existed 
for less than 30 years) has promoted new kinds of interests reflecting the 
postmaterialist ideals, which have only entered the political sphere rather late in 
Finland.   
 Besides the SDP, the Coalition Party has also had the highest support in the 
oldest age cohort. The electoral support of the Centre Party, the True Finns, the 
Left Alliance, the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democrats has 
fluctuated more within the different generations – their support is not 
systematically skewed to any generation.  
 Lastly, the differences in the party choice of educational groups are smaller 
than those of occupational class, which is the other status variable. Those with a 
primary or vocational education have similar voting patterns. They tend to vote 
more for the Social Democrats and the True Finns (in 2011); both these parties 
have more limited support among those with higher education (polytechnic or 
university level). None of the parties dominates among those with an upper-
secondary level education, likewise as none of the parties dominates among lower 
professionals. Those with a higher education (polytechnic or university level 
education) deviate from the other educational groups in voting for the Coalition 
Party and the Green League to a greater extent. However, even though the Green 
parties have been regarded as the parties of the highly educated (see Stubager 
2009) the Green League has had substantial support in single elections among 
those with the lowest level of education or a middle-level education. As such, the 
support of the party is not raised according to the level of a respondent’s 
education.  
 The support of the Centre Party, the Left Alliance, the Christian Democrats 
and the Swedish People’s Party is not strongly skewed to either low-educated or 
highly educated groups. It is notable, however, that the electorates of all these 
four parties had more distinctive features in terms of occupational class. To 
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conclude, education does not lead to as clear-cut settings between voter groups 
and their trustee parties as occupational class. It does however pit the lower-
educated, who support the True Finns and the Social Democrats, against the 
higher educated, who support the Coalition Party especially and also the Green 
League.  
 To conclude, the groups that are based on the old social structural bases, 
native language, type of residential area and occupational class, seem to have 
more distinct voting patterns than the groups that are based on potential new 
cleavage bases. There are clear-lined patterns in voting behavior based on social 
structural positions. However, it is important to detect the relative impact of a 
social structural position on party choice when all the social structural variables 
and value/attitudinal dimensions are put in the same model as explanatory 
variables of party choice. This is done in subchapter 5.3. Before moving on to 
that, the next subchapter explores how the voters of different parties are 
positioned in the value/attitudinal dimensions.  
 
5.2.2 Value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice 
In this subchapter the focus is shifted from social structural positions and party 
choice to value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice. It is discovered how and 
how much the electorates of the parties differentiate from each other in the four 
identified value/attitudinal dimensions in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. The 
identified dimensions include the economic right and authority, regional and 
socioeconomic equality, sociocultural and European Union dimensions. It is 
important to extract how stable the value/attitudinal orientations are within the 
electorates of each party. The aim is to characterize the value/attitudinal 
differences between the voters at a more descriptive level before treating both 
social structural positions and values and attitudes in logistic regression models. 
 Table 5.7 indicates the mean positions for the voters of each parliamentary 
party in the dimensions (principal component scores) and the related standard 
error. In addition, a one-way variance analysis is deployed.  
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Table 5.7 The mean positions of the voters by party choice in the value/attitudinal 
dimensions in 2003–2011. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.  
 
Year Dimension Party choice                 
    SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All F 
            2003 Economic –0.10 0.04 0.44 –0.71 0.09 –0.66 0.34 0.41 –0.02 13.7*** 
 
right and (.08) (.07) (.08) (.12) (.23) (.18) (.14) (.18) (.04) 
 2007 authority –0.38 0.33 0.51 –0.58 –0.06 –0.76 –0.10 0.12 –0.01 26.8*** 
  
(.08) (.06) (.06) (.12) (.13) (.13) (.14) (.16) (.04) 
 2011 
 
–0.28 0.29 0.36 –0.80 0.13 –0.57 0.63 0.44 0.02 16.8*** 
  
(.10) (.08) (.08) (.14) (.09) (.13) (.12) (.18) (.04) 
 2003 Regional and  0.04 0.35 –0.62 0.23 –0.09 –0.11 0.09 –0.11 –0.01 10.4*** 
 
socio- (.08) (.08) (.10) (.12) (.37) (.14) (.12) (.20) (.04) 
 2007 economic 0.29 0.28 –0.77 0.49 0.23 –0.44 0.22 –0.47 –0.04 27.6*** 
 
equality (.06) (.06) (.08) (.10) (.14) (.14) (.16) (.16) (.04) 
 2011 
 
0.26 0.33 –0.31 0.22 –0.14 –0.34 0.14 0.09 0.02 6.0*** 
    (.08) (.11) (.09) (.16) (.10) (.13) (.18) (.22) (.04)   
2003 Socio- –0.23 0.03 0.02 –0.17 –0.35 0.49 0.46 0.65 0.02 6.0*** 
 
cultural (.07) (.08) (.09) (.14) (.32) (.15) (.19) (.20) (.04) 
 2007 
 
0.08 –0.13 –0.35 –0.04 –0.49 0.55 0.12 0.20 –0.05 7.7*** 
  
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.14) (.18) (.13) (.15) (.15) (.04) 
 2011 
 
0.08 –0.14 –0.07 0.33 –0.65 0.89 0.08 0.59 –0.02 16.1*** 
  
(.09) (.09) (.08) (.15) (.09) (.12) (.19) (.22) (.04) 
 2003 European  0.29 –0.25 0.33 0.01 –0.79 –0.06 –0.50 0.38 0.05 8.0*** 
 
Union (.07) (.08) (.09) (.12) (.47) (.14) (.20) (.18) (.04) 
 2007 
 
0.30 –0.09 0.49 –0.21 –0.74 –0.11 –0.38 0.39 0.09 13.2*** 
  
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.14) (.18) (.13) (.16) (.15) (.04) 
 2011 
 
0.15 0.17 0.65 –0.33 –0.69 0.17 –0.57 0.60 0.05 22.5*** 
  
(.08) (.10) (.08) (.12) (.10) (.13) (.21) (.20) (.04)   
2003 (N) (149) (150) (113) (60) (7) (49) (32) (28) (588) 
 2007 (N) (156) (177) (170) (69) (31) (65) (37) (35) (739) 
 2011 (N) (116) (100) (123) (50) (104) (45) (26) (21) (600)   
 
Note: The bold figures indicate the mean positions and the figures in the parentheses represent the standard 
error of the mean. The mean score for each principal components (column “All”) is not exactly 0 as the 
respondents who voted for a non-parliamentary party or did not vote at all are excluded from these analyses (in 
contrast to the principal component analysis in chapter 4.3). 
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The F-test shows whether the group means are equal or not, that is, whether there 
are statistically significant differences in the positions of voters in the dimension 
at hand. The F-values are not totally comparable inside each dimension or 
between dimensions due to the different amount of questions and different kinds 
of questions in the dimensions. However, Table 5.7 shows that the differences 
between the parties’ electorates became more distinctive in the sociocultural and 
European Union dimensions in the 2011 election. Indeed, the EU-issues and 
minority and immigration issues were highly politicized in the 2011 election (see 
Borg 2012d, Grönlund & Westinen 2012). As the Table 5.7 includes plenty of 
information, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the mean positions of the voters of each 
party in each dimension in 2003–2011. 
 First, the economic right and authority dimension pits the voters of the Left 
Alliance, the Green League and the SDP against the Coalition Party, the Christian 
Democrats, the Centre Party and the Swedish People’s Party. The True Finns is 
the only party whose voters are not positioned on either side in the economic 
right and authority dimension, as illustrated by Figure 5.1. This division indicates 
basically a red-green vs. center-right divide. The voters of the True Finns do not 
fit into this division because they are not strongly in favor of entrepreneurship, a 
market economy and lower taxation, although they show support for the respect 
of authority and traditional moral values (cf. Kitcschelt 1995). These attributes 
cancel each other out in this dimension.  
 The voters of the Green League and the Left Alliance show the steadiest and 
strongest patterns regarding anti-authority and anti-economic right attitudes. 
The Social Democrats are a milder version of this value/attitudinal location. The 
ideals of the economic right and respect for authority and tradition are, in turn, 
the strongest in the electorate of the National Coalition Party. Also the voters of 
the Swedish People’s Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party have 
been somewhat right-wing minded in this dimension.  
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Regional and socio- 
economic equality + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional and socio- 
economic equality  
 
 
           Economic right                  Economic right 
           and authority –                     and authority +  
  
Figure 5.1 The mean positions of the voters of different parties in the economic 
right and authority and the regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions 
(principal components). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011  
 
 
The regional and socioeconomic equality dimension in turn sets the voters 
against each other in another manner, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The voters of 
the Centre Party and the Left Alliance (and to a lesser extent also the voters of the 
SDP and the Christian Democrats) defend regional and socioeconomic equality, 
while the voters of the National Coalition Party and the Green League do not 
promote them eagerly. The positions of the voters of the Coalition Party, Centre 
Party and Left Alliance are the most distinctive in this dimension. The voters of 
the True Finns and the Swedish People’s Party (with the clear exception in 2007) 
do not have a clear stand in issues attached to regional and socioeconomic 
equality.  
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Hence, unlike the economic right and authority dimension, this dimension does 
not set the voters of red-green parties and center-right parties against each other. 
Rather, those voters who want to eagerly promote regional and socioeconomic 
equality vote for the parties that have defended social and geographical 
peripheries. Concerns over socioeconomic issues have been especially important 
for the voters of the Left Alliance and the SDP, while concern over 
decentralization issues have been important for the voters of the Centre Party 
(Mickelsson 2006; Paloheimo 2008). The other end is represented by the voters of 
the National Coalition Party and the Green League. The voters of these parties 
are primarily urban and often have a high social status, as noted in subchapter 
5.2.1. Hence, it makes sense that they do not have a first-hand concern for 
regional and socioeconomic equality.  
 The positions of the parties’ voters in the two first dimensions also relates to 
the traditional polarization in left-right terms. The voters of the Left Alliance and 
the SDP more systematically oppose the issues associated with the political right 
and promote the issues associated with the political left; the voters of the 
Coalition Party more systematically oppose the issues associated with the political 
left and promote the issues associated with the political right.  
 The sociocultural dimension, in turn, sets the voters of the Green League and 
the Swedish People’s Party who are for the rights of the sexual and ethnic 
minorities, immigration, and environmental protection against the voters of the 
True Finns who are anti-minority, anti-immigration and anti-environmentalist. 
This is illustrated distinctively in Figure 5.2. The voters of these three parties have 
had the most clear-cut positions in the dimension in 2003–2011, while the 
positions of the voters of other parties have fluctuated more. It should be noticed 
that the voters of the three biggest parties in the 21st century, the SDP, the Centre 
Party and the Coalition Party, are largely outside the sociocultural conflicts. 
These old parties have been either internally split or they have avoided 
emphasizing the issues that are attached to the sociocultural dimension (Jutila 
2003; Paloheimo 2006; Westinen 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that their 
voters do not have distinctive positions in the sociocultural dimension (with the 
exception of the voters of the Coalition Party being against postmaterialist values 
in 2007, see Table 5.7).  
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Union – 
 
                            Sociocultural diversity and           Sociocultural diversity and                     
     postmaterialism –              postmaterialism + 
                      
Figure 5.2 The mean positions of the voters of different parties in the sociocultural 
and the European Union dimensions (principal components). Source: FNES 2003, 
2007, 2011 
 
 
Furthermore, the positions of the Left Alliance -voters and Christian Democrats 
have fluctuated in the sociocultural dimension throughout the period. One 
reason for this might be that in 2003 the dimension did not include a question on 
sexual minorities, on which the Christian Democrats has had a conservative 
position (see Table 5.7). The electorate of the Left Alliance was more 
postmaterialist in 2011 than before, which matches the party’s nuanced red-green 
profile (see Westinen 2011). 
 In light of the above, the sociocultural dimension sets the voters of the most 
liberal parties (the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party) against the voters of a 
nationalist-populist party (the True Finns). The tension between the voters of the 
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Green League and the True Finns is the most prominent with regard to sexual 
minorities, immigration and environmental protection. In turn, the disputes 
between the voters of the Swedish People’s Party and the True Finns voters 
revolve mainly around minority issues at large, and more specifically around the 
position of the Swedish language in Finnish society.   
 In the European Union dimension, the dividing lines of the 1994 referendum 
on EU membership can still be seen in the electorate. Figure 5.2 shows that the 
most pro-EU electorates are the ones of the Coalition Party, the Swedish People’s 
Party and the Social Democratic Party (with the slight exception of 2011), while 
the most anti-EU electorates are the ones of the True Finns and the Christian 
Democrats. 
 The electorates that were most split on EU-membership in the referendum in 
1994 are still split. However, the voters of the Centre Party have seemingly shifted 
toward a more pro-EU position, as indicated in Table 5.7, which might be 
entangled with the fact that the Centre Party was a Prime Minister party in 2003–
2011 and had to take a more positive approach toward EU integration 
(Paloheimo 2008). The voters of the Left Alliance, in turn, have become more 
critical toward the EU in 2007 and 2011. The voters of the Green League have not 
been strongly positioned at either end of the dimension, which also reflects the 
conflicting views inside the party over the benefits of the EU and EU-integration 
(Paloheimo 2000; Westinen 2011).  
 The EU dimension deviates from the other dimensions in terms of which 
voters it sets against each other. This is the only dimension where the voters of 
the Coalition Party and the Social Democratic Party are clearly on the same side. 
Furthermore, the electoral supremacy of the pro-EU parties has been clear in 
relation to the anti-EU parties before the 2011 election. Accordingly, there has 
been room for a party to gather the anti-EU votes. In the 2011 election, on which 
Euro Crisis had much impact on, the True Finns managed to take advantage of 
the open party space at the anti-EU side (Borg 2012d; 2012e). There has also been 
room for a party in the Finnish party sphere to gather the anti-minority, anti-
immigration and nationalist voters (see Kestilä 2006). The True Finns managed 
to take advantage of this demand in the 2011 election, where sociocultural issues 
became increasingly politicized (Grönlund & Westinen 2012).  
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In general, the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic 
equality dimensions reflect the ‘old’ issues, and the sociocultural and EU 
dimensions reflect the ‘new’ issues. The analysis on the positions of the voters in 
these dimensions has shown that division to the voters of old parties (founded at 
the beginning of the 20th century) and to the voters of newer parties follows this 
pattern to some extent.  
 The voters of the Centre Party have more distinct positions in the ‘old’ 
dimensions. They are pro-authority and traditional moral values and for the 
issues associated with the economic right and they support regional and 
socioeconomic equality. However, they hold middle positions in the sociocultural 
and EU dimensions. In similar vein, the voters of the SDP do not have distinctive 
values and attitudes in the two new dimensions. They are against traditional 
authority and issues associated with the economic right, while simultaneously 
they are for regional and socioeconomic equality. The voters of the third large old 
party, the Coalition Party, have a distinctive profile. They are for the issues 
associated with the economic right and they do not show great support for 
regional and socioeconomic equality. In addition, they are the most Euro-
optimist voters and have hence acquired a clear position also in a new dimension.  
 The voters of the Left Alliance (which has its roots in the defunct Communist 
Party but which was founded only in 1990) have also more distinctive profile in 
the old dimensions. However, the 2011 election indicated that they might be on 
the move to become more orientated into the issues such as the rights of sexual 
and ethnic minorities due to their more distinctive position in the sociocultural 
dimension. Lastly, the voters of the Swedish People’s Party have the most 
distinctive profile in the sociocultural dimension mainly due to the sole ‘old’ issue 
in the dimension, namely the language issue. However, they are also liberally 
orientated more generally and they are also strongly for EU-integration. 
 The voters of the True Finns are extremely distinctive in the sociocultural and 
EU dimensions, while the old dimensions leave them close to the neutral middle 
positions. Hence, it can be said that that despite being founded as a successor 
party to the Finnish Rural Party the True Finns does not have that clear electoral 
profile in those issues that are attached to the old dimensions. In addition, the 
voters of the Green League are the most distinctive in the sociocultural 
dimension. In addition, they reject both the importance of promoting economic 
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right issues and the support of traditional authority; they also reject the 
importance of regional and socioeconomic equality. The voters of the Christian 
Democrats are an exception in the sense that they support both the economic 
right and authority issues and profile themselves in opposing the EU.  
 So far, the connection between voters’ social structural positions and party 
choice and voters’ values and attitudes and party choice have been analyzed at a 
descriptive level. These analyses have crystallized how a membership in a social 
structural group is associated with party choice and how the value/attitudinal 
profiles of the electorates of each party can be characterized. In addition, these 
analyses have illustrated which parties are set against each other on the basis of 
the structural positions and values/attitudes of the voters. These analyses have 
not, however, yet revealed the effect that social structural positions and values 
and attitudes have on party choice. For that purpose, the social structural 
positions and value/attitudinal dimensions are treated simultaneously as 
explanatory variables of party choice in logistic regression models in the next 
subchapter. On the basis of this analysis, it is concluded which conflicts can be 
treated as cleavages. 
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5.3 Bringing it together – cleavage-based voting  
5.3.1 The impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal 
dimensions on party choice. 
The effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice is 
detected by binary logistic regression. The odds ratios indicate whether belonging 
to a certain social structural group and whether having a certain value/attitudinal 
orientation increased or decreased the likelihood of voting for a certain party in 
the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections. The dependent variable is dummy-coded: 
1 indicates voting for a certain party and 0 stands for voting for any other 
parliamentary party. A pseudo R², Nagelkerke’s R², is used to evaluate the 
goodness-of-fit of the models.  
 As the relationship between social structural positions and party choice and 
value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice showed quite consistent patterns 
in the two previous subchapters, the following analyses are conducted by merging 
the FNES-data from 2003, 2007 and 2011 into single data. The analyses with 
merged/pooled data serve the goal of arriving at more general conclusions on the 
importance of social structural positions and values and attitudes in conditioning 
party choice in contemporary Finland. This also improves the reliability of the 
analyses, since the small-N problem for minor parties is less serious.   
 The analysis consists of six statistical models. Model 1 captures only the social 
structural variables without controlling for values and attitudes. In Models 2 to 5, 
each of the four value/attitudinal dimensions is added separately to the model 
that includes only social structural variables. These models indicate the effect of 
values and attitudes on party choice.  
 The main interest lies in a) detecting whether the members of a social 
structural group, with common values and attitudes, support a certain party and 
b) detecting whether these patterns constitute bipolar conflicts. If the social 
structural position and values/attitudes at hand have an effect on voting for a 
certain party and if there was a connection between the social structural position 
and values and attitudes in the linear regression analysis, then the effect of group 
membership on party choice is reinforced through common values and attitudes. 
An example of this would be that being an EU-sceptic and a resident in a rural 
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municipality would increase the likelihood of voting for a party advocating the 
interests at hand and in turn, being a resident in the Helsinki metropolitan area 
and being a supporter of the EU integration would increase the likelihood of 
voting for a party that advocates these interests (as relationship between the type 
of residential area and the EU dimension was found in chapter 4.4).  
 Model 6 finally brings all the variables into the same model and the focus is 
exclusively on the goodness-of-fit of the model (measured by Nagelkerke’s R²). 
The goodness-of-fit in Model 6 is compared to the goodness-of-fit in Model 1. 
The Nagelkerke’s R² value in Model 1 shows how well party choice can be 
explained with a model that includes social structural variables before the 
insertion of dimension variables in Models 2–5. Model 6 in turn shows how well 
party choice can be explained when all the variables are included. It indicates how 
much extra value values/attitudes add when explaining the likelihood of voting 
for a certain party over the others. In other words, their independent total effect 
is explored. Finally, it is concluded which political conflicts in Finland can be 
categorized as cleavages or possibly emerging cleavages.   
 The inclusion of both occupational class and educational level to same 
statistical models leads again to multicollienarity. Occupational class is more 
significant in explaining party choice. Hence, Table 5.8 shows the results of the 
logistic regression with occupational class included as a social status variable 
while Table 5.9 shows the impact of education on party choice with education 
included as a social status variable alongside the other variables. The effects of 
other social structural variables and values and attitudes on party choice stayed 
similar irrespective of which one of the social status variables was included in the 
models. Moreover, language had to be excluded as an explanatory factor 
(notwithstanding the Swedish People’s Party) as inclusion of it led to too large 
standard errors concerning the Finnish-speaking parties. As shown in Appendix 
Tables 7–9, the Swedish-speaking voters constituted roughly only 1 percent of the 
electorates of many parties. This means of course that the following models are 
not fully comparable between the Swedish People’s Party and other parties.  
 First, it is explored which social structural positions affect party choice the 
most in the electorate of each party when the value/attitudinal dimensions are 
not introduced. Table 5.8 contains the odds ratios associated with Model 1 (social 
structural variables). Also the odds ratios associated with the value/attitudinal 
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dimensions (Models 2–5) are shown in the table. This table clarifies the impact of 
social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice. 
Odds ratios larger than 1 indicate that having a certain social structural position 
or values/attitudes, increase the likelihood of voting for the party at hand instead 
of the others; odd ratios smaller than 1 indicate that having a certain social 
structural position or values/attitudes, decrease the likelihood of voting for the 
party at hand instead of the others, given that they are statistically significant. The 
parties are presented in party pairs in the following tables: the electorates of each 
pair are fairly similar in terms of social structural positions and/or values and 
attitudes affecting party choice. 
 Being a blue-collar worker or a routine non-manual employee, having an 
upper secondary level education and belonging to the second oldest generation 
all double the likelihood of voting for the Social Democratic Party rather than any 
other party. Moreover, having a primary or vocational level education and 
belonging to the oldest generation almost triple the likelihood of voting for the 
SDP. Being a blue-collar worker or routine non-manual employee also doubles 
the likelihood of voting for the True Finns rather than any other party and even 
stronger effects are found among educational groups in Table 5.9. Those with 
primary, vocational or upper secondary level education are much more likely to 
vote for the True Finns than those with university-level education. However, the 
True Finns deviates structurally from the SDP in the sense that the True Finns is 
largely neglected in the oldest age cohort: a voter born before 1945 is four times 
less (OR=0.27) likely to vote for the True Finns in comparison to all other parties. 
These patterns match with the party profiles: the SDP is an old party whose 
relatively old voters have been socialized into voting for the traditional socialist 
alternative, while the True Finns presents a new proletarian alternative.  
 Being a blue-collar worker increases the likelihood of voting for the Left 
Alliance in a similar fashion to the SDP and the True Finns (OR=2.21). However, 
the specialty in the social structural factors explaining a vote for the Left Alliance 
is the effect of denomination. The odds of a voter who does not belong to any 
church to vote for the Left Alliance are four times higher than of a voter who does 
belong to the main church (OR=4.07). Not being a church-member also makes 
the odds of voting for the Green League two times higher in comparison to the 
members of the main church.  
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In other areas than denomination, however, the factors explaining a vote for the 
Greens do not match with those explaining a vote for the Left Alliance. Voting 
for the Greens is best explained by the type of residential area, occupational class, 
gender, age cohort and education. Being a metropolitan, higher professional, 
woman, having a university-level education and belonging to the youngest 
generation, increase the likelihood of voting for the Greens. 
 Living in a rural municipality (OR=5.41) or a small municipality (2.98) and 
being an agricultural entrepreneur (OR=6.45) strongly increase the likelihood of 
voting for the Centre Party over other parties. Furthermore, these factors do not 
increase the likelihood of voting for any other party. The first two decrease the 
likelihood of voting for the Green League or the Coalition Party and the last 
decreases the likelihood of voting for the SDP or the Coalition Party. Moreover, 
being a member of the Evangelic-Lutheran church increases the likelihood of 
voting for the Centre Party.  
 Only two social structural factors, gender and denomination, contribute to 
voting for the Christian Democrats in a statistically significant way. Even more 
so, their effect is modest. Being a woman and a main church member slightly 
increases the likelihood for voting for the Christian Democrats. Therefore, 
already at this point it can be said that the social structural positions that could be 
derived from the data function the worst for the Christian Democrats. However, 
although it cannot be reliably derived from the existing data, it is worth 
considering that being a member in a revivalist Christian church would surely 
increase drastically the likelihood of voting for the CD. 
 Living in a metropolitan area and being a higher professional or manager and 
having a university-level education increase the likelihood of voting for the 
National Coalition Party the most. Moreover, the effects of belonging to the main 
church and belonging to the oldest generation are statistically significant. The 
Coalition Party is the most popular party among small employers. However, 
being a small employer does not add to the likelihood of voting for the Coalition 
Party, as it is also the most popular party among the reference group (higher 
professionals and managers). Hence, the category of small employers is 
redundant in the logistic regression analyses as it is has statistically significant 
effect only in the electorate of the True Finns. However, the confidence intervals 
are so large in this case due to low N that the result is not robust. Furthermore, 
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being a lower professional – in contrast to being a higher professional/manager – 
only slightly increases the likelihood of voting for the Social Democrats or the 
Centre Party. Hence, it can be confirmed that neither small employers nor lower 
professionals constitute a special clientele for the Finnish parties. Moreover, the 
effect of belonging to the second youngest age cohort (born in 1960-1975) is 
totally out of statistically significant effects: it does not increase or decrease the 
likelihood of voting for any party.  
 The impact of being a Swedish-speaking Finn on voting for the Swedish 
People’s Party is overwhelming as odds ratio (430.3) indicates in Table 5.8: in 
fact, it outweighs all other social structural variables. As mentioned, in all other 
cases language had to be excluded as an explanatory factor due to large standard 
errors that the inclusion of the variable would have caused. Being a Swedish-
speaking Finn explains which party you vote for whereas being a Finnish-
speaking Finn explains primarily which party you do not vote for.  
 When the value/attitudinal dimensions are added in separate stages (in 
Models 2–5) to the regression model that contains only social structural variables 
(Model 1), the following conflicts arise between the voters of different parties. 
Supporting the issues that are related to the economic right and authority 
(market economy, entrepreneurship, law and order and traditional moral values) 
explain a vote for the Coalition Party, the Centre Party and also narrowly for the 
True Finns. Opposing these issues explain a vote for the Left Alliance, the Green 
League and the Social Democrats. Supporting the issues associated with 
socioeconomic and regional equality (e.g. decentralization and narrowing income 
differences) explains a vote for the Left Alliance and the Centre Party and to a 
lesser extent for the Social Democrats. Opposing these issues increases the 
likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party. 
  Having values that support sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism 
(relating positively to ethnic and sexual minorities, immigration and enhancing 
environmental protection) increases the likelihood of voting for the Green 
League. They are set against the voters of the True Finns who oppose 
sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism (and to a lesser extent the voters of 
the Coalition Party solely due to the effect of the position of the Coalition Party 
voters in the 2007). Lastly, those with pro-EU attitudes are most inclined to vote 
for the Coalition Party or the Social Democrats and those with anti-EU-attitudes 
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are most inclined to vote for the True Finns or the Christian Democrats (or the 
Left Alliance).  
 That none of the dimensions explain a vote for the Swedish People’s Party is 
explained by the fact that the effect of language is so overwhelming that it 
outweighs the impact of values and attitudes. However, as shown in Figure 5.2 in 
subchapter 5.2.2, which positioned the voters of the parties in the 
value/attitudinal dimensions, the clear majority of Swedish People’s Party -voters 
is for sociocultural diversity and clearly pro-EU. 
 Table 5.10 summarizes the social structural positions and values/attitudes that 
add the likelihood of voting for a certain party the most (on the basis of the odds 
ratios in Tables 5.8 and 5.9). It also highlights how voters of different parties are 
set against each other. Native language sets the Finnish-speaking voters of the 
Finnish-speaking parties against the Swedish-speaking voters of the Swedish 
People’s Party. The type of residential area sets the residents in rural and small 
municipalities voting for the Centre Party against those living in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area voting for the Coalition Party or the Green League.  
 The picture regarding occupational class is more complex. On the one hand, 
blue-collar workers voting for the SDP, the Left Alliance or the True Finns are set 
against the higher professionals/managers voting for the Coalition Party or the 
Green League. The same pattern applies to the conflict between routine non-
manual employees and higher professionals/managers, with the exception being 
that a routine non-manual employee does not explain a vote for the Left Alliance. 
Moreover, agricultural entrepreneurs voting for the Centre Party complement the 
picture of conflicts deriving from occupational class.  
 Education sets the voters of Social Democrats and True Finns with primary, 
occupational or upper secondary level education primarily against the highly 
educated (university-level) voters of the Coalition Party but also against the 
voters of the Greens. Hence it follows partly the setting based on occupational 
class. However, education does not have any effect on voting for the Centre Party 
and a slight effect on voting for the Left Alliance. Occupational class is still at the 
beginning of the 21st century a better variable in explaining party choice than 
education. Class conflicts concern the voters of several parties and they are hence 
more extensive.  
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Table 5.10. Social structural positions and dimensions contributing the most to 
party choice in the electorate of each party (1) 
 
Social structural base Party choice 
Native language   
Swedish SWE 
Finnish (Finnish-speaking parties) 
Type of residential area 
 Rural municipality CENT 
Small municipality CENT 
Town - 
Metropolitan area COA, GREENS 
Occupational class    
Blue-collar workers SDP, LEFT, TF 
Routine non-manual employees TF, SDP 
Agricultural entrepreneurs CENT 
Small employers  - 
Lower professionals - 
Higher professionals COA, GREENS 
Education   
Primary TF, SDP 
Vocational SDP, TF, LEFT 
Upper Secondary TF, SDP 
Polytechnic - 
University COA, GREENS 
Denomination 
 Does not belong to any church LEFT, GREENS 
Evangelic-Lutheran CENT, COA, CD 
Gender    
Female GREENS, CD 
Male - 
Age cohorts  
 -1944 SDP, COA 
1945-1959 SDP 
1960-1975 - 
1976- GREENS 
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Table 5.10. Social structural positions and dimensions contributing the most to 
party choice in the electorate of each party (2) 
 
Dimensions Party Choice 
Moral and economic right + COA, CENT 
Moral and economic right – LEFT, GREENS, SDP 
Regional and socioeconomic equality + LEFT, CENT, SDP 
Regional and socioeconomic equality – COA 
Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism + GREENS 
Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism – TF 
European Union + COA, SDP 
European Union – TF, LEFT, CD 
 
 
The main church members voting for the Centre Party, the Coalition Party (and 
to a lesser extent the voters of the Christian Democrats) are set against non-
church members voting for the Left Alliance or the Green League. Gender does 
not actually set the voters of the different parties against each other, as being a 
man does not increase the likelihood of voting for any party. Instead, being a 
woman does contribute toward voting for either the Green League or, to a lesser 
extent, the Christian Democrats. In the descriptive chapter 5.2.1 it was found that 
the True Finns is the only party that has showed the most clear-cut patterns of 
being a party that men favor. Some recent studies, such as that of Arter and 
Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) which was conducted with data from 2006-2013 (the 
Finnish Business and Policy Forum, EVA) shows that the electorate of the True 
Finns is clearly male-dominated and men are more likely to choose the True 
Finns than women. However, with the FNES-data from 2003–2011 no such 
effects could be detected.  
 Age cohorts set the voters who belong to either of the two oldest generations 
and who vote for the Social Democrats against the younger voters of the Green 
League (born after 1975). Belonging to the oldest generation (born before 1945) 
also seems to add to the likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party. However, 
other datasets, such as the European Social Survey (2012) and national surveys 
actually show a fairly even support among different generations for the Coalition 
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Party at the beginning of the 21st century (see e.g. Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 
2014). The result concerning the National Coalition Party might be explained by 
skewed data. The oldest age cohort has been overrepresented in the drop-off-
questionnaire and there have been constant challenges in getting enough of the 
voters of the National Coalition Party to the sample (hence probably giving a 
misleading picture of the age composition of the electorate of the party). 
Belonging to the oldest age cohort does not most likely add much likelihood of 
voting for the Coalition Party when compared to the youngest age cohort in 
reality. Furthermore, the True Finns otherwise has quite an even support among 
the four generations, albeit belonging to the oldest age cohort has a distinctive 
negative effect on the likelihood of voting for the True Finns.  
 
5.3.2 The overall impact of social structural positions and values and 
attitudes on party choice 
As the last aspect of cleavage explanations of party choice, the overall goodness-
of-fit of the models explaining party choice is assessed. Franklin (2010), for 
example, maintains that the social structural positions should explain party 
support to a considerable extent in order to suffice for evidence of cleavage-based 
party support. Nagelkerke’s R² in Model 1 in Table 5.11 is a measure for the 
goodness-of-fit for a model that includes social structural variables before the 
insertion of dimension variables in Models 2–5. Nagelkerke’s R² in Model 6 in 
Table 5.11 shows the goodness-of-fit when all the variables (social structural 
variables and value/attitudinal dimensions) are included. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
goodness-of-fit graphically. 
 Social structure has little significance in explaining a vote for three parties, 
namely the Social Democrats, the True Finns and the Christian Democrats. The 
first two of these parties compete for the votes of the blue-collar workers and 
routine non-manual employees. When the loyalties of blue-collar voters are 
currently more split than they used to be, the effect of social structure on voting 
for a traditional left-wing party is not that strong anymore. The explanatory 
ability of social structure is not either high in the case of another left-wing party, 
the Left Alliance.  
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Table 5.11 Overall goodness-of-fit of the models explaining party choice  
 
  LEFT GREENS SDP TF CENT CD COA SWE 
Nagelkerke's R²  Model 1 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.66 
(Social structural positions) 
  
  
  
 
 Nagelkerke's R² Model 6 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.35 0.67 
(Full model= social structural  
  
  
  
 
  positions + all dimensions)         
 
Note: The Nagelkerke's R²s are from the models that include occupational class as the status variable instead of 
education as the social status variable. This is because the goodness-of-fit of the model that included 
occupational class was better in comparison to the model that included education.  
 
 
Despite similarities in social structure in the electorates of the Social Democrats 
and the True Finns, the ability of value/attitudinal dimensions to distinguish the 
parties is rather prominent. Values and attitudes explain better the support for 
the True Finns, the ‘new party of the proletariat’ than for the SDP, the ‘old party 
of the proletariat’. Social structural variables have very little significance in 
explaining a vote for the True Finns, whereas adding the value/attitudinal 
dimensions to the model increases the goodness-of-fit significantly (from 0.07 to 
0.23 as highlighted also in Figure 5.3).  This can be seen as an indicator of how a 
newer party with a blue-collar voter appeal has succeeded in politicizing the 
value/attitudinal base in the electorate. It also indicates that despite the appeal of 
the True Finns among blue-collar workers and also routine non-manual 
employees, the electoral support of the True Finns is not rooted strongly to social 
structure. The role of values and attitudes in conditioning a vote for the True 
Finns is significant.  
 The success of the True Finns relies much on the ability to keep on politicizing 
EU and sociocultural issues, in which it has succeeded in 2010s. In the light of the 
2015 election result with the True Finns being the second largest party, the party 
seems to have stabilized its position as the propagator of anti-EU and anti-
immigration and anti-minority interests. Hence, values and attitudes may cement 
partisan loyalties towards the True Finns more efficiently than social structure 
(see Enyedi 2008. 293) In turn; an important reason why the Nagelkerke’s R² 
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reaches even 0.10 in Model 1 for the SDP is the reliance of the SDP on the two 
oldest age cohorts.  
   
 
 
Figure 5.3 The overall impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal 
dimensions on Finnish party choice. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
 
 
The case of the Christian Democrats shows the problems related to the threefold 
cleavage definition. It also shows the problems involved in not having enough 
specific answering categories in social structural questions. Social structure has 
little significance in explaining a vote for the party, since membership in smaller 
Christian Churches could not be included in the analyses due to small N 
problems. Furthermore, religiosity was not included in the analyses as it is a 
subjective identification measure, not based on objective social structural groups. 
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The electorate of the Christian Democrats is obviously the most religious of all 
the parties.  
 Nagelkerke’s R² reaches 0.20 in Model 1 for the Green League, 0.19 for the 
Centre Party and 0.14 for the Coalition Party. For the Centre Party, adding values 
and attitudes to the model does not add much to the goodness-of-fit – 
Nagelkerke’s R² reaches 0.22 in Model 6. Hence, the support of the Centre Party 
is strongly anchored in social structure – mainly due to the effect of type of 
residential area. In terms of the value/attitudinal dimensions, the voters of the 
Centre Party were somewhat distinctive only in supporting a decentralizing and 
redistributive state.   
 As practically all social structural positions affected voting for the Green 
League, i.e. those based on type of residential area, occupational class, education, 
gender, denomination and age, it can be said that the electorate of the Green 
League is distinctive in social structural terms. Therefore, the results complete the 
perception of the Green League as a value-based party (see Paloheimo 2008): it is 
both structure- and value-based party. That said, values and attitudes make the 
model significantly better in explaining a vote for the Greens: they have also a 
significant independent effect on voting for the Green League.  
 Nagelkerke’s R² in Model 6 increases the most in comparison to Model 1 in 
the case of the Coalition Party. The voters of the party have distinctive positions 
in the dimensions. The electoral support of the Coalition Party is by no means 
weakly anchored to social structure but values/attitudes play also a significant 
independent role in comparison to the Centre Party, for example.  
 The Swedish People’s Party is an extreme case of a structure-based party. The 
model receives an extremely high level of goodness-of-the-fit in Model 1 due to 
the effect of native language (Nagelkerke’s R²=0.66). As Figure 5.3 illustrates, 
adding values and attitudes to the model gives almost none additional 
explanatory value precisely because of the overwhelming effect of native 
language.  
 Social structure has not predicted party choice to a great extent in most West 
European at the end of 20th century (see Franklin et al. 2009). In this regard, 
many Finnish parties seem to be quite standard cases. The Swedish People’s Party 
is an obvious exception as a language party. Moreover, there is evidence that 
social structural cleavage elements explain relatively well voting for the Centre 
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Party, Green League and to a lesser extent the Coalition Party. In addition, the 
models explaining the vote for the Left Alliance, reach an in-between goodness-
of-fit. However, the social structure had even less significance in explaining vote 
for the Social Democrats, True Finns and Christian Democrats. This underlines 
the problems of the SDP: it relies too much on old voters and has not been able to 
renew its profile in a successful way as it did in the 1990s.  
 The social structural positions that affect party choice the most and the 
value/attitudinal dimensions that affect party choice the most are partly 
overlapping in setting parties against each other. Next, it is dealt with whether 
they can be regarded as cleavages that fulfil all the requirements of a definition of 
cleavage presented earlier. As discussed, a cleavage can be regarded to exist if 
there are objectively identifiable and politically relevant social structural groups 
that share common values and attitudes and if being a member of the respective 
social structural group and having the shared values/attitudes contribute both to 
voting for a party that represents the interests at hand.  
 
5.3.3 The categorization of the conflicts  
This chapter provides with an answer to the last research question “Which 
conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with 
them?” (RQ5). The cleavage bases are handled one at a time in order to categorize 
and define the conflicts as either established cleavages or as having the potential 
to emerge as cleavages. The tables below follow the subsequent logic. The first 
column represents the social structural cleavage base and the second column 
represents the social structural groups in between which the conflict rises. The 
third column represents the dimension on which the social structural position 
has an effect (see Tables 4.14–4.17 for the effects in the linear regression analysis) 
and this dimension affects party choice in the same way as the social structural 
position. The fourth column finally represents which are the parties that are 
involved in the conflict.  
First, Table 5.12 illustrates that the conflict that is based on the type of 
residential area sets the residents in rural and small municipalities who  support 
decentralization and regional equality and vote for the Centre Party against 
residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area who have common interests in 
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opposing regional equality and who primarily support the National Coalition 
Party. The conflict, deriving from these patterns, is encompassing, has political-
historical roots and is attached to the current debate on (de)centralization (see 
e.g. Moisio 2012). As noticed earlier, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party 
have represented these interests as political parties. Hence, the conflict that is 
based on the type of residential area and reflected in the regional and 
socioeconomic dimension meets the requirements of a cleavage. 
 
Table 5.12 Cleavage based on the type of residential area   
 
Cleavage base The social structural groups Dimension Party choice 
 
between which the conflict 
rises   
Type of  Rural municipality vs. 
Regional and socioecon. 
equality + 
Centre Party  
residential 
area Metropolitan area 
Regional and socioecon. 
equality –  
Coalition Party, (Green 
League) 
 
Small municipality vs. 
Regional and socioecon. 
equality + 
Centre Party  
 
Metropolitan area 
Regional and socioecon. 
equality – 
Coalition Party,(Green 
League) 
 
 
Moreover, since the conflict has long political-historical roots and concerns the 
voters of two major parties, it is also an influential cleavage. It also emphasizes 
the peculiarity of Finland given that the Agrarian-based Centre Party has 
managed to stay as one of the main parties, partly because of its ability to 
represent decentralizing interests (Paloheimo 2008). As Moisio (2012) has 
argued, the conflicts do not arise merely along the rural-urban -division as the 
Helsinki metropolitan area (instead of urban areas at large) has become 
increasingly important economically while the peripheral areas have increasingly 
been left to cope on their own. In this sense, the cleavage at hand can be 
interpreted as a modern version of the old rural-urban cleavage (see Allardt & 
Pesonen 1967; Paloheimo 1988). Also the Green League represents an opposite 
for the Centre Party voters in this cleavage in the sense that living in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area increases the likelihood of voting for the Green League more 
than voting for the Coalition Party. However, opposing regional and 
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socioeconomic equality did not increase the likelihood of voting for the Green 
League. The Green League’s voters are not as much against socioeconomic and 
regional equality as are the Coalition Party voters although they were located at 
the end of not favoring regional and socioeconomic equality in Figure 5.1. 
The residential area also had an effect on the EU-dimension: rural residents 
are more EU-sceptic than the metropolitan voters. However, the party choice 
effect of living in a rural municipality and the party choice effect of having anti-
EU attitudes are not overlapping. Anti-EU attitudes do not have an impact on 
voting for the Centre Party, and living in a rural municipality does not have an 
effect on voting for the True Finns, the Left Alliance or the Christian Democrats 
although their support is explained by anti-EU attitudes.  
With regard to native language, the Swedish-speaking voters are more liberal-
minded and more in favor of minority protection than the Finnish-speaking 
voters. This pattern in the sociocultural dimension is especially due to the issue 
concerning the rights of the Swedish-speaking minority. The sociocultural 
dimension, however, has no effect on choosing the Swedish People’s Party. In 
subchapter 5.2.2 it was noticed that the voters of the Swedish People’s Party are 
strongly in favor of sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism. This orientation 
just does not add to the likelihood of voting for the Swedish People’s Party, since 
native language absorbs all of the party choice effect as an immensely strong 
factor for voting for the Swedish People’s Party. When considering these aspects, 
it can be stated that language constitutes an immensely rigid and one-sided 
cleavage, as illustrated by Table 5.13.  
 
Table 5.13 Cleavage based on native language  
 
Cleavage base The social structural groups Value/attitudinal dimension Party choice 
 
between which the cleavage 
rises 
  Native 
language 
Swedish-speaking 
Sociocult. diversity and 
postmaterialism + 
Swedish People's Party 
 
Finnish-speaking 
Sociocult. diversity and 
postmaterialism – 
(Finnish-speaking 
parties) 
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The language cleavage sets the Swedish-speaking people who have common 
interests in minority protection and who vote for the Swedish People’s Party 
against the Finnish-speaking people who do not cherish that much minority 
protection and who vote for one of the Finnish-speaking parties. The Finnish-
speaking parties are in parentheses since having Finnish as a native language is 
not in itself a good explanatory variable for which party one votes for.  Instead, it 
is a good explanatory variable for which party one does not vote for (the Swedish 
People’s Party). 
This cleavage has been an inseparable part of the Finnish party system since 
its birth because language has conditioned party choice to a great extent in the 
Swedish-speaking population. The Finnish-Swedes have a clear language-based 
identity, which produces a loyalty to vote for the Swedish People’s Party that has 
been the propagator of these language-based interests. Furthermore, from a 
historical perspective, this loyalty has been immune to big turbulences in the 
Finnish parliamentary elections, such as in 1945, 1970 and 2011 (see Sundberg 
1985; Westinen 2014). Although the Swedish-speaking interests and the Swedish 
People’s Party do not have a clear single opposite here, the True Finns has been 
the party which has revived anti-Swedish attitudes in recent years (Grönlund & 
Westinen 2012, 176). Its voters are the only ones who have clearly negative 
attitudes toward the language issue and other issues that concern minority 
protection.   
Occupational class results in several bipolar conflicts along social structural 
and value/attitudinal lines that can be characterized either as cleavages or 
potentially emerging cleavages. There is evidence for the continued existence of a 
traditional class cleavage that is reflected in the regional and socioeconomic 
equality dimension, as illustrated by Table 5.14. First, it sets blue-collar voters 
who have common interests in supporting socioeconomic equality and who vote 
for the Left Alliance or Social Democrats against the higher professionals and 
managers who have common interests in opposing socioeconomic equality and 
who vote for the Coalition Party. All of these parties have represented the 
interests at hand (Paloheimo 2008; Westinen 2011). Second, it almost identically 
sets routine non-manual employees who have common interests in supporting 
socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Social Democrats against the higher 
professionals and managers who have common interests in opposing 
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socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Coalition Party. However, this 
conflict is not as strong as the one separating blue-collar workers and higher 
professionals/managers since being a routine non-manual employee has weaker 
effect on supporting equality and since it has also a weaker party choice effect.  
 
Table 5.14 Traditional class cleavage 
 
Cleavage base The social structural groups Dimension Party choice 
 
between which the conflict rises 
  
Occupational Blue-collar workers Regional and socioecon. equality + Left Alliance  
class 
  
Social Democratic Party  
 
Higher professionals/managers Regional and socioecon. equality – Coalition Party  
 
Routine non-manual employees  Regional and socioecon. equality + Social Democratic Party  
 
Higher professionals/managers Regional and socioecon. equality – Coalition Party  
 
Agricultural entrepreneurs  Regional and socioecon. equality + Centre Party  
 
Higher professionals/managers Regional and socioecon. equality – Coalition Party  
 
 
The same clash persists also between lower-educated who vote for the Social 
Democrats and who support socioeconomic equality and highly educated who 
vote for the National Coalition Party and who do not emphasize socioeconomic 
equality. The overlap of occupational education and blue-collar jobs and 
university level education and higher professional jobs is evident here. However, 
education explained a vote for both the SDP and the Coalition Party to a lesser 
extent than occupational class and the parties at hand have first and foremost 
represented the interests of occupational groups. Hence, the cleavage is treated as 
primarily based on class but it is a cleavage that is also partly strengthened by 
educational opposites.  
The clash between the opposite sides in the traditional class cleavage dates 
from long back in time. From the beginning, the SDP and the Communists were 
the parties of the working class and the Coalition Party, in turn, was a party of the 
upper strata of society. This division to the socialist workers’ parties and the 
upper-class party was one of the cornerstones of the modern Finnish party 
system at the beginning of the 20th century (Paloheimo 2007). The analyses 
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suggest that blue-collar voters still propagate for a strong state that has 
redistributing policies, whereas the more well-off higher professionals and 
managers have not shown that strong support to a state that redistributes wealth. 
Hence, this cleavage reflects a classic division between the political left and 
political right. The expansion of the service sector has meant that the number of 
routine non-manual employees has grown, which in turn represents a more 
recent conflict base than that of blue-collar workers. Also the routine non-
manual employees support a redistributive state and trust that the Social 
Democrats advocate their cause. 
Furthermore, the traditional class cleavage is supplemented by agricultural 
entrepreneurs supporting a state which promotes redistribution and 
decentralization, and vote for the Centre Party. Being an agricultural 
entrepreneur decreased the likelihood of voting for the SDP and the Coalition 
Party, which emphasizes the triangular nature of the traditional class cleavage. 
Also this aspect of the cleavage dates back to the birth of the modern party 
system, as the Agrarian League, the predecessor of the Centre Party, was formed 
to advocate farmers’ interests. As we have noticed, the Centre Party has 
continued on promoting the farmers’ interests in the 21st century.  
When these forms of traditional class cleavage are combined it can be said that 
the pattern matches the triangular model between different classes (Nousiainen 
1970). The conflict between routine non-manual employees and higher 
professionals/managers and the educational base in the conflict between the SDP 
and the Coalition Party update the model. Moreover, the blue-collar voters and 
routine non-manual employees emphasize more socioeconomic equality than the 
agricultural entrepreneurs, whose main concern is regional equality. This 
emphasizes the partly split nature of the issues in the dimensions.  
Hence, all three old main parties, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and 
the Coalition Party, are set against each other on a structural base in the class 
cleavage to which they are still anchored. Moreover, despite the party’s recent 
red-green, postmaterialist profile, the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance are 
still anchored to the traditional class cleavage, reflecting the Communist 
working-class heritage. So far, evidence has been found that all three classic 
Lipset-Rokkan -cleavages exist in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century, 
even though they exist in an updated form. 
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The results show that a modern version of class cleavage would be reflected in the 
new sociocultural and EU-dimensions. Table 5.15 illustrates how postmaterialist-
liberal higher professionals are set against the anti-postmaterialist, anti-minority 
blue-collar voters. The former support the Greens and the latter the True Finns. 
The dimension involved handles issues (immigration, ethnic and sexual 
minorities, environmental protection) that have been politicized rather recently 
in Finland (see Paloheimo 2008; Westinen 2011) and concern the voters of 
parties that have been represented in the parliament only from 1980s and 1990s 
onwards. In accordance with the wider West European framework (see e.g. Kriesi 
et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009), the Green League has propagated 
for the promotion of minority rights, increased immigration and environmental 
protection while the True Finns has represented the opposite stands in these 
issues (see Mickelsson 2006, Westinen 2011; Ruotetsaari 2012). 
 
Table 5.15 Possibly emerging cleavage based on social status  
 
Cleavage The social structural groups Dimension Party choice 
base btw. which the conflict rises     
Occupational Blue-collar workers Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism – True Finns  
class Higher professionals Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism + Green League 
 
Blue-collar workers  European Union –  True Finns  
 
Higher professionals European Union + 
Coalition 
Party  
 
 
Although the clash at hand fulfils the cleavage criteria rather well, due to the 
recent nature of the conflict (the True Finns gaining substantial support for the 
first time in parliamentary elections in 2011) it cannot be regarded at least yet as 
an established cleavage. Rather, it is classified as a possibly emerging cleavage, 
where the modern proletarian frustration is reflected in opposing sociocultural 
diversity and postmaterialism and channeled into voting for a nationalist-
populist party, and where the upper strata defends diversity and postmaterialism 
and votes for a liberal and ecological party. Moreover, it should be emphasized 
that the effect of being a higher professional or a manager on voting for the 
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Green League was rather weak. Hence, the social structural base of this conflict is 
far from cemented. 
Table 5.15 also illustrates how pro-EU managers and higher professionals who 
vote for the Coalition Party are set against anti-EU blue-collar workers who vote 
for the True Finns. The Coalition Party has represented pro-EU stands 
throughout the 1990s and the 21st century. Anti-EU stands and defense of 
national sovereignty have been the cornerstones of the True Finns’ policies. 
(Paloheimo 2000; Westinen 2011, 46–48.) The conflict has a theoretical 
anchoring, since free mobility of labor has been considered as disadvantageous 
for blue-collar workers who fear of losing their jobs. Moreover, the blue-collar 
voters have fewer resources available to benefit from the globalization and 
integration in comparison to higher professionals and managers, who cope better 
in the ever-changing and integrating labor market. (see Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et 
al. 2012.) However, also in this case it is too soon to evaluate whether this conflict 
has the longevity of evolving into an established cleavage. The True Finns may 
develop a stable voter base with a strong anti-EU blue-collar worker segment in 
the long run. It should be noted that in comparison to the class conflict reflected 
in the sociocultural dimension, the one reflected in the EU dimension is more 
strongly rooted in social structure: being a higher professional/manager is a 
stronger explanatory factor for voting for the Coalition Party in comparison to 
the Green League. 
The possibly emerging class cleavage that is reflected in the sociocultural and EU 
dimensions can be treated as a possibly emerging cleavage based on social status 
since the same patterns are present even when occupational class was switched to 
education in the party choice models. This does not apply as a whole to the old 
class cleavage. For example, the common interests of the Centre Party voting 
farmers are purely entangled to their occupational position, not to their 
education.  
The emerging class cleavage not only sets the True Finns blue-collar workers 
voting against the higher professionals and managers voting for the Green League 
or the Coalition Party. They also set those with a primary or vocational level 
education against those with university-level education, since the lower-educated 
are anti-postmaterialist in the sociocultural dimension and anti-EU in the EU 
dimension in contrast to the highly educated. Moreover, the party preferences of 
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these educational groups were indeed identical to the respective occupational 
groups (blue collar workers & higher professionals and managers). Although, yet 
again, the effect of having a university level on voting for the Greens is modest. 
Hence, these conflicts can be considered as social status-based in general. This is 
in accordance with the theories that emphasize the importance of education in 
new types of conflicts (Stubager 2010). 
So far, it has been showed that there is evidence for the continued existence of 
the three traditional cleavages, i.e. the three pillars in the Finnish party system 
(see Karvonen 2014). They are accompanied by possibly emerging social status -
based cleavage that is reflected in new types of issues and dimensions. The 
following section will present an analysis regarding how other conflicts can be 
classified.  
Denomination is an old source of conflict that has been politicized recently in 
Finland as a result of resignations from the church. Table 5.16 illustrates how the 
conflict sets the main church members, whose common interests are reflected in 
showing respect for authority and traditional moral values and who vote for the 
Centre Party, the Coalition Party or the Christian Democrats against the non-
church members, who neglect the importance of authority and traditional moral 
values and who vote for the Left Alliance or the Green League.  
 
Table 5.16 Possibly emerging cleavage based on denomination 
 
Cleavage base The social structural groups Dimension Party choice 
  between which the conflict rises     
Denomination Evangelic-Lutherans Economic right and authority + Centre Party (CENT) 
   
Coalition Party (COA) 
   
Christian Democrats (CD) 
 
Non church-members  Economic right and authority –  Green League (GREENS) 
 
 
 Left Alliance (LEFT) 
 
 
The values and attitudes do not contribute to voting for the Christian Democrats 
despite the fact that the CD-voters support traditional moral values and strong 
authorities. This is largely because the values and attitudes can hardly have an 
effect on voting since it is absorbed by denomination. There are hardly any voters 
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who do not belong to any church or religious community and who would vote 
for the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, it is problematic that the dimensional 
effect is due to only some issues: economic right issues are not entangled to 
denomination. 
The major parties concerned in the traditionalist church member side, the 
Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are center-right parties, which have 
historically valued religion as one of the basic pillars in Finnish society. For the 
Centre Party, religion and moral values have had continued importance in the 
21st century, while the Coalition Party has toned down the role of religion and 
traditional values in its party profile (Jutila 2003; Lahtinen 2006; Westinen 2011, 
65). The party profile of the Christian Democrats obviously builds on these 
themes. However, the target group of the Christian Democrats is religious voters 
at large (Westinen 2011, 67). The parties on the anti-clerical side of the conflict, 
the Left Alliance and the Green League, have wanted to decrease the importance 
of church and traditional values in society (Westinen 2011, 69–70).  
However, further evidence is needed on whether the conflict between the 
Evangelic-Lutheran and non-confessional voters is of stable nature. Cleavages 
should arise from some durable feature. Such durability, strengthened by 
socialization mechanisms, cannot have occurred yet, since the divide into 
confessional and non-confessional voters has sharpened in structural terms only 
recently (Mykkänen 2012; cf. Niemelä 2006): resignation from church has 
accelerated only in the 2010s. Moreover, the resignation has been affected by the 
debate on moral values and authority (Mykkänen 2012). Thus, the 
denominational conflict can be categorized as a possibly emerging cleavage. 
Moreover, it should be acknowledged that applying the threefold cleavage 
definition with the available data does not fully reveal the dynamics involved. The 
denominational conflict might be more relevant between deeply religious 
members of revivalist movements and those non-religious voters who are not 
members in any church. Other studies have deployed religiosity or church-going 
activity as the basis for a religious cleavage (see e.g. Knutsen 2006; Franklin et al. 
2009), but these are not social structural measures. It is unlikely that conflicts 
would rise in the electoral arena any time soon between two religions since 
Finland is at the time being overwhelmingly Christian.  
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Gender had a clear effect only on the sociocultural dimension, as women are 
more sensitive for minority interests and environmental protection and towards 
immigrants than men. However, the gender effect on party choice remains one-
sided. Gender has an effect on party choice only in the electorates of the Green 
League and the Christian Democrats, which are both dominated by women. The 
electorate of the True Finns is slightly dominated by men, but being a man does 
not increase the likelihood of voting for the True Finns. Having liberal and 
postmaterialist values explains voting for the Green League and opposing them 
explains voting for the True Finns, as highlighted in Table 5.17.  
 
Table 5.17 Possibly emerging cleavage based on gender 
 
Cleavage 
base 
The social structural groups Dimension Party choice 
  
between which the conflict 
rises 
    
Gender Women vs. Sociocultural diversity and 
postmaterialism + 
Green League 
(GREENS) 
 
Men 
Sociocultural diversity and 
postmaterialism – 
(True Finns, TF) 
 
 
However, recent studies, such as that of Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) using 
newer data from 2013, have showed that the electorate of the True Finns would 
actually be more male-dominated than the FNES-studies in 2003–2011 suggest. 
Hence, a gender-based conflict that sets the Green League-voters and True Finns-
voters against each other both on a structural and value/attitudinal basis might 
establish itself in the future. This potential is underlined by the fact that the party 
profiles of the Green League and the True Finns suggest that there could be 
potential for an emerging gender-based cleavage. Parties on the populist radical 
right have been labelled as men’s parties (see Mudde 2007, 90–92) and Green 
parties have been advocating feminism (Inglehart & Norris 2000), which also 
applies to the party profile of the True Finns and the Green League. In addition, 
women have been overrepresented in the parliamentary group of the Green 
League and men have been overrepresented in the parliamentary group of the 
True Finns (Mickelsson 2007; Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). Future evidence 
is needed on whether the electorate of the True Finns becomes more distinctively 
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male-dominated. As the bipolarized politicization of gender-based conflict is 
rather new, the requirement of durability makes the gender conflict reflected in the 
sociocultural dimension a possibly emerging cleavage.  
It is also noteworthy that the sociocultural dimension sets the voters of the 
Greens and the True Finns against each other on the basis of 
occupational/educational status. Gender differences in party popularity have not 
just been fully established on the basis of the FNES-data in comparison to social 
status differences in party popularity. Hence, both of these patterns are in 
accordance with the theoretical frame of new cleavages that was presented in 
subchapter 3.2.4. The frame presupposed that men and those with a low 
occupational/educational status are less postmaterialist and liberal than women 
and those with high occupational/educational status, and that they turn to new 
parties in fulfilling their opposite interests.  
Age cohorts, in turn, had the strongest effect on values and attitudes in the 
economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality 
dimensions. However, the party choice patterns were overlapping in social 
structural terms and in terms of values/attitudes only in one case. Those who 
belong to the oldest generation (born before 1945), who support the issues 
associated with the economic right and authority and vote for the Coalition 
Party, are set against the members of the youngest generation (born after 1975), 
who neglect the importance of these issues and vote for the Green League. 
However, the result concerning the Coalition Party is likely to be misleading due 
since other datasets, such as those from European Social Survey or EVA (Finnish 
Business and Policy Forum), indicate that no such pattern exists – that the 
Coalition Party does not have an especially strong position among the oldest 
generation in comparison to the other generations. Moreover, the Coalition Party 
is not dedicated to taking care of the interests of the oldest generation, while it 
can be argued that the Green League has its core clientele in the youngest 
generation (Mickelsson 2006). Hence, there is no convincing evidence for a 
cleavage based on age cohorts. Nevertheless, there is a structural divide between 
the young voters voting for the Green League and the old voters (born before 
1945 or 1945–1959) voting for the Social Democrats.  
Age does not constitute cleavage-like conflicts in Finland, which gives support 
to Franklin and Van der Eijk’s (2009) standpoint of cleavages potentially 
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changing when generations replace one another. Instead, age cohorts are best 
understood as structural divides in the electorate. It is obvious that the Social 
Democratic Party, especially, is a party of elderly generations, while the Green 
League is a party of the young. Generational replacement may first and foremost 
lead to changes in party popularity. If the SDP continues to struggle among 
younger generations and if the members of the younger generations continue to 
support the Green League to a great extent, even when they get older, the SDP is 
bound to lose its position as a main party and the Green League is bound to grow 
its support steadily. Moreover, generational replacement is likely to shift the 
focus in the values and attitudes that are considered important. The youngest 
generation does not give much value to issues associated with the economic right 
and authority and socioeconomic and regional equality.  
 
5.3.4. The Finnish cleavage structure at the beginning of the 21stcentury 
Previous chapters have dealt with the interaction between the three cleavage 
elements – social structural position, values/attitudes and party choice. Thus, the 
answer to the last research question (RQ5) “Which conflicts can be regarded as 
cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?” can be now 
summarized. 
On the basis of the results it can be argued that three old cleavages exist even 
at the beginning of the 21st century, namely a language cleavage, a cleavage based 
on the type of residential area and a class cleavage. As Table 5.18 illustrates, the 
parties that are attached to the old cleavages are all old parties or have their 
ideological heritage in an old party (the Left Alliance). Furthermore, the existence 
of the old cleavages has been based on strong political socialization. For example, 
the Swedish-speaking population has been socialized to vote for the Swedish-
speaking party and the rural residents have been socialized to vote for the 
Agrarian-based Centre Party. Moreover, the parties concerned in the established 
cleavages have propagated for the common interests of the social structural 
groups concerned.  
First, the language cleavage concerns the Swedish People’s Party the most and 
even though the interests of the Swedish-speaking population are reflected in a 
‘new’ dimension, the sociocultural dimension, the language issue is an old one. It 
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was disputed heatedly in the 19th century, before the arrival of the modern party 
system, and the most fierce language disputes during the modern party system 
were fought during the 1930s. Second, the old rural-urban cleavage has evolved 
into a cleavage that sets the residents in rural and small municipalities against the 
residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area. It is present in the socioeconomic 
and regional equality, which reflects the old issues of redistribution and 
decentralization. Moreover, the two main parties concerned, the Centre Party 
and the Coalition Party, are old parties. However, also a new party, the Green 
League, is somewhat involved in the cleavage and it has an even more crucial 
support base in the metropolitan area than the Coalition Party in relative terms. 
The third conflict that is categorized as a cleavage is the traditional 
occupational cleavage that is also reflected in the regional and socioeconomic 
equality dimension. This cleavage sets blue-collar voters and routine non-manual 
employees who vote for the Social Democrats or the Left Alliance, who demand a 
bigger role for the state in promoting socioeconomic equality, against higher 
professionals/managers who vote for the Coalition Party and support solutions 
that do not even out welfare. Moreover, the triangular cleavage is accompanied 
by agricultural entrepreneurs who vote for the Centre Party and support 
decentralization. Originally, when over two thirds of the population worked in 
agriculture at the beginning of the 20th century (see Karvonen 2014, 30), the last 
aspect reflected the tensions inside primary production and between primary 
production and commercial interests. Nowadays, its importance has weakened in 
the sense that farmers constitute less than five percent of the economically active 
population and since farmers constitute only ten percent of the Centre Party’s 
electorate (ibid.).  
Table 5.18 indicates that four further cases are categorized as possibly 
emerging cleavages. The one based on the occupational/educational status of the 
voters has the most potential while the ones based on denomination and gender 
have a more limited potential to emerge as cleavages. Next, it is argued why these 
cases do not yet qualify as cleavages and why they have some potential of 
becoming cleavages. The conflict that has the most potential to emerge as a 
cleavage is based on occupational/educational status and it is reflected in the 
sociocultural and EU dimensions.  
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The blue-collar voters and low-educated (with primary or vocational education) 
who have common interests in opposing sociocultural diversity are set against 
higher professionals and managers and the highly educated (university-level 
education) who have common interests in supporting sociocultural diversity and 
postmaterialism. The first-mentioned have supported the True Finns, especially, 
while the latter have supported the Green League, which have ideologically 
represented group-based interests. However, the party choice effect of social 
structural positions is not particularly strong or established. Even though the 
three cleavage elements are fairly well fulfilled, the recent nature of the conflict 
raises doubts on its durability, i.e. whether the conflict is more than ephemeral. 
The conflict between Greens and True Finns gained substantial importance first 
in the 2011 election where the True Finns managed to politicize anti-immigrant 
and nationalist-conservative attitudes to become the third largest party in the 
parliament. The Green League, on the other hand, seems to have somewhat 
stabilized itself as a popular party among the liberal-postmaterialist voters with 
high social status (class or education) (see Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; 
Paloheimo 2008).   
The anti-EU blue-collar voters and low-educated are set against pro-EU 
higher professionals and managers and the highly educated. The first-mentioned 
have supported the True Finns, especially, and the latter have supported the 
Coalition Party, which have ideologically represented these group-based interests 
ever since the EU-issues became topical in the Finish party system in the 1990s 
(see Paloheimo 2000). However, the problem of durability also applies here, as 
the 2011 election was the first election which was fought intensively over EU-
issues and when the True Finns managed to break the consensus over the 
management of EU-policies (Borg 2012e).  
The new social status-based conflict with two dimensional reflections 
(sociocultural and the EU) has more potential to evolve into a cleavage in 
comparison to conflicts that are based on gender and denomination. The 
connections between cleavage elements were more solid in the social status -
based conflict, and the interests attached to the conflict were represented by the 
parties at hand in more explicit terms than in the conflicts based on 
denomination and gender. 
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Denomination is categorized as a possibly emerging cleavage since the 
conservative voters who belong to the main church and vote for the Centre Party, 
Coalition Party and Christian Democrats are set against the anti-authority and 
anti-tradition voters of the Left Alliance and Green League. Its potential for a 
cleavage is even more recent than in the emerging social status -based cleavage 
since the structural base became more topical in the 2010s, due to the increased 
number of resignations from the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Moreover, the 
nature of the cleavage based on denomination remained imprecise with the 
available data. However, denominational conflict needs more verification in 
future elections. Moreover, the recent debate around the Evangelic-Lutheran 
church and the resignation from the church has been much affected by the way 
church relates to sexual minorities. However, questions on sexual minorities 
belong to the sociocultural dimension on which denomination had no effect since 
also questions on immigration and environmental protection belong to the 
dimension. Hence, the dynamics behind the denomination-based conflicts are 
not fully revealed by applying the threefold cleavage definition in this study.  
Conflict based on gender does not fulfil all three criteria of cleavage. The 
liberal-postmaterialist orientation was represented by women voting for the 
Green League. However, even though the electorate of the True Finns was 
dominated by men, gender did not have a statistically significant effect on voting 
for the True Finns. Opposing liberal and postmaterialist values has instead a clear 
effect on voting for the True Finns. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the 
structural element becomes fulfilled on both sides of the gender-based conflict. 
However, gender has the potential to become a cleavage since the True Finns has 
had increasing electoral appeal among men (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014) 
and since the sociocultural issues have not yet been fully politicized (see 
Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 183–184). Even though the Green League and the 
True Finns are not parties based on gender, such as the Feminist Initiative in 
Sweden, the Green League has articulated feminist interests and the True Finns 
has promoted patriarchal views of society. 
Figure 5.4 concludes the answer to the main research problem of this thesis 
“What kind of a cleavage structure does there exist in Finland at the beginning of 
the 21st century”? The results suggest that there is a 3+1+2-model of cleavages in 
the country. This model, illustrated in Figure 5.4, means that there are three old 
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and established cleavages, one conflict that is reflected in two different 
dimensions and has the most potential to develop into a cleavage, and two 
conflicts that have more limited potential to develop into cleavages.  
 
Occupational 
class (old) 
Type of 
residential area 
Native 
Language 
 
         
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The Finnish cleavage structure at the beginning of the 21st century 
 
The three old, established cleavages, based on occupational class (reflected in the 
regional and socioeconomic equality dimension), type of residential area and 
native language, partly explain the persistence of the old parties in the Finnish 
party system and crystallize how the tensions are revolved over “old” issues. 
These established cleavages are conflicts in which the parties concerned are most 
dedicated to defend the interests of the groups concerned. The conflict that has 
the most potential to develop into a cleavage combines an old social structural 
cleavage base (class) with a new one (education) and is reflected in two new 
value/attitudinal dimensions (sociocultural and the EU). Two other conflicts 
based on gender and denomination, on the other hand, are conflicts that are less 
clear-lined. There is less empirical support for them and they have not been 
incorporated into party profiles to the extent that the aforementioned status-
based conflict has, not to mention the three established cleavages. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This study has analyzed the present cleavage structure in Finland by examining 
the connections between the different cleavage elements. This chapter 
summarizes the major findings, discusses their implications and concludes what 
this study has revealed about cleavages in Finland.  
 
6.1. Major findings of the study  
This study focused extracting the effect of social structural positions on values 
and attitudes and detecting how they have affected the party choice of the Finnish 
voters in the parliamentary elections in the 21st century. Thereby the Finnish 
cleavage structure was detected. The analysis was done by applying a threefold 
definition of a cleavage and by examining the effects between different variables 
with statistical analyses. According to the cleavage definition, cleavages arise 
when members of social structurally-defined groups disagree on certain matters 
with other groups and share a set of political values and attitudes, which is 
primarily reflected in voting for a party that represents these group-based 
interests (Bartolini & Mair 1990, Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995). This study 
entailed five research questions. Table 6.1 and the following discussion 
summarize the answers to those questions.  
First, this study identified the relevant social structural cleavage bases in 
Finland. Native language, type of residential area and occupational class form the 
most solid cleavage bases. The linguistic identity, rural/urban identity and class 
identity are still relevant in the Finnish electorate in the 21st century. 
Denomination, gender, education and age cohorts were regarded as more recent 
relevant cleavage bases but their importance is less established.  
Second, four similar value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in 2003, 
2007 and 2011 through principal component analysis: 1. Economic right and 
authority dimension 2. Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 3. 
Sociocultural dimension 4. European Union dimension. The first two dimensions 
reflect the old issues in Finnish politics while the sociocultural and EU-
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dimensions, reflect primarily the newly politicized issues that have become 
increasingly conflictual in the 21st century in Finland.  
Third, the overall effect of social structural positions on the values and 
attitudes of the electorate is rather modest. Social structural variables explain only 
around one tenth of the variance. Despite this, several social positions have a 
clear-lined effect on some of the value/attitudinal dimensions.   
Fourth, the effect of social structural position and values and attitudes on 
voters’ party choice was diverse. The impact of being a Swedish-speaking Finn on 
voting for the Swedish People’s Party is overwhelming. Living in a small 
municipality, especially in a rural one, being an agricultural entrepreneur and 
supporting regional and socioeconomic equality strongly explain voting for the 
Centre Party. Living in a metropolitan area, being a higher professional or a 
manager, having a university level education and having economic right and pro-
EU attitudes are the most important determinants for voting for the National 
Coalition Party. Being a blue-collar worker or a routine non-manual employee, 
having a low educational level, belonging to the oldest age cohort and supporting 
socioeconomic equality explain strongly a vote for the Social Democrats. Voting 
for the Left Alliance is explained by being a blue-collar worker, not belonging to 
the church and by de-emphasizing economic right and authority –related values 
and supporting socioeconomic equality.  
Vote for the True Finns is explained by being by being a blue-collar worker or 
a routine non-manual employee, having a low education and by opposing the EU 
and liberal sociocultural values. Living in the Helsinki metropolitan area, being a 
woman, having a high social status and belonging to the youngest age cohort and 
having liberal sociocultural values explain a vote for the Green League. Belonging 
to the main church and being a woman and supporting economic right and 
authority values and opposing the EU are the strongest explanatory factors for 
voting the Christian Democrats.    
Fifth, building on the previous findings some of the conflicts were categorized 
as cleavages and some as possibly emerging cleavages. Three conflicts are 
regarded as old, established cleavages, namely the language cleavage, the cleavage 
based on the type of residential area and the traditional class cleavage.  
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The first of these established cleavages concerns primarily the voters of Swedish 
People’s Party while the second concerns the voters of Centre Party, Coalition 
Party and partly the Green League. The classic class cleavage reflected in the 
regional and socioeconomic equality dimension concerns in turns the blue-collar 
voters of the Left Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, the agricultural 
entrepreneur voters of the Centre Party and higher professional and manager 
voters of the Coalition Party. The conflict with the most potential as a cleavage is 
the one based on social status (occupational class and education) and it is 
reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. It concerns the voters of the True 
Finns, Green League and Coalition Party. Conflicts based on denomination and 
gender have a more limited potential as possibly emerging cleavages. 
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6.2 Implications and contribution of the study 
The results of the study show that cleavages, following the threefold cleavage 
definition, still exist in contemporary Finland. The cleavage structure still partly 
reflects the old basis of the Finnish party system and the old sources of conflict 
between parties and voters. More importantly, this study has identified a few 
potentially emerging cleavages that go well along with the change in the party 
system that has taken place in recent decades. Hence, this study challenges the 
conception that potential, new cleavages are no longer based on social structure 
(see Deegan-Krause 2007, 541). 
The threefold cleavage á la Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Knutsen and 
Scarbrough (1995) is a heavy apparatus to analyze cleavage structure since there 
has to be steady and strong linkages between all three cleavage elements. 
Moreover, socialization processes should also maintain the cleavages over time. 
When the concrete common interests of social structural groups, explicated in 
the form of values and attitudes, are taken into account, the approach can, 
however, reveal, which group-based conflicts are more penetrating in society 
than others.  
Whereas the previous Finnish studies have not analyzed the connection 
between social structural positions and values/attitudes when analyzing party 
choice (see Pesonen et al. 1993; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2005, 
2008: Grönlund & Westinen 2012), this study explored the connections between 
all these cleavage elements. Moreover, by treating both old and new cleavage 
bases simultaneously and by also including a whole spectrum of value/attitudinal 
dimensions in the analysis, the study explored mechanisms that have largely been 
largely ignored also in comparative literature on cleavages. The previous studies 
have mainly focused on verifying the strength of single cleavages or treated 
cleavages empirically almost merely in terms of social structural positions and 
party choice. (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 2009; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & 
De Graaf 1999; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2010; Stubager 2010; 
Evans & de Graaf 2013).   
The general contribution of this study is as follows. The study reveals that 
single strong connections can be found between the cleavage elements, namely 
social structural positions, values and attitudes and vote for a party that 
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represents the common interests. Indeed, some linkages between group-based 
interests and parties proved to be so persistent that they do not verify the general 
pattern of weakened party-voter ties, discovered in the literature. However, the 
overall effect of social structural positions on the identified value/attitudinal 
dimensions was not impressive and there is much else affecting party choice than 
social structural positions and values and attitudes. Franklin and colleagues 
(1992, 2009) stated that when coming to the 1990s, the voters had released 
themselves from the straightjacket of social structure, thus resulting in more 
unpredictable voting behavior. In the same vein, it can be argued that the voters’ 
interests, reflected in their values and attitudes, are not, at least in Finland, 
dictated by their social structural characteristics.  
The results also show the diversity in the values and attitudes of voters 
belonging to a certain social structural group. Nevertheless, some patterns were 
sufficiently strong to form a basis for group-based interests that were also present 
in party choice. It was also confirmed, according to the expectations, that social 
structural positions deriving from old cleavage bases were also reflected more 
visibly in the old dimensions (economic right and authority and regional and 
socioeconomic equality), whereas social structural positions stemming from new 
cleavage bases were reflected more in the new dimensions (sociocultural and EU).  
It is important not to undermine the fact that the parties’ electorates are 
internally diverse. Due to the research setting in this study, the focus has been on 
finding those social structural characteristics and values and attitudes that are 
common for the voters of each party.  A study on the 2011 parliamentary election 
(Westinen & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2015) reveals, however, that the voter profile of 
each party is not that homogenous. Certain blocs that divide the electorates of the 
parties also internally can be identified when also the second party preference is 
taken into account 90  
                                                            
90 Moreover, the parties in the parliament are internally split in ideological terms. Paloheimo, 
Reunanen and Suhonen (2005) discovered in the context of the 2003 parliamentary election that the 
MP’s could be reshuffled into new parties based on their answers in a voting advice application. 
Some MP’s deviated significantly from the average opinions on political issues inside their own 
parliamentary group. This phenomenon is fueled by the Finnish electoral system, which encourages 
to intra-party competition and which allows political diversity inside the candidate lists (see 
Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Arter 2014). 
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The results show that some parties, most prominently the Swedish People’s Party 
and the Centre Party, are still strongly rooted to social structure. Despite these 
two examples, the dichotomy to old parties that are anchored to social structure 
and to new parties that are anchored to values and attitudes does not get 
empirical evidence. This would be in accordance with the shift from social 
structure to values and attitudes (Thomassen 2005a; Dalton 2008), which has 
enabled the emergence of new parties in political systems.  
Furthermore, this study contradicted for example Paloheimo’s (2008) 
dichotomy to structure-based parties and value-based parties in Finland. For 
example, the electoral support of the Green League, a party founded in 1987, was 
anchored to practically all social structural bases while values and attitudes also 
play an important role in the electorate of the Green League. The Coalition Party, 
which is an old established party, could be categorized as a party that has an even 
more distinctive profile in terms of values and attitudes. They had a major 
independent role in explaining a vote for the Coalition Party. 
Moreover, this study showed that the left-wing parties are not anchored to 
social structural groups to the same extent as the parties in the center-right. The 
populist True Finns Party fights partly for the same social structural voter groups 
as the traditional left-wing parties but this study shows how the blue-collar voters 
of the True Finns are realigned with new kinds of values, channeling their voice 
through sociocultural and EU-issues. The limited importance of social structure 
in explaining a vote for the traditional left-wing parties, which have historically 
been strongly anchored to social structure, matches also the wider West 
European context (see Franklin et al. 2009). In contrast, the independent effect of 
values and attitudes on choosing the True Finns is striking. The value basis of the 
voters of a populist party has proved to be much more important than the 
structural base in general (see Mudde 2007), which matches also the True Finns 
despite having a voter base among those with ‘lower’ social status which has 
common interests in the sociocultural and European Union dimensions.  
  What is then the contribution of this study regarding the identified 
established cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages? First, by building on three 
parliamentary elections in 2003–2011, this study identified which established 
cleavages seem most stable, which are under pressure and which conflicts the 
volatile 2011 election brought upfront. Since the True Finns is involved in the 
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new social status -based conflict that has the most potential to emerge as a 
cleavage, the significance of the 2011 landslide victory cannot be underestimated 
in the scope of cleavage structure. The success of the True Finns has continued 
even after the 2011 election: the party gained the second most seats in the 2015 
parliamentary election. The True Finns at the same time challenged old cleavage 
stability (most notably, the loyalty of blue-collar voters) and brought upfront new 
conflicts that either supplement or partly replace the old cleavages. 
Second, one could argue that detecting cleavages based on native language, the 
type of residential area and occupational class does not bring an added value to 
the things we already know of cleavages in Finland (see e.g. Paloheimo & 
Sundberg 2005). However, each of the old cleavages has some aspects that have 
not been noticed in previous studies. Most importantly, they deal with the 
research strategy chosen here. As language has been classified as an obvious and 
straight-forward social structural base affecting party choice, the values and 
attitudes of the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking voters have been left without 
attention. This study shows that the Swedish-speaking people not only develop 
more positive attitudes toward the language issue but they are also more sensitive 
to minority interests (sexual minorities and immigrants) in general. This is why it 
can be considered as a sound party strategy from the Swedish People’s Party to 
promote all kinds of minority issues (see Swedish People’s Party 2011). It was also 
shown that since native language plays such an immense role in the electoral 
support of the Swedish People’s Party, adding values and attitudes gives almost 
no extra value in terms of explaining a vote for the party. Obviously, the linguistic 
cleavage concerns a small part of the electorate, although it is of utmost 
importance for the voters of the Swedish People’s Party. 
Third, the identification of a threefold cleavage based on residential area 
implies that tensions no longer revolve around rural and urban residents. Rather, 
the interests of the residents in rural and small municipalities are in conflict with 
the interests of residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area. This tension revolves 
around centralization and decentralization, which has become a major topic in 
Finland, and sets the Centre Party and Coalition Party against each other. In 
addition, the metropolitans differ in this regard also from the residents in urban 
environments outside the metropolitan area. Accordingly, the Centre Party has 
indeed significant support also in large towns outside Southern Finland. Hence, 
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this study argues that a rural-urban division is too crude in cleavage terms. The 
presence of such a cleavage can also be regarded as an important explanation of 
why the Centre Party has remained as one of the main parties. It has been able to 
rely on residents in rural and small municipalities and politicize the issues 
concerning regional politics. The cleavage is fairly pervasive, as the voters of two 
big parties, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are involved in it.  
Fourth, the concrete interests in the class cleavage have also largely either been 
taken for granted or they have not been considered at all. By deploying the 
threefold cleavage definition, this study showed that it is not obvious what the 
interests of the different occupational classes are. An illustrative example is the 
case of blue-collar workers. The interests of the blue-collar workers voting for the 
traditional left-wing parties, the Social Democrats or Left Alliance, are reflected 
first and foremost in supporting a redistributive state, while the interests of blue-
collar voters of the True Finns are primarily reflected both in opposing 
sociocultural diversity and postmaterialist values as well as in opposing the EU 
and further integration inside the EU. Hence, this study identified a classic class 
cleavage that revolves around ‘old issues’ that have to do with the role of the 
welfare state and a possibly emerging class cleavage that revolves around issues 
belonging to the newly politicized dimensions (cf. van der Brug & van Spanje 
2009; Bornschier 2010). It is then justified to talk about the ‘old proletariat’ and 
‘new proletariat’ in the Finnish electorate, with differing interests and differing 
party preferences.  
In addition, the continued unity of agricultural entrepreneurs in their 
common interests and in their loyalty toward the Centre Party emphasizes the 
historical perspective since the triangular model that revolves around the 
tensions between blue-collar workers, farmers and higher professionals/managers 
(upper class), with their traditional party loyalties could still be detected. The 
routine non-manual employees update the model by belonging to the same 
corner as blue-collar workers and they are set against the higher 
professionals/managers. It is then interesting to note that the voters of the parties 
that built the welfare state, the SDP and the Centre Party, continue to support a 
state that takes care of its citizens through redistributive and decentralizing 
politics. They stand in opposition to the higher professionals and managers 
voting for the Coalition Party. This is in accordance with the present ideology of 
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the Coalition Party, that emphasizes a more efficient and competitive way of 
handling the economy as a whole, and the public sector in particular. It has also 
spoken for scale benefits instead of decentralized solutions (see e.g. National 
Coalition Party 2011). 
In terms of relative weight, the old class cleavage is still quite substantial since 
the Left Alliance and the SDP still rely on the blue-collar voters and the Coalition 
Party on higher professionals and managers and since the share of blue-collar 
SDP-voters and higher professional voters of the Coalition Party is quite high. 
However, the electoral support of the Centre Party does not rely on agricultural 
entrepreneurs to any great extent even though they still comprise a large 
proportion of party members (see Jutila 2003). Furthermore, the traditional class 
cleavage is not as pervasive as it used to be, as the share of blue-collar voters, and 
especially farmers, has decreased in the population and as the party loyalty of 
blue-collar voters has become more split (cf. Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005). In 
addition, the emerging status-based cleavage is at the time being significant in 
terms of relative weight since the opposites in the EU-dimension, the Coalition 
Party and the True Finns are both large parties. Due to generational replacement, 
the significance of liberal-postmaterialist Green League-voters with social status 
is not likely to decrease in the sociocultural dimension where they are set against 
the True Finns. 
This study has also contributed to the discussion on education replacing class 
in the cleavage structure. Education and class explain values and attitudes in quite 
the same manner, since there was coherence between the ‘lower’ classes and the 
low-educated and ‘upper’ classes and the highly educated. Actually, education 
explains the values and attitudes of the electorate slightly better than occupational 
class. However, education has not taken over class in party choice explanations. 
The triangular class-based model is still valid since the class-based interests are 
reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension that handles 
mostly the role of state in redistributing wealth. The new conflicts are based more 
unequivocally in both class and education and they are reflected in sociocultural 
and EU dimensions. Here it is not just a question of wealth; it is also a question 
about sociocultural identity and what is also conceived as a cultural  threat or 
identity threat to those with low social status and as a possibility to those with 
high social status. (cf. Stubager 2010).  
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Fifth, it has not been previously widely discussed whether a denominational 
cleavage could emerge in Finland. This study has shed light on the clear value gap 
between the members of the Evangelic Lutheran church and those who do not 
belong to any church or religious community. This gap concerns traditional 
moral values and authority and it is furthermore manifested in deviating party 
preferences. However, there is a severe problem in illustrating a possibly 
emerging cleavage by applying the threefold cleavage definition with the available 
data. The share of people belonging to the main church is overwhelming in the 
electorates of the Centre Party and Coalition Party and the shares do not deviate 
that much from the total share of main church members in the whole electorate. 
Moreover, these parties do not build on their party profiles on denomination. 
Instead, the existence of the Christian Democrats can be argued to be based on a 
niche conflict between extremely religious voters and non-believers. 
Sixth, even though the gender gap in voting behavior has been studied 
previously in Finland, it has not been analyzed whether gender has potential as a 
cleavage base. Gender is not as important a base for political conflict in Finland 
as it is, for example, in Sweden (see Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013), but it has some 
potential to become a cleavage that is reflected in the sociocultural dimension. 
However, neither the electoral support of the Green League or the True Finns is 
extremely skewed to women or men. 
Seventh, in terms of age cohorts, this study primarily sheds light on how 
generational replacement is likely to change the focus in the dimensionality in the 
electorate. It has not been previously explicated that younger generations put less 
emphasize on redistributive and decentralizing the welfare state or that they also 
cherish less the ideals associated with economic right and authority. At the same 
time, the issues associated with the sociocultural dimension are neither cherished 
more by the younger generations than by the older ones. In single issues, such as 
gay rights, the youngest generation is more liberal, but the youngest generation 
does not have a postmaterialist orientation that would differentiate significantly 
from other generations. Moreover, despite the expectations of younger 
generations being more open to EU integration than the older ones, this study 
does not show such pattern. This may imply that the EU has not been able to 
deliver the benefits it was supposed to deliver for the young EU-citizens.  
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In addition, in terms of electoral research in Finland, this study has also 
underlined the problematics concerning data. The National Election Studies have 
been conducted in Finland only from 2003 onwards and the questions included 
have been only partly consistent in time. The questions on political issues, 
measuring values and attitudes, have been included in the drop-off 
questionnaires, which unfortunately lowers the N significantly in studies 
deploying these questions. Pooled data solution was used to mitigate the low N 
problem in this study. Based on the experiences, the 2015 National Election Study 
placed some of the questions pertaining to values and attitudes in the face-to-face 
mode.   
 
Implications of the results for the Finnish party system 
 
The study implicates that the nature of the Finnish party system cannot be 
understood without cleavages despite the documented general downward trend 
in the significance of social structure in explaining party choice. As Karvonen 
(2014, 23) reminds us, parties are institutionalized conflicts: parties bring people 
together to steadily defend their interests and viewpoints against other groups of 
people that have the opposite interests. This traditional thought still applies to 
Finland where parties do not come and go depending on single scandals and 
depending on their political leaders, for example.  
The continued presence of institutionalized cleavages partly explains why the 
old large parties, the Centre Party, the Coalition Party and the Social Democratic 
Party, continue to thrive, albeit admittedly to a lesser extent than during their 
golden era. Class and residential area cleavages have the biggest importance for 
these parties. Also the Left Alliance, with Communist roots, leans partly on the 
traditional class cleavage. Moreover, the linguistic cleavage explains the 
persistency of the Swedish People’s Party.   
The emergence of potential new cleavages is in accordance with the change in 
the Finnish party system. When electoral competition revolves around new social 
structural positions or value/attitudinal dimensions and when also the ‘old’ social 
structural positions, such as occupational class, are reflected in more recently 
politicized political issues resulting in a possible realignment in the electorate, it 
gives space for new parties to challenge the old ones. This was witnessed 
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strikingly in the 2011 earthquake election. This study illustrates how the two 
newest parties, the True Finns and the Green League are each other’s opposites, 
both in terms of social structure and in terms of values and attitudes. Lastly, the 
Christian Democrats can be argued to be stabilized around moral conservative 
voters, albeit its significance in the Finnish party system is rather limited.  
On the basis of electoral results, there seems to be certain saturation in terms 
of the amount of relevant parties that are represented in the parliament. The 
representatives of the same eight parties have been chosen to the parliament from 
2003 to 2015. The variety of social structural groups and values and attitudes 
represented by the contemporary parties in the parliament explains why Finland 
remains a system with eight parliamentary parties rather than four parties, for 
instance. Some parties have their electoral support more strongly rooted in social 
structure than others, but each party has its core clientele and each party has its 
own nuances in its ideological profile, which can be seen in the values and 
attitudes in the electorate. There is hence a clear structure- and value-based 
demand for eight parties in the present political context. 
Moreover, in the long run, the Finnish parties have been capable of handling 
several conflictual issues without falling into permanent internal fractions that 
would change the basic character of the party system (Karvonen 2014). Of the 
eight parliamentary parties, four parties were already represented in the 
parliament in the 1920s. The Christian Democrats has been presented 
continuously since the 1970s, the Green League entered the parliament in 1987 
election, the Left Alliance in 1991 election and the True Finns in 1995. The last 
two were founded as successor parties.   
 
A unique Finnish cleavage structure? 
 
As studies containing all the relevant social structural bases and value/attitudinal 
dimensions have been rare in the cleavage literature, direct comparisons cannot 
be made between Finland and other West European countries on the basis of this 
study. However, the results point out some patterns, which have been found in 
other West European countries and other patterns, which illustrate the specialty 
of the Finnish case. 
 250 
 
This study implicates that there is a diverse cleavage structure in Finland: there 
are three old and established cleavages, one emerging cleavage with notable 
potential and two conflicts with limited cleavage potential. Especially in terms of 
value/attitudinal orientations, the voters of certain parties can be on the same 
side in some dimension, while in others they can be on the opposite sides. This 
tendency affects the co-operation between parties. Historically, compromises 
have been sought between the socialists (the SDP and the Communists), 
agrarians (the Agrarian League) and the commercial-urban side (the Coalition 
Party). Nowadays, the relations are even more complex since there are more 
parties thriving on new kinds of conflicts and since the True Finns has become a 
major force. This pattern matches the wider frame since ecological and especially 
the nationalist-populist parties have changed the nature of co-operation in the 
West European party systems (see Gallagher et al. 2011).  
On the ground of cleavage structure in Finland, the prerequisites for two 
opposite party blocs to be formed are weak. Moreover, the dimensionality in the 
values and attitudes in the electorate does not revolve around any single super 
dimension, such as the left-right dimension (see Thomassen 2005a) or even 
around socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions (see e.g. van der Brug & van 
Spanje 2009; Hooghe et al. 2010). Despite the multiplicity of conflicts, the Finnish 
parties have been able to co-operate in government and they have had the will to 
overcome cleavage-based differences. This has led to political compromises in 
government that may be difficult for the voters to understand (see Karvonen & 
Paloheimo 2005; Karvonen 2014).  
The eccentricity of the Finnish party system is that even though the 
ideological differences between voters are rather clear-cut, the parties have been 
extremely willing to enter into almost any government coalition (with some 
exceptions, like the True Finns in 2011). The government coalition that was 
formed in 2011 included eventually the most left-wing party, the Left Alliance 
and the most right-wing party, the Coalition Party. In addition, the coalition 
entailed the Green League and the Christian Democrats, whose electorates have 
almost nothing in common in ideological terms. Eventually the Left Alliance and 
the Green League left the government in 2014 and the government period 2011–
2015 was extremely difficult due to the ideological differences. In 2015, mutual 
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agreement of a government coalition was found between the Centre Party, the 
National Coalition Party and the True Finns.   
The strong presence of a cleavage based on the type of residential area is a 
particularly striking feature of the Finnish case. In many other West European 
countries, the rural-urban cleavage had a small importance to the voters and 
parties to begin with or its significance has decreased drastically (Gallagher et al. 
2011, 283–284). In Finland it has evolved from a cleavage between mainly 
agricultural interests and urban-commercial interests into a cleavage that sets the 
voters in small communities against those living in the Helsinki metropolitan 
area. Furthermore, as a reminisce of the old cleavage structure, the tension 
between agricultural entrepreneurs, loyal to the Centre Party and higher 
professionals and managers voting for the Coalition Party, overlaps with the 
cleavage based on the type of residential area. As noted, these tensions have not 
prevented the parties from co-operating in government.  
The tension in regional equality and decentralization is present in Norway 
(see e.g. Aardal 2007b) but not in other Nordic countries (see Bengtsson et al. 
2013, 149–177). In contrast to Norway, there is a major party in Finland (the 
Centre Party), whose ideological core is in a decentralized society. The Finnish 
Centre Party has consciously and actively propagated for a strategy in which the 
thought of decentralization is central (see Kääriäinen 2002). As regards to the 
linguistic cleavage, the exceptionality lies in the extremely homogenous voting 
behavior of the Swedish-speaking Finns in voting for the Swedish People’s Party 
and in the power which the Swedish People’s Party has had since it was in every 
government between 1976 and 2015.  
Another distinctive feature in the Finnish cleavage structure is the appearing 
absence of a sharp left-right polarization in issue opinions. A socioeconomic left-
right dimension could not be detected based on the voters’ opinions on political 
issues. The voters can place themselves in a consistent way to the general left-
right scale but the peculiarity lies in the pattern that many voters support both 
issues associated with the political right and issues associated with the political 
left. At the same time, one can support a broader public sector, a more even 
distribution of wealth, bigger tax cuts and stand for entrepreneurship and 
market-driven solutions in economy. Simply put, a share of the voters want to eat 
their cake and still have it left since in surveys they are not obliged to make a 
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choice between tax cuts and encompassing welfare services. The prospects of a 
classic socioeconomic left-right-dimension to occur on the basis of data would 
undoubtedly be better if the voters had to make a choice between the afore-
mentioned policies.  
However, it would be an overstatement to regard Finland as exceptional in 
cleavage terms. The class cleavage pits blue-collar voters voting for left-wing 
parties against upper class voters voting for the major right-wing party. The 
sociocultural and EU dimensions are found also elsewhere in Europe and the 
social structural groups and parties associated with promoting and opposing 
sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism and further integration inside the EU 
are the usual suspects. The politicization of these dimensions explains why the 
Greens has established itself in the party system in the long run and why the 
nationalist-populist True Finns was able to make such a rapid rise from being a 
small party to the third biggest party in parliament in 2011 
The new sources of political conflict in the sociocultural and EU dimensions 
indicate how issues, such as immigration, ethnic and sexual minorities and EU-
integration, which are debated all around Western Europe, concern also Finland. 
The continued crisis inside the EU and the asylum seeker floods from outside of 
the EU underline the common topics of political debate in different parts of the 
continent. The diffusion of conflictual topics is a prime example of how Finland 
is more and more influenced by external determinants. Globalization can also be 
seen as a threat to the Nordic model of social welfare or the future of Finnish 
agriculture (Karvonen 2014, 151) thus unbalancing the old class cleavage. It is 
difficult to evaluate whether comparatively the most distinctive cleavage, the 
cleavage based on the type of residential area, persists when new type of political 
topics gain salience.   
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The prospects of the Finnish cleavage structure 
 
The cleavage structure is obviously of a dynamic nature. Even though cleavages 
have longevity as their essential feature, societal and political circumstances 
change in time’s course. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2011) state that a change in 
cleavage structure can occur as a result of change in social structure, of change in 
collective value basis or as a result of change in organizational structure. 
As regards to the future prospects of cleavage structure, the societal change 
(rise of educational levels, change in economic structure, migration to urban 
areas, increasing resignation from the church) and looming change in values and 
attitudes (first and foremost in the de-emphasis of regional and socioeconomic 
equality due to generational replacement) means that the parties have to adapt 
their party strategies accordingly. In the long run, the Finnish parties have 
showed ability to update their ideological profile and electoral strategies.  
The internal migration from rural and small municipalities to urban areas, 
especially to the Helsinki metropolitan area means that the cleavage based on the 
type of residential continues to be a highly debated topic in Finnish politics. The 
Centre Party aims at keeping the whole country populated, while the Coalition 
Party and also the Green League have been for a more dense community 
structure. For the Centre Party, the internal migration represents a challenge as 
the voters from small communities often have to deal with cross pressures (see 
Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Campbell et al. 1960) when moving to urban environments: 
their loyalty towards the Centre Party is put into test. The Centre Party has gone 
through a major, successful transformation from a farmers’ party into a centrist 
party that appeals to people in sparsely populated Finland. At times, such as in 
2011 election, the electoral loyalty of these people has decreased. The continued 
politicization of the issues in regional and socioeconomic equality dimension is of 
utmost importance for the Centre Party. On the other hand, keeping 
decentralization issues upfront limits the party’s growing potential in the most 
populated cities in Southern Finland.  
On the other hand, the share of Swedish-speaking voters has sunk only 
marginally in recent years and the linguistic identity of the Swedish-speaking 
voters and their loyalty toward the Swedish People’s Party are hardly threatened. 
The Swedish People’s Party has little reason to change its electoral strategies 
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drastically even though it aims to represent itself as the representative of all 
minorities (the party has inter alia recently recruited indigenous Sami people to 
be candidates for the Swedish People’s Party in Lapland).  
Of the old cleavages, the traditional class cleavage seems to be under the most 
pressure to change. The share of agricultural entrepreneurs continues to decrease, 
which undermines their importance as the Centre Party’s clientele in numbers. 
However, due to the party’s agrarian roots and due to the special importance of 
agriculture for keeping the countryside alive, the agricultural interest is most 
likely to retain as an important aspect of the Centre Party’s party profile. 
Due to the turbulence in industry and the economy, the blue-collar workers 
may channel their resentment by opposing increasingly integration, immigration 
and specific minority interests. The SDP and the Left Alliance have to balance 
with their electoral appeal. They have to decide to which extent they either 
continue to hold on to their traditional workers’ party images with close ties to 
labor unions or widen it to a more centrist (the SDP) or a red-green image (the 
Left Alliance). The parties on the political left have indeed been at pain to 
crystallize their strategies. The SDP has long had a downward electoral trend 
(with the exception of the 1990s) and it has lost its appeal both among blue-collar 
workers and professionals. The attempts to transform the SDP into a broadly 
appealing middle-class party while still holding on its close ties with the labor 
union have not succeeded in the 21st century. The biggest challenge deals with the 
aging electorate and the fact that the SDP-voters are holding onto a strong 
redistributing state, which is under pressures in economically hard times. The 
electorate of the Left Alliance seems to be a mix of old and new; of old voters and 
blue-collar workers holding onto a strong redistributing state and of younger 
voters who emphasize for example minority issues. The long-term plan might be 
to have an even more underlined red-green party image while appealing to the 
‘new, disadvantaged proletariat’ (see Left Alliance 2011).  
An obvious threat to these parties is the True Finns, which may lift the 
importance of the potential new class cleavage, reflected in sociocultural and EU 
dimensions. Moreover, as older generations value a strong decentralizing and 
redistributing state, it is likely that on a long time-span the traditional regional 
and socioeconomic equality issues become less important in class-based conflicts. 
They may be replaced by themes that underline the unsecure nature of present 
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working life and by different conceptions that the younger generations have 
concerning the relationship between employers and employees (Hoikkala et al. 
2006).  
It is too soon to evaluate whether the recent volatility in the Finnish electorate 
is a sign of dealignment or realignment. However, the results concerning the 
possibly emerging cleavages in this study show that there is at least clear potential 
for enduring party-voter alignments to be forged along new cleavage lines (thus 
speaking for realignment). This in turn could lead to a long-lasting change in the 
party system. The success of the True Finns, which continued in the 2015 
parliamentary election, might not be of temporary nature. There is potential for it 
to be anchored on occupational and educational groups, (possibly on gender) and 
on the issues in the sociocultural and EU dimensions. Hence, future studies are 
needed to verify the realignment thesis.  
Without the upsurge of the True Finns, the Finnish cleavage structure could 
indeed be considered as extremely stable, reflecting the old conflicts and the 
heritage of the Lipset-Rokkan-model. The volatile 2011 election showed that 
there has been a pervasive linkage between high volatility and cleavage change 
Bartolini and Mair (1990, 212) in Finland in the 21st century. Even though party 
membership and party loyalty have been decreasing in the biggest old parties 
(SDP, Centre Party and Coalition Party), they were fairly successful in blocking 
the electoral challenges from other parties until the 2010s. In the 2011 election, 
the cleavage system did not any longer produce a ‘full closure’ (see ibid. 38–41).  
In the 2011 election, the True Finns managed to build up a stable and 
encompassing party organization with full candidate lists in each electoral district 
with capacity to reach to larger voter segments (Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). 
The politicization of new issues, such as EU-integration, immigration and 
minority questions and the longing for ‘good old times’ when the nation could 
take care of its citizens has enabled the True Finns to present such alternatives in 
these issues that deviate much from the alternatives the other parties propose. 
Attitudinally, there has been demand for a conservative, nationalist, anti-
immigrant party already before the 2010s but there was no credible party 
alternative on the supply side by then (see Kestilä 2005, 2006). The old cleavage 
structure could persist as long as the old left-wing parties could satisfy the blue-
collar voters and routine non-manual employees with their political agenda. 
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Pertaining the challenges that globalization has brought upfront in the labor 
market and for the nationalist ideals, the True Finns has managed to attract the 
disappointed blue-collar voters and routine non-manual employees with their 
anti-immigration and anti-EU policies. The True Finns has simultaneously 
managed to channel the disappointment to the welfare state that according to the 
party (The True Finns 2011) is incapable of solving present problems while it still 
makes possible the abuse of social welfare services.   
While the Centre Party and the Social Democrats have built on the 
“redistributing and decentralizing state” –themes, the third old major party, the 
Coalition Party (and its voters) has aimed towards a more dynamic, competitive 
and market-orientated state. Furthermore, as a pro-EU party, the Coalition Party 
is involved more intensively in a new conflict over the direction the EU than the 
other old parties. The major threat for the Coalition Party is that it may be 
considered as being solely the representative of well-off, high social status urban 
people benefitting from EU-integration and market economy. Indeed, the 
electoral strategy of the Coalition Party has been to tone down class conflicts and 
ideological conflicts in order to appeal on a broader electoral base (see National 
Coalition Party 2007, 2011).   
The Green League as well as the True Finns would undoubtedly benefit if the 
potentially emerging new cleavages would establish themselves. They are each 
other’s opposites in occupational class/education-based and gender-based 
conflicts, both of which are reflected in the sociocultural dimension. The 
continued debate on both sexual and ethnic minorities and especially 
immigration, which has remained intensive also after the 2011 election, means 
that much of the public attention is owed to new issues. Traditional issues, such 
as economy, continue to be important but nowadays also immigration belongs to 
the topics that have been given much attention in the media (see Välimäki 2012). 
The number of immigrants and the numbers of asylum seekers in Finland is in 
absolute terms low in European comparison but their number is increasing (The 
Finnish Immigration Service 2015), which has increased also the political 
importance of immigration. The ability of the True Finns to politicize minority 
issues may have to do only partly with what the current situation is in Finland 
and more with the conceived potential threat that immigration outside from 
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Western world presents for those who cherish nativism. The Green League on the 
other hand has been a prominent propagator for a multicultural Finland.   
In addition, the Green League and the Left Alliance could benefit if the 
resignation from the Evangelic-Lutheran church continues to grow as a protest to 
the conservative stands of the church, since non-church members tend to back 
these parties. In turn, the Christian Democrats could mobilize religious voters by 
propagating for a counter reaction for the decay in respect for traditional moral 
values, just as it did in its early phases as a counter-reaction to cultural 
radicalism. 
Even though age cohorts were not identified as a cleavage base, generational 
replacement affects party popularity and value/attitudinal climate in the 
electorate. The effect of generational replacement is built-in in many other 
changes, such as urbanization and rise in educational level. Perhaps the biggest 
change deals with attachment to political parties. The two oldest age cohorts in 
this study (born before 1960) have been socialized into voting and to acquire a 
party identity to a greater extent than the younger generations (see Grönlund et 
al. 2005a; 2005b). This tendency represents the biggest threat to those parties that 
lean in their support on older generations, especially the SDP.   
  To conclude, cleavages have undergone big changes during the modern party 
system. However, there is not a revolution in cleavages. They are just more 
modern versions of the old cleavages since the occupational structure has 
changed, the degree of urbanization has increased and the concrete interests that 
the social structural groups possess have changed (see Karvonen 2014, 23–29). 
Evidently also political agenda and media may act as catalysts of cleavage 
change (cf. Gallagher et al. 2011). The political parties try to affect and control the 
political agenda in their favor in terms of topical issue questions. However, also 
other institutions and factors, such as trade unions, non-governmental 
organizations, media and international relations affect the agenda. In the 2011 
parliamentary election, the EU-issues clearly rose on the top of agenda. It seems 
that the media is more and more interested in handling the new conflictual 
issues, such as immigration, sexual and ethnic minorities and the EU because 
they seem to evoke the most intense party political conflicts in the 2010s in 
Finland (see Pernaa 2012; Välimäki 2012). Hence, the power of media in affecting 
what is on top of political agenda may in the long run lift upon certain conflicts 
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while toning down others (see Herkman 2011). The old parties, such as SDP and 
the Centre Party, whose core is in the old cleavages, may have it difficult to cope 
with the ‘new’ agenda which often handles issues, such as immigration and the 
EU, that they do not have a clear stand on.  
Exploring the connections between social structural positions, values and 
party choice is becoming more and more intriguing since volatility and sudden 
upheavals in party support are becoming more and more common, such as in 
Finland in 2011 and elsewhere in Western Europe in the 2010s. Whether 
reshuffles in the West European electorates form patterns that re-emerge in 
subsequent elections and whether these patterns can be described as cleavages is 
one task for future cleavage research. 
Furthermore, regarding the Finnish case, interesting shifts in party support 
continued in the 2015 parliamentary election. The Centre Party, which was the 
Prime Minister Party in 2003–2011, had record low support after the 2011 
election in the polls (13.2 percent). In 2011, many loyal voters punished the party 
for unsuccessful politics and the trust toward the Centre Party seemed to have 
eroded (Mattila & Sundberg 2012; Westinen 2012). However, in the 2015 
parliamentary election, the Centre Party regained position as the largest party 
from opposition, with 21.1 per cent of the vote. Moreover, the SDP obtained a 
record low support in parliamentary elections – gaining merely 16.5 per cent of 
the vote. The same pattern applies for the other left-wing party, the Left Alliance, 
which got all-time low result with 7.1 per cent of the vote. The True Finns proved 
that its success in the 2011 earthquake election was not merely a one-off protest 
against the old parties. The True Finns became the second largest party in 
number of seats in the parliament in 2015 with 17.7 per cent of the vote and it 
seems to have stabilized itself in the party system to some extent. Although the 
2015 parliamentary election has not been included in this study, the success of 
the True Finns gives reason to assume that the identified emerging cleavages in 
this study indeed have potential to evolve as stable cleavages. That the True Finns 
also entered the government coalition after the 2015 election for the first time in 
its history should be seen as a sign of a further institutionalization of the party 
that has grown remarkably quickly.  
Hence, many significant things are happening in party support in the 2010s in 
Finland. The conventional pattern that the incumbent Prime Minister party is 
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punished is apparent. When the voters are disappointed at the Prime Minster 
party, they are alert to seek alternatives and turn to a major party that is the most 
trusted in running the economy, improving employment and bringing hope to 
the voters. This is an especially important factor in economically hard times: the 
need for big reforms in Finnish society concerning the public sector and the 
economy might only accentuate the shifts in power every fourth year since there 
is no easy way out of solving the problems in a way that would satisfy the voters.  
 
6.3. Concluding remarks  
Franklin (2009, 649, 654) has argued that cleavage research has ended up in 
examining the niches in electoral behavior: that cleavage research is unable to 
take into account the dynamics in present electoral behavior and party systems. 
He claims that scholars in the world of cleavage politics research appear strangely 
alienated from real-world and the divisions that are the subjects of their enquiry. 
He claims that the tragedy of cleavage research is that its practitioners do not 
appear much interested in explaining why the world is the way it is.  
This study has analyzed the contemporary cleavage structure in Finland and 
paid attention to the political context. It has contributed toward explaining which 
cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages condition the ties between voters and 
parties. By doing this, it has partly explained why the contemporary Finnish 
parties have a quite stable place in the party system, why and how the old parties 
have been challenged by new parties and which conflicts are behind the 
emergence of newer parties. Despite having a limited impact in terms of 
explaining party support with social structural positions and values and attitudes, 
cleavages help to understand how parties fight for the votes and how the voters 
structure their loyalties. In this sense, cleavage research is still a relevant area of 
study. That being said, it must be remembered that there is much else affecting 
the voting behavior than social structural positions and values and attitudes. 
Evidently, the cleavage approach cannot capture for example the last-minute 
dynamics that have to with campaigning effects and topics in the political agenda 
that have nothing to do with issues attached to cleavages. Issues, such as election 
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finance scandal (see Mattila & Sundberg 2012), may affect the electoral fortunes 
of a party dramatically.  
The applicability of the threefold cleavage definition in empirical analyses can 
be questioned. The definition is partly unsatisfactory in explaining the dynamics 
in the electorate and party sphere, at least in the Finnish case. The demands that 
the threefold cleavage have to fulfill in the strong and steady linkages between 
social structure, values and attitudes and a vote for a party that represents the 
group-based interests at hand, not to mention the aspect of socialization, are 
demanding especially in times when party loyalty is decreasing. One could feel 
tempted to take cleavage theories further with less rigid requirements, reinterpret 
them and find new ones in value orientations, as Enyedi (2008) suggests. 
However, one of the merits of cleavage as an analytical tool has been precisely 
that not every conflict in the electoral arena is treated as a cleavage (Bartolini & 
Mair 1990; Deegan-Krause 2007). If stable value orientations without any 
structural basis sufficed as cleavages, then the distinction to Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) theorem would be clear-cut. If the significance of social structure keeps on 
decreasing, such strategy may be better to analyze the party-voter ties. Moreover, 
in party systems, where the electoral volatility is extremely high and where the 
whole basis of the party system is shaken by a severe disappointment to those 
who hold the power, the whole cleavage approach may not be so fertile. Elections 
that have been affected by the Euro crisis and mismanagement of economy in the 
respective country (especially in Southern Europe) might demand another kind 
of an approach (see e.g. Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2013).   
The obvious challenge in categorizing conflicts as cleavages is at any case the 
aspect of longevity and the preconditions of this longevity. When the cleavages 
are understood in the conventional sense, they should arise from some feature 
that sustains the sort of durability in party support that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
were trying to explain. Socialization processes are the only such source of 
durability ever demonstrated in this sphere. Admittedly, the socialization 
processes, where individuals grow into a certain way of thinking via their milieus 
and via members of the same social structural group, are increasingly challenging 
to extract. Hence, cleavage studies run the risk of not having an explicit logic of 
how conflicts evolve as enduring cleavages. In a society characterized by 
increasing social mobility, migration and interaction and multiplicity of 
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identities, there are weaker grounds for people to become involved in cleavage 
politics in such a way that was still predominant at the time when Lipset and 
Rokkan published their theorem. During that time of mass parties, class society 
still flourished and the ties between voter groups, parties and interest 
organizations were strong, into the extent that this era could be called the era of 
political camps (see Mickelsson 2007). Nowadays, the camps do not exist in this 
sense. Nevertheless, this study has shown that certain structural barriers in voting 
behavior are still more rigid than others.  
One task for future cleavage research, applicable in any political context, 
would be to track down who are the voters that punish their parties in power and 
who are those who turn to an opposition party. Are those who punish the party 
in power, the members of a key social structural group of this party, ready to give 
up their traditional loyalties? Are those who turn to support the major opposition 
party unified more by social structural characteristics or by values and attitudes, 
as the notion of the shift from social structure to issues would suggest? Or are the 
members of social structural groups with common attitudes and values moving 
more permanently from party to another, hence contributing to realignment and 
new cleavage-like constellations? It is also possible that these voter groups are not 
unified at all by certain social structural characteristics or values and attitudes 
and that they switch party from election to another if they bother to vote; they 
just want political change towards better times. The last scenario would speak for 
a dealignment pattern instead of voters realigning to new parties.   
This study focused on the common interests of social structural groups in the 
form of values and attitudes. Hence, group-based identity and especially group 
consciousness were not much considered. In terms of cleavage research it would 
be intriguing to be able to analyze the relative strength of social structural 
position and values and attitudes in dominating one’s political identity. To what 
extent do citizens think of themselves as belonging to certain social structural 
group? To what extent do they feel a sense of belonging because of values 
irrespective of social their background? Or does social identity from childhood 
home sustain with having effects on voting behavior even if the current social 
structural position is different from family background? A crucial aspect in more 
nuanced research on cleavages is hence high-quality data, which enables analyses 
that dig deep to the electorate. This study showed the need for a more 
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comprehensive set of social structural variables and especially the need for a 
broader set of questions reflecting the values and attitudes in the electorate. With 
an extensive set of relevant variables, the analyses reach a more nuanced and a 
more robust picture of the party-voter ties. The national election studies 
obviously play here a big role since they are conducted in accordance with the 
parliamentary elections.  
Furthermore, future studies on cleavages could combine social structural 
characteristics and focus on analyzing to which extent political conflicts are 
overlapping in social structural positions. For example, the values and attitudes of 
young, highly educated women and young low-educated men, as well as their 
party preferences, could be contrasted with each other.  This study treated the 
social structural positions separately in order to detect the effect of single social 
structural positions on values/attitudes and party choice while keeping the scope 
of the study limited enough. Critical for future studies is, to invent theoretical 
frameworks and methodological choices that further contribute toward capturing 
what is going on in the electorate and party system. 
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Appendix 
 
List of the parties representing different party families in Table 2.3 
SD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (AUT), Parti Socialiste, Socialistische Partij Anders 
(BEL), Socialdemokraterne (DEN), Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, (FIN), Parti Socialiste 
(France), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (GER), Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 
Dimokratiki Aristera (GRE), Alþýðuflokkurinn, Samfylkingin (ICE), Labour Party (IRL), 
Democratici di Sinistra, Partito Democratico (ITA), Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei 
(LUX), Partit Laburista (MLT), Partij van de Arbeid (NED), Arbeiderpartiet (NOR), Partido 
Socialista (POR), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (SPA), Sveriges socialdemokratiska 
arbetareparti (SWE), Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse (SUI), Labour 
Party (UK). 
  
CONS: Konservative Folkeparti (DEN), Kansallinen Kokoomus (FIN), Union pour un mouvement 
populaire (FRA), New Democracy (GRE), Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn (ICE), Fianna Fáil (IRL), Forza 
Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Il Popolo della Libertà (ITA), Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei 
(LUX), Høyre (NOR), Partido Social Democrata, Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular 
(POR), Partido Popular (SPA), Moderaterna (SWE), Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei 
Schweiz/Parti bourgeois démocratique suisse (SUI), Conservatives (UK). 
 
CD: Österreichische Volkspartei (AUT), Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, Centre démocrate 
humaniste (BEL), Kristendemokraterne (DEN), Kristillisdemokraatit (FIN), Christlich 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands /Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (GER), Fine Gael (IRL), 
Centro Cristiano Democratico, Cristiani Democratici Uniti, Unione di Centro (ITA), Chrëschtlech 
Sozial Vollekspartei (LUX), Partit Nazzjonalista (MLT), Christen-Democratisch Appèl, 
ChristenUnie (NED), Kristelig Folkeparti (NOR), Kristdemokraterna KD (SWE), 
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz/ Parti Démocrate-Chrétien (SUI).    
  
LIB: Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten, Mouvement Réformateur (BEL), Radikale Venstre, 
Ny Alliance (DEN), Union pour la Démocratie Française, Mouvement démocrate, Nouveau Centre 
(FRA), Freie Demokratische Partei (GER), Frjálslyndi flokkurinn, Björt framtíð (ICE), Progressive 
Democrats (IRL), Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita (ITA), Demokratesch Partei (LUX), 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, Democraten 66 (NED), Venstre (NOR), Folkpartiet 
(SWE), Die Liberalen,/Les Libéraux-Radicaux, Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz/Parti vert'libéral 
(SUI), Liberal Democrats (UK).  
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NAT-POP: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (AUT), Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie, Vlaams Belang, bertair, Direct, Democratisch, Front national (BEL), Dansk Folkeparti 
(DEN), Perussuomalaiset (FIN), Front national, Mouvement pour la France (FRA), Laikós 
Orthódoxos Synagermós, Anexartitoi Ellines (GRE), Lega Nord (ITA), Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Partij 
voor de Vrijheid (NED), Fremskrittspartiet (NOR), Sverigredemokraterna (SWE), Schweizerische 
Volkspartei/ Union démocratique du centre (SUI), UK Independence Party, British National Party 
(UK).      
    
COM & NEW LEFT: Enhedslisten, Socialistisk Folkeparti (DEN), Vasemmistoliitto (FIN), Parti 
communiste français, Front de gauche (FRA), Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, Die Linke 
(GER), Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (GRE), 
Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (ICE), Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani, La Sinistra – L'Arcobaleno, Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, (ITA), Lénk (LUX), 
Socialistische Partij (NED), Sosialistisk Venstreparti, (NOR), Bloco de Esquerda, Coligação 
Democrática Unitária (POR), Izquierda Unida (SPA), Vänsterpartiet (SWE).  
      
GREENS: Die Grünen (AUT), Groen, Ecolo (BEL), Vihreä Liitto (FIN), LV, Europe Écologie – Les 
Verts (FRA), Bündnis 90/die Grünen (GER), Green Party (IRL), Déi Gréng (LUX), GroenLinks 
(NED), Miljöpartiet (SWE), Grüne Partei der Schweiz/ Les verts – Parti écologiste suisse (SUI).  
  
CENT: Venstre (DEN), Suomen Keskusta (FIN), Framsóknarflokkurinn (ICE), Senterpartiet 
(NOR), Centerpartiet (SWE).  
 
ETH-REG: Svenska folkpartiet i Finland (FIN), Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, Convergència i Unió (SPA), Scottish National Party (UK).   
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Appendix Table 1. The social structural characteristics (%) of Finnish voters in the 
self-administered questionnaire of FNES-studies.  Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011 
 
  2003 (N) 2007 (N) 2011 (N) 
Native language 
      
Finnish 95 (709) 95 (979) 95 (763) 
Swedish 5 (37) 5 (51) 5 (40) 
Type of residential area             
Rural municipality 17 (128) 18 (182) 16 (125) 
Small municipality 16 (121) 16 (169) 17 (134) 
Town 42 (213) 45 (462) 51 (409) 
Metropolitan area 25 (184) 21 (218) 17 (135) 
Occupational class             
Blue-collar workers 28 (182) 28 (263) 25 (161) 
Routine non-manual employees 23 (151) 23 (215) 27 (126) 
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural) 7 (48) 9 (83) 5 (36) 
Lower professionals 15 (102) 16 (156) 19 (178) 
Higher professionals and managers 27 (178) 24 (231) 24 (161) 
Denomination             
Evangelic-Lutheran 81 (609) 82 (814) 77 (601) 
Does not belong to any church 13 (91) 18 (178) 23 (179) 
Gender             
Male 48 (360) 47 (485) 49 (394) 
Female 52 (386) 53 (545) 51 (409) 
Age cohorts 
      -1944 29 (213) 31 (315) 23 (181) 
1945-1959 30 (221) 29 (298) 32 (254) 
1960-1975 25 (188) 22 (225) 24 (193) 
1976- 17 (123) 19 (192) 22 (175) 
Education             
Primary 26 (196) 24 (246) 19 (152) 
Vocational 28 (207) 32 (327) 28 (227) 
Upper Secondary 28 (211) 25 (257) 26 (206) 
Polytechnic 8 (56) 6 (66) 10 (79) 
University 10 (74) 13 (135) 17 (138) 
All  100 (746) 100 (1030) 100 (803) 
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Appendix Table 2 The impact of social structural groups on the economic right 
and authority dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS 
regression. Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011 
 
  Pro economic right and   
  authority        
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant –0.62***   –0.61***   –0.51***   
Native language ᵅ       
Swedish 0.55** .17 0.12 .15 0.27 .16 
Type of residential area ᵇ            
Rural municipality 0.10 .12 0.12 .11 0.15 .13 
Small municipality 0.11 .12 0.09 .11 0.13 .13 
Town 0.03 .10 0.04 .09 0.06 .10 
Education ᶜ              
Primary 0.34* .14 0.34** .11 0.44*** .12 
Vocational 0.37** .14 0.38** .11 0.33** .11 
Upper Secondary 0.22 .14 0.35** .11 0.36*** .11 
Polytechnic 0.13 .18 0.16 .16 0.20 .14 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  –0.47*** .11 –0.39*** .09 –0.46*** .09 
any church        
Gender ᵉ            
Female 0.21** .08 0.04 .07 –0.01 .07 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.36** .12 0.57*** .10 0.61*** .11 
1945-1959 0.28* .12 0.28** .10 0.22* .10 
1960-1975 0.09 .12 0.22* .10 0.12 .11 
R² 0.09   0.09   0.13   
Adjusted R² 0.07   0.08   0.12   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. 
Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975. 
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Appendix Table 3 The impact of social structural groups on the regional and 
socioeconomic equality dimension with education included as a social status 
variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011 
 
  Pro regional and socioeconomic   
  equality   
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant –0.82***   –1.08***   –0.85***   
Native language ᵅ 
      
Swedish 0.01 .16 –0.45** .14 0.13 .17 
Type of residential area ᵇ              
Rural municipality 0.64*** .12 0.65*** .10 0.54*** .13 
Small municipality 0.46*** .12 0.50*** .11 0.56*** .13 
Town 0.23** .09 0.47*** .08 0.33** .10 
Education ᶜ              
Primary 0.31* .14 0.31** .11 0.03 .12 
Vocational 0.30* .14 0.59*** .11 0.06 .12 
Upper Secondary 0.22 .14 0.39*** .11 –0.02 .11 
Polytechnic –0.14 .18 0.25 .15 0.08 .15 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  0.01 .11 0.05 .08 0.07 .09 
any church            
Gender ᵉ 
 
      
Female 0.04 .08 0.17** .06 0.12 .07 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.54*** .11 0.45** .09 0.64*** .11 
1945-1959 0.42*** .11 0.32*** .09 0.58*** .10 
1960-1975 0.10 .12 –0.01 .10 0.26* .11 
R² 0.13   0.17   0.11   
Adjusted R² 0.11   0.15   0.09   
N 700   908   710   
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. 
Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975. 
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Appendix Table 4 The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural 
dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression. 
Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011 
 
  Pro cultural diversity and postmaterialism 
  (sociocultural dimension)     
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 
Constant 0.46**   –0.11   0.29* 
Native language ᵅ      
Swedish 0.55*** .15 0.34* .15 0.66*** 
Type of residential area ᵇ          
Rural municipality 0.07 .11 –0.10 .11 –0.19 
Small municipality –0.07 .11 –0.27* .11 –0.31* 
Town 0.03 .09 –0.10 .09 –0.21* 
Education ᶜ            
Primary –0.84*** .13 0.06 .12 –0.39** 
Vocational –0.87*** .13 0.04 .11 –0.38** 
Upper Secondary –0.10 .13 –0.09 .11 –0.30** 
Polytechnic –0.15 .16 –0.15 .16 –0.36* 
Denomination ᵈ            
Does not belong to  0.03 .10 0.13 .09 –0.01 
any church         
Gender ᵉ        
Female 0.20** .07 0.41*** .07 0.44*** 
Age cohorts ᶠ           
-1944 –0.15 .11 0.08 .10 0.10 
1945-1959 –0.16 .11 –0.06 .10 –0.12 
1960-1975 –0.18 .11 –0.18 .11 –0.17 
R² 0.20   0.07   0.12 
Adjusted R² 0.18   0.06   0.10 
N 700   908   710 
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. 
Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975. 
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Appendix Table 5 The impact of social structural groups on the European Union 
dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression. 
Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011 
 
  Pro European Union        
          
 2003 std.er. 2007 std.er. 2011 std.er. 
Constant 0.37***   0.47**   0.44**   
Native language ᵅ 
      
Swedish 0.23 .16 0.16 .15 0.43** .16 
Type of residential area ᵇ              
Rural municipality –0.44*** .12 –0.33** .11 –0.15 .13 
Small municipality –0.14 .12 –0.32** .11 0.03 .13 
Town –0.19* .09 –0.22* .09 0.12 .10 
Education ᶜ              
Primary –0.21 .14 –0.49*** .11 –0.62*** .12 
Vocational –0.08 .14 –0.41*** .11 –0.68*** .11 
Upper Secondary 0.01 .14 –0.31** .11 –0.54*** .11 
Polytechnic 0.09 .17 –0.07 .14 0.03 .14 
Denomination ᵈ              
Does not belong to  –0.06 .11 –0.22* .09 –0.20* .09 
any church          
Gender ᵉ 
         
Female –0.31*** .07 –0.17** .06 –0.17* .07 
Age cohorts ᶠ             
-1944 0.20 .12 0.50*** .10 0.18 .11 
1945-1959 –0.04 .11 0.12 .10 0.22* .10 
1960-1975 –0.02 .12 0.06 .10 –0.08 .11 
R² 0.07   0.10   0.12   
Adjusted R² 0.05   0.08   0.10   
N 700   908   710   
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. 
Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975. 
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Appendix Table 6 The connection between social structural position and party 
choice. Chi²-values. 
 
Year Social structural base Chi²  
2003 Native language 480.1*** 
 2007 
 
662.8*** 
 2011 
 
511.2*** 
 2003 Type of residential area 101.5*** 
 2007 
 
140.4*** 
 2011  132.5*** 
 2003 Occupational class 164.8*** 
 2007 
 
190.6*** 
 2011 
 
152.3*** 
 2003 Denomination 71.7*** 
 2007 
 
60.8*** 
 2011  70.5*** 
 2003 Gender 7.9 
 2007 
 
20.5** 
 2011 
 
23.8** 
 2003 Age cohorts 70.8** 
 2007 
 
117.7*** 
 2011  86.3*** 
 2003 Education 119.1*** 
 2007 
 
117.7*** 
 2011 
 
97.4*** 
  
Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Appendix Table 7. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2003 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2003. (1) 
 
Social structural position Party choice             
 
SDP CENT COA LEFT GREENS CD SWE All 
Native language                  
Finnish 98 99 99 98 100 98 11 95 
Swedish 2 1 1 2 0 2 89 5 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Type of residential area  
        Rural municipality 13 34 10 6 9 6 20 16 
Small municipality 17 23 11 20 9 14 23 17 
Town 46 30 43 47 39 52 35 41 
Metropolitan area 23 13 35 27 43 29 23 25 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Occupational class 
        Blue-collar workers 35 24 16 44 12 28 5 26 
Lower grade white-collar workers 20 16 14 27 29 39 27 21 
Small employers (incl. agricultural)  4 29 9 0 2 4 14 11 
Lower professionals 20 9 19 11 24 15 27 16 
Higher professionals and managers 22 22 42 18 33 13 27 25 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Denomination  
        Evangelic-Lutheran 83 96 92 61 79 100 96 87 
Does not belong to any church 17 4 8 39 21 0 4 13 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gender  
        Male 51 49 54 53 39 30 44 48 
Female 49 51 46 47 61 70 56 52 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Age cohorts  
        -1944 38 25 30 26 9 30 33 29 
1945-1959 32 34 23 36 17 26 30 30 
1960-1975 21 25 26 28 43 23 22 26 
1976- 9 16 20 10 30 21 15 16 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix Table 7. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2003 parliamentary election (%).Source FNES 2007. (2). 
 
Social structural position Party choice             
 
SDP CENT COA LEFT GREENS CD SWE All 
Education                 
Primary 31 27 14 29 6 26 19 24 
Vocational 31 29 16 35 22 25 15 26 
Upper Secondary 24 24 37 25 46 30 33 30 
Polytechnic 7 4 19 2 11 9 11 9 
University 8 15 13 8 15 9 22 12 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix Table 8. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2007 parliamentary election (%). Source FNES 2007 (1). 
 
Social structural position Party choice               
  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All 
Native language           
Finnish 98 99 99 99 100 96 97 16 95 
Swedish 2 1 1 1 0 4 3 84 5 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Type of residential area           
Rural municipality 12 36 8 16 9 11 23 16 17 
Small municipality 19 21 12 16 21 7 13 18 16 
Town 49 35 45 50 53 37 48 37 44 
Metropolitan area 20 8 35 18 18 45 18 29 23 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Occupational class 
         
Blue-collar workers 41 27 7 48 36 13 19 15 26 
Lower grade white-collar workers 24 17 18 20 23 23 33 18 20 
Small employers (incl. agricultural)  4 20 11 6 13 5 6 6 10 
Lower professionals 17 20 15 7 10 16 22 18 16 
Higher professionals and managers 15 17 49 20 19 44 19 44 28 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Denomination           
Evangelic-Lutheran 81 91 87 56 77 74 89 85 82 
Does not belong to any church 19 9 13 44 23 26 11 15 18 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gender           
Male 51 48 51 56 55 31 35 47 48 
Female 49 52 49 44 45 69 65 53 52 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Age cohorts  
         
-1944 43 32 42 30 12 8 25 40 33 
1945-1959 33 28 23 45 18 23 42 26 29 
1960-1975 14 24 21 14 36 34 23 18 21 
1976- 10 17 15 11 33 35 10 16 16 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix Table 8. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2007 parliamentary election (%). Source FNES 2007. (2) 
 
Social structural position Party choice               
 
SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All 
Education                   
Primary 28 20 16 26 29 27 10 21 22 
Vocational 37 37 19 47 27 17 40 18 31 
Upper Secondary 24 23 32 8 32 19 30 26 24 
Polytechnic 5 7 10 3 9 11 5 8 7 
University 6 14 24 16 3 26 15 26 16 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix Table 9. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2011 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2011. (1).  
 
Social structural position Party choice               
  SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All 
Native language  
         Finnish 96 100 99 96 99 100 96 19 95 
Swedish 4 0 1 4 1 0 4 81 5 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Type of residential area 
         Rural municipality 8 36 8 18 14 4 15 23 14 
Small municipality 20 23 10 15 18 9 15 19 17 
Town 61 34 57 47 50 50 44 35 50 
Metropolitan area 11 8 25 20 19 38 26 23 19 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Occupational class 
         Blue-collar workers 34 19 8 27 34 13 8 5 23 
Lower grade white-collar workers 29 26 17 25 31 21 35 19 26 
Small employers (incl. agricultural) 3 16 6 3 4 3 8 5 6 
Lower professionals 17 25 21 17 18 21 15 24 19 
Higher professionals and managers 17 15 49 27 12 42 35 48 26 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Denomination 
         Evangelic-Lutheran 75 90 88 55 71 64 91 96 77 
Does not belong to any church 25 10 12 45 29 36 9 4 23 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gender 
         Male 55 54 45 44 59 29 33 46 49 
Female 45 46 55 56 41 71 67 54 51 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Age cohorts 
         -1944 32 28 32 15 19 2 19 19 24 
1945-1959 35 32 32 42 31 11 44 27 32 
1960-1975 23 17 18 29 30 31 30 35 24 
1976- 10 23 19 14 20 56 7 19 20 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix Table 9. The share of social structural groups in the electorates of 
Finnish parties in the 2011 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2011. (2).  
 
Social structural position Party choice               
 
SDP CENT COA LEFT TF GREENS CD SWE All 
Education                   
Primary 19 19 14 20 21 18 7 11 24 
Vocational 28 31 17 38 35 9 26 12 32 
Upper Secondary 33 24 21 20 31 16 22 46 24 
Polytechnic 7 16 15 5 5 16 7 8 7 
University 12 10 33 18 8 40 37 23 16 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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How are party choice, social structural positions and 
values and attitudes of the voters entangled with 
each other? The author examines these questions in 
this study by analyzing data from the 2003, 2007 and 
2011 Finnish National Election Studies. The results 
indicate that the overall effect of social structural 
positions on values and attitudes is rather weak. 
Despite this, a few rather strong connections be-
tween these two cleavage elements were identified 
and they were also linked to voters’ choice of a party. 
The study implies that old cleavages, those based on 
native language, type of residential area and occupa-
tional class, still exist. The political parties involved in 
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lized the party system but also renewed the Finnish 
cleavage structure. The conflict that is based on both 
occupational class and education and that is reflected 
in the sociocultural and EU dimensions has the most 
potential to evolve as a cleavage.
By assessing the contemporary cleavages in Finland, 
the study highlights the similarities and dissimilari-
ties in the conflict structure between Finland and 
other West European countries. The cleavages based 
on native language and the type of residential area 
accentuate the specialty of the Finnish case while the 
potentially emerging cleavages accentuate the more 
common sources of contlict.
ISBN 978-951-765-800-3
9 789517 658003
